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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. October 1912.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(10109.)

F.O. 413

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PART 44.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

AFFAIRS OF MOROCCO.

56

January to June 1912.

F.O. 413/56 ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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87	Sir F. Bertie ..	32 Tel.	28,	Franco-Spanish negotiations (see No. 85). Spanish Ambassador states that France has withdrawn her demand for Cap de l'Eau, but claims a shifting northward of frontier as marked on Delcassé map in 1904, so as to give France valley of Warga. French Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to Spanish Ambassador that France would proceed to negotiation and declaration of protectorate, reserving questions of Spanish zones and Tangier for ulterior consideration	108
88	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	29	26,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is very despondent respecting French territorial demands (see No. 81), especially Warga valley, which Spain would be bound to resist. Has suggested that a commission might be sent to examine exact geography of the districts in dispute	108

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89	To Sir M. de Bunsen	22	Mar. 5, 1912	Tangier. Conversation with Spanish Ambassador, who said it would be easier for Spain to negotiate with France about territorial concessions if Tangier question could be dealt with at the same time. Sir E. Grey replied he was waiting to discuss question with Sir R. Lister	109
90	Mr. White ..	5 Tel.	7,	Attitude of Sultan. Consul MacLeod reports Sultan hostile to French protectorate, and talking of abdication. No trouble anticipated at French Legation	110
91	Sir F. Bertie ..	119	7,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Outburst of ill-humour in French press against Spain on account of delay in negotiations. Summarises articles lecturing and threatening Spain. Great irritation has been caused in France by firmness of Spain in refusing territorial concessions demanded by France and in refusing to allow any French interference in Spanish zone	110
92	Consul MacLeod ..	2 Confidential	Feb. 24,	Sultan. Reports audience with Sultan, who was in very good humour. He seemed very keen to know what was being arranged about Tangier, and asked a number of questions about British methods of self-government	111
93	Mr. White.. ..	40	Mar. 1,	Slavery in Morocco. Refers to No. 72. Is not aware of any British-protected person holding a slave, but it is possible some semsars residing in the interior may do so. Is addressing a circular to consuls, reminding them of rule that no British-protected person may hold slaves, and proposes if any such cases are reported to withdraw British protection from the offender	112
94	„ „ ..	44	2,	Casa Blanca port works. Refers to No. 71. Transmits letter from M. de Billy to doyen, suggesting that contracts should be made at once without adjudication for blocks of masonry, caissons, and necessary plant. Reports conversation with M. de Billy as to whether contracts should be made by Public Works Department or Adjudications Commission. Transmits circular from Dutch Minister, making it clear that latter is the proper body ..	112
95	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	34	5,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Reports discussion with Minister for Foreign Affairs on various points at issue in connection with last French draft agreement ..	114
96	„ „ ..	35	5,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 95. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that attitude of French members of mixed commission respecting customs question was distinctly discouraging. French Ambassador is less concerned about customs question than about French territorial demands which Spanish Government are not prepared to grant. French Government are going to propose that customs duties on goods destined for consumption in one sphere shall accrue to the administration of that sphere, irrespective of port of entry ..	116

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97	To Sir F. Bertie ..	124	Mar. 11, 1912	Franco-Spanish negotiations. French Ambassador says negotiations are not making progress. French Government wish to propose that watershed between rivers running into Mediterranean and into Atlantic should be taken in principle as boundary between zones, and that delimitation of this boundary should be entrusted to a commission, and French Government would be glad if Sir M. de Bunsen would support this idea at Madrid. Sir E. Grey replied that he would discuss matter with Sir R. Lister and speak to M. Cambon again	117
98	„ „ ..	125	11,	Tangier. French Ambassador has asked for early answer to M. Poincaré's proposals (No. 59). Sir E. Grey replied he was waiting to see Sir R. Lister, and would do so as soon as possible	118
99	Notes by Sir E. Crowe	..	13,	Tangier municipality (see No. 59). Notes on Tangier municipality, stating principles on which scheme for municipality should be based	118
100	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	14 Tel.	14,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 81. Minister for Foreign Affairs has handed to French Ambassador Spanish reply to French territorial demands. Spain gives France left bank of Warga River, and presses for extension of her zone in north-east so as to include some Riff tribes. In southern Spanish zone Spain offers to cede hinterland only, retaining coast herself. M. Geoffray thinks latter offer will be rejected by French Government as entirely inadequate	122
101	To Mr. White ..	32	14,	Tangier municipality. Expresses appreciation of care and skill with which scheme enclosed in No. 79 has been prepared ..	122
102	Memorandum communicated to French Ambassador	..	15,	Tangier municipality. Memorandum communicated to French Ambassador, setting forth views of His Majesty's Government as to composition, powers, &c., of municipal council. Memorandum is based on No. 99	122
103	Mr. White.. ..	45	7,	Road dues at Mogador. Refers to No. 56. Transmits despatch from vice-consul at Mogador reporting abolishing of dues formally levied by Kaïds Hajji and Guellouli	124
104	„ „ ..	46	6,	Tangier municipality. Reports conversation with Spanish Minister, who fears that French authority will be supreme owing to State bank, &c., and that control will not really be international. He was in favour of fairly extensive zone if it was to be really international; if not, as restricted a zone as possible	125
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108	„ „ ..	20 Tel.	16,	Casa Blanca port works (see No. 94). Has pointed out to French Minister that proposal of Adjudication Commission to award at once contract for jetty, quay, and terreplein was contrary to agreement, and that these were not the three lots to which His Majesty's Government had given their consent. French Minister produced telegram from French Government to the effect that they were. Meeting of commission has been postponed to enable reference to be made to respective Governments	128
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122	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	18 Tel.	20,	Franco-Spanish negotiations (see No. 117). Spanish Government are ready to amplify concession offered in southern zone by including 90 kilom. of coast from Wady Mesa south, but they could make no further concession in northern zone. French Ambassador said this would not satisfy his Government	136
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127	Mr. White.. ..	54	15,	Situation at Marrakesh. Transmits despatch from Consul Madden reporting recent attacks on Europeans at Marrakesh. Does not attach much importance to incident. French Minister is minimising incident in his reports, but reports from south had lately been unsatisfactory, and French might have to take some action ..	138
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144	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	50	28,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. French views on Spanish territorial offers. French Ambassador is advising Spanish Government to abandon hopeless task of delimiting two zones by any hard and fast line. Recent Spanish losses in Riff have given rise to severe criticism of conduct of campaign in Spanish press	157

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147	To Sir M. de Bunsen	28	1,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Ambassador states that latest French reply takes matters no further, and he fears a deadlock	159
148	„ „ ..	29	1,	Tangier. Spanish Ambassador is entirely dissatisfied with French municipality proposals, and enquired whether His Majesty's Government thought that Spain could claim Tangier for Spanish zone. Ambassador was informed that His Majesty's Government were pledged to internationalisation of Tangier, and that if Spanish proposal were made it would only produce irritation	159
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150	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	51	Mar. 29,	Franco - Spanish negotiations. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs states that, pending a serious and formal reply from the French Government to last Spanish offers, Spain will abstain from making fresh suggestions. Has suggested to Minister for Foreign Affairs that district in question should first be surveyed by a commission *ad hoc*. Has discouraged idea which Minister for Foreign Affairs is fond of advancing—that Tangier should be included in Spanish zone and administered like other Spanish ports (see No. 148) ..	160
151	Sir R. Lister ..	27 Tel.	Apr. 3,	Protectorate treaty. Treaty on lines of Treaty of Bardo signed on 31st March. French chargé d'affaires now confirms news, though up to 2nd April he said no telegram reporting signature had been received	161
152	Mr. White.. ..	67	Mar. 28,	Allocation of customs duties between French and Spanish zones. Refers to Nos. 96 and 120. Points out that if principle recommended by French is adopted, no customs revenue would be left for Tangier, as nearly all imports are destined for the interior and exports come from beyond proposed municipal district	161
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159	Sir G. Buchanan ..	110	4,	Russian Legation at Tangier. Legation will be left in charge of a chargé d'affaires till French protectorate over Morocco has been definitely established	167
160	Sir F. Bertie ..	160	5,	Franco - Moorish protectorate treaty (see No. 158). Transmits text as published in "Figaro"	167
161	To Sir F. Bertie ..	172	9,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Transmits memorandum from French Ambassador to the effect that there has been a misunderstanding, and that contract for whole work must be allotted at once to the same contractor. In reply, substance of Nos. 131 and 134 has been communicated to M. Cambon	169
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166	To Sir F. Bertie ..	156 Tel.	13,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. He should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of No. 167, and urge them not to break off negotiations, in which case Spain would either ask for arbitration or appeal to Powers. Either step would be embarrassing	173
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182	To Sir M. de Bunsen	20 Tel.	19,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. French Government are willing to extend Ifni zone and agree respecting appointment of Khalifa, but they cannot withdraw demand for whole Warga valley. Enquires how Spanish Government would receive such a proposal	185
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195	Consul MacLeod ..	8	12,	Sultan's journey to Rabat. Court is to leave Fez for Rabat about the 18th to 20th April, and French mission a few days earlier. Movement to Rabat is much disliked both by Court and public, and fear is expressed that Sultan will be kept permanently there, and instead of reforming Moorish administration French will establish their own administration and annex country ..	193
196	Sir R. Lister ..	80	18,	Suppression of arms traffic at Fez. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod regarding complaints of Moorish and Jewish shopkeepers at proceedings of French military authorities. Soldiers are extorting money under threat of accusing shopkeepers of illicit traffic, and French instructor is alleged to have flogged a Jew in order to extort a confession	194
197	„ „ ..	81	18,	Protestant missions in Morocco. Protestant missions are said to encounter difficulties in Algeria and Tunis, and it would, therefore, be desirable to obtain assurances from French Government when they request British consent to Protectorate treaty ..	195
198	„ „ ..	82 Confidential	17,	General situation. Conversation with Spanish Minister respecting future administration of Spanish zone. Minister thinks he will be first High Commissioner, and he will find himself in constant opposition to military party in Spain. Minister fears that France will hold overwhelming position at Tangier in spite of internationalisation. Rival Sultan is reported to have been proclaimed in south, and situation at Marrakesh is very dangerous	196
199	„ „ ..	83	20,	Mutiny at Fez. News caused general consternation. Thinks disorders probable throughout the country. French are going far too quickly and exasperating the natives, and it is not only in military matters that they are showing want of judgment, *e.g.*, movement of Court to Rabat and proposed visit of Sultan to Paris	197
200	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	32 Tel. Confidential	27,	Warga. French Ambassador has telegraphed to Paris laying stress on danger of a rupture with Spain, and urging his own proposals (see Nos. 144 and 173) ..	198
201	„ „ ..	33 Tel.	28,	Warga. Refers to No. 200. French Government have replied to French Ambassador that they will await result of joint examination of last French proposal (see No. 194). French Ambassador thinks it desirable that French Government should be made to understand that His Majesty's Government consider last French proposal has no chance of acceptance	198
202	„ „ ..	61	26,	Warga. Refers to Nos. 186 and 190. Transmits text of letters exchanged between Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador	198

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No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
203	Sir F. Bertie ..	187	Apr. 27, 1912	Resident-general. Reports appointment of General Lyautey, with M. Gaillard as secretary-general	199
204	Note communicated by French Ambassador	..	29,	Appointment of General Lyautey as resident-general at Fez. Notifies appointment, which is due to recent grave events in Morocco. Resident will have most extended civil and military powers ..	200
205	Sir R. Lister ..	38 Tel.	28,	Appointment of French resident-general. French chargé d'affaires has communicated telegram from French Government to the effect that all diplomatic powers are transferred from French Legation at Tangier to resident-general at Fez. French agency is established at Tangier under provisional charge of M. de Billy	200
206	To Sir F. Bertie ..	185 Tel.	29,	Warga. Refers to No. 201. He should inform French Government that His Majesty's Government consider latest French proposals have no chance of acceptance by Spain, adding that though His Majesty's Government would greatly regret a rupture, they feel Spain has reached the limit of concessions. They would, however, be prepared to urge Spanish Government to accept proposal referred to in No. 200..	200
207	Sir F. Bertie ..	60 Tel.	30,	Warga. Refers to No. 207. Requests further instructions with regard to representations to be made to the French Government	201
208	„ „ ..	198 Tel.	May 1,	Warga. Refers to No. 207. Representations to French Government should be as stated in No. 206, adding that His Majesty's Government are ready to urge Spanish Government to accept a line following a ridge of hills just north of River Warga along that portion of it which approaches Fez, leaving Upper Warga to Spain	201
209	To Sir F. Bertie ..	211	1,	Powers of resident-general (see No. 204). M Cambon states that rising in Morocco had rendered it necessary to appoint a soldier and place diplomatic as well as military powers in his hand. But French Government had also appointed an agent in Tangier with whom foreign representatives could communicate	201
210	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	62	Apr. 29,	Warga valley. Reviews situation created by French demand for whole valley. Transmits formula for delimitation proposed by French Ambassador to Minister for Foreign Affairs on 26th April ..	202
211	Note communicated by French Ambassador	..	May 2.	Public works at Tangier. Requests explanation between apparent discrepancy in British note reserving public works to municipality (see No. 145) and letter to Mr. Norton to the effect that harbour works and railway might be adjudicated on by Moorish Government (see No. 75)..	204
212	Sir R. Lister ..	41 Tel.	2,	Appointment of resident-general. Refers to No. 205. French chargé d'affaires has been instructed to continue to treat all matters with diplomatic body during period of transition	204

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213	Sir R. Lister ..	42 Tel.	May 2, 1912	Reported abdication of Sultan. Sultan is reported to be abdicating in favour of his 8-year-old son. French Legation have no confirmation, but state that Sultan has been wishing to abdicate for some time. He has been told that if he does so his property will be confiscated and he probably will not be allowed to remain in Morocco	204
214	To Sir M. de Bunsen	40	2,	Tangier. Transmits correspondence, and requests that he will explain fully to Minister for Foreign Affairs views of His Majesty's Government	205
215	To French Ambassador	..	2,	Tangier. Transmits memorandum commenting on French draft municipality scheme enclosed in No. 130	205
216	To M. Cambon ..	..	2,	Appointment of French resident-general. Refers to No. 204. His Majesty's Government take notice of appointment. French Government will no doubt concur that until Franco-Moorish treaty is ratified and accepted by Powers, position of foreign representatives at Tangier and their mode of communication with Moorish Government must remain unaltered	208
217	To French Ambassador	..	2,	Responsibility for safety of foreigners in Morocco. Refers to No. 180. His Majesty's Government take note of communication from French Government, but they could not agree to any part of Morocco to which a clear treaty right of resort exists being entirely closed to British subjects	208
218	To Spanish Ambassador	..	2,	Tangier. Refers to No. 162. Transmits memorandum showing reasons for which His Majesty's Government cannot support arguments which Spanish Government propose to use in their reply to French Government, and memorandum showing views of His Majesty's Government on French draft (No. 130)	209
219	Sir F. Bertie ..	66 Tel.	2,	Warga. Refers to Nos. 206 and 208. Minister for Foreign Affairs will examine proposed compromise with every desire to meet British wishes. He will reply to His Majesty's Government before making any further communication to Spanish Government	213
220	To French Ambassador	Confidential	3,	Tangier. Refers to No. 215. Transmits memorandum on French scheme as communicated to Spanish Government (No. 218), and calls attention to omission therefrom of all reference to previous exchange of views between French and British Governments	213
221	Sir R. Lister ..	86	Apr. 27,	Casa Blanca harbour works (see No. 187). Conversation with M. Porché, who wishes that further small works should be submitted to *marché de gré à gré*. Has explained at length to M. Porché the annoyance of His Majesty's Government at the gross mismanagement of the matter and their objection to being blackmailed into further concessions	213

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222	Sir R. Lister ..	87	Apr. 27, 1912	Slavery in Morocco. Refers to No. 164. Mr. Mackenzie's statements are, as they were before, quite unreliable. Menebhi holds no slaves. Enquiries are being made as regards Shereef of Tamslocht ..	215
223	„ „ ..	88	29,	Rising at Fez. Transmits letter from Dr. Verdon, describing events and attributing all the blame to the tactlessness of the French. Appointments of General Lyautey as resident-general and M. Gaillard as secretary-general could not be better ..	215
224	Sir F. Bertie ..	192	May 5,	Warga. Refers to No. 219. Transmits instructions sent by M. Poincaré to French Ambassador in London to propose a formula for boundary in Warga valley. M. Poincaré hopes it will be approved by His Majesty's Government	218
225	Sir R. Lister ..	90	Apr. 30,	Rising at Fez. Reports receipt of delayed telegrams from Consul MacLeod examining causes which contributed to the rising. Situation at Fez is improving daily. Jewish quarter has suffered terribly, and subscriptions are being collected for their relief	219
226	„ „ ..	46 Tel.	May 7,	Situation at Fez. Telegram from Consul MacLeod, stating that all reports confirm Sultan's resolution of abdicating and leaving Fez. Religious service was held in honour of victims of rising, and General Moinier made most injudicious speech of a vindictive and threatening nature ..	220
227	„ „ ..	47 Tel.	8,	Sultan. Refers to No. 226. French chargé d'affaires states Sultan has been prevailed on not to leave for Rabat, but to await arrival on 24th May of French resident-general at Fez	220
228	To Sir M. de Bunsen	39 Tel.	8,	Warga. Transmits formula for delimitation of boundary, and enquires whether it would be accepted by Spanish Government	221
228*	Italian Embassy ..	..	8,	Consular jurisdiction in Spanish *presidios*. Suggests joint representations to Spanish Government with a view to inclusion of *presidios* in districts of foreign consuls on conclusion of Franco-Spanish negotiations	221*
229	Sir R. Lister ..	91 Confidential	6,	Rising at Fez. Substance of letters from Dr. Verdon. Rebel soldiers are being arrested daily and forty have been shot. Very bitter feeling prevails against French. Basha of New Fez is suspected of being implicated in rising. Sultan still anxious to abdicate and come and live at Tangier. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting Sid Taib Mokri's request for British protection	221
230	Memorandum communicated by French Ambassador	..	10,	Customs control between zones (see Nos. 96 and 152). Communicates formula with regard to collection of duties on goods passing from one zone to another, and invites views of His Majesty's Government on proposed establishment of internal customs control	222

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231	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	37 Tel.	May 10, 1912	Warga. Refers to No. 228. Minister for Foreign Affairs has submitted proposed formula to Council of Ministers, who ask for further details	223
232	To French Ambassador	..	10,	Public works at Tangier. Refers to No. 211. Explains that His Majesty's Government do intend to reserve for municipality call for tenders for public works. Apparent discrepancy between this intention and letter to Mr. Norton is due to use of words "Moorish Government," by which His Majesty's Government meant sovereign authority in the three zones as delegated to protectorate and municipal officials ..	224
233	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	38 Tel.	10,	Warga. Refers to No. 231. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that British suggestion, though not acceptable in its present form, showed France was adopting a more conciliatory attitude. He would accept a settlement based on tribal frontiers, but it would be difficult to apply this consistently	224
234	„ „ ..	69 Confidential	11,	Tangier. Refers to No. 218. Transmits memorandum containing preliminary Spanish observations on British memoranda. Two principal points are area to be assigned to municipal district and assimilation of Tangier customs to those at Tetuan and Laraiche	225
235	To Sir M. de Bunsen	40 Tel.	14,	Warga. Refers to No. 233. Transmits fresh formula for delimitation of boundary. He should express hope that Spain will accept proposal, as otherwise His Majesty's Government do not see what more they can do	227
236	To Sir R. Lister ..	60	15,	Customs control. Transmits copy of No. 230, and requests observations. System now proposed may be less cumbersome than one of refunds, but it will certainly give to smuggling	227
237	Sir R. Lister ..	99	11,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Transmits circulars and annotations of diplomatic body. Neither Compagnie marocaine nor Schneider have yet signed the contract. Is inclined to propose that present *marché de gré à gré* should be dropped and a general scheme embracing all the works should be drawn up and offered to adjudication	228
238	„ „ ..	100	12,	Marrakesh. News from Marrakesh is disquieting. Mennou, the Basha, is unable to maintain order. In the Rehamna anti-Makhzen force under Kaïd Abdsalem is increasing daily. French vice-consul has asked that a light column should be held in readiness to proceed to Marrakesh ..	231
239	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	41 Tel.	18,	Warga (see No. 240). King of Spain still hopes agreement may be reached, but Spain must have line of communication between eastern and western zones. Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that this is principal point at issue	232

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240	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	72	May 17, 1912	Warga. Transmits Spanish reply to British proposal made in No. 235. Spain will not consent to surrender riverain tribes unless bulk of tribe be established on left bank; and she insists on frontier being drawn so as not to cut essential line of military communication between eastern and western zones	233
241	French Ambassador..	..	19,	Responsibility for safety of foreigners in Morocco. Refers to No. 217. French Government never intended to suggest closing parts of Morocco to which British subjects have treaty right of resort, but only to divest themselves of responsibility	234
242	Sir R. Lister ..	50 Tel.	21,	Situation at Fez. Tribes east of Fez are united, and threaten to attack town. French troops numbering 5,000 are considered insufficient to deal with general tribal rising	234
243	To Sir F. Bertie ..	253	21,	Warga. Refers to No. 244. Has informed French Ambassador of approval of Sir A. Nicolson's suggestion (see No. 244), which meets difficulty in regard to dividing tribes. Suggestion might be further modified to meet Spanish demand for means of communication. Great thing was to find a formula to satisfy Spanish public opinion	234
244	To Sir M. de Bunsen	50	21,	Warga. Spanish Ambassador has been informed by Sir A. Nicolson that His Majesty's Government did not propose to take any further action in regard to Warga question. Sir A. Nicolson suggested that Spanish Government might accept last British proposal as a basis of negotiation conditionally on a joint commission determining that communications between eastern and western portions of Spanish zone were freely secured ..	235
245	To Sir R. Lister ..	66	23,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Refers to No. 237. Has carefully considered suggestion that *marché de gré à gré* should be dropped and a general scheme substituted. Thinks matter depends on whether or not first portion of works can be finished before the winter. If not, His Majesty's Government, who only consented on ground of urgency, would be justified in withdrawing their consent	235
246	Note communicated by M. Cambon	..	24,	Tangier municipality. French Government propose that scheme should be discussed at Madrid between British, French, and Spanish delegates. If His Majesty's Government agree, it would be desirable to give effect to the proposal as soon as possible	235
247	Sir R Lister ..	106	15,	Organisation of protectorate. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting general lines on which new régime is to be organised. Consul MacLeod strongly criticises scheme, which is not development of existing system but creation of a new one	236
248	Sir R. Lister ..	107	May 16, 1912	Attitude of Sultan. Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting Sultan's unsatisfactory state of health and his desire to abdicate. M. Regnault has persuaded him to await General Lyautey's	

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				arrival before taking any decision. If he resigns, Abdul Aziz would be most suitable successor, but it is doubtful if he would accept	237
249	„ „ ..	108	16,	Situation at Fez. Transmits despatches from Consul MacLeod, reporting issue of proclamation by General Moinier imposing a fine of 33,335*l.* on inhabitants of Fez on account of recent massacres. Notables have protested. Sultan is indignant at proclamation being issued in any name but his. It is to be hoped General Lyautey will show more tact than General Moinier	238
250	„ „ ..	109	18,	Right of French military authorities to try foreign subjects and protected persons by court-martial. Transmits memorandum by Consul MacLeod, and requests instructions	240
251	„ „ ..	111	19,	Situation at Fez. Things quiet in town. Tribes to the east of Fez much excited and threatening town	242
252	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	42 Tel.	25,	Warga (see No. 244). Spanish Ambassador in London has been instructed to submit further proposal to the effect that mixed commission should fix Warga frontier, line being drawn along heights overlooking right bank of river in such a way as to safeguard necessary Spanish military communications	242
253	Sir R. Lister ..	117	21,	Customs control. Refers to No. 236. Objections to line of internal control. Points out confusion and expense which would arise. No advantage whatever would be gained by Tangier	243
254	„ „ ..	53 Tel.	28,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Refers to No. 237. Public Works Committee have decided to offer three small works to *marché de gré à gré*. No work can be done this year on second section, adjudication on which is to take place on 20th June. Suggests withdrawal of this adjudication and substitution of a new adjudication in accordance with regulations for all the works required	244
255	To Sir M. de Bunsen	43 Tel.	28,	Warga (see No. 252). Transmits fresh formula endeavouring to reconcile Spanish and French views	244
255*	Sir R. Lister ..	54 Tel.	28,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Refers to No. 254. Doyen has not yet been officially informed of signature of contract, though it took place three weeks ago. Adjudications Committee have not yet received document	245*
256	„ „ ..	55 Tel.	29,	Tangier municipality. Refers to No. 234. Spanish proposal respecting extent of municipal district quite inadmissible. Tangier must be as absolutely independent of Spanish influence as of French, and Tangier customs officials should be international	245
257	„ „ ..	56 Tel.	29,	Fez (see No. 242). Attack on Fez resumed yesterday. Resident-general says he can hold town and line of communications, but can do no more	245

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258	Sir R. Lister ..	57 Tel.	May 30, 1912	Casa Blanca harbour works. Refers to No. 254. State engineer proposes construction of further small work by *marché de gré à gré*. Requests instructions ..	245
259	To Sir R. Lister ..	21 Tel.	30,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Refers to No. 254. Agrees with his views, and authorises him to insist on adjudication fixed for 20th June being withdrawn and a proper scheme substituted. His Majesty's Government will consent to *marché de gré à gré* for three works specified in No. 254	246
260	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	43 Tel.	30,	Warga. Refers to No. 255. Minister for Foreign Affairs not favourably impressed by latest British proposal. Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired respecting Tangier, saying that Spanish Government would not sign any convention without knowing how far municipal area would extend	246
261	Sir R. Lister ..	118	23,	Consular jurisdiction in Spanish *presidios*. Refers to No. 228*. If "consular jurisdiction" as understood in Morocco is meant, Spaniards are certain to refuse. If ordinary consular representation is meant, the proposal is excellent, especially as regards Melilla	246
262	„ „ ..	119	23,	Responsibility for safety of foreigners in Morocco (see Nos. 180 and 217). German Minister has informed M. de Billy that Germany holds France responsible for protection of German subjects in Morocco, notably the Mannesmann party at Tarudant. French have given some vague assurance to the desired effect	247
263	„ „ ..	121	26,	Situation in the soutl.. Disquieting news received respecting new pretender, "Hiba," who is said to be marching on Marrakesh. If this is true, Mannesmann party at Tarudant will be in a precarious position ..	247
264	„ „ ..	122	26,	Attack by French on M. Renchausen's farm. Negotiations still proceeding between French and German representatives. German Minister says whole affair was due to spite on the part of a French semsar. It is proposed that a joint commission should enquire into the affair. Reports arrest of German and Spanish semsars by French military authorities	248
265	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	44 Tel.	31,	Warga. Refers to No. 260. Spanish Ambassador in London has been instructed to submit a text which Spain would accept if France will give a reasonable radius to Ifni and accept certain financial proposals. French Ambassador is fairly satisfied with this reply	248
266	Note communicated by Spanish Ambassador	..	June 3,	Warga. Spanish formula referred to in No. 265	249
267	Sir R. Lister ..	60 Tel.	2,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Has acted on instructions in No. 259. French representative is excited, and maintains that adjudication cannot now be withdrawn. State engineer now agrees that some work could be done on second section, but this is doubtful	249

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268	To Sir M. de Bunsen	44 Tel.	June 3, 1912	Tangier. Municipality scheme is to be discussed at Madrid between representatives of Spain, France, and England. Instructions will shortly be sent, and meanwhile he should abstain from any discussion ..	250
269	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	78	1,	Warga. Expands No. 265. Explains points with regard to Ifni and customs control which Spain lays down as condition for her acceptance of formula	250
270	Sir R. Lister ..	63 Tel.	7,	Sultan has left Fez for Rabat, accompanied by M. Regnault, who is coming to Tangier	252
271	To Sir R. Lister ..	22 Tel.	7,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Refers to No. 267. Constantly-changing views of French place us in an impossible position. Is not prepared to modify instructions in No. 259 unless something more substantial than M. Porché's statement is urged against them	252
272	„ „ ..	23 Tel.	7,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Refers to No. 258. Agrees to further work by *marché de gré à gré*, but he should first make sure there will be no further proposals of the kind	252
272*	To Sir M. de Bunsen	46 Tel.	7,	Warga. French Ambassador states that French Government will accept last Spanish formula (see No. 266) with slight modification	252*
273	Sir R. Lister ..	128	1,	Société marocaine des Travaux publics (see No. 75). Transmits memorandum by Mr. Harris respecting conversation with one of directors of company. Directors realise that arrangements must be made for larger British participation, and a scheme has been proposed for creating sub-companies for each separate undertaking in which the various participations could be rearranged	252
274	„ „ ..	129	2,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Expands No. 267	254
275	„ „ ..	132	3,	Situation at Fez. Transmits two despatches from Consul MacLeod describing situation and reporting an interview with General Lyautey	257
276	„ „ ..	64 Tel.	8,	Casa Blanca harbour works (see No. 271). Resolution has been passed by diplomatic body to the effect that adjudication previously decided on should be transformed into a larger one, including all the necessary works, and that prescribed formalities shall be observed	259
277	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	45 Tel.	8,	Warga. Refers to No. 272*. Spanish Government will accept French modification of their last formula conditional on an extension of Ifni zone and French concessions with regard to financial proposals. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs in a very excited state	260
278	To Sir M. de Bunsen	47 Tel.	10,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 277. Spanish Ambassador states that French have reverted to original unfavourable proposal about Ifni, and have even gone back on arrangement about Khalifa	260

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279	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	46 Tel.	June 11, 1912	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 278. Statement of Spanish Ambassador is incorrect, as no definite arrangement about Khalifa was ever reached. French Ambassador has given Minister for Foreign Affairs to understand that Spanish wishes about Khalifa and Ifni will be met on condition of settlement of other outstanding questions	261
280	To Sir R. Lister ..	25 Tel.	11,	Tangier. Negotiations are to be opened at Madrid between French, Spanish, and English representatives. Has selected Mr. White as British representative, and he should proceed to Madrid at once ..	261
281	„ „ ..	26 Tel.	11,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Refers to No. 276. Approves resolution, and congratulates on way in which he has handled the matter	261
282	To Sir M. de Bunsen	57	12,	Tangier. Refers to No. 234. Views of His Majesty's Government on three points raised by Minister for Foreign Affairs, *i.e.*, area of municipal district, French predominance in council, and customs arrangements	262
283	„ „ ..	58	12,	Tangier (see No. 268). Mr. White has been appointed British delegate at the forthcoming meetings at Madrid. Discusses powers and composition of municipality, area of district, and customs	263
284	To M. Cambon ..	..	12,	Customs control. Refers to No. 230. His Majesty's Government, while ready to concede principle that duties should accrue to zone in which goods are consumed, doubt whether arrangement proposed will prove satisfactory. Points out objections as stated in No. 253, and hopes French Government will reconsider proposals ..	264
285	Sir R. Lister ..	136	9,	Casa Blanca harbour works. Expands No. 276, and gives full details of meeting of diplomatic body. A mission of French nautical experts are going to visit all the ports and report on the works required ..	265
286	„ „ ..	138	10,	Situation at Fez. Refers to No. 275. Transmits despatches from Consul MacLeod relative to line of policy which General Lyautey proposes to adopt. Fine imposed on Fez by General Moinier has been withdrawn	268
287	To Sir M. de Bunsen	60	17,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Ambassador fears negotiations may break down owing to new difficulties which French are continually raising. Transmits note communicated by his Excellency, giving Spanish grievances in regard to Mount Gani, schools, and Khalifa ..	268
287*	To Italian Ambassador	..	20,	Consular jurisdiction in Spanish presidios. Refers to No. 228*. His Majesty's Government presume that Italian Government do not intend extra-territorial jurisdiction or right of protection, but consular representation in the ordinary sense. In that event they would be ready to examine question when an opportune moment arrived	269*

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288	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	84	June 18, 1912	Tangier. Refers to No. 283. Mr. White has arrived at Madrid. M. Guiot and M. Padilla will be French and Spanish delegates. Transmits memorandum by Mr. White of first meeting held on 18th June	269
289	Sir R. Lister ..	142	15,	Situation at Fez (see No. 286). Transmits despatch from Consul MacLeod, reporting steps which General Lyautey is taking ..	271
290	„ „ ..	145	16,	Departure of Sultan. Transmits extract from despatch from Consul MacLeod describing departure of Sultan and Court from Fez, and despatch from Consul Madden reporting His Majesty's arrival at Casa Blanca	273
291	„ „ ..	146	16,	Slavery in Morocco. Refers to No. 222. Mr. Mackenzie's allegation that Shereefs of Tamslocht hold slaves is false ..	274
292	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	87	19,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Now that Warga boundary and Ifni question has been settled, frontier from Muluya to Beni Hassan and frontier in Lucus region remain to be settled. Questions of Spanish Franciscan monks in French zone and appointment of Khalifa continue to form subject of acrid discussion between Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador	274
293	„ „ ..	88	20,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Refers to No. 292. Views of French Ambassador on points still under discussion. He fears there will be a rupture, and has begged his Government that if they reject Spanish demands they will not proclaim a formal breakdown, but merely announce suspension of negotiations	276
294	To Sir M. de Bunsen	63	25,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Spanish Government, in order to conclude negotiations, have proposed to concede to France limits she desired near Laraiche on condition of Mount Gani being included in Spanish zone, to meet French wishes in regard to religious establishments, and to maintain Spanish view that Spain should submit only one name for post of Khalifa in Spanish zone	277
295	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	91	23,	Tangier. Refers to No. 288. Memorandum by Mr. White on recent meetings of delegates. M. Guiot is determined to maintain Contrôle de la Dette at Tangier Customs-house. Area of municipal district is still open	278
296	„ „ ..	53 Tel.	26,	Tangier (see No. 295). Agreement has been reached on various points on lines recommended in Foreign Office Memorandum of 14th March (No. 99), but Spanish Government desire that limit of councillors of one nationality should be raised to five, and that rent qualification for franchise should be very low. Suggests that municipality should be free to draw up its own land regulations	280
297	Note communicated by M. Cambon	..	27,	Customs control (see No. 284). Explains system proposed, *i.e.*, a line of control, and points out difference between this and a real customs frontier. Thinks that foreign trade will have nothing to complain of ..	280

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298	Sir R. Lister ..	66 Tel.	June 28, 1912	Marrakesh. British vice-consul reports that, owing to presence of M'toogi's son with armed force, appointment of Glawi brothers to governorships would cause disturbances. He and his German and Austrian colleagues have written to French consul suggesting postponement of appointments. Has instructed consul at Fez to talk matter over with resident-general, who will be best judge of course to pursue	281
299	Sir M. de Bunsen ..	54 Tel.	28,	Tangier. Refers to No. 296. Delegates have decided to leave question of mode of setting up municipality to their respective Governments. French and Spanish delegates do not think treaty between Sultan and the Powers is necessary. Spanish Government desire to exclude Moorish representative from Committee of Control	282
300	„ „ ..	55 Tel.	28,	Franco-Spanish negotiations. Discussion is proceeding more smoothly. Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes soon to be able to sign convention if an agreement can be reached about Tangier area and customs régime. Chief outstanding difficulty is Mount Gani	282
301	French Ambassador..	..	28,	Tangier (see No. 215). Discusses question of mode of instituting municipality. French Government consider that institution of municipality is covered by article 4 of Franco-German Convention of November 1911, and therefore no treaty is required and French Government will simply notify arrangement to the Powers	282
302	„ „ ..	..	28,	Customs control (see No. 297). Further explanations regarding proposed system. No reason to fear contraband trade will arise	283
303	To Sir M. de Bunsen	49 Tel.	28,	Tangier. Refers to No. 296. His Majesty's Government cannot give way as regards number of councillors of same nationality nor agree to a low franchise. Concurs in municipality having a free hand in regard to land regulations	284
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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. August 1912.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Morocco.

Part 44.

[129] No. 1.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1912.)

(No. 206.)

Sir, *Madrid, December* 21, 1911.

IN my telegram, No. 98 of the 26th instant, I stated briefly what were the chief objections raised by the French Government, in a telegram to M. Geoffray to the Spanish counter-propositions, as forwarded to you in my despatch No. 202 of the 21st instant.

The French Government adheres, in the first place, to the principle laid down in paragraph 2 of article 1 of the French draft, to the effect that "de même que dans la zone française, les règlements d'application concernant ces réformes seront arrêtés par le Makhzen." The Makhzen, in short, makes the laws for the whole country. The laws are then to be "applied" everywhere by the Moorish authorities. At the same time (paragraph 3) the laws are to be "contrôlés" by Spanish agents in the Spanish zone, and, of course, by French agents in the French zone. In the French view, the Makhzen continues to be an authority standing above the respective French and Spanish administrations. Its writ runs throughout the whole Empire, although, within the French and Spanish zones respectively, it is enforced by agents acting under the corresponding foreign control.

I doubt whether it will be possible to induce the Spanish Government to adopt this point of view. In their eyes the Makhzen has become, by virtue of the Franco-German agreement, the docile instrument of France. Its laws will be laws dictated by France. There will be no guarantee that they will be framed to suit the special conditions prevailing in the Spanish zone. Spanish pride will shrink from even the appearance of subjection to the French protectorate. In my opinion, the Spanish Government would be quite capable of breaking off the negotiation, regardless of consequences, rather than yield on this all-important point.

In the second place, I understand from the tolegram which M. Geoffray had the goodness to read to me, that M. de Selves is unable to accept articles 5 and 6 of the Spanish draft.

These articles were framed to exclude from the Spanish sphere of influence all agents acting under French direction. Under the Paris loan agreement of the 21st March, 1910, between France and Morocco, the following arrangements are agreed to as the means of securing to the holders of the 1904 and 1910 loans and to the French Treasury the annuities, to which they are respectively entitled.

The whole of the customs receipts of the Moorish ports being already pledged by contract, dated the 12th June, 1904, to the service of the loan of 1904, it is provided that the service of the loan of 1910 shall be guaranteed by pledging to it the following revenues:—

1. What remains of the customs receipts (except 5 per cent. reserved to the Makhzen) after providing for the service of the 1904 loan.
2. The tobacco, kif and opium monopoly.

3. Produce of the mostafadet and sakkat taxes in all the ports.
4. Produce of the Sultan's property within the ports and a 10 kilom. radius.
5. The share of the Makhzen in the urban tax.

The surplus of the above taxes, after providing for the service of the 1910 loan, is set aside to provide the annuity of 2,740,000 fr. due for 75 years to the French Treasury on account of the Moorish war indemnity of 70,000,000 fr.

Extensive arrangements already exist for collecting, under the Administration du Contrôle de la Dette—a body completely under French control—some, if not all of the various revenues detailed above. The Spanish Government fear that to allow this French organisation to pervade the Moorish ports within the Spanish zone, and even, in respect of the enforcement of the tobacco monopoly, the interior of that zone, in order that certain revenues may be collected under the direction of inspectors appointed by the French Government, would be equivalent to creating an *imperium in imperio*, and would inevitably provide a constant source of friction between the two Governments.

They admit, however, that, if the above security be withdrawn, another security at least equally as good must be found to replace it. The security offered for this purpose is that of the Spanish State. Spain, in short, will pay, at fixed intervals and at the proper quarter, a sum equal to the sum annually required for the service of the two loans and for the annuity due to the French Treasury. Thus no one will be the loser. Indeed the security offered is far better than the existing security and far less costly to collect.

This, briefly, is the upshot of articles 5 and 6 of the Spanish draft. If accepted, they would relieve France and the holders of the loan of all trouble and anxiety in respect of their credits in Morocco. Spain, on the other hand, would gain by getting rid of an army of quasi-French officials and by securing control of the entire resources of her zone for purposes connected with its administration and development.

At first sight the Spanish solution seems both simple and easy of execution. If France persists in rejecting it, her motive arises, perhaps, mainly out of a desire to retain a certain right of intervention in the Spanish zone. M. Geoffray, however, maintains that there is also the legal and material difficulty of inducing the holders of the loan to relinquish the rights they possess under the existing contracts. Any modification of those contracts would require, he states, an absolutely unanimous vote on the part of all the holders. Some of these, however, would be certain to object to an alteration which would tend to restrict in any way the French control over the whole of Morocco. The change desired by Spain is, therefore, entirely impracticable.

Señor Garcia Prieto, on the other hand, stated at one of our meetings, very positively, that his study of the contracts, from the point of view of a lawyer, had convinced him that there was no legal obstacle to prevent the French Government and the banks, which issued the loans, from agreeing to any arrangements they choose, provided that the necessary sums should be forthcoming with the same certainty as before.

M. Geoffray thinks the Spanish Government will have to rest content with the prospect of achieving the complete control of the revenues of their zone, provided by the last paragraph of article 12 of the French draft, which postpones till the date when the loans in question can be converted the period when Spain will be able to collect the customs revenues herself.

The French Ambassador has not yet received the definite instructions which M. de Selves promised to send him as soon as he should be able to fix the details in consultation with the French Cabinet.

I have, &c.,
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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[145] No. 2.

Mr. Russell to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 1, 1912.)

(No. 224.)
Sir, *Vienna, December* 30, 1911.

IN my telegram No. 138 of the 17th instant I had the honour to inform you that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors at Berlin and Paris had been authorised to inform the German and French Governments that Austria-Hungary assented in principle to the

Franco-German Morocco agreement, with the reservation that the formal written adhesion to the agreements could not take place until later.

I now have the honour to report that a communication was made to the French Embassy yesterday by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Austria-Hungary was now in a position to give her formal written adherence to the agreement.

This announcement is also published in the semi-official "Fremden-Blatt" this morning, together with an explanation to show that the delay was only due to the necessity of submitting the agreement to the Austrian and Hungarian Governments for their perusal and sanction. Now that negotiations with regard to the French loan have been suspended, the vote of confidence which has been accorded to Count Aehrenthal by the Hungarian Delegation after his exposé on the foreign policy of the dual monarchy, and the fairly good reception which he has met at the hands of the Austrian delegation have no doubt removed the last obstacle to any further delay in adhering to the Morocco agreement.

I have, &c.
THEO RUSSELL.

[2458] No. 3.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, January* 1, 1912.

ALI ZAKKI called to-day to sound me as to whether King would receive representative of the Sultan who would be sent to salute him on his passage as was done when King Edward passed through. Since then a representative was sent to greet President of the French Republic when at Algiers. Reception need not last for more than a few minutes, and, I think, would produce good impression here. This is important in view of the position which we should occupy in an international Tangier.

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[296] No. 4.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 2, 1912.)

(No. 634. Confidential.)
Sir, *Paris, December* 31, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that M. de Selves sent me yesterday, *à titre personnel*, the text of the Spanish counter-draft of the proposed Franco-Spanish convention respecting Morocco, as well as the observations drawn up by the French Government thereon.

I transmit to you herewith the text of the former and a copy of the latter document.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Spanish Counter-Draft of proposed Franco-Spanish Convention.

ARTICLE 1er.

SA Majesté le Sultan déléguera d'une manière générale l'exercice de tous les droits et actions qui lui appartiennent dans la sphère d'influence espagnole et confiera l'administration des régions comprises dans ladite sphère à un Haut Commissaire nommé sur la proposition du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne. La délégation aura un caractère permanent, afin que, en conséquence de cette délégation, dans les cas de substitution, le substitut du Haut Commissaire entre provisoirement en fonctions dès sa présentation. Le Haut Commissaire résidera en un point de la sphère d'influence espagnole. Sa Majesté le Sultan n'aura à contribuer, en aucune façon, aux dépenses de la sphère d'influence espagnole; aucune responsabilité ne pourra non plus lui incomber du fait de réclamations fondées sur des faits survenus, sous l'administration du Haut Commissaire, dans les régions susénoncées.

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ARTICLE 2.

L'action que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne aurait la faculté d'exercer à l'égard du Gouvernement marocain pour ce qui se réfère à la sphère d'influence espagnole, ledit Gouvernement espagnol aura la faculté de l'exercer à l'égard du Haut Commissaire prévu par l'article 1er du présent arrangement. Le Gouvernement de la République française reconnaît que cette action est la même que celle qu'il s'est réservée dans le reste de l'Empire, conformément à la déclaration franco-anglaise du 7 avril, 1904, et à l'accord franco-allemand du 4 novembre, 1911.

En exerçant cette action, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne veillera dans la sphère d'influence espagnole à l'observation des clauses que la seconde des conventions précitées contient, pour la garantie de la liberté commerciale, au bénéfice aussi bien de l'Allemagne que des autres Puissances signataires de l'Acte général de la Conférence internationale d'Algésiras.

ARTICLE 3.

La Banque d'État du Maroc devant conserver ses droits et actions dans les régions qui constituent la sphère d'influence espagnole, il est entendu que, en vue de la haute surveillance qu'il appartient au Gouvernement chérifien d'exercer sur cet établissement, le Haut Commissaire aura le droit, quant aux affaires qui intéressent ladite sphère, de nommer des délégués spéciaux ayant les pouvoirs prévus dans l'article 42 de l'Acte général de la Conférence internationale d'Algésiras.

Le personnel des succursales, agences, &c., de la Banque d'État du Maroc, dans les régions qui constituent la sphère d'influence espagnole, sera de nationalité espagnole.

ARTICLE 4.

Pour l'exercice des pouvoirs que le cahier des charges, d'après lequel fut adjugé le monopole du tabac du Maroc, attribue au Gouvernement marocain, en ce qui concerne les régions qui constituent la sphère d'influence espagnole, le Haut Commissaire de cette sphère aura le droit de désigner des délégués spéciaux dans les mêmes conditions que Sa Majesté le Sultan dans le reste de l'Empire. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne pourra, d'accord avec la société fermière du monopole du tabac au Maroc, modifier, acquérir ou racheter les droits de cette société.

ARTICLE 5.

L'Espagne et la France conserveront leurs créances sur le Gouvernement marocain telles qu'elles résultent de leurs accords respectifs avec le Makhzen, mais chaque Gouvernement renonce en faveur de l'autre à la garantie qui lui a été concédée dans la zone correspondante.

ARTICLE 6.

Afin que les impôts et redevances de toute nature des régions qui composent la sphère d'influence espagnole puissent, dès maintenant, être consacrés à cette sphère, sans préjudice pour les porteurs des emprunts de 1904 et 1910, tout pouvoir pour les recouvrements, ainsi que pour l'administration des droits de douane mostafadet, sakkat, des biens du Makhzen et des autres taxes des ports, donnés en garantie desdits emprunts, est dans ladite sphère d'influence espagnole, transféré aux agents désignés par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne et le Haut Commissaire. En échange, le Gouvernement espagnol s'oblige à verser un mois avant l'échéance de chaque coupon :

A la Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, la somme annuelle de ;
Au délégué français des porteurs de la dette pour le reste de l'Empire, la somme annuelle de ;
A la Banque d'État du Maroc, la somme annuelle de ;

comme part correspondant aux recettes de Tétouan, Tanger et Larache, pour les intérêts, l'amortissement, &c., des emprunts 1904 et 1910, et des avances de la Banque d'Etat garanties sur le 5 pour cent des recettes douanières restant à la libre disposition du Makhzen.

Moyennant l'exécution ponctuelle desdits versements, les porteurs, ni la Banque d'État pour ses avances actuelles, ne pourront invoquer d'autres droits dans la sphère d'influence espagnole.

A l'époque où, d'après les conditions des emprunts, le Makhzen aurait le droit de rembourser les porteurs, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique aura la faculté de libérer la sphère d'influence espagnole de toute obligation envers lesdits porteurs, en leur versant la somme de , équivalant au capital qui se trouve garanti par les recettes de Tétouan, Tanger et Larache.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne et le Gouvernement de la République française s'engagent à respecter, dans leurs zones respectives, la liberté et la pratique extérieure de tous les cultes existant aujourd'hui au Maroc.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne fera en sorte que le privilège, actuellement conféré aux missions franciscaines espagnoles, dans toute l'étendue des possessions chérifiennes ne dépasse pas la sphère d'influence espagnole; bien entendu, ces missions conserveront leurs propriétés et la liberté de s'établir, en tout temps dans la sphère d'influence française.

ARTICLE 8.

En vertu de l'adhésion que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne donne à la construction immédiate de la ligne Tanger–Fez, le Haut Commissaire des régions qui composent la sphère d'influence espagnole se concertera avec la Direction des Travaux publics de Sa Majesté le Sultan pour que l'adjudication pour la construction du chemin de fer de Tanger à El Ksar et à la limite de ladite sphère d'influence soit notifiée en même temps, et sous les mêmes conditions, que celle du chemin de fer de cette frontière à Fez.

Une commission, composée de deux délégués du Haut Commissaire pour la sphère d'influence espagnole, et de deux délégués de la Direction des Travaux publics de Sa Majesté le Sultan, se réunira une fois par an et sera chargée d'assurer, en vue de faciliter le trafic, l'unité du matériel, des tarifs, des points de contact, &c., entre les compagnies exploitant les deux chemins de fer.

ARTICLE 9.

Les Gouvernements de Sa Majesté Catholique et de la République française se concerteront en vue de :

1. Toute modification qui, dans l'avenir, devrait être apportée, en ce qui touche les droits de douane de l'Empire, sous réserve des clauses des traités antérieurs ;
2. L'unification des tarifs postaux et télégraphiques à l'intérieur de l'Empire ; et
3. La fixation des quantités de monnaie marocaine à frapper.

ARTICLE 10.

Tant que le chemin de fer allant de Tanger à la limite de la sphère d'influence espagnole n'aura pas été construit, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne ne mettra aucun obstacle au passage des convois d'approvisionnements destinés au Makhzen; il est entendu qu'il y aura lieu de l'en informer préalablement, et que les personnes qui conduiront ou accompagneront ces convois se conformeront, quant à l'usage des armes, aux règlements alors en vigueur dans la région.

ARTICLE 11.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne et le Gouvernement de la République française renoncent à concéder à l'avenir, au Maroc, en dehors de leurs zones respectives, des patentes de protection aux indigènes, sous quelque forme que ce soit. Ils consentent en outre à reviser la liste des protégés actuels d'accord avec Sa Majesté le Sultan, le Haut Commissaire des régions qui composent la sphère d'influence espagnole et les autres Puissances signataires du traité de Madrid de 1880 et de l'Acte de l'Algésiras.

ARTICLE 12.

Les intérêts des sujets marocains originaires de la zone d'influence espagnole seront confiés, à l'étranger, aux agents diplomatiques et consulaires espagnols.

ARTICLE 13.

Lorsque les nationaux et protégés espagnols dans la zone française, ou des nationaux et protégés français dans la zone espagnole auront formulé une plainte contre les autorités marocaines, ou les personnes agissant en tant qu'autorités marocaines, si leur réclamation n'a pas reçu de solution satisfaisante à la suite de négociations entre les agents français et espagnols, l'affaire sera soumise à un arbitre désigné par les agents locaux ou par les Gouvernements des deux pays.

ARTICLE 14.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique et le Gouvernement de la République française se réservent la faculté de faire en sorte que, dans leurs zones respectives, soient établies des organisations judiciaires inspirées de leurs législations propres. Une fois que cet établissement se sera produit et que les nationaux et protégés de chaque pays dans sa zone auront été soumis à la juridiction de ces tribunaux, le Gouvernement de la République française, dans la sphère d'influence espagnole, et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne, dans la sphère d'influence française, soumettront aussi à cette juridiction locale leurs nationaux et protégés respectifs.

ARTICLE 15.

Ville de Tanger. (Réservé.)

ARTICLE 16.

Sont abolis toutes conventions, tous accords et règlements antérieurs qui seraient en opposition avec ce qui est arrêté dans la présente convention.

ARTICLE 17.

Les divergences qui se produiraient entre les hautes parties contractantes à l'égard de l'interprétation et de l'application de la présente convention et qui ne pourraient être tranchées par la voie diplomatique, seront soumises à un tribunal arbitral constitué conformément à la convention du 18 octobre, 1907. Dans chaque cas il y aura compromis d'arbitrage et on procédera suivant les règles de ladite convention pour autant qu'elles n'auraient pas subi de modification expresse au moment du litige.

ARTICLE 18.

La présente convention sera notifiée aux Gouvernements signataires de l'Acte général de la Conférence internationale d'Algésiras.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

French Observations on Foregoing.

DEUX principes essentiels doivent dominer et diriger la négociation engagée entre la France et l'Espagne :—

1. L'unité et l'intégrité de l'Empire chérifien. Il ne peut être en effet question, entre la France et l'Espagne, de partager l'Empire marocain, ni d'annexer des territoires qui seraient soustraits à l'autorité du Sultan ; dans l'organisation de son protectorat, la France n'entend exercer que des droits d'assistance et de contrôle, elle n'assume que l'administration directe des territoires ; la France ne peut donc reconnaître à l'Espagne d'autres pouvoirs que ceux qu'elle prétend exercer elle-même.

2. Les droits attribués précédemment à des tiers, institutions, sociétés ou particuliers ne sauraient être atteints par le nouveau régime. Une négociation entre la France et l'Espagne ne peut avoir pour résultat de modifier des contrats intervenus précédemment entre le Makhzen et des tiers.

L'article 1er de la contre-proposition espagnole est en pleine contradiction avec le premier des principes que le Gouvernement français a exposés ci-dessus.

Aux termes de cet article, l'Espagne entend faire administrer la zone espagnole par un Haut Commissaire dont elle proposerait la nomination au Sultan. Elle ne précise pas si ce fonctionnaire sera espagnol ou marocain. Elle se réserve le droit de déléguer le pouvoir de ce commissaire à un substitut, sans même que le Sultan soit admis à intervenir. Une pareille clause est inadmissible et la proposition inscrite à l'article 3 de l'avant-projet français doit donc être maintenue.

En outre le dernier paragraphe de l'article 1er (espagnol) ne semble viser que la responsabilité du Sultan en matière financière. Il importe que, conformément au paragraphe 3 de l'article 3 du projet français, le Gouvernement espagnol déclare assumer la responsabilité de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans sa zone ainsi que l'application de tous les traités souscrits entre les Puissances et le Makhzen.

Pour l'article 2 (espagnol), la rédaction du premier paragraphe, notamment de la deuxième phrase, peut faire naître des difficultés. Le second paragraphe ne cite que la liberté commerciale alors qu'il importe, en matière économique de se référer à toutes les dispositions inscrites à la convention franco-allemand du 4 novembre.

Les articles 3 et 4 (espagnols) sont contraires au second principe fondamental. L'accord franco-allemand du 4 novembre a confirmé les statuts et privilèges de la Banque d'État du Maroc.

Article 5 (espagnol) : L'indemnité de guerre française est gagée par les excédents réalisés dans tous les ports marocains sur les droits de douanes et autres revenus concédés. L'indemnité de guerre espagnole n'est gagée que sur des droits à prélever éventuellement par le Makhzen sur les exploitations minières. Une renonciation réciproque à ces garanties serait en l'état présent très sensiblement plus onéreuse pour la France que pour l'Espagne. Le Gouvernement francais ne saurait y consentir qu'après une étude spéciale de la question par le Ministère des Finances.

L'article 6 (espagnol) est contraire au deuxième principe. Ce qui paraît peut-être acceptable, c'est le principe de la revision de la situation actuelle au moment où serait rendue possible l'opération de la conversion.

En ce qui concerne l'article 7 du projet espagnol, il y a lieu de revenir à l'article 7 du projet français.

Article 8. Le Gouvernement français ne peut concevoir qu'une seule concession marocaine s'appliquant à toute l'étendue de la ligne Tanger–El Ksar–Fez. Une société unique liée par un cahier des charges établi par le seul Gouvernement marocain aurait la concession de la ligne. Cette société recevrait le droit d'exploitation et pourrait également être chargée de la construction sous réserve de la mise en adjudication des lots à construire. On pourrait admettre que cette société serait franco-espagnole proportionnellement à la longueur de la ligne dans chaque zone et à l'importance des capitaux engagés.

Les articles 14 et 15 du projet français doivent donc être maintenus.

L'article 9 (espagnol) comporte trois paragraphes. Au premier il conviendrait d'ajouter *in fine* : "sous réserve des clauses des traités et engagements antérieurs du Makhzen." Le troisième paragraphe est contraire aux privilèges reconnus à la Banque d'État.

L'article 10 (espagnol) est inadmissible. Aucune limitation de doit être apportée à aucune époque, ni au passage des approvisionnements destinés au Makhzen, ni à la libre circulation des voyageurs. A cet égard, la rédaction de l'article 8 du projet français pourrait être reprise en même généralisée. Il conviendrait d'ajouter qu'aucune taxe ou droit de transit ne sera prélevé pour le passage d'une zone à l'autre.

Article 11 (espagnol). Il est impossible de supprimer dès maintenant l'institution des protégés et associés agricoles sans nuire aux intérêts des commerçants et colons des deux pays. Cette question ne peut recevoir de solution qu'après la revision de la convention de Madrid prévue à l'accord franco-allemand.

L'article 12 (espagnol) ne peut être accepté.

Au lieu de la rédaction proposée par l'article 13 (espagnol), il serait préférable d'adopter une clause reproduisant les termes de l'article 9 de la convention franco-allemande.

La même observation s'applique à la rédaction de l'article 14 (espagnol).

L'article 16 ne soulève pas d'objection.

Pour l'article 17 (espagnol), il serait désirable de revenir purement et simplement à la rédaction de l'article qui porte le même numéro dans le projet français.

La contre-proposition espagnole ne contient aucune clause touchant les points visés aux articles 4, 5, 10, 13 et 16 du projet français.

Ces dispositions ne peuvent être passées sous silence.

Il est essentiel de rappeler que, conformément à l'accord franco-anglais de 1904, l'Espagne ne saurait céder à une Puissance étrangère ses droits sur sa zone d'influence (article 4); de même, il convient de mentionner l'interdiction de fortifier la côte de la zone d'influence espagnole afin que le libre passage du détroit de Gibraltar demeure assuré (article 5).

L'article 10 du projet français précise qu'aucune ressource marocaine provenant des impôts et taxes perçus dans la zone espagnole ne pourra être appliquée à d'autres besoins qu'aux dépenses publiques de ce territoire.

Le Gouvernement de la république croit devoir insister pour que, conformément à l'article 13 de son projet et aux promesses réitérées de l'Espagne, il soit procédé à bref délai à l'établissement de la douane de Melilla.

Il considère que l'Espagne ne saurait se refuser à maintenir les clauses de réciprocité inscrites à l'article 16 du projet français, en vue de la répression de la contrebande des armes et munitions de guerre.

En résumé, la contre-proposition espagnole est sur plusieurs points en contradiction absolue avec les principes fondamentaux qui doivent, au sens du Gouvernement français, inspirer la négociation; sur d'autres points, les divergences de vues sont nettement accusées. Il conviendrait donc de reprendre comme base de discussion le projet que le Gouvernement de la république a pris l'initiative de proposer au Gouvernement Royal.

Le Gouvernement français a d'ailleurs le désir très sincère de ne pas entraver l'action du Gouvernement espagnol dans sa zone au Maroc et il ne voudrait pas lui donner à penser qu'il cherche par des ingérences directes ou indirectes auprès du Sultan à placer la zone espagnole sous une surveillance ou sous une tutelle quelconque de sa part.

Si la France attache la plus grande importance à ne rien abandonner des principes qu'elle a posés comme base de discussion, elle est prête à examiner avec l'Espagne les modifications que celle-ci demanderait d'apporter aux formules des articles du projet français, afin de dissiper tout motif d'inquiétude ou de susceptibilités.

[51980] No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 3, 1912.*

YOUR Excellency will have received in the Morocco print sections a copy of Sir E. Goschen's despatch No. 379 of 14th November last, reporting that an agreement had been signed between the Mannesmann Mining Syndicate and the Union des Mines for the fusion of their commercial interests in Morocco.

On receipt of Sir E. Goschen's despatch I communicated with the Board of Trade, and I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of their reply.* I agree with the view expressed therein, and I should be glad if you would take an opportunity of representing to the French Government that an allotment of at least 20 per cent. of the shares of the new syndicate to British subscribers would be no more than a fair recognition of British interests; and that without such recognition it will be practically impossible for His Majesty's Government to give support to a syndicate in which British participation has now been whittled down to practically nothing at all.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

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[706] No. 6.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Madrid, January 1, 1912.*

THE French Ambassador, having received on the 29th instant a detailed telegraphic reply from the French Government to the Spanish counter-proposals, fourth meeting was held on the following afternoon between his Excellency and the Minister for Foreign Affairs to continue the negotiation concerning Morocco. I was again present.

* Part 43, No. 587.

M. Geoffray opened the discussion with a few preliminary remarks on the fundamental principles to which his Government felt bound to adhere. The first was the sovereignty of the Sultan, which must be clearly maintained if the unity of the Empire was to be preserved. The second was the obligation incumbent on the French Government to support throughout Morocco, including the Spanish zone, the acquired rights of third parties. His Excellency alluded, namely, to the guarantees secured in that country by the holders of the 1904 and 1910 loans and by the French Treasury.

Reverting to the original French draft convention, which Señor Garcia Prieto tacitly accepted as the basis of the future discussion, M. Geoffray read out the French text, article by article, inserting here and there a new form of words to give satisfaction as far as possible to some of the minor demands of Spain. He handed to the Foreign Minister a copy of the amended French text. Although he had previously gone over the whole ground with me in conversation, text in hand, he did not offer me a copy.

Article 1 naturally gave rise to a renewed discussion on the right claimed by France for the Makhzen to make the "general regulations" for the whole country, to be applied subsequently by the local Moorish authorities under a certain control at the hands of the French and Spanish agents according to the zone.

M. Geoffray was instructed to say that this provision seemed essential to the preservation of the principle of unity throughout the country. Señor Garcia Prieto disagreed. The Spanish draft (article 9) had proposed a method of maintaining unity of customs, postal and telegraph tariffs and coinage, by means of concerted action between the two Governments. The same method might be extended to other matters. Unity was therefore not in danger. Spain, moreover, could never accept the task of merely interpreting and carrying out, in her sphere, a set of regulations or laws drawn up under French inspiration.

Although M. Geoffray is more than half in agreement personally with this view, he was compelled to maintain the position to which his Government attaches so much importance, namely, that of retaining in the hands of the French-protected Makhzen the power of legislating for the whole of Morocco.

The discussion becoming warm and offering no visible prospect of agreement, I intervened at this point with a suggestion which found favour with both parties. Understanding that one of the difficulties which stands in the way of devising a working constitution for Tangier arises from the similar French contention that certain powers of exercising influence and even of intervening materially in some cases must be retained in the hands of the Sultan, I advised postponement of further debate on this delicate point until the Tangier draft regulations should be agreed to between England and France. It seemed to me not impossible, I said, that the form of words accepted by those two Governments as defining the limits of the Sultan's authority in Tangier would be found to be applicable, perhaps with some modification to the case of the Spanish sphere of influence.

M. Geoffray and Señor Garcia Prieto both concurring, this particular question was left in abeyance, and the negotiation proceeded.

The French Ambassador said that it was felt in Paris that the manner of appointing the Sultan's High Commissioner for the Spanish zone must conform to article 3 of the original French text, and that it should be expressly provided that his place of residence should be Tetuan.

Señor Garcia Prieto promised again to study this point.

A long discussion ensued on the guarantees of the loans and war indemnities. As regards the latter, I find that I did not accurately describe the Spanish demand (article 5 of the Spanish draft) in my despatch No. 202 of the 21st. Spain does not propose to find a portion of the annuity required for the payment of the French war indemnity until its extinction in seventy-five years' time. Her proposal is merely that each country should surrender to the other the guarantees which it possesses in the zone of the other. In other words, France would have to rely only upon her own zone in order to collect the whole of the war indemnity due to her, *i.e.*, seventy-five annuities of 2,740,000 fr. These annuities would be provided by (1) the remainder of the customs receipts after providing for the service of the two loans, the tobacco monopoly, and certain Moorish taxes; and (2) the proportion of the, as yet uncreated, mining tax, which at present forms the guarantee, in the French zone, of the Spanish war indemnity. On the other hand, Spain would rely only on her own zone in order to collect the whole of the war indemnity due to her, namely, seventy-five annuities of 2,545,000 pesetas. These Spanish annuities would be provided by the said

mining tax and by the portion of the customs receipts which at present forms the guarantee in the Spanish zone of the French war indemnity.

Señor Garcia Prieto having clearly explained his proposal on this point, M. Geoffray said that it could not be accepted by France. The proposed exchange was between two sources of income, one of which was already operative, namely, the customs receipts, and could be accurately gauged, whereas the other was not yet in existence, and might be found eventually to be worth nothing, or very little. France would be surrendering a sound guarantee for one which was extremely problematical. The French Government could not be expected to accept such a one-sided bargain.

To this Señor Garcia Prieto replied that the guarantee of the customs claimed by France in the Spanish zone had been secured by France in an entirely unjustifiable manner. France had no right to enter into a separate agreement with Morocco affecting the Spanish zone, as she had done in 1910. Spain had from the first protested against this arrangement, which was in open conflict with the convention of October 1904 constituting the two spheres of influence. She had never recognised it, and could not now regard it as a valid obstacle to the simple proposal she was making, namely, that each country should rely on its own sphere for the recovery of the annuities forming its war indemnity.

There was much discussion on the question of the security for the 1904 and 1910 loans. On this point I believe I have correctly stated, in my despatch No. 202 of the 21st December, the Spanish offer to pledge the credit of Spain to the punctual payment of so much of the sum annually required for the service of those loans as is attributable to the Spanish zone.

M. Geoffray repeated that no concession could be made in this respect. The holders of the two loans would never be asked by the French Government to surrender the security which the latter had obtained for them. As he put it, "les droits des tiers" must be upheld, and, even if the Spanish proposal offered these third parties a better security than the one they possessed, it would suffice for one holder to object to any alteration of the existing security to render a change impossible.

Both, therefore, in respect of the war indemnity and of the loans, existing arrangements must stand, and, if the Spanish Minister proved uncompromising on this question, M. Geoffray said that the negotiation would have to be broken off.

I am personally inclined to agree with the French Ambassador that it would be useless for Spain to insist further on her point of view with regard to this part of the discussion. I therefore put in the remark that I thought it would be well for both parties to accept accomplished facts as far as possible. France, indeed, had already accepted the accomplished fact of the Spanish occupation of Larache and Alcazar, for her proposals did not require the evacuation of those places. Similarly, Spain would be well advised to leave existing guarantees alone. It would only embitter the discussion—happily a perfect friendly one so far—if accusations of breach of treaty were bandied from side to side, each party demanding of the other a reversion to a previously existing state of affairs.

Señor Garcia Prieto said that he would again study the above question of the financial guarantees, as also that of the Tangier-Fez Railway, in respect of which M. Geoffray submitted a scheme founded on the principle of a single tender for the entire line, and of joint participation by both parties in its administration in proportion to the financial share taken respectively by each in the undertaking.

My impression of the whole conversation is that it was not unsatisfactory, and that, if the French Government could be induced to yield on the point of the "general regulations" and the Spanish Government on that of the guarantees, there would be good prospect of an early settlement.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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[990] No. 7.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 8, 1912.)

(No. 359. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, December* 30, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your telegram No. 70, instructing me to ask for a delay in settling the question of the method of construction and

payment of the works at Casa Blanca necessary for the protection of lighters, and desiring me to report to you fully by despatch on the whole subject, explaining the exact bearing which the proposal to meet the charges out of the Shawia indemnity had on the question of adjudication and on the rights and duties of the Committee of Public Works.

The French chargé d'affaires came to see me early this morning on the subject, and I informed him of your desire that the settlement might be delayed until you had had time to fully consider the whole matter. M. de Billy appeared much upset at the news, and showed some bitterness; he realised, however, that there was nothing to be done but acquiesce, and asked me to communicate at once with Zaky Bey and have the meeting adjourned, as that would have a less bad effect than if the meeting took place and nothing were settled. This accordingly was done, as I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 164.

The urgency of the need for a shelter of some sort for lighters at Casa Blanca has been so evident for some time past, that the question of the best method of providing it has been very freely discussed. It was generally understood that the course to be adopted had been decided upon, and that a long narrow basin stretching from the natural creek, which already existed, to the mole which is in actual course of construction was to be created; the basin would be protected by a sea wall and flanked by a "terreplein" on which merchandise could be landed. The accompanying rough sketch* may serve to explain the scheme. When, however, M. de Billy called upon me this morning he showed me a copy of a telegram which M. Llorens, the assistant engineer, had received from his chief, M. Porché, in Paris, from which I gathered that the form which the work was to take had by no means been finally settled, and that it would remain in suspense, at all events until the receipt of M. Porché's technical report. I took care to point this out to M. de Billy, observing that it was evident that the commencement of the work would have been delayed in any case, even if His Majesty's Government had not asked for time to study the matter more fully. M. de Billy was unable to deny this.

Wishing to know how matters stood, I subsequently asked M. Llorens to come round and see me. He explained to me M. Porché's telegram, which was somewhat technical and difficult of comprehension to the layman. It appears that he (M. Porché) has always had a hankering to provide the necessary shelter for lighters by means of an "épi" or wall jutting out from the mole now in course of construction (see annexed plan).* The scheme has been very severely criticised, notably by the "Contrôle de la Dette," who maintain that it would be very difficult of construction, and that, to be effectual, it would be very expensive, and that the money spent upon it would have been thrown away once the larger port works had been made. M. Porché was consequently supposed to have abandoned his idea, but his telegram to M. Llorens shows clearly that he has once more reverted to it, and a new complexion may be put upon the whole technical aspect of the question as soon as his report arrives.

When M. de Billy spoke to me on the subject on the 28th, as reported in my telegram No. 163, the French Government evidently assumed that the scheme adopted was the one to which I alluded above, namely, that of the basin, the sea wall, and the "terreplein." They maintained that for its execution two courses were open: either that the work should be divided into two parts, the actual basin being constructed and paid for out of the funds of the "Caisse spéciale" after a *marché de gré à gré* with local firms, in view of the urgency of the need, while the "terreplein" and the sea wall were to be built from the amount set aside from the Shawia indemnity for the Casa Blanca harbour works, and entrusted with the latter to the "Compagnie marocaine"; or that the whole work should be defrayed from the funds of the Shawia indemnity as forming part of the Casa Blanca harbour works, in which case they took it for granted that there would be no question of adjudication, and that the whole matter would be taken out of the hands of the Committee of Public Works.

The story of the grant of the port works at Casa Blanca to France and their connection with the Shawia indemnity is, roughly speaking, as follows: Shortly before the Algeciras conference the right to make the Casa Blanca port works was given to France, Germany being entrusted with the execution of those at Laraiche and Tangier. The work was handed over to the "Compagnie marocaine," who in turn passed the contract over to a French firm. The latter proved to be most unsatisfactory, and the "Compagnie marocaine" withdrew their contract and determined to execute the work themselves. The plans were submitted to M. Porché, who by that time had been

* Not reproduced.

appointed State engineer under the provisions of the Act of Algeciras. M. Porché found that the scheme of the "Compagnie marocaine" was on far too small a scale to be of any practical use, and drew up a larger and more ambitious scheme, towards meeting the extra expense of which it was decided to devote a portion of the Shawia indemnity. The arrangement was never officially communicated to the representatives of the Powers, although its existence was known. No question was asked, as far as I know, and no objections were raised. Work was recommenced on the new plans, and is still being proceeded with.

M. de Billy's contention is that any work connected with the improvement of the harbour, which can be defrayed from the surplus still remaining from the Shawia indemnity, can be undertaken by the French without being submitted to any commission of adjudication, and I must say that if M. Porché's pet scheme of the "épi" were adopted, it would appear only reasonable to entrust its execution to the "Compagnie marocaine," who already have all the necessary plant on the spot for the construction of the mole. At the same time, the view of the French Government, as set forth by M. de Billy, is open to argument, and the Dutch Minister maintains very strongly that any fresh works in connection with the port at Casa Blanca, even if not coming within the province of the "Caisse spéciale," must be submitted to the "Commission générale des Adjudications." This view is, I believe, shared by the German Minister, but I have avoided discussing the matter with him.

I cannot help thinking that the scheme of the basin protected by a sea wall and flanked by a "terreplein" is by far the more practical of the two, and will provide a work of more general and lasting utility. This view is very strongly held by the "Contrôle de la Dette" and the "Comité des Douanes," and is based upon the opinion expressed by the French naval authorities. I adhere to the opinion expressed in my telegram No. 162, that by far the best course, and the one which would obviate all suspicion of French methods, would be to submit the work to an adjudication or *marché de gré à gré après concours*, provided always that we can count upon the work being sufficiently far advanced by next autumn to provide an adequate amount of shelter for lighters before the advent of the bad season. This, I believe, M. Llorens thinks could be done, and I gather that he adheres to the view that no important work could be commenced until the spring on account of the weather conditions prevailing during the winter, although, no doubt, the necessary material and plant could be collected in the meantime. This certainly is the common-sense view which would be taken by any ordinary person, but, according to M. de Billy, it has been over-ruled by M. Porché, who declares that the actual work could be begun at once, and it is of course difficult, on a technical point, to disregard the opinion of the chief State engineer, appointed by the Powers, who is, undoubtedly, far more competent than his assistant.

The urgency of the need is of course indubitable, and plays a very great part in the whole matter. M. de Rappard, whom I happened to meet this evening, told me that he, personally, was so impressed by it that he was of opinion that the construction of the "darse" or basin and of the sea wall to protect it should be made over at once to a contractor, whether French or otherwise, by a *marché de gré à gré*, but that at the same time a very severe contract should be drawn up with him, by which he should be bound to complete the work at a certain date, and in the event of his failing to do so, he would be liable to a very heavy fine. The "terreplein," on the contrary, the need for which was very much less urgent, should, in his opinion, be put up to adjudication in the ordinary way.

There is, I think, a good deal in what M. de Rappard says, and should it be proved that my idea of an adjudication *après concours* would cause so much delay in the construction of the basin as to render its completion impossible before the next bad season, I am inclined to adopt his view. I see clearly that he is determined to oppose tooth and nail the idea that any part of the work should be defrayed from the Shawia indemnity, and thus be withdrawn from the control of the "Caisse spéciale," and I should not be surprised if his view were to prevail with the Committee of Public Works, the composition of which, as I pointed out in my telegram No. 164 of to-day, will be changed after the 1st January, and will certainly be less favourable to the French than before. This legation ceases to be represented on the committee, but, as a matter of fact, Mr. Rattigan will attend the first meetings as *suppléant* for the delegate from the American Legation, who has gone away on leave of absence.

By confiding the construction of the basin and the sea wall to the same contractor the main objection to the division of the work is obviated, as the rock removed for the hollowing of the one can be used for forming the foundations of the other. As a matter of fact, both contracts will almost certainly in any case go to the "Compagnie

marocaine," who, owing to the fact that they already possess all their plant, &c, on the spot, can undertake to execute the work at a much cheaper rate than other possible contractors. The French, therefore, will have attained their object; at the same time by adopting my proposal, or, should that have to be abandoned on account of pressure of time, the proposal of the Dutch Minister, the principle of adjudication would have been maintained and no dangerous precedent created.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S. *December* 31.—I have just received a note from the Décanat, stating that an error was made in informing Mr. Rattigan that he was the first *suppléant* on the committee. As a matter of fact he is only the second *suppléant*, and will, therefore, not be sitting instead of the American delegate; the latter will be represented by the delegate from the Russian Legation.

R. L.

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[939] No. 8.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Paris, January 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an article published by the "Temps" of to-day's date from its correspondent in London with regard to the attitude of England in the Franco-Spanish negotiations.* The article points out that it should be realised in France that the recent treaty with Germany is viewed in quite a different manner by English opinion than by French opinion. It is considered in England that France has made an excellent bargain, and therefore it is not considered that she is in any way worthy of compassion. The British Government stood loyally by France throughout the negotiations with Germany, but in the negotiations with Spain, while admitting that some compensation from that country may justifiably be asked for by France, they consider that the claims of Spain must also be taken into account. The British Government are therefore inclined to await the result of the controversy, and in the meantime to mix themselves up in the matter as little as possible.

The article then comments on the desire of England to remain on the best of terms with Spain, and on the importance for the former of knowing that her ships of war can in case of necessity make use of ports in the Peninsula, and of guarding against the eventuality that Germany should take her place in the good graces of Spain.

It is said, the article continues, that the British Government have approved the demands made by France on Spain, but the real fact is that they were only approved as a basis for the negotiations, and not as a minimum demand which could not be reduced. It is hoped in London that England will not be obliged to intervene in the controversy; but if she did, it would not be to exert pressure only on Spain, but to induce both parties to make mutual concessions. The British Government obviously hope to be able to avoid this disagreeable eventuality, for they know that it frequently happens that an arbiter falls out with one of the parties in a controversy, if not with both, and England wishes to keep the friendship of both France and Spain.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1119] No. 9.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 18.)

Sir, *Paris, January 8, 1912.*

I HAVE met the President of the Council several times lately, and on each occasion he has animadverted on the dilatory and intractable attitude of the Spanish Government in the negotiations on the subject of Morocco. His contention is that, out of deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government, the French proposals had

* Not printed.

been made as moderate as is possible, consistently with a due regard to capital French interests. As regards the Spanish counter-proposals, some of them could not be carried out, and others would be tantamount to the annexation of the Spanish zone. Moreover, the Spanish Government do not seem to realise that any compensation is due by Spain for the improved position in Morocco, which she will derive from the sacrifices made in the French Congo to Germany. The French Government having waived their demand for Larache and El Kazar, the Spanish Government should be more conciliatory than they are, and their attitude appears to be due in part to the expectation of British support in their unyielding attitude.

On the 5th instant M. Caillaux repeated these observations, and expressed the hope that you would inspire the Spanish Government with moderation and expedition, for it was advisable that the negotiations should be terminated, if possible, before the question of an agreement with Spain became a matter of discussion in the Senate.

I observed to M. Caillaux that the Spanish Government naturally relied on the engagements of 1904 in their negotiations, and they were not expeditious in their ways, but I thought that an arrangement would be come to. On his remarking that circumstances had changed since 1904, I stated that the engagements of that year were still binding, and that when made they were advantageous for France, for the proposals negotiated between France and Spain in 1902 would never have been accepted by England, but that he might be sure that His Majesty's Government would not support the Spanish Government in any unreasonable contentions, as you admitted that Spain owed France some compensation.

M. Caillaux requested me to ask you to use your undoubted influence at Madrid with a view of expediting the negotiations and bringing them to a conclusion which could be accepted by the French Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[1385] No. 10.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 8, 1912.

THE Spanish Ambassador explained to me to-day the view of Spain respecting liberty of action in her sphere in Morocco.

The French argued that general edicts for Morocco would apply to the French sphere as well as to the Spanish sphere, and that, therefore, Spain could have nothing to fear. If any edicts were issued by the Sultan having special reference to the Spanish sphere, Spain would be consulted about them beforehand. The Ambassador said that it might very well be that edicts of general application, not objectionable to French interests in the French sphere, might be objectionable to Spanish interests in the Spanish sphere, and there would in practice be no edicts for the Spanish sphere alone.

He then repeated the Spanish view as to the collection of customs in their sphere, and expressed regret that you should have assumed that the interests of the bond-holders required collection by French officials to be maintained. It would be a most inconvenient precedent to admit this argument; for if it held good with regard to customs in the Spanish sphere it ought also to hold good with regard to Tangier. When this had been pointed out to you, you had said that the question of Tangier was a separate matter, which must be settled between France and England. This had surprised the Spanish Government, and made them fear that they might be presented with a *fait accompli* with regard to Tangier, and that we might come to a definite agreement with France as to Tangier before they had been consulted at all.

I told the Ambassador that I thought there must have been some misunderstanding as to what you had said. The Tangier proposal had not been discussed further with France since I last saw the Spanish Ambassador.

I added that I was to see M. Cambon to-morrow, and before expressing an opinion I must hear what he had to say. Also, I had not yet had time to study the latest information which we had in the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1149] No. 11.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Berlin, January* 3, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that the following semi-official communiqué appeared in the "North German Gazette" last night:—

"It has been asserted in press reports of the proceedings of the French Senate Commission that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had, in his conversations with the French Ambassador Cambon, demanded the occupation of Mogador. We are authorised to state that such a demand was never put forward."

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[1193] No. 12.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Madrid, January* 6, 1912.

M. GEOFFRAY, French Ambassador, read to Señor Garcia Prieto yesterday afternoon, at the latter's weekly diplomatic reception, a telegram from his Government, the contents of which he had already had the goodness to confide to me. It was an instruction to point out to the Spanish Government as clearly as possible that though France had no desire whatever to interfere in the administration of the Spanish zone in Morocco, she could not withdraw from the position which she had advisedly taken up with regard to the retention in the hands of the Makhzen of the power to make "general regulations" for the whole Empire. M. Geoffray was directed to endeavour to remove the suspicion, and even apprehension, with which the Spanish Government had hitherto been disposed to regard this fundamental French demand. He was to remind them that the world presented several examples of Federated States which, though practically autonomous, were subject on points of general utility to laws and institutions framed in the federal capital. The case of Germany was especially recommended to him as being calculated to him to allay the fears of Spain, if the latter country would only consider, for instance, the freedom and virtual independence in respect of all local questions of the national life of Bavaria.

Although I doubt if his Excellency was himself entirely convinced by the arguments he was invited to employ, he informed me, on leaving Señor Garcia Prieto's reception room, that he had endeavoured to make the best of them in the conversation which he had just held with the Foreign Minister. He had failed, he feared, to make any material impression. In very friendly language the Spanish Minister had remarked that, though he might be prepared to accept the self-denying assurances as regards non-interference in the Spanish zone, which the present French Government had authorised M. Geoffray to give him, a less friendly disposition might come to prevail in the mind of some future French Government and he could not confine his outlook merely to the present situation. He added that the analogy offered by the case of Germany appeared to him to be at least incomplete, for both the people of Germany and the different States were represented at Berlin, whereas Spain was offered no voice in the councils of the Sultan at Fez.

M. Geoffray also had some conversation with Señor Garcia Prieto on the subject of the security for existing loans. On this point he repeated that, in his opinion, the French Government would be compelled to uphold the arrangements on the strength of which the loans had been obtained.

Señor Garcia Prieto said that, in a recent conversation with the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, M. de Selves had not entirely closed the door against a reconsideration of this question. The French Foreign Minister had expressed his willingness that Señor Perez Caballero should discuss it with M. Guyot, representative of the French holders of the loans. Señor Garcia Prieto was only waiting to receive Señor Perez Caballero's written report of the conversation before sending him instructions as to the language he should hold to M. Guyot.

Señor Garcia Prieto subsequently repeated to me much of what he had already said to my French colleague. Though not discouraged as to the final issue of the

negotiation, he feared that it must necessarily drag on for some time. The distance between the two points of view was still too great to admit of their being easily adjusted. Moreover, nothing was yet known here about Tangier. His Excellency had had a conversation with Señor Maura, the conservative leader, on the bearing of the embryo Tangier regulations on the more general question of the regime of the Spanish zone. Señor Maura had expressed his conviction that England would never consent to the administration of the Moorish debt—a prevailingly French institution which must now become more French than ever—exercising its extensive functions in the custom-house and other tax-gathering departments of the port of Tangier. Why then should Spain submit to such an irksome control? The intervention of the Fez Government would be equally intolerable, in the ex-Prime Minister's opinion, at Tangier and throughout the Spanish zone.

Touching on the subject of the Fez–Tangier Railway, Señor Garcia Prieto remarked that, as the longer section would lie within the French zone, France would of course claim a predominent position on the Board of Directors, and this nominally mixed undertaking would fall more and more under French control. Past experience did not allow Spain to count too much on French authority being employed in a friendly manner where Spanish interests were concerned. In this connection his Excellency mentioned an incident of which I had recently seen a brief notice in the Spanish press. M. Boisset, French consular representative at El Kasr, had gone to Fez to purchase a Makhzen building situated in El Kasr, which the Spanish authorities were using by right of military occupation, as a storehouse for material belonging to the general staff. By this act, M. Poisset showed that he had not yet been able to bring himself to recognise the Spanish occupation, which was at least a *de facto* one.

Señor Garcia Prieto hoped that the French Government would not make trouble over this affair, which only showed how unwilling the French local agents were to adopt the friendly attitude which, no doubt, the French Government desired them to assume towards the agents of Spain.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN

[1429] No. 13.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 9, 1912.

M. CAMBON discussed to-day the Franco-Spanish negotiations.

He said that it was impossible for Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Diplomatists to settle the complicated financial questions which were involved in any change affecting the security for the Moorish loan. These questions could be dealt with only by financial experts. The Spanish proposal to take the collection of the customs dues out of the hands of the creditors of Morocco, and to give in return to the creditors a Spanish guarantee for the equivalent of what was due to them from the customs of the Spanish zone, would require an investigation by experts that would take months.

Apparently, it would involve the repayment of part of the loan by Spain, and that would lead to a similar operation for the rest of the loan in the French zone. The part secured by the customs of Tangier would also have to be dealt with. Possibly, an arrangement might be come to by which Spain would agree that the collection of the customs as at present should continue in the Spanish zone for a year, during which the question should be investigated by a Franco-Spanish committee of financial experts

I said that I would make this suggestion on my own responsibility to the Spanish Ambassador if some compromise could be arranged as to the application of general regulations in Morocco to the Spanish sphere. The Spanish Ambassador had told me that his Government were very much upset by the French proposal to subject the Spanish zone to regulations drawn up in Fez and issued from there.

M. Cambon observed that it ought to be easy to arrange this. There were certain matters which must come under general regulations issued for the whole of Morocco, but they were few in number. Those which occurred to him at the moment were customs dues, which were regulated by international treaties, currency, and posts and telegraphs. A list might be made and agreed to of the three or four matters which must come under general regulations, and for other matters there might be some great Moorish representative of the Sultan, a sort of Moorish Viceroy, appointed for the Spanish zone; and the regulations for this zone might be issued by him in consultation

with the Spanish authorities. The French Government earnestly desired a settlement, and were prepared to put Spain in her sphere in a position similar to that which France occupied in the French sphere.

M. Cambon then spoke of the railway, and said that it would have to be put up to tender, and would eventually be managed as a commercial concern. The railways in Spain itself had been made with French money, and were managed largely by Frenchmen. He thought that Franco-Spanish management of railways in Morocco might be arranged without difficulty. He also mentioned the subject of the State Bank.

I told him that I would see the Spanish Ambassador to-morrow, and would put before him, as my own suggestions for a reasonable settlement, the proposals as to the customs and the issue of regulations that we had been discussing. M. Cambon readily acquiesced in doing this, and I understood from him that M. de Selves would be prepared to accept a settlement on these lines.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1555] No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1912.

I HAVE discussed Franco-Spanish negotiations with both French and Spanish Ambassadors here separately. As a result of these conversations, I have told Spanish Ambassador that following appears to me a fair and possible arrangement of two chief difficulties:—

1. Regulations issued by Sultan from Fez of general application to Morocco, including Spanish zone, should be limited to certain specified subjects. These would be very few in number, such as tariff, coinage, posts and telegraphs. Regulations on all other subjects for Spanish zone would be issued by a Moorish khalifa or viceroy appointed by Sultan for Spanish zone, and would be drawn up by him in consultation with Spanish authorities.

2. It should be part of the agreement between France and Spain that collection of customs in Spanish zone continues as at present for one year. During that time a Franco-Spanish committee of financial experts will examine how security for Moorish loan can be rearranged, as, for instance, by the Spanish proposal for a guarantee.

Spanish Ambassador urged that Spain should be consulted beforehand about all general regulations; this will be difficult, for French Ambassador is evidently of opinion that previous consultation with Spain might involve so much delay as to be obstructive or impossible. But I think some formula might be found, as, for instance, that such general regulations should be settled at Fez, but not actually enforced in Spanish zone without approval of Sultan's representative there.

You should inform your French colleague of this and be guided by it in negotiations when resumed. You can also inform Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs of first paragraphs of this telegram, but you should not mention my suggestion in penultimate paragraph for meeting Spanish demand for previous consultation till you have discussed this with your French colleague and it is known whether or not French Government are opposed to anything of the kind.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 6.)

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[990] No. 15.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 5. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1912.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 359, Confidential, of the 30th ultimo on the subject of the method of construction and payment of the works at Casa Blanca necessary for the protection of lighters, and I entirely approve the action you have taken and your views as to the best manner of proceeding in this matter.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

You should therefore propose that the work should be submitted to an adjudication or *marché de gré à gré après concours*. If, however, there is no time for this course to be pursued, you should support the proposal favoured by M. de Rappard.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1770] No. 16.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Tangier, January 5, 1912.*

AT the beginning of the week Mr. Harris recounted to me an incident which he appeared to think was largely responsible for the sudden and violent recrudescence of hostilities on the part of the Riffians.

About six weeks ago, when fighting was still going on, the Riffians sent four ambassadors to Tangier bearing letters to the various Ministers, in which they set forth their grievances against the Spaniards and implored the intervention of the Powers, in order that peace might be established on a durable basis.

The bearer of the letter to the German Minister succeeded in reaching the legation and delivering his letter. The German charge d'affaires told him it was a matter in which he could not possibly intervene, and referred him to the Makhzen. He, however, sent the letter up by the interpreter of the German Legation to Sid Mohammed Guebbas. About an hour later the interpreter of the Spanish Legation arrived in haste at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, saw Guebbas, and insisted upon the arrest of four Riffians, who, he said, were known by the Spanish police to have entered the town and were guilty of innumerable crimes against the Spanish authorities. Guebbas appears to have yielded to the demand under considerable pressure, the orders for their arrest were issued, and the messenger who had delivered his letter at the German Legation was caught and imprisoned. The remaining three succeeded in escaping and returned to the Riff. One may be sure that the story of what had befallen them and their comrade has lost nothing in the telling.

Before reporting this incident officially I thought it best to verify it, although I imagined that Mr. Harris must be pretty certain of his facts, as he was telegraphing on the subject to the "Times." Ali Zaky Bey has informed me that it is absolutely correct. He shares Mr. Harris's view that the effect produced will be deplorable, and that the incident may very possibly account for the increased bitterness and determination which is being shown by the Riffians. He went on to speak of what the attitude of the natives might be expected to be when the Spaniards obtained a free hand in their zone. His prognostications are distinctly gloomy. He anticipates that the whole country will be overrun with the riff-raff of the population of Southern Spain, as, indeed, has happened at Tangier. Every little post, no matter how insignificant, will be taken from the Moors and given to the Spaniards. The former will grow more and more exasperated, disturbances will begin in the country, which the Spaniards, for whom the Moors already have the greatest contempt, will be unable to quell, and after a short time the situation throughout all the hinterland of Tetuan and Laraiche will be the same as in the Riff. There will be no security outside the walls of the towns and the range of the guns defending them.

There is no doubt a certain amount of foundation for Ali Zaky's fears, but I trust that his view is unnecessarily gloomy.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[1771] No. 17.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Tangier, January 7, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Casablanca containing information in regard to public opinion at Marrakesh, and the probable attitude of the southern kaïds to the French and the Glawi family.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 17.

Consul Madden to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Casablanca, January 4, 1912.*

MR. LENNOX informed me lately that a French officer, who had been to call on him, has arrived in Marrakesh to recruit 2,500 native soldiers. The French are making many demands on the Basha, which appear to give him a great deal of worry.

Frequent meetings between El Emtoogi and the kaïds are and have been taking place lately. Mulai Mustapha and Hadj Thami tell Mr. Lennox that the discussions have been relative to a verbal message from the Sultan that they should attack Si el Madani el Glawi on his return, and also the French, when they go to Marrakesh, but none of the kaïds will run the risk. The Sultan promised El Emtoogi that Si el Madani should not return to Marrakesh, but Mulai Hafid now says that the Europeans have overruled him. It appears that this had been talked of in Fez before Hadj Thami left there, and he decided to rush for Marrakesh, so that if there were any move against his brother he would be able to oppose it, and he has sent out strong escorts to meet Si el Madani at the river with Glawa tribesmen, so Mr. Lennox tells me.

Hadj Thami left Casablanca one Friday at 1 a.m., and reached Marrakesh the following Sunday morning, without incident. Si el Madani left here on the morning of the 29th ultimo, and travelled in the general's motor to the river, besides hiring another motor for his suite.

Public opinion in Marrakesh, Mr. Lennox says, is that Si el Madani will not be content to sit idle, but Hadj Thami assures Mr. Lennox that his brother can or will do nothing. It seems unlikely that El Emtoogi will do anything against Si el Madani as he has sent presents to the latter's family; but El Emtoogi has never again made friends with Hadj Thami since an incident which occurred when Hadj Thami was fighting for Abd-el-Aziz. Si el Madani is to lodge in El Menebhi's house.

Mr. Lennox also informs me of a visit he had had from a scribe of the Basha of Marrakesh, a man who was secretary to one of Hafid's missions to Europe, and later to El Mokri in Paris, and who holds a French decoration. This man stated to Mr. Lennox that the Basha Drees wold Mennou had received orders from the Sultan to procure a first-class English doctor and lady doctor for the palace, a proper contract being made. Mr. Lennox replied that he did not see the need of this, as they had now French doctors, and there are English missionary practitioners at hand.

Mr. Lennox asked my opinion on the subject, and I replied that, in my opinion, he should discourage the idea, which I did not think suitable under present conditions.

Another matter that I would beg leave to mention to your Excellency is the action of the kaïds round Marrakesh in endeavouring to secure for themselves all the Makhzen land they can get now. Mulai Hafid, Mr. Lennox hears, has been making presents of many of the best Makhzen gardens at Marrakesh to his favourites. Hafid is said to have written to Basha Drees wold Mennou to the effect that he had done his utmost to resist the French without success, and that now the kaïds must do as they like, but Mulai Mustapha is convinced that the latter will not make a move against the French.

Writing to me on the 31st December, Mr. Lennox says that the kaïds had another gathering in the garden of an influential Efki named Sebaie the day previous to his writing. No authentic report as to what was discussed can, however, be obtained, but it is thought that it might have reference to the approaching return of Si el Madani. Si Teeb Mokri, an influential member of the Makhzen at Fez is believed, also, to be trying to make money by inviting the recently deposed kaïds to come to Fez, promising to use his influence to restore them.

Mr. Lennox also remarks to me that the delay in the conclusion of the negotiations with Spain is having some effect on the public mind. People are much surprised that the Spaniar can resist the French, when the Germans had to give way at Agad. There are also wild stories of the kaïds at their meetings having united to resist the French, stories of the cafes, which, nevertheless, show the trend of thought lately prevailing in the City of Marrakesh.

I beg to enclose herewith copy of an article which appeared in the local Casablanca journal relative to the sale of lands by the Basha of Marrakesh, Drees wold Mennou.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 17.

Extract from the "Vigie marocaine" of January 3, 1912.

BILLET DE MARRAKESCH.

"L'ATTITUDE du pacha de la ville, Si Driss Mennou, ne répond que trop aux craintes qui avaient marqué sa nomination à un tel poste. En outre des vexations qu'il fait subir à ses contribuables, il s'applique à réaliser par tous les moyens une fortune personnelle, dont l'édification laissera la ville complètement dénuée de ressources. C'est ainsi qu'il vend tous les terrains et immeubles makhzen dont la location constituait une source de revenus aisée pour le Trésor en même temps que légère au contribuable, à qui il est indifférent de payer son loyer à l'État ou à tout autre propriétaire. Ces revenus dilapidés au plus grand profit de ce peu intéressant fonctionnaire menacent d'être complètement taris pour le futur budget si une prompte décision n'intervient pas."

Casablanca, mercredi, 3 janvier, 1912.

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[656] No. 18.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1912.

M. DAESCHNER called at the Foreign Office on the 3rd instant with reference to the negotiations now proceeding between France and Spain at Madrid.

After expressing the desire of the French Government to receive the support of His Majesty's Government, M. Daeschner stated that, in connection with the rectification of frontiers which the Spanish Government would be asked to concede to France as a set-off against the concessions which France had been obliged to make to Germany, the French Government would, in addition to the demands already put forward, propose a slight modification of the eastern boundary of the Spanish zone, which is at present formed, at the northern end, by the course of the Muluya River.

M. Daeschner explained that, according to information recently obtained on the spot, the river was an unsatisfactory boundary, because the same tribe was settled on both banks The French Government therefore propose that the boundary should run along the watershed west of the river, leaving both banks of the latter in Algerian territory. The boundary line would reach the sea at Cape Agua, and "therefore" the Chafarinas Islands would of course also fall to France.

On being asked whether these demands were to be put forward now, although it had, as His Majesty's Government understood, been agreed at Madrid that, following the recent precedent of the Franco-German negotiations, the rights to be conceded to Spain in the Spanish zone should be settled first, and the question of the price to be paid by Spain should meanwhile stand over, M. Daeschner gave it to be understood that M. Geoffray had already been instructed to put these new territorial demands forward.

It was admitted to M. Daeschner that practical difficulty was sometimes caused by a frontier running through the middle of a territory inhabited by the same tribes, but he was reminded that the Chafarinas Islands were actually Spanish possessions, and were cherished by Spain for their value from a naval point of view, should the Spanish plan of creating a large harbour in the lagoon of Mar Chica ever come to be realised.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1862] No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 15, 1912.

IN discussing with me on the 10th instant the terms of the proposed Franco-Spanish agreement respecting Morocco, M. Cambon adverted to the question of the Tangier municipality. M. de Selves had gathered from your recent communication that what we proposed was an arrangement in all respects similar to the foreign settlements at Shanghai. Such an arrangement was, in his view, quite impossible in view of the different character of the two places and the different position occupied by the native element there.

It was explained to M. Cambon that it had not been intended to suggest that the model of Shanghai should be precisely copied at Tangier. There were, however, certain principles governing the municipal administration of the international settlement at Shanghai which could with advantage be adapted to the needs of the Moorish municipality. The essential thing was that such powers as were exercised by the foreign community at Shanghai should, generally speaking, be definitely delegated to the body of foreign residents at Tangier, who should be placed in a position of independence of any native opposition to measures properly pertaining to the functions of municipal government. The Shanghai Land Regulations and Bye-Laws cover most of this ground, and might from this point of view present certain useful analogies. It was not desired to press such analogies too far.

M. Cambon expressed the opinion that there should be representation of the native element in the municipality, but he agreed that this would have to be so arranged as to leave real authority in all matters to the European residents and their representatives.

His Excellency intimated that the French Government would welcome any British proposals for the creation of a municipality at Tangier, and were ready to consider any views or suggestions we might wish to put forward in the most friendly spirit.

I adhere, however, to the opinion expressed in my despatch to your Excellency, No. 522 of the 11th ultimo, that, once the general principle is agreed to that the European community should be given real control over all municipal affairs, and that the Sultan's or Makhzen's authority must be eliminated by an unequivocal delegation of powers to a municipal body independent of Moorish control, the details of the scheme would be best left to be elaborated by the diplomatic body at Tangier.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2458] No. 20.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, January* 17, 1912.

SIR A. NICOLSON'S telegram of 15th January.

I informed Zakki Bey privately yesterday that if the Moorish mission were sent to salute His Majesty the King at Gibraltar His Majesty would receive them on 31st January, but that of course I should have to be approached officially on the subject. He said that he would telegraph at once to Mokri to say that he gathered from me that proposal to send mission would be favourably received, and to recommend that it should be made at once. He said that he would have to telegraph through the French Legation so as to use their cypher. I saw no objection.

French chargé d'affaires informs me that he is sending the message, but that he considered it his duty to express opinion to his Government that, if by that date Franco-German agreement had been ratified, the Sultan's representative ought to be presented to the King by the French representative in Morocco.

By the ratification of the agreement he considered that French protectorate had been established, and that this opportunity should be taken to emphasise it. I abstained from giving an opinion, but said that the question would have to be settled by our Governments. (End of R.)

The pretension appears to me preposterous, as I do not see how protectorate can be considered to have come into force until the agreement is adhered to by all the Powers.

[2487] No. 21.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 10.) *Madrid, January 13, 1912.*

Sir,

I HAVE had the honour to receive your telegram No. 1 of the 10th instant, containing suggestions as to a possible arrangement of the two chief difficulties which have presented themselves in the course of the negotiations now proceeding between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador at Madrid. The Spanish Ambassador in London had also reported by telegraph the result of his conversation with you, and in the afternoon of the 11th instant Señor Hontoria, Under-Secretary of State, called on me, by desire of Señor Garcia Prieto, in order to inform me that the Spanish Government, which was grateful for the interest you were taking in the matter, had replied to Señor Villa Urrutia to the effect that your suggestions would be submitted to the Council of Ministers.

At the same time Señor Hontoria expressed to me his fear that the Spanish Government would find it difficult to agree to the drawing up by the Makhzen alone (which meant the French Government) of any general regulations whatever for application in the Spanish zone. He said that Spain could not understand why she should be called upon to renounce the complete liberty of action which in a solemn treaty was secured to her in the event of certain things happening, which had now happened. His remarks referred, he said, not only to the general regulations, but to the question of the intervention, which France continues to claim on behalf of the holders of loans and of the French Treasury, in the control of the receipts of the Moorish custom-houses and other centres for the collection of revenue. He could not believe that such intervention could be tolerated under the new régime contemplated for Tangier. Recent experience in that port had shown that the Administration of the Debt, which France desired to maintain, was likely to be in perpetual conflict with the municipal and other international boards exercising authority there. But if internationalised Tangier was bound in her own interest to shake off such extraneous control, and to find some other way of satisfying the legitimate and undisputed demands of the loanholders, much more would Spain, a weak nation standing single-handed against the wealth and power of France, be compelled, before undertaking to administer her zone, to claim for herself within it the entire independence of action to which she had a treaty right endorsed by England. Little, he thought, would be gained by postponing the question for a year, for the mixed Franco-Spanish committee proposed by your second suggestion would be certain to disagree, and matters would remain as they were. France, he continued, was manifestly determined to keep in her own hands, by means of the Administration of the Debt, an effective control over the ports in the Spanish zone. There was no sufficient reason of a merely financial nature why she should hold out on this point. The entire yield for the whole of Morocco of the customs and other taxes assigned to the service of the loans and of the French war indemnity did not exceed 20,000,000 pesetas a-year. But the yield for the ports of Tetuan and Laraiche, the only ones for which Spain would become responsible, amounted together to only about 1,000,000 pesetas. It was unreasonable that for one-twentieth of the entire security France should seek to keep up the powers of the Administration of the Debt, in view of the ample alternative security offered by Spain to replace it. Señor Hontoria believed no Spanish statesman could be found to acquiesce in this entirely unjust and unreasonable pretension. Although Señor Hontoria's anti-French bias is well known, it seems to me right to report his language as held to me presumably under instructions from the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I discussed the points suggested in your telegram on the following morning with M. Geoffray. His Excellency was already acquainted with their purport through a telegram which he had received from Paris repeating one from M. Paul Cambon. On the first point, namely, the reservation of a restricted number of specified subjects for regulation by the Makhzen, his Excellency had already replied to his Government in a telegram, which he had the goodness to read to me. He expressed his opinion that there was no prospect of the Spanish Government accepting the position of being merely the interpreters in the Spanish zone of regulations presumably framed under French dictation, whatever might be their subject-matter. He renewed the advice already repeatedly tendered by him that all matters subject to general regulation, including public works, as well as the matters mentioned in your proposal,

should be discussed by a joint Franco-Spanish commission, whose recommendations would then be embodied by the Makhzen in general regulations applicable throughout the country by the authorities in control.

I mentioned to M. Geoffray that you were inclined to think that the Spanish reluctance to accept general regulations framed without the concurrence of Spain might be overcome by the adoption of some formula to the effect that, though settled at Fez, the general regulations concerning specified subjects might be enforced by Spain in her zone without the previous approval of the representative of the Sultan. M. Geoffray seemed to think that the powers of the Sultan's representative in the Spanish zone would in any case be limited by his subservience to advice tendered by Spain, and that the question would not be affected either way by any stipulation regarding the approval or non-approval of that official.

On the other point, namely the prolongation for a year of the existing control over the customs and other sources of revenue, pending examination of the question of finding some other security for the loans, &c., by a committee of financial experts, M. Geoffray, if I rightly understood his telegram, recommended your suggestion to his Government as one that ought to lead, if adopted in a conciliatory spirit by both Governments, to a solution of this difficulty. It was, he urged, a financial question, as to which it was natural that competent experts should be fully consulted.

Later in the day I had a conversation with Señor Garcia Prieto. On the first point his Excellency merely repeated what Señor Hontoria had said to me the day before. On the second, though evidently mistrusting the intentions of France and continuing to believe that she would never willingly surrender her virtual control over the ports through the instrumentality of the Administration of the Debt, he said that he would consult the Cabinet as to the form in which your proposition might be accepted by the Spanish Government and submitted as part of the Spanish reply to the French proposals now under consideration. He had no doubt, however, that the Cabinet would require the insertion of a clause making it clear that under no circumstances could Spain consent to a continuance of the existing French control after the expiration of the stipulated year.

Señor Garcia Prieto repeatedly expressed to me the hope that the pending Ministerial crisis in Paris might lead to the formation of a new French Government, which should be inspired with more friendly sentiments towards Spain than that presided over by M. Caillaux.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[2589] No. 22.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 42.) *Paris, January 18, 1912.*

Sir,

IN a note of the 6th instant I made a representation to the French Government in the sense indicated in your despatch No. 8 of the 3rd instant respecting the agreement reported to have been signed between the Mannesmann Mining Syndicate and the Union des Mines for the fusion of their commercial interests in Morocco. I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the reply, dated the 16th instant, which I have received from the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that nothing has resulted from the negotiations between the two above-mentioned groups, which remain free to act independently.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Poincaré.

L'AMBASSADE d'Angleterre à Paris a entretenu, par une note du 6 de ce mois, le département des conditions de l'entente projetée entre l'Union des Mines marocaines et le Syndicat de MM. Mannesmann.

F.O. 371/1150
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, a l'honneur de faire connaître à l'Ambassade d'Angleterre que les négociations dont il s'agit n'ont pas abouti et que chacun des groupes susvisés a conservé sa liberté d'action.

Il saisit, d'ailleurs, cette occasion pour déclarer que le Gouvernement de la république sera toujours heureux de voir des associations d'intérêt se produire entre les ressortissants français et anglais au Maroc.

Le 16 janvier, 1912.

[2724] No. 23.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, January 19, 1912.*

AS the result of a long conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning the French Ambassador is telegraphing to the French Government to the following effect:—

Before negotiations can usefully proceed an understanding is essential on the two questions of general regulations and the security for loans. Spanish Government would accept proposals made in your telegram No. 1 with following modifications. As regards general regulations on the four subjects suggested by you Spanish Government require that they should not be issued by the Sultan without previous agreement between the French and Spanish Governments. As regards security for loans Spanish Government demands that, failing agreement by the proposed mixed committee on the question of an alternative security to the existing one, arrangement proposed in article 6 of Spanish counter-project shall be adopted at the conclusion of one year.

On this point French Ambassador is sure that the French Government will not bind themselves as to what they will do in the event of mixed committee reaching no conclusion. He urges, however, that something should be agreed to on the lines of your proposal.

On point 1 he supports the Spanish demand adding only suggestions that matters subject to general regulations shall be made to include regulations affecting persons and property such as marriage, inheritance, &c. This would, of course, be unwelcome to the Spanish Government, who prefer very restricted list of subjects for general regulations. In conversation with me afterwards Minister for Foreign Affairs insisted strongly on Spanish view of these questions. He assured me that all the party leaders, including republican, agreed with him that Spain should refuse to take over her zone subject to servitudes of the nature of French guarantees which would make it impossible for her to open new ports or institute a new tax in the existing ports without the concurrence of the holders of the loans. He said that the highest financial authorities in Paris had assured the Spanish Ambassador that there was no legal obstacle to the acceptance immediately of a new security obviously at least as good as the old one. In these circumstances the Spanish Government and, he added, the King were firmly resolved to conclude no convention which should imply indefinite continuance of present system.

Although the Minister for Foreign Affairs held much the same language to the French Ambassador, the latter is still under the impression that the Spanish Government desire to treat, and he is doing what he can to persuade, the French Government to take up a conciliatory attitude. He has advised the French Government to confer again with you before sending him fresh instructions.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[2458] No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 20, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 3 of 20th January to Tangier.

If you think it necessary you should privately suggest to Minister for Foreign Affairs that the occasion of the King's visit to Gibraltar would not be a suitable one to raise a question of the nature indicated by the French chargé d'affaires.

[2458] No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 20, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 3 of 17th January.

If the Sultan officially asks that his representative should be received by the King at Gibraltar, the only proper person to present such representative to His Majesty is yourself. Before a French protectorate becomes an actual fact the Franco-German agreement would have to be accepted by all the Powers signatory of the Algeciras Act. If any difficulty is likely to arise about this it would be better to let the proposal to send a Moorish representative drop altogether.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 12.)

[3068] No. 26.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, January 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 3 of 20th January.

French chargé d'affaires called on me this afternoon and read me a telegram from his Government stating that the Grand Vizier would send a mission to salute the King at Gibraltar, provided that they were certain of being received.

He was to enquire of me whether I could give assurance to this effect. I replied that, as I had already informed him, the matter had so far been treated quite privately, but that you had informed me that if official application were made the mission would be received. French chargé d'affaires then added that his Government had further stated that in the event of my reply being in the affirmative they would send a cruiser to convey the mission to Gibraltar with French representative, who would present them to the King.

I said that His Majesty's Government considered that the only person who could present the Sultan's representative to the King was myself, as in their opinion Franco-German agreement would have to be accepted by all the Powers signatory of the Algeciras Act before the protectorate became actual fact. He said that he could not agree with this view, as each Power maintained its sovereign right to adhere to a convention and act accordingly independently of the action of other Powers. I replied that even were this the case the Franco-German convention did not actually establish a protectorate, but merely laid down that in the event of France being led to extend her protection in Morocco Germany would take no objection.

French chargé d'affaires, however, maintained his view, and said he would refer the matter to his Government, who would no doubt come to some agreement with you. I said that I thought that it would be better to allow the whole matter to drop if there were any danger of its creating difficulties. He said that unfortunately there was a growing party in France who held the view that England was continually placing spokes in French wheel in Morocco; if England, after adhering to the convention, were to deny to France rights she had gained under it, bad impression would be produced. I observed that I personally could not admit the argument on which his contention in the matter was based. It was, moreover, quite possible that the convention would not have received the sanction of the Senate before the King's arrival at Gibraltar, in which case the question would not arise. French chargé d'affaires admitted this.

I cannot help being surprised that the French Government should have adopted M. de Billy's view, which appears to me untenable.

In any case it would seem imperative that the point raised should be definitely cleared up; otherwise the door will be left open for all sorts of pretensions on the part of the French Government.

F.O. 413/56
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

[3068] No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 22, 1912.*

[MOORISH mission.]

Tangier telegram No. 5 of 22nd January.

Please approach Minister for Foreign Affairs personally, and explain to him that, for reasons given in my telegram No. 3 of 20th January to Sir R. Lister, His Majesty's Government cannot agree with views of French chargé d'affaires at Tangier.

Proposal for mission originated with the Sultan, and the King consented to receive them at Gibraltar as representatives of the ruler of a friendly and neighbouring State. On the hypothesis that they represent not an independent State, but a French protectorate, there would be no point in the King receiving them at all, any more than representatives of the Dey of Tunis, after His Majesty had been greeted by the French fleet at Malta.

Sooner, therefore, than that any divergence of opinion should come between the two Governments in this matter, His Majesty's Government would prefer that no mission should be sent.

(Repeated to Tangier.)

[3106] No. 28.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

No. 6.)
ir, *Tangier, January 8, 1912.*

I REGRET to have to trouble you with a question which is arising with more frequency every year in connection with the issue of semsars' certificates to British firms who are represented in this country by agents only. Some of these firms are important business houses doing a large trade with Morocco but are represented here by foreign agents who all hold the full number of semsars permitted by treaty in their own name, and who seek to obtain further protégés by applying for semsars' certificates through the British firms for whom they are agents.

As an illustration of this I would quote the case of Messrs. Peek, Frean, and Co., who have recently applied for a second semsar at Casa Blanca where they already hold one. There is no doubt as to the importance of the firm in question, or that it does a considerable trade with this country; but in granting a semsars' certificate to their nominee British protection is extended not only to the interests of the British firm in the hands of the proposed semsar but also to those of the Moor himself and those of the agent (in this instance a German subject).

In most cases, as in this, the person for whom the application is made is in no sense the agent of the firm applying for the certificate, but merely a client who purchases goods through their agent, so it can scarcely be held that the issue of a semsar's certificate in their favour will be instrumental in increasing British trade.

The number of such protégés an unscrupulous agent might thus obtain would only be limited by the number of agencies of firms he could secure, in each of whose names he might apply for two semsars.

The practice of granting semsars to firms in Europe who have no business house open in Morocco is in itself an abuse in which this legation has had to follow the custom pursued by other legations, but in cases similar to that cited above, where the agent is a foreign subject, I would submit that a Mokhalata certificate, which protects the holder from illegal arrest (see article 60 of the Madrid convention of 1880), is sufficient to protect the interests of the British merchant in the hands of the Moor, and obviates the possibility of abuse of the system of protection by foreign agents obtaining semsars in the name of the British firms they represent over and above the number they are entitled to in their own name.

I should be glad, therefore, if I might be furnished with an opinion on this point as it is practically certain that some of the applicants will refer their applications to the Foreign Office when they are refused by me.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[3110] No. 29.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Tangier, January 14, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 337 of the 12th November last, I have the honour to report that the French chargé d'affaires informed me yesterday that he had applied for the dismissal of Hadj Dris Mennou from the post of Basha of Marrakesh, as it had recently come to light that he had been mixed up in all sorts of transactions for the sale of Makhzen lands. I am instructing Mr. Macleod to support the representations of M. de Billy, at Fez, and shall then press for the reinstatement of Hadj Thami as basha.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[3111] No. 30.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Tangier, January 15, 1912.*

AS I had the honour to report to my telegram No. 155 of the 18th November last, an agreement was come to in the course of that month between the Union des Mines marocaines and the Brothers Mannesmann, according to which a new company was to be formed, 40 per cent. of which was to be held by the Union des Mines, 40 per cent. by the Mannesmanns, and the remaining 20 per cent. by a consortium of French banks.

Mr. Harris now informs me that on the 13th of December, Messrs. Mannesmann wrote to the Union des Mines stating that, as the French banks refused to take up their participation, they (the Mannesmanns) repudiated the agreement and proposed that another should be made by which the total capital should be shared equally between the two companies. Their proposal, they said, was a most generous one, as their holdings were four times as valuable as those of the Union des Mines. As a matter of fact, the statement made by the Mannesmanns with regard to the refusal of the banks to take up their participation was absolutely untrue, as in the afternoon of the very day on which the letter was written the committee of the consortium of banks held a meeting, and passed a resolution which appeared favourable to the formation of the proposed association.

The Union des Mines replied to the Mannesmanns' communication by return of post. They acknowledged the repudiation of the agreement, they declined the Mannesmanns' proposal, observing that their valuation of the syndicate's holdings eventually differed very considerably from that put upon them by the Mannesmanns, and they claimed complete liberty of action in the future.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[3088] No. 31.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 47.)
Sir, *Paris, January 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 21 of the 13th instant, recording a conversation which took place on the 3rd instant at the Foreign Office with the French Minister at London on the subject of the Franco-Spanish negotiations.

The Chafarinas Islands were mentioned by M. Daeschner as necessarily falling to France as a consequence of the modification of the eastern boundary of the Spanish zone in the neighbourhood of the Muluya River to which Spain would be asked to agree.

In this connection, I have the honour to refer you to Sir Edmund Monson's despatch No. 233, Secret and Confidential, of the 22nd April, 1904, in which an account is given of an interview with the Marquis del Muni, Spanish Ambassador at Paris, who was at that time negotiating with M. Delcassé for an agreement respecting the French and Spanish zones in Morocco. The Marquis del Muni stated that M. Delcassé claimed

the Chafarinas Islands, which he (Marquis del Muni) declared to be "a most important strategical group, capable of being converted into a second Gibraltar."

In a further despatch (No. 241, Secret, of the 25th April, 1904) Sir Edmund Monson reports a further interview with the Marquis del Muni, in the course of which he observed that the terms of the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, by which France was bound not to erect fortifications on the Morocco coast, would not apply to these islands.

His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid reported in his telegram No. 28 of the 6th May, 1904, that he had learnt from the Spanish Minister of State that the pretension of France for the eventual extension of her sphere of influence to a point on the coast opposite the Chafarinas Islands had been withdrawn by M. Delcassé, and Señor San Pedro attributed this change to the influence of the Marquess of Lansdowne, for the exercise of which he expressed his gratitude.

I beg leave to submit for your consideration that, if these islands are to be given up by Spain to France, steps should be taken to secure an undertaking from France that they are to be regarded as covered by the stipulation in the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 for the non-fortification of the Moroccan coast.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[3086] No. 32.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

[By Post.]

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.)

Paris, January 22, 1912.

MOROCCO.

Tangier telegram No. 3 of 17th January Your reply No. 3 of 20th and your telegram No. 13 of 20th January to me.

I have spoken to M. Poincaré. He holds that, as soon as the French Government have concluded an agreement with the Makhzen for a protectorate after the ratification by the French Parliament of the Franco-German Convention, the French protectorate will be effective in regard to all those of the Powers signatories of the Act of Algeciras who have announced to the French Government their acceptance of the Franco-German Convention; but that as a Franco-Moorish agreement for the protectorate will not have been completed until after the passage of the King at Gibraltar there can be no doubt that His Majesty's Minister at Tangier would, in such circumstances, be the proper person to present to the King a Moorish mission.

M. Poincaré will telegraph instructions accordingly to the French chargé d'affaires at Tangier.

[3292] No. 33.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 12.)
Sir,

Madrid, January 19, 1912.

AS already reported in my despatch No. 10 of the 13th instant, I lost no time, after receiving your telegran No. 1 of the 11th instant, in talking over your helpful suggestions concerning the Franco-Spanish Morocco negotiations with Señor Hontoria, the Spanish Under-Secretary of State, with the French Ambassador, and with Señor Garcia Prieto, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Spanish Government seemed to be already so accurately informed with regard to them by a telegram received from Señor Villa Urrutia, that I did not then think it necessary to communicate to Señor Garcia Prieto an exact translation of the text of your suggestions as contained in your above-mentioned telegram. Understanding, however, from his Excellency a few days ago, that he was expecting a more formal communication from me in further explanation of what I had already said to him verbally, I gave him on the morning of the 17th instant a translation of the two paragraphs in question, which dealt respectively with the subject of the general regulations and with that of the security for loans and war

indemnity. I urged him strongly to embody them, as far as he could, in the counter-propositions, which I expressed the hope would now be drawn up without delay, and submitted to the French Ambassador, who, I knew, was impatiently awaiting them. His Excellency thanked me again for the kindly interest you were taking in the matter, and while repeating generally the views on your two points, which I have already made known to you, he promised to set to work at once on his new draft.

Late last night I received from his Excellency, under cover of a private letter, a text, which he said he had immediately prepared in order to show his willingness to proceed on the lines which you had been good enough to indicate. From the enclosed translation, you will see that on point No. 1 he practically adopts your proposal, subject to the important modification that the issue by the Sultan of the general regulations concerning tariffs, posts, telegraphs, and coinage shall be preceded in each case by an agreement between the French and Spanish Governments.

My French colleague thinks the Spanish demand on this point quite natural and fair, and he has again recommended his Government to accept it.

On point No. 2, Señor Garcia Prieto, while agreeing to the appointment of a mixed Franco-Spanish committee to study the question of an alternative security, inserts the strange proviso that, during the year set apart for the deliberations of the said committee, the arrangements proposed by Spain in her counter-proposition shall operate in the Spanish zone. In other words, he proposes that the guarantee of the Spanish State shall be immediately substituted for that of the customs and other assigned taxes. It is difficult to understand what, under these conditions, would be the use of appointing a mixed committee.

I pointed out to his Excellency to-day how illogical it was to seek to institute straight away the régime which it was supposed to be the task of the mixed committee to elaborate. This would be to beg the whole question at issue, and I strongly advised him not to submit such a preposterous proposal to the French Government. I said that a main point of your suggestion lay in the provision that existing arrangements should hold good throughout the year, during which the mixed committee would be devising a régime for the future, and I expressed the hope that he would revise his proposal on that principle.

His Excellency admitted that his proposal had no prospect of being adopted as it stood, and he confessed to me that he had given it the form to which I took exception, in the hope that you might be led on reading it to suggest to the French Government as a compromise that, if Spain accepted the continuance of the *status quo* for a year, France should agree in return that, in the event of the committee not coming to an agreement, the Spanish proposal pledging the credit of Spain as security for the loans should come in force on the expiration of that period.

I remarked that you would not be likely to make a proposal of this kind, for obviously, if adopted, it would be an inducement to the Spanish members of the mixed committee to disagree with the French members, for by doing so they would ensure the adoption, pure and simple, of the original Spanish proposal.

I added that some mutual confidence and goodwill were necessary in drawing up arrangements for the administration of the Spanish zone, and I urged the acceptance by Spain of the proposal made by you, in the event of the French Government being willing to adopt it.

Señor Garcia Prieto said that he would accept your formula, provided it could be amended so as to exclude the contingency of a continuance of the present system of French intervention in the customs, &c., after the expiration of the stipulated year. The leading Spanish statesmen of all parties, including Señor Azcarate, the distinguished jurist at the head of the Republican party, were unanimous in deprecating the assumption of the administration of the Spanish zone under the conditions sought to be imposed by France. Spain, if she yielded on this point, would find herself in constant conflict with the agents of France. She would be precluded from opening new ports, or imposing fresh taxation in those already opened. In short, she would be financially crippled, and it was unfair to expect her to undertake the expense of the civil and military government of her zone without placing in her hands the means of meeting it. Moreover, Señor Perez Caballero had been assured by bankers of the highest standing in Paris that no legal obstacle whatever stood in the way of the substitution of a new and better guarantee for the one at present in force. It was clear then that France had no motive in holding out on this point, which was of absolutely supreme importance to Spain, beyond the desire to retain in her hands the power to molest and hamper the Spanish Government in the difficult task which it was about to assume. He added that he could positively assure me that the King, as well

as the entire Government and all the Opposition leaders, were resolved to insist upon their full rights in this matter, as derived from a solemn treaty, under which entire liberty of action is secured to Spain on the extinction of the independent authority of the Sultan.

As a result of our separate interviews to-day with Señor Garcia Prieto, the French Ambassador has telegraphed in detail to his Government, recommending to their favourable attention the demands of the Spanish Government on the two above points. As regards the first, he suggests that regulations affecting property and personal status, *e.g.*, marriage, inheritance, &c., should be included in the category of general regulations. The Spanish Government of course would seek to restrict the number of subjects to be withdrawn from separate treatment by themselves in concert with the Sultan's High Commissioner for the Spanish zone. They would be likely, therefore, to resist the extension of the list proposed by you, which includes only tariffs, posts, telegraphs, and coinage.

M. Geoffray recommends further a settlement of the customs question on your lines, excluding naturally the Spanish addition, to the effect that, failing agreement, the Spanish solution should automatically come into force at the end of the first year.

The state of the negotiation at present is therefore one of abeyance pending agreement on the two questions, which are felt to dominate the whole subject of the future relations between France and Spain in Morocco. M. Geoffray advises his Government to confer again with you on these points. In his opinion, no material progress can be made without agreement between London and Paris. While fully agreeing with his Excellency in this respect, I am also convinced, by my conversations with the Spanish Foreign Minister and other Spainards, that Spain is likely to continue to resist desperately the maintenance of the régime for the collection within her zone of customs and certain other taxes which was instituted behind her back by direct arrangements between France and the Makhzen.

I may add that M. Geoffray was not dissatisfied with the tone assumed to-day by Señor Garcia Prieto in defending the Spanish case, and that he still thinks the Spanish Government are anxious to come to terms. My own feeling is that, though desiring a settlement, if one is obtainable on the basis of the complete independence of French control, Señor Garcia Prieto, in his present mood, would refuse to sign a treaty which did not secure that basis, and that he would be fully supported by Spanish opinion in so doing.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 33.

Text of certain Modifications agreed to by Spanish Government.

(Translation.)

THE Spanish Government are prepared to agree:—

1. That the regulations fixing customs duties, post and telegraph tariffs, and the amount of money to be coined shall be dictated by the Sultan from Fez, and shall be of general application to the whole of Morocco, . . . such regulations to be previously agreed upon between the French and Spanish Governments. The regulations regarding other questions in the Spanish zone shall be promulgated by the High Commissioner, after being drawn up by him in concert with the Spanish authorities.

2. TLat a Franco-Spanish mixed commission of experts shall study the legal and financial means of proceeding to the conversion of the loans, or some other formula, which, without prejudice to third parties, may permit of the free disposal of the guarantees in the Spanish zone, . . . it being understood between France and Spain that, in the meantime, article 6 of the Spanish counter-proposals shall be provisionally applied.

[3280]

No. 34.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 32.)

Berlin, January 22, 1912.

Sir,

IN my despatch No. 3 of the 3rd instant, I had the honour to report the result of a libel action arising out of an article printed in the "Grenzboten," in which certain newspaper were described as the "Mannesmann press," and were accused of misleading public opinion in regard to German intentions in Morocco at the instigation of those financiers. As stated in that despatch, a further action was brought against the "Grenzboten" by the "Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung," one of the newspapers attacked in the article in question, on account of the statements contained therein.

The action came up for trial at Essen on the 19th instant, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs.

In the course of the trial the editor of the "Grenzboten" stated that he had not intended to convey by the article that the newspapers had been in the pay of the Mannesmanns, but he asserted that they had derived the materials for their articles on Morocco from the Press Bureau maintained by the brothers.

The editor of the "Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung" said that he did not know the Mannesmann brothers, and had never been in communication with them, and that the articles in his paper on Morocco had been inspired purely by patriotic motives, and had been written with the full approval of the Foreign Office. He asked that Dr. Class, president of the Pan-German League, should be called as a witness to show that, at the desire of the editor, he had been in communication with Herr von Kiderlen, and had had a long conversation with him on the 19th April, 1911, in Mannheim, in the course of which his Excellency had said: "I support the policy of the partition of Morocco; the pan-German aspirations are thoroughly justified; we shall stick to Morocco; you may rely on me that you will be entirely satisfied with our Morocco policy; I am as pan-German as you are." Dr. Class had, the editor said, also seen Herr Zimmermann, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on the day of the dispatch of the "Panther" to Agadir, when Herr Zimmermann had said that Germany would keep Agadir. Germany required a field for her surplus population. Demands for compensation should not be raised in the press. Germany did not want compensation—she wanted Morocco. France intended to offer her the Congo. Dr. Class would, he continued, support this statement on oath. It was quite untrue that his paper had worked against the Government. At that time the German Government were in complete sympathy with pan-German policy. He desired further to call the editor of the "Tägliche Rundschau," who could state that the meeting of journalists, so often referred to, at which the occupation of a portion of Morocco was advocated, had not been convened by the Mannesmanns, as asserted by the defendants, but rather by the Foreign Office. The editor of the "Tägliche Rundschau" had been informed by Herr von Kiderlen ten days after the dispatch of the "Panther" that he was determined to pursue a strong Morocco policy, and that he wanted to get Mogador at least. This was much more than his paper had demanded, and it proved the incorrectness of the accusations levelled against it. He could prove, he said, that the paper had throughout the Morocco negotiations been in complete accord with the Foreign Office. He could prove that the Foreign Office had called upon all local authorities to report what interests German industrial firms had in Morocco, in support of Germany's claims in that country. He concluded by stating that after Mr. Lloyd George's speech the Foreign Office had "caved in."

The witnesses cited were not called, and, as stated above, a verdict was given for the plaintiffs, the defendants being condemned to pay a fine of 300 M. (15*l.*).

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[3428] No. 35.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, January 24, 1912.*

MOORISH mission to salute the King.

Mokri has telegraphed to Fez to propose to the Sultan that Guebbas, the Basha of Tangier, and Ali Zaki Bey be sent.

The Sultan's reply is expected at Tangier to-day or to-morrow. Choice appears satisfactory. Presume that cruiser will be sent to convey the mission and myself to Gibraltar on 29th.

[3540] No. 36.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, January 25, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 24th January.

French chargé d'affaires called on me to tell me that his Government had informed him that the Sultan had left the Grand Vizier full liberty of action with regard to the composition and dispatch of the mission. French chargé d'affaires said that he felt very nervous as to the impression which might be produced here among chauvinistic French journalists, who are always looking out for a pretext to attack Government, if a Moorish mission were sent on a British cruiser to salute the King at Gibraltar. I had observed in a former conversation, he said, that if the matter were to create difficulties it might be better to let the proposal drop, and he had come to ask me whether I thought that this could be done. I said that I would telegraph to you at once, but that he must undertake to make the situation quite clear with the Moorish authorities. At the present moment I was awaiting an official application from the Sultan. If you agree to drop the whole thing, that must of course not be sent. He said that, according to his information, which was much more recent than that of Zaky, application would have come from the Grand Vizier.

In any case, I have asked him to do nothing till I have received your reply.

Evidently the whole objection in the first instance originated with him, and he is now trying to save his face, but I imagine that it would be better to agree to his request.

[3540] No. 37.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 25, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 8 of 25th January: Moorish mission.

From Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 9 of 22nd January, repeated to you 23rd January, it is clear that French Government raise no objection to mission.

Matters have now gone too far to let proposal drop unless Sultan and Moorish Government themselves wish to do so, and even this would not in the circumstances be courteous to the King, who has approved reception of mission

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[3751] No. 38.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 13. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, January 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your despatch No. 5, Confidential, of the 11th instant with regard to the question of the method of construction and payment of the works at Casa Blanca necessary for the protection of lighters.

I at once caused enquiry to be made of M. Llorens, the assistant State engineer, as to how the matter stood at present, and whether any definite scheme had been

accepted by the Public Works Committee. M. Llorens stated that M. Porché's technical report had not yet been received, that he did not expect it for at least a week, but that he believed his chief was still inclined to favour the idea of the "épi."

I subsequently called upon the French charge d'affaires, and he showed me a telegram, copy of which is enclosed,* which he had just received from M. Porché, and which was being communicated to M. Philippeau, the engineer of the Public Works at Casa Blanca. As you will observe, the works now contemplated by M. Porché are on a very much larger scale than those previously suggested, and I gather that they will cost something like 50,000*l.* or 60,000*l.* I told M. de Billy that you still strongly maintained the view that the work ought to be submitted to a "marché de gré à gré après concours," unless this was rendered absolutely impossible by the time question; this, I added, I could hardly believe, as it was out of the question to imagine that any serious work could be begun at Casa Blanca in the present season in the appalling weather conditions which prevailed on the Atlantic coast—only a few days ago two more tugs were smashed to pieces by the violence of the waves. Now that there was a chance of the works to be executed being far more important, it appeared to me all the more necessary, in the interests of France, to do nothing which could give rise to the impression that she was trying to evade the principle of adjudication. Moreover, I warned him that he must be prepared for opposition on the committee to the scheme of payment which he had described to me, as the Dutch Minister had spoken to me on the subject when the last meeting was postponed at my request, and had given me clearly to understand that he would never agree to the work being considered as part of the Casa Blanca port works to be executed out of the funds of the Shawia indemnity, and consequently removed from the obligation of being put up to adjudication. I imagined that the German Minister held the same view. Both of them had delegates on the committee this year, whereas I had none. M. de Billy said that evidently the whole situation had been changed by M. Porché's new proposal, and he therefore felt unable to give me any definite reply. At the same time he appeared to me far more inclined to admit the possibility and advisability of a "marché de gré à gré après concours," and even discussed possible dates and terms of delay.

I have since seen the Dutch Minister, and he says he will certainly instruct his delegate to insist upon the adjudication "après concours" whenever the question comes up again for discussion.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[3752] No. 39.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)
Sir, *Tangier, January 22, 1912.*

AS I had the honour to report in my private telegram of the 1st instant, Ali Zakki Bey called upon me with the Basha of Tangier that day to congratulate me on the New Year, and in the course of conversation (in French, which the Basha does not understand) said that he thought it would be most desirable that the Sultan should send a representative to salute the King on his arrival at Gibraltar, as had been done when King Edward had passed through on his way from the Mediterranean. Ali Zakki said that of course, before making any proposal officially, it would be necessary to ascertain whether the King would receive such a representative, and asked me if I thought I could ascertain this. He was, he said, speaking to me quite privately, as Sid Guebbas knew nothing of his *démarche*, but I must say that I always imagined that he had been instructed by Sid Mokri in Paris to sound me on the subject. Sid Guebbas is often kept in ignorance of matters which are treated between Mokri and Ali Zakki, so that I was not surprised at his not having been informed. Ali Zakki pointed out that when the President of the Republic had been at Algiers, a representative of the Sultan had been sent to salute him; he felt sure that the impression produced in Morocco would be excellent if the King would now receive an envoy, and it would be of special importance in view of the position which Great Britain must certainly occupy in an internationalised Tangier. I replied that I personally saw

* Not printed.

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no objection to a mission being sent, but that I would refer the matter privately to you and ascertain the King's wishes in the matter.

On the receipt of Sir A. Nicolson's telegram of the 13th instant, I informed Zakki Bey that if it were decided to send a Moorish mission to Gibraltar the King would receive them on the 31st, but that of course I should have to be approached officially on the subject. Ali Zakki said that he would telegraph at once to Mokri to say that he gathered from me that if a proposal were made by the Moorish Government to send a mission to Gibraltar it would be favourably received, and to recommend that the proposal be made at once. He said that he would have to telegraph through the French Legation, as he had no cypher, but he did not imagine that there could be any objection to this. The telegram would be sent by him to Mokri merely through the channel of the legation. I assented, for I never for a moment imagined that it could create any difficulty; in fact, I thought that it was more than probable that the French Legation were fully aware of Ali Zakki's action in approaching me, as he rarely does anything without their knowledge or instructions.

I was therefore astounded when the French chargé d'affaires came to see me on the following morning, and told me that he had sent the telegram, but that he had felt it his duty to express the opinion to his Government that if by the date of the King's arrival in Gibraltar the Franco-German convention had received the sanction of the Senate, the Sultan's representative would have to be presented to the King by the French representative in Morocco. By the ratification of the agreement he considered that the French protectorate had been established, Great Britain had adhered to it, and this was an excellent opportunity of emphasising the fact. I must say that I have seldom been more taken aback by anything in my life. I thought it however better to say that I could express no opinion officially until I had referred the matter to you, but I let him see clearly that I personally could not admit his view. I heard nothing more of the matter for several days, and hoped that the French Government had not adopted M. de Billy's view, and that Mokri had been given a hint to let the matter drop, which would have been quite easy, as no official action had been taken in the matter. Yesterday, however, M. de Billy came to see me. He said that he had received a telegram from his Government informing him that Mokri wished very much to send the mission, and understood that in principle His Majesty's Government had no objection to its being dispatched; he must however be absolutely certain, before making any proposal, that it would be received. M. de Billy was consequently instructed to ascertain from me whether I could give such an assurance. He added that Mokri was afraid that Ali Zakki Bey might have been acting "on his own," and might not have reported the situation correctly to him. I recapitulated briefly to M. de Billy what had occurred: in the course of conversation some time ago, Ali Zakki Bey had said to me that he thought it would be an excellent thing if a Moorish Mission could be sent to Gibraltar to salute the King, as had been done in the case of King Edward and also the President of the French Republic when he visited Algiers, and had asked me whether I could ascertain whether such a mission, if sent, would be received. He was acting, he said, privately and without the knowledge of Guebbas, but I told M. de Billy that I had certainly been under the impression that El Mokri was aware of his *démarche*. I had replied that I would make inquiry privately, and on hearing from you that a mission if sent would be received had so informed Ali Zakki, adding that of course I should have to be approached officially in the matter, as so far everything had been private and consequently non-existent from the official point of view. Ali Zakki had then telegraphed to El Mokri through the French Legation. M. de Billy said he was very glad to think that all was arranged. Up to that moment he had said nothing as to the presentation of the mission, but he then produced his telegram once more from his Government, and read me the last paragraph, which was to the effect that if His Majesty's Government agreed to the reception of the mission the French Government would be glad to send a cruiser to Tangier to fetch the mission and the French representative, who would present them to the King.

I said that this procedure would not, I feared, meet the view of His Majesty's Government, who considered that the only person who could present the Sultan's representative to the King was myself; they held the opinion that the Franco-German agreement would have to be accepted by all the Powers signatory to the Act of Algeciras before the protectorate became an actual fact. M. de Billy combated this view. He said that in accordance with international law each Power maintained its sovereign right to adhere to a convention, and to act accordingly, independently of the action of other Powers. If the result of the adhesion of one Power was made conditional on the adhesion of others, then the sovereign right of the first Power to make or adhere to

treaties was infringed. I said that even were this the case, I did not consider that the Franco-German convention actually established the French protectorate. It merely stated that in the event of France being led to strengthen and extend her control and her protection in Morocco, Germany would raise no objection. Great Britain in adhering to the convention recognised this, but it certainly appeared to me that a further step was required before the protectorate was actually established. My view of the situation was the following. France intended to alter the *status quo* in Morocco. She had already made her arrangements with England on the subject in the past. She now found two other Powers who had to be squared—Germany and Spain. She had made her agreement with the former, and obtained an assurance from her that she would raise no objection if she (France) takes certain action. She was now negotiating a similar arrangement with Spain; when that was concluded, and when the other Powers had adhered to these agreements, her hands would be free to make the various modifications in the *status quo* of Morocco which she had proposed; but I did not see that by adhering to one agreement a Power, whether Great Britain or another, admitted that those modifications had already been put into execution. This, as far as I could make out, was his contention. M. de Billy adhered to his view, and maintained that in his opinion Great Britain, by adhering to the Franco-German agreement, had recognised the French protectorate in Morocco, and that this new situation became operative as soon as the agreement received the sanction of the two Houses of the French Legislature. I observed that I could not agree with him. He said that he would telegraph to Paris at once to say that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government the proper person to present the Sultan's representative to the King was His Majesty's Minister, and the matter would then be discussed between the two Governments. I said that it appeared to me that it would be better to allow the whole matter to drop if there were any danger of its creating difficulties. It made very little difference to either of our two nations whether the Moorish mission were received or not. Mokri had taken no action officially, and the whole thing might easily be stopped. M. de Billy did not take this suggestion up; he harped a great deal upon the painful impression which would be produced in France if it were not the French representative who presented the Moorish Mission. There was, he said, unfortunately, a growing party in France who held the view that England was continually placing spokes in the French wheel in Morocco. If now England, after adhering to the Franco-German convention, were to deny to France the right which she gave under that instrument, a new and powerful argument would be given to them. I replied that I regretted that such a party existed, but that, in this case, I felt that they had no reasonable ground for complaint; moreover, I could not admit the argument upon which his whole contention was based. I added that it was quite possible that the King would have left Gibraltar before the convention had received the sanction of the Senate, in which case the whole question would fall to the ground. This he was bound to admit.

His contention that a very bad impression would be produced in France if the Moorish Mission were presented by the British representative instead of the French is, I think, ridiculous. I do not believe that it has entered anybody's head in France that the protectorate is *ipso facto* established by the ratification by the French Senate of the Franco-German agreement. M. Regnault, in a letter addressed to the Portuguese Minister, says that he is overwhelmed with work in connection with the scheme for the protectorate, and adds "Nous en avons, je crois, pour un an." If its elaboration, &c., is to take a year, it can hardly be considered as established; moreover, I understand that as soon as the agreement has been voted a French official is to be sent up to Fez to discuss the whole matter with the Sultan.

The incident is no doubt regrettable, but since hearing M. de Billy's views I am almost glad that it should have occurred, as the situation as understood by him appears to me fraught with considerable danger for us. The French, I suppose, are very sore at losing their power over Tangier, and the legation here are undoubtedly trying by every sort of trick to introduce the thin end of the wedge and face us with the *faits accomplis*, which will hamper us in drawing up the scheme for the international municipality. Moreover, if the protectorate is to be considered established by the mere ratification of the Franco-German convention by the French Chambers, Tangier, which until its internationalisation will continue to be governed by the Makhzen, will practically be governed by the French. Once they are in the saddle they can frustrate our views in every sort of way, and by the system of procrastination, which has been brought by the Makhzen to a fine art, can indefinitely delay the internationalisation of the town. Judging by M. de Billy's attitude, I think we may expect that they will at once oblige the Sultan, in accordance with article 3 of the convention, to hand over to

the French representative at the Moorish Court the duty of acting as intermediary with the other foreign representatives, and by this means further reduce our powers and authority.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[3871] No. 40.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, January 28, 1912.*

MOORISH mission to Gibraltar.

All is now satisfactorily settled, and representatives mentioned in my telegram No. 7 of 24th January leave with me to-morrow on His Majesty's ship "Cumberland."

[3996] No. 41.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Madrid, January 25, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 6 of the 8th January, which reached me this afternoon by Foreign Office bag, I ask leave to submit a few observations on the position which I have hitherto taken up in regard to the points in discussion between the French and Spanish Governments I do not think that my attitude has been quite correctly described to you by the Spanish Ambassador.

On the question of the collection of customs in the Spanish sphere it is true that, as the result of many conversations with the French Ambassador and in my desire to dissuade the Spanish Government from adopting a *non possumus* attitude on every important French demand, I endeavoured on one or two occasions to bring the Spanish Foreign Minister round to the view that he might possibly secure French concurrence with the Spanish demands in respect of the manner of drawing up the general regulations if he would show a spirit of compromise in the loan guarantees. I pointed out that whereas the framing of general regulations was a matter of permanent importance, inasmuch as it would affect, for as long as the desired agreement with France lasted, the relations between the French and Spanish zones, the present system regarding the collection of customs would automatically cease when the loans came to be converted, and that therefore it was only a question of putting up for a few years with the inconvenience of submitting to the authority of the "Administration de la Dette." M. Geoffray had laid much stress on the legal and material obstacles, which he said stood in the way of an alteration of existing guarantees. In his view the security could not be changed, even if the French Government had no objection to changing it. Señor Garcia Prieto has, however, since repeatedly assured my French colleague and myself that, after investigating the question in all its legal aspects, he had been unable to find that any real impediment to an alteration of the guarantee existed. In view of this conflict of expert opinion, your suggestion that the question at issue might be usefully referred to a mixed commission of financial experts appeared to me to be very much in point, and I have not ceased to recommend the Spanish Government to adopt it, provided it be accepted also by the French Government. As already explained in my despatch No. 12 of the 19th instant, the hesitation which the Spanish Government still feel on the subject is due to their fear that, failing agreement between the two parties to the mixed commission, the present régime will continue to remain in force indefinitely.

I may add that, though I have tried to conciliate the conflicting views of the French and Spanish negotiators on the points at issue, I am personally inclined to feel that the French Government could, if they really wished it, go a long way to meet the not unnatural wishes of Spain in respect of the loan guarantees, without in any way interfering with the punctual service of the loans. M. Geoffray seems to regard the question as being for his country chiefly one of *amour-propre*, and he is in favour of its being settled as proposed by you, though without making any promises as to what should be done if the mixed commission fail to agree.

Señor Villa Urrutia appears to have heard that, when it was pointed out to me that the maintenance of the present system regarding the collection of customs in the Spanish sphere would imply its maintenance also at Tangier, I had replied that Tangier

was a separate matter, which had no bearing on the question, as it was being settled between France and England.

This is a strange perversion of what I have not ceased to say since the negotiations began, namely, that the settlement, which must sooner or later be come to with regard to Tangier, will no doubt supply solutions for many of the difficulties which have arisen as regards the Spanish zone. Señor Garcia Prieto well knows that this is my opinion, and that I have more than once put it forward during the conversations. His only objection to it is that the Tangier settlement is likely to require many months, whereas an agreement with France regarding the relations between the two zones is a matter for immediate arrangement, if possible.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[3997] No. 42.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 18. Confidential.)
Sir, *Madrid, January 25, 1912.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your despatch No. 8 of the 16th instant, enclosing copy of your despatch No. 21 of the 13th instant to His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris on the subject of certain fresh demands which the French Government desire to put forward in the negotiation with Spain.

It is proposed, in short, that the frontier between the Spanish zone and Algeria shall be drawn along the watershed west of the River Muluya, leaving both banks of that river in Algerian territory. The boundary line would reach the sea at Cap de l'Eau, the Chafarine Islands, therefore, falling to France.

M. Geoffray some time ago told me that his Government was contemplating a proposal of this kind, and that his opinion had been asked with regard to it. He had replied without hesitation that it would be quite useless to submit it to the Spanish Government. The mere suggestion would be indignantly rejected, and might not improperly prejudice the entire negotiation. I was under the impression, till your above-mentioned despatch reached me this afternoon, that the French Government had abandoned the idea.

I agreed with my French colleague in thinking that it is one which, if it became known to the Spanish Government, would greatly embitter the tone of the discussions which are proceeding in Madrid. I doubt if any Spanish Government could consent, except under compulsion, to yield up a group of islands long recognised as belonging to Spain. To the French demand that the mouth of the Muluya should be regarded as falling within Algerian territory, Spain would probably reply that the boundary between Algeria and Morocco in that region is understood to be the River Kis, and that to shift it to Cap de l'Eau would be to alter the territorial *status quo*, which France, Spain, and England agreed in 1907 should be maintained. Ever since the French occupation of Udja, the coast between the Kis and the Muluya has been, I believe, regarded as belonging to the portion of Morocco which it was given out by France that she had been compelled to occupy as a temporary measure pending the surrender and punishment of the murderers of Dr. Mauchamp.

I may add that M. Geoffray has also spoken to me with regard to another "rectification" of the line of demarcation between the two zones in Morocco, which the French Government desire, if possible, to bring about. The line as drawn in the map attached to the secret convention of October 1904 has been found to cross rivers and mountain ranges in a most erratic manner. The French Government consider that as a frontier it would be rendered more scientific and convenient if all the rivers flowing into Wady Inauen and Wady Sebu from the north were included in the French zone. The watershed between those valleys and the Mediterranean would therefore become the boundary, which would thus be shifted inevitably somewhat to the north.

M. Geoffray is convinced that, however desirable this alteration may be from a scientific point of view, it is sure to be hotly resisted by the Spanish Government as a fresh infringement of the territory claimed by them under the Secret Treaty as constituting the Spanish sphere of influence. His Excellency thinks, however, that Spain might possibly agree to a compromise based on the surrender by France of her demand for the stretch of territory lying within the Spanish sphere to the south of the

River Lukkus in exchange for the acceptance by Spain of the desired rectification as described above.

As regards the southern Spanish zone, the French Ambassador is personally inclined to recommend that a proposal should be made to Spain that she should surrender to France the coast-line from Ifni (or even from a point somewhat south of Ifni) northward so as to join on without a break to the French zone. This strip, he urges, cannot be accurately described as lying opposite the Canary Islands. He would propose, on the other hand, that France should recognise in exchange, as belonging to the Spanish zone, the coast-line between Ifni and the Rio de Oro, which includes all the coast actually facing the Canary Islands, and is, therefore, an object of natural solicitude to Spain.

The Ambassador is, however, much in doubt as to the extent to which his Government could be persuaded to adopt his views on these points.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[3106] No. 43.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 29, 1912.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 6 of the 8th instant, in which you request instructions with regard to the issue of semsars' certificates to British firms.

After careful consideration, I agree with your view that, when a British firm, whose agent in Morocco is a foreign subject, applies for a semsar certificate, the issue of a mokhalata certificate will be sufficient to meet the case, unless you are satisfied that the person for whom application in made is in reality an agent of the firm, and I should be glad if you would continue to maintain this practice. In the event of any firm addressing complaints to the Foreign Office, I propose to inform them that, under the terms of the recent Franco-German convention, to which His Majesty's Government have adhered, the whole system of protection in Morocco will be examined and regularised, and that, meanwhile, His Majesty's Government must abide by the spirit of the Madrid convention.

As regards the general question of the granting of semsars to firms in Europe who have no business house open in Morocco, I transmit to you herewith a copy of a memorandum drawn up at the Foreign Office in 1909,* and I would call your special attention to the paragraphs therein summarising the views expressed by Sir A. Nicolson in his despatches No. 21 of the 26th February and No. 183 of the 18th December, 1901.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[4232] No. 44.

Memorandum by M. Cambon.—(Received January 30.)

LE commerce de Casablanca, à la tête duquel se trouvent de grandes maisons anglaises (Lamb, Murdoch, Butler, &c.), subit en ce moment des pertes considérables par suite de l'insuffisance du matériel d'acconage. L'embarquement et le débarquement des marchandises, principalement des céréales, s'effectue difficilement et avec des retards très préjudiciables au commerce.

Un meeting international a eu lieu récemment à Casablanca pour protester contre cet état de choses et demander que des mesures soient prises d'urgence pour qu'une pareille situation ne se renouvelle pas lors de la campagne de 1912. Une démarche dans le même sens a été effectuée à Paris par l'Ambassade d'Allemagne.

D'autre part, le service de l'acconage déclare qu'il lui sera impossible d'augmenter son matériel tant qu'il n'aura pas été créé de nouveau abris pour le préserver d'une destruction certaine. Récemment deux remorqueurs et une partie des chalands affectés à ce port ont été détruits. La jetée, dont on poursuit la construction, ne pourra être achevée avant quelques années; mais le Service des Travaux publics du Makhzen a étudié une solution permettant, en attendant, la construction du port de

* Memorandum in 32055 (1909).

mettre à l'abri le matériel d'acconage et de créer de nouveaux terre-pleins et quais de débarquement indispensables.

Il serait nécessaire, en raison des difficultés que présente l'exécution des travaux à Casablanca, de commencer ces travaux sans aucun délai pour qu'ils puissent être utilisés lors de la prochaine campagne.

Le règlement sur les adjudications au Maroc, édicté par le corps diplomatique, prévoit que dans le cas d'urgence, on pourra passer des marchés de gré à gré. Il n'est pas de cas où l'urgence soit plus manifeste que dans le cas actuel.

Le Service des Travaux publics dispose d'entrepreneurs capables de mener rapidement ce travail.

Quant aux dépenses, qui s'élèveront à 1,500,000 fr. environ, elles seront payées sur les fonds de l'indemnité de guerre versée à la France par les tribus de la Chaouïa à la suite des événements de 1907. Il avait été stipulé dans les traités passés avec les tribus et ratifiés par l'accord franco-marocain de 1910 que cette indemnité serait employée à continuer les travaux du port de Casablanca et le principe d'un marché de gré à gré a été nettement spécifié.

Les 2,500,000 fr. constituant l'indemnité de guerre ne peuvent être assimilés à des fonds makhzen ni à des capitaux étrangers auxquels le Makhzen a fait appel pour exécuter des travaux publics. Ils ne sont pas incorporés dans le budget du Maroc, et ils constituent un abandon fait par la France dans un but d'intérêt général d'une somme lui appartenant.

Déjà une partie de cette indemnité a été employée par voie de marché de gré à gré au vu et au su de tous.

D'autre part, on se souvient qu'en 1908 le corps diplomatique a autorisé le Makhzen à passer un marché de gré à gré avec un entrepreneur allemand pour l'exécution d'un terre-plein à Tanger. Ce travail ne présentait pas le même caractère d'urgence que celui dont il s'agit, et bien plus il était payé sur les fonds du Makhzen.

L'Ambassadeur de France est chargé d'exposer cette question au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères, et de lui demander l'adhésion du Gouvernement britannique à la passation d'un marché de gré à gré que le Makhzen, d'accord avec le Gouvernement français, se propose de conclure en vue de satisfaire à des intérêts internationaux, en affectant aux travaux des fonds de provenance française. Ce marché peut être passé ainsi sans aucun délai, tandis que les formalités et délais d'adjudication, réduits même au minimum en raison de l'urgence, entraîneront un retard de deux mois et demi au moins; il est certain que dans ces conditions les travaux ne pourraient plus être exécutés en temps voulu et que la situation si préjudiciable faite au commerce international de Casablanca se renouvellerait l'hiver prochain, amenant des réclamations encore plus vives qu'aujourd'hui.

M. Paul Cambon serait reconnaissant à Sir E. Grey de vouloir bien le mettre à même de faire connaître le plus tôt possible au Gouvernement de la république la réponse du Gouvernement britannique.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 janvier, 1912.

[4364] No. 45.

M. Cambon to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received January 31.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 30 *janvier*, 1912.

Cher Sir Arthur,

JE vous disais hier que mon Gouvernement adhérait à la suggestion de Sir Edward Grey pour la réunion d'une commission d'experts financiers franco-espagnole qui rechercherait un règlement de la question douanes marocaines dans la zone espagnole. Je reçois ce matin de M. Poincaré la formule qu'il propose à cet effet.

Je m'empresse de vous la communiquer suivant son désir.

Votre sincèrement dévoué,

PAUL CAMBON.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure in No. 45.

Note by M. Poincaré.

EN ce qui touche la question du service des emprunts de 1904 et de 1910 et la créance du Trésor français représentée par l'annuité de 2,700,000 fr., la situation présente sera provisoirement maintenue.

Une commission d'experts financiers représentant les Gouvernements français et espagnol sera constituée dans le plus bref délai ; elle aura pour mission d'examiner tout arrangement qui pourrait être suggéré pour assurer un règlement satisfaisant de la question, notamment l'arrangement actuellement présenté par le Gouvernement espagnol.

Cette commission devra, dans un délai qui n'excédera pas une année, arrêter les propositions qui seront soumises aux deux Gouvernements à l'effet d'arriver à un règlement de la question.

[3086] No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 36.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1912.

IN your telegram No. 9 of the 22nd instant, your Excellency reported that the President of the Council holds that as soon as the French Government have concluded an agreement with the Makhzen for a French protectorate over Morocco, such protectorate will be effective in regard to all those Powers signatories of the Act of Algeciras who have announced to the French Government their acceptance of the Franco-German Convention.

I have given my careful consideration to the opinion expressed by M. Poincaré, the acceptance of which involves certain legal difficulties ; and I avail myself of this opportunity to acquaint your Excellency with my views on the question of the recognition by His Majesty's Government of a French protectorate over Morocco.

I am advised that, as a matter of legal construction and treaty interpretation, the preamble to the Algeciras Act guaranteeing the independence of the Sultan of Morocco remains operative and binding unless and until all the signatory Powers, including Morocco, shall have agreed to abrogate it or to modify it in whole or in part. The Sultan cannot, even as between himself and one or several of the Powers interested, agree to surrender the independence which has been guaranteed to him by the consensus of all the signatory Powers to the Act. The acceptance of a protectorate by the Sultan is a modification of that independent status which has been guaranteed to him by all the Powers, and therefore it is a departure from the principle stipulated for in the preamble of the Act, and is not binding on the other Powers so long as any one of them does not assent to it.

It must further be remembered that His Majesty's Government, when giving their adherence to the Franco-German Convention, did so on the explicit understanding that the special position of Spain in the Spanish zone created under the agreements of 1904, and the international status of Tangier, were maintained and confirmed. It follows that, even if the view expressed in the preceding paragraph were, for the sake of argument, to be waived, His Majesty's Government would, until France and Spain have reached an understanding, only be in a position to recognise a French protectorate over the French zone.

The question is at present of academic interest, but in the event of the French Government taking steps to conclude a convention with the Sultan for the establishment of a protectorate over Morocco before the Spanish Government have signified their adherence to the Franco-German Convention, it might become of great practical importance. For if in the above circumstances the Spanish Government were to call on His Majesty's Government to refuse to recognise a French protectorate over Morocco on the ground that such a protectorate was contrary to the Algeciras Act, and that the latter could not be abrogated except with the consent of all the signatory Powers, His Majesty's Government, holding the views already set forth, would find themselves in an embarrassing situation.

It is to be hoped that this eventuality will not arise, but if a suitable opening occurs either in conversation or otherwise, I should be glad if your Excellency would take the opportunity of explaining to M. Poincaré the views held by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4728] No. 47.

Memorandum respecting Protection in Morocco.

THE earliest treaty whereby protection was granted in Morocco to certain people appears to have been probably that of 18th March, 1767, between France and Morocco. Article 11 of that agreement stated that the interpreters, brokers or others in the service of the consuls or merchants were not to be molested in the discharge of their duties, and that they were to be exempt from personal taxes. Then followed a treaty with Spain, dated 20th December, 1851, and the commercial treaty with Great Britain of 9th December, 1856. Article 4 of the latter grants to British subjects the right to manage their own affairs or to commit those affairs to brokers or agents, but these, if Moorish subjects, were to be regarded and treated as were other subjects of Morocco.

So far, the extra-territorial character of these protégés had not been laid down in very precise terms, though it was, to a certain extent, implied.

On 19th August, 1863, a treaty was concluded between France and Morocco to which Great Britain adhered. It was laid down in this instrument that there were two classes of protected persons :—

(1.) Natives employed by the French Legation or consulates, and

(2.) Native brokers, factors or agents, employed by French merchants in their mercantile affairs. Each house of business to have no more than two such protégés. But each such house having establishments in different ports might have two semsars for each such establishment.

By "merchants" was to be understood people engaged in wholesale, import and export trade, either on their own account or on commission. Their protégés form the category of persons known generally as semsars, *i.e.*, brokers.

Frenchmen engaged in agricultural pursuits were not to have the right to claim protection for their agents after a certain date.

Yet native agriculturists, shepherds and other peasants in the service of French citizens were not to be arrested unless immediate notice be given to the proper French consular authorities. The object of this proviso was to ensure a substitute being found, in the case of a man's arrest, who would look after the goods or interests confided to the care of the man who had been arrested. This category, whom the French called in those days "associés agricoles," got to be known later on as mokhalats. This class became amplified later on, as will be seen.

The treaty stipulated that lists of protégés were to be regularly furnished to the local authorities, and that each protected person was to be given a certificate by the French Legation indicating the nature of his employment. Such certificates are also given to mokhalats.

Owing to abuses which had crept in a conference on the subject of protection in Morocco was held in 1880, which resulted in the Madrid convention of 3rd July of that year. It was concluded between Morocco and many of the Powers.

A copy of this convention is annexed herewith. Attention is called to articles 7 to 13, from which it will be seen that the rights secured by the French treaty of 1863 were somewhat modified.

In his despatch No. 126 of 16th November, 1899, Sir A. Nicolson forwarded a translation of a letter which the Sultan's agent had addressed to the doyen of the diplomatic body, complaining of abuses in the system of protection. The following were amongst the conditions for which he stipulated :—

Semsars to be granted only to merchants of importance, and in their case only as long as necessary.

That, as a rule, they should be selected from the towns, and that if both a town and country semsar were necessary, only one should be taken by each house from the country, and he alone should devote himself to the business in the country.

One of the chief complaints of the Moorish Government against the working of the treaty of 1863 was that French merchants when seeking semsars in the interior usually selected wealthy farmers, precisely the class relied on by the Sultan to police their districts. Whenever called upon to collect troops to quell a disturbance they pleaded that they had the affairs of their principals to attend to.

Sir J. Drummond Hay and his German colleague considered these grievances well founded, but the French Minister would make no concession on the point.

The Moorish Government also complained of the objectionable behaviour of many of the country semsars.

As regarded mokhalats, the Sultan's agent expressed a desire that the term might be dropped from conversation, as it gave those individuals too great importance. He said it, properly speaking, signified "partner." He asked that the words agricultural labourer, servant, pastor of sheep, &c., be used following the conventions of 1880 and 1863. He desired the number of these mokhalats to be limited and their certificates annually renewed. He also complained that merchants having no business house in Morocco took semsars. This he alleged to be in violation of the treaties. These grievances were to form the subject of investigation by the diplomatic body. It was apparently not against England that the complaints of the Maroquine Government were specially directed.

In his No 18 of 14th February, 1901, Sir A. Nicolson stated that the Sultan's deputy claimed that it was for the Maroquine Government to determine what merchants or others had the right to semsars. But Sir Arthur observed in his despatch that this was a point for the legations to decide; that the names of new semsars were always submitted to the Sultan's deputy, and that, if he had any well-founded objection to some particular person, the merchant was requested to seek a substitute. As mokhalats did not enjoy personal protection, it was never considered necessary to consult the Moorish authorities as to their selection. (I have seen it stated that in practice they are sometimes protected.)

Sir Arthur stated that the Sultan's deputy had also maintained that merchants were not allowed mokhalats, and had argued that this class was limited to servants and workmen who were engaged in certain specified employments, such as agriculture or domestic service. Sir Arthur observed in the despatch to this Office referred to above, that article 9 of the Madrid convention mentioned "employé or servant in the employ of a foreign subject," that this had always been held to include merchants, and that the latter could not carry on their business if the interests confided to the mokhalats were not protected, as the two semsars to whom they (*i.e.*, the merchants) were entitled would not suffice. Sir Arthur said that if this demand were accepted it would go to the root of all commercial security in Morocco.

In his No. 21 of 26th February, 1901, Sir Arthur Nicolson forwarded copy of his reply to the Sultan's agent, in which he pointed out that, according to article 8 of the Madrid convention, lists of semsars were to be transmitted to the Moorish Government by the legations annually, but that they have not to await the ratification of the Moorish Government, but come into effect the day they were transmitted as recognised by protocol 4 of the conference of Madrid, but that he admitted that the Sultan's agent had a right to call attention to any irregularities in the lists. Sir A. Nicolson also observed in his note to the Sultan's agent that he did not know why the convenient designation "mokhalats" used and admitted by him (*i.e.*, the Sultan's agent, Sid Mohammed Torres) for so many years should be abandoned, and that, as regarded the right of merchants to employ mokhalats, article 9 of the Madrid convention laid down no restrictions in this respect. It broadened the convention of 1863 on this point, and did not specify the nature of the employment of this category of persons. It mentioned, in general terms, employés or servants of foreign subjects. Sir Arthur also pointed out to the Sultan's agent that the Madrid convention did not limit the number of mokhalats, but that the British Legation always carefully limited their number in proportion to the value of the interests confided to their charge.

In his No. 28 of 15th March, 1901, Sir Arthur Nicolson enclosed a memorandum containing the observations of the diplomatic body on the proposals of the Moorish commissioner relative to naturalisation and protection.

He observed in his despatch that there was a general wish amongst his colleagues to allow semsars only to firms or merchants doing a considerable trade, and that it was the custom of His Majesty's Legation to decline to grant semsar certificates to merchants in a small way of business. Sir Arthur proceeded to state that the Italian Minister having pressed very strongly that merchants who were opening business relations with Morocco should enjoy the right to semsars, he and several of his colleagues pointed out

that such a concession would, to a great extent, nullify the object in view, and he said he had urged that a mokhalat certificate would sufficiently protect the nascent interests of a new firm. This, said Sir A. Nicolson, had been the practice of the British Legation in such cases, and he did not consider that this limited protection crippled the development of business relations.

The Italian Minister, however, pressed his point, and the majority of his colleagues yielded to his wishes.

Sir A. Nicolson also explained that he had dissented from the practice adopted by most of his colleagues of refusing semsar certificates to non-resident firms who had no branch establishments in Morocco. He did not consider that important Manchester and London firms could be called upon to change their methods, and it was not from them that abuses had sprung. They employed comparatively few semsars. Sir Arthur considered that it was immaterial whether goods were imported by a resident or non-resident firm. The spirit of the conventions provided for the protection of commerce, and he said that, owing to the dangers existing in the country, special precautions were necessary.

In his No. 183 of 18th December, 1901, Sir A. Nicolson enclosed copy of a letter he had addressed to the London Chamber of Commerce with reference to the request of certain firms that Mr. Leon Corcos should be appointed their semsar.

In this letter he explained that commercial houses transacting a considerable import and export business were allowed two semsars each, and that, unlike the other legations, the British and United States Legations interpreted the treaty as allowing semsars to non-resident firms if the volume of their transactions could be fairly described as forming a considerable import and export trade. Sir A. Nicolson also pointed out to the London chamber that it would be impossible to grant to Mr. Corcos a general semsar's certificate, as he must be a semsar in the employ of some particular firm.

Foreign Office, February 1, 1912.

[5067] No. 48.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Paris, February* 3, 1912.

I HAD occasion to pay a visit this morning to M. Poincaré in order to make a communication to his Excellency on your part on the subject of Crete, and I took advantage of this opportunity of a conversation to act on the instructions contained in your despatch No. 36 of the 31st ultimo.

I reminded M. Poincaré of the communication which I had made to him on the 22nd ultimo in regard to the Moorish mission which it was proposed to send to Gibraltar to meet the King. That matter was passed, but his Excellency had in his conversation with me raised a point in regard to the actual establishment of the French protectorate in Morocco which I had reported to you, and I thought it would be well that he should see my report and your reply, not with the view of entering into a polemical discussion, but in order that he might before concluding any convention with the Makhzen know your views in regard to the recognition by His Majesty's Government of a French protectorate over Morocco. I then handed to M. Poincaré for perusal my telegram to you No. 9 of the 22nd ultimo and your despatch to me of the 31st of the month.

His Excellency observed that he trusted that the negotiations with the Spanish Government would not drag sufficiently to render the question at issue referred to in your despatch a practical one. The Spaniards expressed goodwill, but they were by nature and habit very dilatory, and never seemed to know exactly what they wanted or expected. He took it that you considered that it was not competent to the Sultan, in view of the Algeciras Act, to accept a French protectorate without the consent of the Powers parties to that instrument. He hoped that you would not consider it necessary to defer the definitive recognition of a French protectorate until all the details of the French arrangements with Spain had been concluded, for they might take a full year. He trusted that you would be content with a definite settlement in principle between France and Spain. I reminded M. Poincaré of the question of Tangier, which was more important to England than even to Spain. This his Excellency admitted, and he said that the French Government had accepted in that matter the stipulation made by His Majesty's Government.

I did not continue the conversation, for I thought that the warning as to your views would be a sufficient indication to M. Poincaré of the necessity for the French Government not to be precipitate in negotiating a protectorate with the Makhzen, and in expecting its immediate recognition by His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[3997] No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 43.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 5, 1912.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 47 of the 20th ultimo, suggesting that if the Chafaunas Islands are ceded to France by Spain, steps should be taken to obtain an undertaking that they are to be regarded as covered by the stipulation as to non-fortification of the Moorish coast in the Anglo-French agreement of 1904.

Your Excellency will see from Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch No. 18 of the 25th ultimo, a copy of which will reach you in the print sections, that, in the opinion of the French Ambassador at Madrid, any suggestion for the cession of these islands would be indignantly rejected by the Spanish Government, and might prejudice the entire negotiations. It seems probable, therefore, that the French Government will have to abandon the idea.

Your Excellency is no doubt aware that as the islands are Spanish possessions and lie to the east of Melilla, article 7 of the Anglo-French agreement could not be held to apply to them, and presumably neither France nor Spain would give an undertaking not to fortify them without receiving some compensation in return.

In the event, however, of the French Government pressing the proposal at Madrid, the considerations urged by your Excellency will be borne in mind.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5316] No. 50.

Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 6.)

Sir, 51, *Denison House, Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, February 5, 1912.*

I AM directed by my committee to forward to you the enclosed copy of a further report which has been submitted to it by Mr. Donald Mackenzie on slavery and slave-trading in Morocco, as far as it came under his notice during a recent visit to that country. The report is a sequel to that which was received from Mr. Mackenzie on the same subject last year, which was brought to your notice in June. Mr. Mackenzie informs the committee that he made enquiry in every possible way and did not find that the number of slaves sold had decreased. I am especially to ask your attention to the statement that Moorish protégés of great Britain hold slaves, and probably also deal in them, which Mr. Mackenzie informs us that he is able to support by particulars which he will supply if desired. My committee considers this to be a matter which calls for investigation, as being contrary to the rule which was understood to apply to those to whom British protection was extended.

In asking His Majesty's Government that efforts may be made to secure the co-operation of other Powers, in order to obtain a treaty with the Sultan of Morocco for the suppression of slavery and slave-trading in his dominions, the committee is urging a policy which it has long advocated, and has more than once ventured to press upon the Government. In January, 1906, for example, when asking on behalf of the Anti-Slavery Society that the question might be brought before the Powers represented at the Algeciras Conference, I stated in a letter to yourself, referring to the

representations which that society had made from time to time for many years past, that the committee had long been convinced that the only hope of stopping the evils of slavery in Morocco lay in the co-operation of the Powers to that end.

I have, &c.
TRAVERS BUXTON, *Secretary.*

Enclosure in No. 50.

Report on Slavery in Morocco, addressed to the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society.

I ARRIVED in Tangier on the 16th October, 1911, and afterwards proceeded down the coast to Mogador. From there I proceeded to Morocco City, and from thence the British vice-consul and myself made a journey into the interior. We passed through nine provinces, and penetrated the Atlas Mountains in two places. We travelled altogether about four hundred miles, and we had a friendly reception wherever we went. We stayed with some of the chief Moors in the interior; they are all holders of slaves. As to their treatment at the hands of their masters it would be difficult to report with any certainty, without a fairly long stay in the country. I am, however, able to state that the native protégés of all nations, including England, are holders of slaves, and are probably dealers in slaves. Mr. Nairn, the superintendent of the Southern Morocco Mission, went with me to visit the slave market in Morocco city. It was on a Friday, a day on which little business is done in slaves; we found only small black girls for sale, with the exception of one fairly old. There were twelve slaves for sale, whether there had been more early, or later in the day, I could not tell. The auctioneers went round with these few slaves asking for bids—a heartrending sight, especially so when one knows that these human chattels are sold under the shadow of a British vice-consulate.

I have every reason to believe that the private sale of slaves in various parts of Morocco surpasses the number sold publicly. White and black are sold privately. I do not think that white slaves are sold publicly. Kidnapping is another form of slave-dealing, which I believe is largely practised in this country. While I was in Morocco, a girl had been kidnapped from the Atlas and taken for some Moor in Saffi; the matter having come before the notice of the British vice-consul, he fortunately took steps to release the girl, and sent her back to her home in the Atlas. I found that some good-hearted people had purchased slaves from their owners, and made the slaves repay the amount advanced; when completed, they were free. This system, however well meant, is open to much abuse, and only encourages slave-dealing, instead of diminishing it. The proposed French occupation of Morocco will not, in my judgment, diminish slave-dealing, or slavery, in that country; the only remedy which the society should adopt is to urge the British Government to join with France, Germany, and Spain, with a view to obtaining a treaty from the Sultan of Morocco for abolishing slave-trading and slavery throughout his dominions. Even after obtaining such a treaty, or decree, its execution would require careful watching. I venture most earnestly to ask the society to take this matter in hand, so as to free Morocco—a country almost in touch with Europe—from the stain of slavery, which has flourished in that land for so many ages.

DONALD MACKENZIE.

January 23, 1912.

[5371] No. 51.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 67.)

Sir, *Paris, February 6, 1912.*

THE discussion by the Senate of the Franco-German treaty of the 4th November last opened in a somewhat sensational manner yesterday with certain startling statements made by M. Jénouvrier, a Conservative Senator, in regard to the secret and unofficial negotiations alleged to have been entered into by M. Caillaux last summer.

M. Jénouvrier, after stating his reasons for refusing to vote in favour of the treaty, alluded to the journey of M. Fondère, director of a Congo navigation company,

to Berlin, to his pourparlers in that capital with Herr Semmler (see the enclosure to my despatch No. 24 of the 11th ultimo), and to M. Fondère's return to Paris, when he had daily interviews with M. Caillaux on the one hand and with Baron de Lancken-Wakenitz, of the German Embassy, on the other, without the knowledge of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was at this stage of the proceedings, according to M. Jénouvrier, that M. Caillaux, on the 26th July last, received the visit of the well-known financier Baron de Gunzburg, and that the basis of a future Franco-German *entente* was laid, which was to consist of the following stipulations :—

1. Not only was all French opposition to the construction and working of the Bagdad Railway to be abandoned, but France was to give her support to the German project.
2. German railway shares, and, at a later date, German *rentes*, were to be given a quotation on the Paris Bourse.
3. A German was to be placed at the head of the Council of the Ottoman Debt.
4. The surrender of the greater part of the Congo up to the River Alima was offered.
5. A French colony in Oceania was to be ceded.
6. A general agreement between France and Germany was drawn up regulating their entire European policy ; France thus renouncing all hope of obtaining a revision of the Treaty of Frankfort, and giving up the Triple *Entente*.

M. Jénouvrier then proceeded to call M. de Selves as witness to the fact that the above offers had been made by M. Caillaux, but M. de Selves confined himself to the remark that he was not acquainted with the fact or offers in question. After the uproar which followed this denial on the part of M. de Selves had subsided, M. Jénouvrier, at the instance of a majority of his colleagues, proceeded to read the following resolution, which he announced his intention of putting forward after the discussion of the Franco-German treaty :—

"Le Sénat, prenant acte de la déclaration contenue à la p. 4 du rapport de sa commission et dans laquelle celle-ci affirme 'qu'il y eut dans l'affaire marocaine trop de tractations secrètes, trop d'engagements ignorés du Parlement' ; de celle contenue à la p. 129 du même rapport et dans laquelle la commission dit que, 'n'étant pas une commission d'enquête, elle laisse à l'avenir le soin d'établir définitivement les responsabilités,' sachant qu'il répond au sentiment unanime du pays, qui veut que toutes les responsabilités soient établies, que toute la lumière soit faite sur ces tractations, les conversations officielles et surtout officieuses et secrètes qui ont précédé le traité du 4 novembre, 1911, maintient la commission qu'il a nommée pour l'examen de ce traité, lui donne expressément mission et mandat de rechercher et de préciser quelles sont les tractations secrètes et les engagements ignorés du Parlement dont il est question à la p. 4 du rapport et, en général, toutes les responsabilités qui ont pu être engagées à l'occasion de ces incidents."

M. Jénouvrier added that the only way to enable those who had been accused to defend themselves was to institute a commission of enquiry of this nature.

After short speeches by M. Charles Dupuy, former President of the Council, in favour of the treaty, and by Comte de Goulaine, a member of the Right, against it, the debate was adjourned until this afternoon.

The following communiqué has been issued to the press by the Havas Agency :—

"M. Caillaux, mis au courant par le compte rendu analytique des attaques dirigées contre lui à la tribune du Sénat, oppose un démenti formel aux allégations qui ont été produites."

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

P.S.—The "Temps" of this evening publishes a letter from Baron Jacques de Gunzburg, copy of which is enclosed herein,* denying in the most positive manner he assertions made in the Senate by M. Jénouvrier in regard to the part played by him in the unofficial negotiations which M. Caillaux is said to have carried on with Germany last summer.

F. B.

* Not printed.

[5664] No. 52.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 63.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 7, 1912.*

I SHOWED to M. Cambon to-day my despatch No. 36 of the 31st January last, which you had shown to M. Poincaré. I told M. Cambon that you had had a conversation with M. Poincaré that sufficiently explained our views. We were therefore not intending to send an official communication about a French protectorate in Morocco or about Tangier.

M. Cambon repeated that his Government were about to submit to us a project for Tangier for discussion, and they were going to negotiate something with the Sultan under which he would agree to accept their advice in their zone, and do what they desired. This would not amount to a formal protectorate, and if the three conditions as to economic equality, reservation of Spanish rights, and internationalisation of Tangier were safeguarded, the French Government considered that they could count upon our moral support if it were required for such an arrangement with the Sultan.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4364] No. 53.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, February 8, 1912.*

FRENCH Government have communicated a formula which they are ready to accept with regard to collection of customs in Spanish zone.

You will doubtless be able to obtain copy from your French colleague, and as formula embodies proposal 2 of my telegram No. 1 of 10th January, I see no objection to it.

[5813] No. 54.

Mr. Norton to Sir E. Crowe.—(Received February 9.)

My dear Crowe, *Argyll House, Chelsea, February 9, 1912.*

I SPOKE to you yesterday about the recent meeting of the board of the Société marocaine de Travaux publics, but perhaps it may be convenient that I should put what I said on record by enclosing you a copy of a letter addressed by our chairman to the French Foreign Office on the 8th January last, and repeated after the change of Ministry. This letter again points out that the société is in possession of all the necessary plans and surveys for the construction of a port at Tangier, and is also in a position to find the capital necessary for the work. It also informs the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères that the société is sending a mission to make surveys for the railway from Tangier to Fez.

The necessary authority from the Makhzen has been received, and the mission leaves Tangier about the 1st March.

In submitting these steps to the board, the chairman, addressing himself particularly to me, laid stress upon the resolution formally come to at a previous meeting and recorded in the minutes, to the effect that—

"Pour répondre à certaines objections formulées par le Gouvernement anglais au sujet de la part trop faible de ses nationaux dans le capital de la Société marocaine, le conseil a précédemment décidé de donner aux groupes anglais une compensation sous forme de privilège dans les fournitures éventuelles."

This resolution, if fairly carried out, should put any would-be British participants in construction work in Morocco in as good a position as French or German firms.

Yours sincerely,
R. D. NORTON.

Enclosure in No. 54.

Société marocaine de Travaux publics to M. de Selves.

M. le Ministre, *Le 8 janvier*, 1912.

COMME suite à la lettre que nous avons eu l'honneur de vous adresser le 15 novembre dernier, nous croyons devoir vous apporter quelques précisions au sujet des travaux publics dont la réalisation immédiate au Maroc se présente comme une conséquence logique de la situation actuelle.

Le récent accord franco-allemand, en reconnaissant au Gouvernement marocain le droit de concéder les grandes entreprises sous le contrôle de la France, aplanit, en effet, aux yeux de tous nos collègues, français et étrangers, les difficultés qui jusqu'ici nous ont empêchés d'aboutir. Dès lors tout retard nouveau serait de nature à nous faire douter d'atteindre jamais le but pour lequel nous nous sommes groupés, d'accord avec nos divers Gouvernements.

Si quelques divergences de vues se sont manifestées au sujet de l'opportunité de certains travaux publics, l'établissement immédiat d'un port à Tanger a, dès à présent, rallié tous les suffrages. L'étude de la concession à notre société de cette œuvre importante ne saurait donc être retardée sans jeter un certain discrédit sur la valeur même de notre groupement international. Les relations entretenues par tous nos collègues avec leurs Gouvernements respectifs sont, d'ailleurs, une garantie certaine qu'une décision de principe relative au port de Tanger serait favorablement accueillie dans les milieux dirigeants de toute nationalité, car elle attesterait votre ferme volonté d'agir vite et en conformité avec les récents accords internationaux.

Notre société a en sa possession tous les documents et études nécessaires à l'établissement d'un projet complet ; elle dispose en particulier de tous les sondages effectués en rade de Tanger aux frais d'un premier consortium dont plusieurs de ses membres faisaient partie, sondages très rigoureux qui ont servi à l'établissement des cartes dont la marine française a seule profité jusqu'ici. Nous avons, en outre, fait l'acquisition d'études relatives au port établies par un groupe allemand.

Nous disposons, d'autre part, des ressources financières voulues pour assumer toutes les charges que pourrait nécessiter une pareille concession.

Nous sommes prêts enfin, si vous le jugiez nécessaire, à envisager la rétrocession de la concession à telle société financière qu'il vous paraîtrait opportun de créer par la suite pour donner à cette œuvre un caractère plus spécial.

Nous avons donc l'honneur, M. le Ministre, de vous prier de bien vouloir prendre notre demande en sérieuse considération, et de nous faire savoir avec quels services de votre administration ou du Makhzen nous devons nous aboucher pour établir immédiatement et d'accord un projet de concession relatif au port de Tanger.

Voulant, d'autre part, compléter notre documentation concernant le réseau ferré dont la construction rapide est indispensable à la mise en valeur du Maroc et au développement de ses richesses naturelles, nous portons à votre connaissance que nous avons donné suite au projet que nous vous exposions le 5 décembre dernier, et décidé l'envoi d'une mission d'études topographiques au Maroc. La première brigade est prête à partir, afin de reconnaître et de préciser le meilleur tracé à adopter pour la voie ferrée Tanger-Fez en partant de cette dernière ville, ainsi que pour les lignes Fez–Oudjda, Fez–Casablanca.

En conséquence, nous avons l'honneur de vous demander de bien vouloir envoyer sur place des instructions pour que les opérations de cette brigade soient facilitées dans la mesure du possible, par les fonctionnaires et les officiers français. Nous conservons, bien entendu, toute la responsabilité de ses opérations.

Nous osons croire, M. le Ministre, que votre attention sera retenue par le caractère d'urgence de nos demandes. Après être restés deux ans groupés sans nous permettre aucune démarche individuelle, confiants dans l'engagement que le Gouvernement français avait pris à l'égard de notre groupement international, nous ne vous cacherons pas qu'un certain malaise commence à régner parmi les membres étrangers de notre société et qu'il finirait par en provoquer la dissolution si aucune assurance ne vient le dissiper. L'œuvre de collaboration internationale préconisée par la France, préparée par tous les accords signés depuis six ans, et à laquelle nous avons donné notre loyal concours, ne s'en trouverait-elle pas compromise ?

Veuillez, &c.

Le Président du Conseil d'Administration.

[4232] No. 55.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, February* 9, 1912.

YOUR despatch No. 13 of 20th January : Casa Blanca port works.

French Government have asked us officially to support their proposals. I have replied to M. Cambon that His Majesty's Government are not convinced by various French arguments adduced, but that they will refer question of urgency again to you ; and that if, on reconsideration, you report that adjudication will really cause material delay in completion of absolutely necessary work, they will, if all the other Powers consent, agree as an exception to waive their rights as regards works which can actually be begun at once ; but contract for rest of works should be awarded by adjudication *après concours*.

Please report as soon as possible.

[6905] No. 56.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 3, 1912.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 62 of the 27th July, 1911, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of two despatches I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador, reporting the abolition of the "N'zalas" in the districts of Kaïds Anflus and Khuban as a consequence of negotiations of these kaïds with the French vice-consul at that town.* It is hoped that Kaïd Guelouli and other neighbouring governors will follow the example of Kaïds Anflus and Khuban, and then effect will be given to the engagement given to me by those kaïds when I visited their districts in the autumn of 1910. This was not done before owing to the rebellion and the consequent powerlessness of the Makhzen to enforce its orders.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[6906] No. 57.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 3, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 9 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report that I left for Gibraltar on the 29th ultimo on board His Majesty's ship "Cumberland," with the Moorish Mission, which had been delegated to salute the King on the passage through Gibraltar. The mission consisted of Sid Mohammed-el-Guebbas, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs at Tangier, Hadj Mokhtar-el-Mokri, the Basha of Tangier, son of the Grand Vizier, and four Secretaries —Sid Ali Zakki, Sid Omar, Sid Rohoni, and Hadj Mohammed ben Sliman. They were received on the following day on board the "Medina," when Sid Guebbas made the following speech :—

"Your Majesty King George V, King of Great Britain, Emperor of India.

"I deem myself highly fortunate in that His Shereefian Majesty, our Lord and Sultan, Mulai Abdul Hafid, has selected me in company with Sid Hadj Mokhtar, the Basha of Tangier, a son of the Grand Vizier, Sid Hadj Mohammed-el-Mokri, to have the honour of presenting myself before your Majesty and of conveying to you all suitable congratulations on the occasion of your passage through your colony of Gibraltar, which adjoins the Shereefian dominions, on your return from your Indian Empire to your English capital.

"I take the opportunity to proffer to your Majesty, on behalf of His Shereefian Majesty, his most fervent congratulations and the expressions of his deep respect. In these expressions I would venture to associate myself, my colleague, and my staff, who share with me the honour of appearing before your Majesty.

"We unite in wishing that your Majesty may be preserved in continued health

* Not printed.

and honour, and that you may ever be blest with happiness and prosperity. We at the same time express the hope that you may long be spared to guard and uphold your possessions and people far and near, and that you may remain a tower of strength to your Empire through all time.

"Since our arrival at Gibraltar we have learnt to our deep sorrow of the calamity which has befallen your Majesty's family, and we wish respectfully to offer our deep sympathy to the Princess Royal. Only a few weeks ago Her Royal Highness, the Duke of Fife, and their daughters were wrecked off the Moorish coast. They were then snatched from the jaws of death, and we hoped that they might be spared to many years of happiness on this earth. It has, however, pleased God to cut short the days of the Duke of Fife, and our hearts are filled with grief at the affliction of the Princess Royal."

The King replied as follows :—

"I am particularly gratified in receiving from His Shereefian Majesty the evidence of good feeling and friendship which have been shown in deputing your Excellency to welcome me in his name on my visit to Gibraltar. It gives me special pleasure to have the opportunity of expressing through you to His Majesty my sentiments of warm friendship towards His Majesty's person and country, and I request your Excellency to convey to your Sovereign my sincere and constant desire for his prosperity and welfare. I am pleased that your Excellency should have been selected for the mission with which His Majesty has charged you, as I know that you spent three years in my country when a young man. I request you on your return to your native land to convey to His Shereefian Majesty my best thanks for his friendly and courteous attention, which has caused me much pleasure and which I appreciate very highly.

"I would at the same time thank you for the expressions of sympathy which you have offered to me in the great loss which has befallen me and my family by the death of the Duke of Fife. My sister, the Princess Royal, and the Duke have often visited Tangier, and carried away the pleasantest recollections of the hours spent there."

The King then presented Sid Guebbas with the insignia of a Knight Commander of the Royal Victorian Order and Hadj Mokhtar with that of the Royal Victorian Order. He subsequently, at my request, named Sid Ali Zakki a member of the Royal Victorian Order.

The Moorish Mission were present at the parade on the following day, when His Majesty presented colours to the South Staffordshire Regiment : they left with me for Tangier on the 1st February on board His Majesty's ship "Cumberland."

Sid Guebbas was very much gratified at his reception, and Sid Ali Zakki, who was plunged into the depths of depression at receiving no decoration on the occasion of the reception of the mission, was overjoyed when he was subsequently named a member of the Royal Victorian Order. He is now prepared to work heart and soul for British interests in Morocco, and, as he will without doubt be the Makhzen delegate on the Tangier Municipality, and is capable, owing to his remarkable intelligence, of rendering great assistance or the reverse, I felt that I was justified in doing all in my power to induce the King to confer upon him the honour which he so ardently desired.

The Governor of Gibraltar told me that the French consul, acting I imagine by M. de Billy's instructions, informed him officially that a Moorish Mission would be sent to salute the King on board a French man-of-war, and that they would be presented to His Majesty by the French chargé d'affaires at Tangier !

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[6904] No. 58.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 10.)

(No. 73.)

Sir, *Paris, February* 9, 1912.

THE feature of yesterday's discussion of the Franco-German treaty was the vigorous denunciation of that treaty and of the semi-official negotiations leading up to it, and the defence of the 1909 agreement, made by M. Stéphen Pichon. The 1909 agreement had, he declared, been well received by all the Powers, and particularly so by England and Russia. Sir Charles Hardinge had observed to M. Cambon that His Majesty's Government were very satisfied at its conclusion, and that "a happier

formula could not have been found." The promise given by France to endeavour to associate her nationals with German nationals in commercial undertakings in Morocco did not imply that France had undertaken to bind herself to such an association of interests everywhere and always. When Germany put forward such pretensions France should have resisted them. M. Pichon, after a lengthy defence of the agreement made by him in 1909, proceeded to blame severely the mystery in which were developed the negotiations with Germany subsequent to the dispatch of the ship to Agadir, and the consequent stifling of French public opinion, which would in the early part of the negotiations have afforded such support to the Government; the fact of engaging in a conversation *à deux* with Germany, instead of with all the Powers signatory of the Algeciras Act; and the isolation in which Spain had been kept, France treating for the whole of Morocco over that Power's head when she was bound to the creation of Spanish zones in the Shereefian Empire. In regard to the treaty of the 4th November last, M. Pichon expressed himself with the utmost pessimism and declared that its interpretation would give rise, both in Morocco itself and in the ceded territory of the Congo, to endless friction and disputes with the German Government. He concluded by declaring that any French Government which attempted to break away from the Russian alliance and the *entente* with England would commit a grave error, and he quoted your words on the latter subject in your speech of November last, and cordially reciprocated the sentiments therein contained, and he expressed regret that M. Caillaux's Government had not taken greater advantage of the support given to France by the Triple *Entente*, and by the unanimous and irresistible force of French public opinion, which had finally rallied round the Government in the defence of French rights.

The text of M. Pichon's speech, which is much commented on by the French press, is enclosed herein.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 58.

Extract from the "Journal officiel" of February 9, 1912.

DEBATE IN THE FRENCH SENATE ON THE FRANCO-GERMAN TREATY.

M. le Président.—La parole est à M. Pichon. (Mouvement général d'attention.)

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Messieurs, je comprends à merveille le désir du Sénat d'arriver aussi promptement que possible au terme du débat qui se poursuit devant lui.

Mais j'espère qu'il voudra bien comprendre également que je suis l'un des derniers à pouvoir m'abstenir de prendre part à la discussion d'une politique à laquelle j'ai été mêlé de si près, que je me dois à moi-même, que je dois aux Gouvernements dont j'ai fait partie, que je dois au Sénat auquel j'appartiens de m'expliquer à ce sujet d'une façon complète. (Vive approbation sur un grand nombre de bancs.)

Non pas, messieurs, je vous prie de le croire, qu'il se mêle une pensée personnelle quelconque à ma discussion ; c'est une discussion qui domine étrangement les questions de personnes. Elle domine même, comme l'a si bien dit l'honorable M. de Las Cases aux applaudissements du Sénat, les partis.

C'est une question nationale. ("Très bien ! très bien !") C'est dans cette pensée que je vais l'examiner devant vous.

Je reconnais d'ailleurs qu'un changement important s'est produit dans la situation, depuis la signature du traité du 4 novembre, 1911. Le Gouvernement qui a négocié ce traité a disparu ; nous avons un Gouvernement nouveau. Nous ne sommes plus en face des Ministres qui ont négocié et poursuit la politique qui a abouti à l'œuvre que nous discutons ; par conséquent, nous n'avons plus de comptes à leur demander des erreurs, des fausses manœuvres, des pourparlers officieux, des démarches contradictoires qui, à nos yeux, ont joué un si grand rôle dans cette politique. Nous sommes en présence de Ministres dont plusieurs partagent notre avis sur le traité, sur les conditions dans lesquelles il a été conclu, sur les clauses qu'il contient, sur ses lacunes, sur ses conséquences particulières et générales. Nous sommes en présence d'un Gouvernement qui, tout entier j'en suis convaincu, partage notre manière de voir sur la diplomatie qui s'impose à la France, sur la direction de ses alliances et de ses amitiés, sur les devoirs et les obligations qui en découlent. Nous avons confiance en lui, par conséquent le point

de vue rétrospectif a perdu une partie de son intérêt. Ce n'est pas à dire qu'il disparaisse.

M. Halgan.—On ne peut pas passer l'éponge. (Exclamations à gauche.)

Voix nombreuses.—Laissez parler !

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Ce n'est pas à dire qu'il disparaisse, je le répète.

M. Charles Riou.—Vous avez raison !

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Il faut bien que le passé serve de leçon pour le présent et pour l'avenir. Il faut bien que nous rappelions tout d'abord ce qu'était notre situation au Maroc, au moment où nous nous sommes engagés dans une voie qui devait fatalement nous conduire à des perspectives nouvelles.

Quelles était donc notre situation ? Nous avions des conventions spéciales avec l'Espagne, l'Angleterre et l'Italie. L'Espagne et l'Angleterre collaboraient à notre action. L'Italie s'en était désintéressée ; la Russie nous soutenait de son alliance ; nous vivions avec l'Allemagne sous le régime de l'Acte d'Algésiras et, il faut bien que j'en parle, à mon tour, sous le régime de la convention de 1909.

En quoi consiste cet accord de 1909 ? Comment et pourquoi avait-il été conclu ?

On en a beaucoup parlé à la tribune. M. Pierre Baudin l'a analysé hier, et malheureusement il n'a parlé que de sa dernière partie, il a négligé d'en lire le début ; il a rappelé que les deux Gouvernements avaient déclaré " qu'ils ne poursuivraient et n'encourageraient aucune mesure de nature à créer en leur faveur ou en faveur d'une Puissance quelconque un privilège économique, et qu'ils chercheraient à associer leurs nationaux dans les affaires dont ceux-ci pourraient obtenir l'entreprise."

Voilà la partie économique de l'accord. Mais, permettez-moi de le remettre dans son véritable cadre et de vous en lire le début :—

" Il s'agissait d'éviter dans l'avenir entre les deux pays toute cause de malentendus.

" Le Gouvernement allemand déclarait ne poursuivre au Maroc que des intérêts économiques." Il reconnaissait " que les intérêts politiques particuliers de la France y sont étroitement liés à la consolidation de l'ordre et de la paix intérieure," et il se proclamait " décidé à ne pas entraver ces intérêts."

Voici maintenant les termes exacts dans lesquels j'ai donné connaissance au Conseil des Ministres de la conclusion de l'accord : " L'interprétation précise qui a été donnée de ce document au cours des pourparlers qui ont précédé sa rédaction est que sa conséquence est le désintéressement politique de l'Allemagne au Maroc et que, dans les affaires économiques qui comporteront une association des intérêts allemands et français, il sera tenu compte, autant que possible, du fait que les intérêts français au Maroc sont supérieurs aux intérêts allemands."

Telle était l'interprétation allemande, aussi bien que l'interprétation française, et elle était confirmée par toutes les déclarations qui nous venaient de Berlin.

Hier, M. Baudin a cité un passage du discours de M. de Bülow qui se rapporte également à la partie économique de l'accord. Permettez-moi d'y ajouter une autre partie du même discours : " L'Allemagne," disait le Chancelier de l'Empire, " n'a aucun intérêt politique au Maroc. Elle n'y a non plus aucune prétention. La France, elle, en a."

Et dans une conversation avec notre Ambassadeur, le Chancelier résumait ainsi sa pensée : " Nous nous sommes désintéressés politiquement du Maroc ; vous y aboutirez certainement aux fins qu'y poursuit la politique française. Nous vous demandons seulement d'être patients." (Vive approbation sur divers bancs.)

L'accueil le plus favorable fut fait à cet accord par toutes les Puissances, qui voyaient très légitimement, selon moi, dans cet acte, la fin des difficultés et des complications qui avaient pesé sur toute la politique européenne, et qui y voyaient par là même un gage de sécurité pour l'avenir.

L'accueil fut particulièrement favorable de la part de l'Angleterre et de la Russie. A Londres, Sir Charles Harding, Sous-Secrétaire d'État, déclara à M. Paul Cambon que le Gouvernement anglais était très satisfait de l'accord intervenu, et il ajouta : " On ne peut trouver une plus heureuse formule." (" Très bien ! ")

Des félicitations nous vinrent du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères du Gouvernement Impérial russe, du Gouvernement italien et de la plupart des autres Gouvernements.

Comment cet accord était-il accueilli par la presse ?

Je cite une phrase de M. Tardieu :—

" La déclaration de février 1909 a dégagé l'atmosphère. Cette éclaircie répand sur l'horizon un apaisement nouveau."

Plus tard, le 29 décembre, 1909, le " Temps " répétait :—

" L'accord franco-allemand de 1909 a produit en Europe une impression de détente et de sécurité qui, depuis, ne s'est pas démentie."

Elle ne s'est pas démentie à la fin de 1909. Elle ne s'était même pas démentie pour le " Temps " au mois de janvier 1911. Car c'est à cette époque que le même journal déclarait que le Gouvernement dont je faisais partie, et qui était alors présidé par mon honorable ami M. Briand, avait " pleinement réussi sa politique marocaine."

On se rend compte du soupir de soulagement avec lequel fut accueillie cette entente, quand on se rappelle ce qu'était alors la situation respective de la France et de l'Allemagne, et, par contre-coup, la situation européenne. L'honorable M. de Lamarzelle l'a très bien exposé hier. Nous étions en présence d'alertes continuelles ; nous ne pouvions pas faire un mouvement sans nous heurter aux protestations de l'Allemagne et à des risques de complications. La politique de 1905 avait survécu autant qu'elle le pouvait à l'Acte d'Algésiras ; et cet Acte lui-même, ainsi que l'a dit aussi M. de Lamarzelle, limitait et réduisait beaucoup nos droits.

Comment l'accord est-il intervenu ? Était-il lié, comme on l'a insinué, à d'autres questions que la question marocaine ? S'inspirait-il de préoccupations s'appliquant à d'autres pays et qui pouvaient être considérées comme susceptibles de fournir des moyens d'action commune à la France et à l'Allemagne dans leur politique générale en Europe ? Pas du tout. Il n'avait été le prix d'aucune promesse, d'aucun engagement pris par nous.

M. Jénouvrier.—Très bien.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Il était simplement le résultat de notre persévérance dans notre politique marocaine, comme l'a dit M. Jénouvrier, de notre ténacité à défendre nos droits, de la résistance opposée par nous à des prétentions que nous considérions comme inacceptables.

Il était également le résultat du désir commun aux deux Gouvernements de mettre un terme à une politique d'antagonisme qui avait eu pour eux de très redoutables conséquences et qui avait failli, par moment, les entraîner à de véritables conflits. C'est dans cet esprit que nous avons pratiqué l'accord. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ")

M. Baudin a parlé de la mission organisée à Berlin pour s'entendre avec le Gouvernement allemand sur la façon de mettre en pratique le côté économique de la convention.

Il faut que je dise d'une façon plus précise, en empruntant le texte même du rapport de M. Guiot, comment cette mission a été remplie. Et tout d'abord, il faut que je dise qu'avant de l'organiser, j'en avais entretenu le Gouvernement anglais, par l'intermédiaire de M. Paul Cambon. M. Paul Cambon avait manifesté certaines appréhensions sur l'extension que pouvait prendre le point de vue économique ; je lui avais donné raison, j'avais donné des instructions en conséquence à M. Guiot ; ces instructions, comme vous allez le voir, ont été fidèlement exécutées. Et lorsque, plus tard, M. Cambon reçut pour instructions de communiquer au Gouvernement anglais le rapport de M. Guiot, il le fit, contrairement à ce qu'on a essayé de le faire croire, sans aucune observation d'aucune sorte de la part du Gouvernement anglais. Voici ce que dit M. Guiot :—

" J'ai marqué de manière précise qu'également respectueux de nos arrangements antérieurs ou récents, nous interprétions la formule 'association franco-allemande' en vue d'entreprises au Maroc dans le sens d'une association comprenant l'Angleterre et l'Espagne."

Voilà une réponse à ceux qui nous accusent d'avoir cherché à établir un condominium franco-allemand au Maroc. (" Très bien ! très bien ! ")

Je poursuis :—

" A propos d'emprunts éventuels des travaux publics gagés sur les recettes des ports, chemins de fer, &c., j'ai déclaré, dit M. Guiot, que nous n'accepterions pas qu'aucun organisme international, fût-ce la banque d'État, fût investi, au titre de ces emprunts, d'un droit de contrôle sur l'exploitation de ces grandes services publics, que le contrôle appartiendrait exclusivement au Gouvernement chérifien et serait exercé... "—retenez cette phrase, messieurs, elle en dira plus long que je n'ai le droit d'en dire—" ...par les conseillers techniques que nous avons désormais le privilège incontesté de lui fournir... "—c'était un des résultats de notre accord.—" De telles commissions de contrôle m'apparaissaient comme inconciliables avec la déclaration du renoncement politique de l'Allemagne."

Et maintenant, que dit M. Guiot au sujet de ce renoncement politique? Voici le postscriptum de son rapport:—

"Votre Excellence remarquera que j'ai placé tous nos entretiens sur la base, non de la 'prépondérance de nos intérêts politiques, mais sur celle du renoncement politique de l'Allemagne.' A maintes reprises, dans ma rédaction du compte rendu, j'ai mis cette formule dans la bouche de M. Erckert. Assurément, ce compte rendu n'est pas un document officiel, et je ne veux pas en exagerer la portée. Il n'en est pas moins à propos de remarquer qu'il a été lu par moi à M. de Erckert, qui la pleinement approuvé; qu'il est resté entre ses mains du 31 mars au 3 avril; qu'il a été annoté par lui sur divers points sans que les expressions 'désistement politique,' 'renoncement politique' aient fait l'objet d'aucune remarque. Le texte que je remets à votre Excellence et celui que j'ai laissé à notre Ambassadeur à Berlin ont été expédiés dans les bureaux mêmes de la Wilhelmstrasse."

Voilà donc, messieurs, comment nous avons compris la pratique de l'accord de 1909, et comment l'Allemagne elle-même avait été amenée à l'interpréter. Et tout cela s'est fait, je le répète, sans aucune protestation de qui que ce soit, et, dans la pratique, nous n'en avons rencontré d'a cune sorte.

Si, plus tard, après mon départ du Ministère, l'Angleterre a réclamé une part plus grande dans la société marocaine, cela ne constituait en aucune manière une protestation contre l'accord de 1909.

Les résultats de la mission Guiot ont été, comme M. Baudin l'indiquait hier, le règlement des questions financières posées avec le Makhzen, la création de l'administration française des revenus concédés, une entente de principe pour l'exécution des travaux publics qui avaient été primitivement prévus. Avant même l'Acte d'Algésiras, on avait concédé à l'Allemagne le port de Larache; le résultat de l'accord a été de lui donner de l'argent pour le construire. Plus tard, ça été le règlement minier.

Mais, messieurs, en promettant de chercher à associer nos nationaux aux nationaux allemands dans les affaires dont les uns ou les autres pourraient obtenir l'enterprise, nous n'avions pas pris l'engagement de réaliser *hic et nunc*, partout, toujours, toutes les entreprises dans lesquelles il leur conviendrait de s'engager. ("Très bien! très bien!")

Je sais bien que certaines difficultés son venues du fait que l'Allemagne a eu une autre interprétation que celle-là; mais alors il fallait lui résister! (Applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs.)

M. Clemenceau.—Très bien!

M. Stéphen Pichon.—C'est ce que je vais développer tout à l'heure; je n'aurais pas cédé sur ce point aux exigences allemandes, vous pouvez en être certains. (Nouveaux applaudissements sur les mêmes bancs.)

A l'abri de la politique suivie depuis 1906 jusqu'au mois de mars de l'année dernière, qu'avons-nous fait? Il faut le rappeler.

Il est entendu que l'Acte de 1909 est inopérant—c'est le mot dont M. Caillaux s'est servi. Inopérant; oui, pour les prétentions allemandes; oui, pour ce qu'on voulait exiger de nous, mais parfaitement opérant pour ce que nous avions à faire, parfaitement opérant pour la sauvegarde de nos droits et de nos intérêts. ("Très bien! très bien!" Nouveaux applaudissements.)

Qu'avons-nous donc fait, à l'abri de la politique, que nous suivions vis-à-vis des Puissances et du Gouvernement allemand? Nous avions organisé la police des ports marocains, pacifié la région frontière de l'Algérie, pratiqué nos ententes avec le Maroc dans cette région, conclu toute une série de conventions pour la liquidation des dettes du Makhzen, et pour la sécurité du Gouvernement chérifien poursuivi notre œuvre de pénétration.

On oublie trop facilement, messieurs—personne n'en a dit un mot à la tribune, et il faut que ce soit moi qui le rappelle—on oublie trop facilement que nous étions à Oudja, à Casablanca, dans la Chaouïa, avec l'autorisation de toutes les Puissances, y compris l'Allemagne.

Nos accords sur les conditions de l'occupation étaient publics; ils figuraient dans un Livre jaune; ils n'avaient soulevé aucune protestation. Que dis-je? L'Allemagne nous avait félicités; vous en trouverez la preuve dans le Livre jaune.

Cependant, nous avons traversé les plus graves difficultés. Nous avions passé par l'asassinat du Dr. Mauchamp, le massacre de Casablanca, l'avènement de Moulay Hafid, la révolte des Beni-Snassen, l'affaire des déserteurs, la soumission de la Chaouïa, en dehors d'une crise marocaine engageant la responsabilité du Makhzen vis-à-vis de

nous et des Puissances. Nous n'avons pris aucune position que nous ayons abandonnée, nous n'avons fait aucun pas en avant pour être obligé d'en faire un en arrière. ("Très bien! très bien!" Applaudissements.)

Est-ce à dire pourtant que je représente l'accord de 1909 comme une chose parfaite et définitive? Jamais, messieurs; mais l'accord de 1909, ce n'était qu'un compromis. Ce n'était, comme je l'ai dit à mon honorable ami M. d'Estournelles de Constant, qui l'a répété à la tribune, qu'une étape. Mais c'était une garantie de paix qui reposait sur la proclamation de nos droits et sur leur acceptation par le Gouvernement allemand.

Et puis, cela ne vous avait rien coûté; c'est une coquetterie que je me permets d'avoir à la tribune. (Applaudissements.)

Cet accord réservait l'avenir, il conjurait les difficultés présentes, il interdisait à l'Allemagne les compensations territoriales dans une région qui devait rester livrée à notre action. Il lui interdisait même de prétendre à la direction des services publics marocains, comme elle l'a fait plus tard.

A-t-on eu raison de vouloir davantage, et de le payer si cher, dans des conditions si discutables? A-t-on, suivant le mot qui a été rappelé à la tribune par M. Jénouvrier, a-t-on eu raison de vouloir une primeur, au lieu de laisser mûrir le fruit? C'est la question qui se trouve posée.

On a dit que l'application de l'accord était devenue impossible, que les prétentions de l'Allemagne étaient exorbitantes, et l'on constate que cette situation correspond à la date du retrait du consortium de la N'Goko-Sangha. Je reconnais sans peine que les prétentions allemandes avaient pris aux mois de mars et d'avril dernier un caractère inadmissible, et je répète que, pour ma part, je ne les aurais pas admises. ("Très bien! très bien!")

Mais ce n'était pas une raison, je le répète aussi, pour cesser de les discuter.

Et tout d'abord, qu'était-ce que ce consortium de la N'Goko-Sangha?

Je vais m'en expliquer très rapidement. Ce consortium n'était pas ce qu'on a dit. On a répandu, à ce sujet, malgré tous les démentis, et, d'ailleurs, on le fait encore, les renseignements les plus inexacts. On confond le texte définitif du projet adopté par le Gouvernement à la fin de décembre 1910 avec des projets antérieurs qui avaient été soumis à l'avis du Ministre des Colonies, mon ami M. Trouillot, et auxquels il avait fait des objections tout à fait sérieuses sur des points fort importants. Ces objections avaient été maintenues par la commission des concessions à laquelle M. Trouillot avait renvoyé les projets. Le Gouvernement les fit siennes, et le projet définitif fut tel que M. Baudin l'analyse exactement dans son rapport.

En voici la disposition principale, d'après le texte même d'une note rédigée par la Direction politique du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères le 13 mars, 1911, après mon départ du Ministère, et remise à M. Cruppi:—

"Le projet de consortium accepté par M. Semler et par le groupe de la Compagnie N'Goko Sangha tend uniquement à la formation d'une société constituée sous le régime de la loi française, ayant son siège en France, dirigée par un conseil d'administration comportant une majorité de Français et exploitant une concession territoriale en territoire français."

L'accord intervenu entre le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement allemand a été confirmé dans deux lettres échangées entre M. de Schoen et moi, en présence de mon honorable ami M. Jean Morel, alors Ministre des Colonies, et avec l'approbation du Président du Conseil, M. Briand.

M. le Président du Conseil.—Sous réserve de l'approbation du Parlement français.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—J'allais le dire, M. le Président du Conseil. Ces lettres, comme l'a dit dans son rapport M. Baudin, réservaient expressément l'avis du Parlement français.

Voici le texte de ma lettre à M. de Schoen:—

"Votre compatriote, M. Semler, quitte Paris aujourd'hui après s'être assuré des bonnes dispositions du Gouvernement français en ce qui concerne le projet de consortium franco-allemand pour l'exploitation d'une région située au Congo français sur les frontières du Cameroun.

"M. Semler et les participants français se sont mis d'accord pour accepter le décret, le cahier des charges et les statuts élaborés par la commission des concessions coloniales (et dont votre ambassade possède un exemplaire), sous réserve des modifications suivantes:

"1. L'exploitation dirigée par le consortium pourra s'étendre sur toute la partie de

la concession N'Goko Sangha située à l'ouest d'Ivindo. Toutefois, tant que la société franco-allemande en formation demeure constituée au capital dont elle dispose actuellement, l'exploitation ne portera que sur une zone dont l'étendue sera déterminée d'accord avec le Ministère des Colonies et ne dépassera pas une superficie de moitié de territoire situé à l'ouest de l'Ivindo. L'autre moitié de ce territoire sera ouverte à l'exploitation de la société franco-allemande si, dans une période de quinze ans à compter de la date du décret réglant les conditions de son exploitation, elle en fait la demande après avoir porté son capital argent à 1,250,000 fr.

"2. Le nombre des actions que chaque administrateur devra affecter par privilège à la garantie de sa gestion sera de dix.

"3. Les délibérations du conseil d'administration seront valables si le nombre des membres qui y auront pris part est supérieur à la moitié du nombre des administrateurs en fonctions, sans jamais être inférieur à trois.

"4. Les actions entièrement libérées en argent seront, dès la constitution de la société, nominatives ou au porteur, au choix de l'actionnaire.

"Le Gouvernement français approuve, en principe, ces dispositions, mais il estime que la constitution du consortium ne peut se réaliser qu'après règlement de la question au point de vue parlementaire.

"Je saurais gré à votre Excellence de bien vouloir notifier cette situation à M. Semler."

Mais la Commission du Budget de la Chambre, où des attaques passionnées se produisaient contre le consortium, lui reprochait de ne porter que sur le territoire français, et de ne pas avoir de contre-partie sur le territoire allemand.

J'engageai de nouvelles négociations avec l'Ambassade d'Allemagne, et, le 15 février, 1911, la Direction politique me remettait une note de laquelle il résultait que M. de Lancken, chargé d'affaires d'Allemagne, déclarait: "Que son Gouvernement serait tout à fait disposé à favoriser la constitution d'une société germano-française, fondée avec des capitaux français et des apports allemands, sous le régime de la loi allemande, pour l'exploitation sur le territoire du Cameroun des produits de cette colonie. Ce serait la réplique du consortium franco-allemand projeté sous le nom de 'Société du Gabon.'"

Le Cabinet Briand quitta le pouvoir le 28 février. Peu de temps après, malgré l'avis formel de la Direction politique du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, qui faisait prévoir de ce fait de très sérieuses difficultés avec le Gouvernement allemand, le consortium était retiré.

Le 6 avril suivant, M. de Kiderlen ayant rappelé à M. Jules Cambon l'échec de cette affaire, notre Ambassadeur lui répondit: "Mais vous l'envisagez comme une affaire particulière."

Je comprends la réponse de notre Ambassadeur. Il ne fallait pas laisser l'Allemagne exagérer l'importance du retrait de ce projet, qui, après tout, était secondaire, malgré le tapage que l'on avait fait à son sujet. Mais, comme le constate la note de la Direction politique dont je lisais tout à l'heure un passage, cette affaire avait été négociée à Berlin sous les auspices de l'Ambassade de France, à Paris sous les auspices de l'Ambassade d'Allemagne; elle avait fait l'objet d'un échange de lettres avec l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, et les conditions mêmes de ces pourparlers et de leur conclusion interdisaient évidemment de la considérer comme une affaire particulière. M. Jules Roche a admirablement exposé dans une série d'articles de la "République française" toute la philosophie de cette affaire.

Quoi qu'il en soit, le retrait du consortium de la N'goko Sangha aurait eu pour conséquence—c'est M. Caillaux qui l'a dit à la commission—des négociations nouvelles pour la construction d'un chemin de fer du Cameroun au Congo.

Mais M. Caillaux n'a pas expliqué pourquoi ces négociations avaient été engagées par des intermédiaires officieux. ("Très bien! très bien!")

Il n'a pas expliqué pourquoi elles n'avaient pas été portées à la connaissance de M. Monis, alors Président du Conseil. (Nouvelles marques d'approbation.)

A ce sujet, M. Monis a fait à la commission, le 24 janvier, une déclaration fort intéressante. Je vous demande la permission de la reproduire:—

"L'affaire," a-t-il dit, "a été soumise le 3 juin au Conseil des Ministres. Elle n'a pas été écartée, mais considérée comme insuffisamment étudiée, et renvoyée pour étude aux Ministres compétents.

"Mais," ajoute M. Monis, "pas plus le 3 juin qu'à aucune des réunions des

conseils que j'ai présidées, je n'ai connu les démarches faites auprès les Ministres des Finances et des Colonies ou à l'Ambassade d'Allemagne par des intermédiaires officieux."

Eh bien, messieurs, voilà une singulière façon de concevoir la dipolomatie—("très bien! très bien!" et applaudissements)—et elle n'a pas été sans surprendre vivement M. Monis, lorsqu'il s'est trouvé brusquement, à l'une des séances de la commission, en présence du texte d'un projet de contrat franco-allemand qu'il avait toujours ignoré jusqu'à cette date. (Exclamations et rires sur divers bancs.)

Les négociations n'ont échoué, a-t-on dit, que devant l'impossibilité pour le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de donner satisfaction aux demandes des Allemands. Ces demandes aboutissaient en somme—je le dis d'après une note de M. Messimy qui a été publiée—à la prépondérance économique de l'Allemagne dans les bassins de la Sangha, de l'Oubanghi et du Chari. Cette prépondérance devait, toujours d'après la note de M. Messimy, entraîner dans un délai inéluctable la prépondérance politique.

Il faut reconnaître que tout cela n'a aucune espèce de rapport avec l'accord de 1909, et qu'il n'y avait pas lieu d'engager des négociations, même officielles, au sujet du Chemin de Fer Congo–Cameroun, après le retrait du consortium de la N'Goko-Sangha. ("Très bien! très bien!")

En même temps l'Allemagne aggravait ses prétentions dans les négociations relatives aux chemins de fer marocains. M. Pierre Baudin a fait l'historique de ces négociations. Elles s'étaient engagées à l'époque où j'étais encore Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, et j'ai le droit de dire que, lorsque j'ai quitté le Ministère, je pouvais me considérer comme d'accord avec M. de Schoen, Ambassadeur d'Allemagne.

Voici les points sur lesquels nous étions d'accord. Il était convenu que les autoitrés militaires françaises construiraient le chemin de fer de Casablanca à Marrakech et le chemin de fer de Nemours à Oudjda, avec prolongement éventuel sur Taourirt; elles les construiraient en les ouvrant, dans des conditions d'égalité économique, au commerce de toutes les Puissances, sous la réserve que le matériel serait acheté à la Société marocaine de Travaux publics.

Un télégramme de moi, du 25 février, à notre Ambassadeur à Berlin, l'établit. Le Cabinet Briand quitte le pouvoir le 28 février: dès le 3 mars suivant l'Allemagne réclame d'autres avantages.

A ce sujet je fais une remarque assez curieuse que je livre simplement à vos méditations: à chaque changement de Ministère les prétentions de l'Allemagne s'accroissent.

M. le Comte de Tréveneuc.—C'est tout naturel.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Je n'explique pas, je constate.

M. Dominique Delahaye.—C'est une des beautés du régime.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Ainsi, le 28 février le Cabinet Briand démissionne, et le 3 mars suivant l'Allemagne augmente ses revendications.

Le 22 juin le Cabinet Monis est renversé: le 1er juillet survient l'affaire d'Agadir.

L'Allemagne en vint à demander un accord général pour la construction de tous les chemins de fer marocains dans l'avenir; et ce fut alors qu'elle parla pour la première fois de la priorité de la ligne de Tanger à Fez, comprise dans le traité du 4 novembre dernier. Non seulement elle demanda des participations fort importantes, mais elle fit entendre qu'il y aurait lieu de lui donner une part des emplois du personnel.

Ceci, je le déclare, était nettement contraire à l'accord de 1909. ("Très bien! très bien!")

M. Clemenceau.—C'est très exact.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—En somme, nous assistions à une sorte d'explosion d'exigences allemandes sur tous les points. Ce n'est certainement pas moi qui reprocherai au Gouvernement de ne pas y avoir cédé. Il m'était arrivé à moi-même dans les Cabinets dont j'ai fait partie, si désireux que je fusse de ménager entre l'Allemagne et nous des rapports conformes aux intérêts pacifiques des deux peuples, de résister à des prétentions que je considérais comme inadmissibles. Le fait s'est produit sous les deux Gouvernements auxquels j'ai appartenu. M. Jénouvrier a rappelé l'une de ces circonstances; je n'ai pas besoin de la rappeler de nouveau. Était-ce une raison pour changer radicalement d'attitude, de point de vue, pour modifier la direction de notre politique et offrir à l'Allemagne des compensations territoriales en échange d'avantages au Maroc? (Vifs applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs.)

M. Dominique Delahaye.—Comptez ceux qui applaudissent et vous compterez ensuite ceux qui voteront contre le traité.

M. le Comte de Tréveneuc.—M. Pichon a parlé en bon Français.

M. Dominique Delahaye.—Mais il votera le traité !

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Non, je ne le voterai pas. (" Très bien ! très bien !" et applaudissements.)

Nous n'étions nullement obligés par notre accord, je le répète, à favoriser quand même les entreprises économiques allemandes et à donner à l'Allemagne dans les affaires marocaines une place tout à fait disproportionnée avec ses intérêts commerciaux et industriels. (Marques d'approbation sur un grand nombre de bancs.) Elle s'était même engagée, je l'affirme à ne pas réclamer cette place. Nous avions enregistré son renoncement politique. Elle l'avait constaté et proclamé elle-même. Nous pouvions nous y tenir rigoureusement et lorsqu'elle soulevait des objections contre nos actes politiques, nous n'avions qu'à lui répondre : " Vous vous en êtes désintéressée."

Nous pouvions, nous devions nous cantonner sur ce terrain. (" Très bien ! très bien !")

Nous devions le faire en particulier dans le développement des faits qui vont suivre et au cours desquels notre droit était évident.

Nous sommes au mois d'avril, 1911. Les dépêches de nos agents au Maroc nous ont amenés à envisager une marche sur Fez. Un Conseil de Cabinet du 23 avril—M. Caillaux étant présent, contrairement à ce qu'on a dit dans certains journaux—a décidé cette marche. Nous sommes partis à Fez au secours des colonies étrangères. Le consul d'Allemagne à Fez a reconnu lui-même le danger que pouvaient courir ses nationaux. Nous avons été appelés par le Sultan.

Le Général Moinier reçoit le 16 mai des instructions très modérées lui disant :—

" Les opérations doivent être aussi réduites que possible.

" Les forces françaises doivent être cantonnées dans le voisinage de la ville.

" Nous devons nous efforcer de ramener nos troupes aussitôt que possible en laissant au Gouvernement marocain le soin et les moyens de poursuivre les réformes visées dans l'accord de 1910."

Ces instructions, messieurs, sont constamment maintenues ; M. Monis l'a très nettement établi devant la commission. Et, le 13 juin, le Général Goiran télégraphie au Général Moinier :—

" Votre action doit tendre désormais à assurer vos communications et à préparer votre retour en Chaouïa, après avoir fourni au Sultan le moyen d'asseoir et d'exercer sa souveraineté."

M. Clemenceau.—Et les instructions au Général Moinier ont été communiquées par nos Ambassadeurs à toutes les Puissances, y compris l'Allemagne ! Par conséquent, l'Allemagne savait que nous préparions notre chemin de retour.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Parfaitement !

Nous restions donc, politiquement, à l'abri des protestations de toutes les Puissances, y compris l'Allemagne. Mais cette dernière, évidemment encouragée par les pourparlers officieux qui s'échangeaient à la fois à Paris avec son Ambassadeur et à Berlin avec différents personnages—(mouvements)—continuait à se montrer exigeante et à manifester des inquiétudes sur notre action. Le 11 juin, M. de Bethmann-Hollweg déclare à M. Jules Cambon : "Je suis très préoccupé au sujet du Maroc." Notre Ambassadeur s'étonne de cette préoccupation et la discute. Puis il part pour Kissingen, où l'attend M. de Kiderlen. La conversation s'engage. M. Cambon invoque l'accord de 1909 ; c'est son premier mot pour justifier notre politique. M. de Kiderlen reconnait que cet accord consacre le désintéressement politique de l'Allemagne et l'égalité économique ; mais il soutient que nous excédons notre droit en occupant Fez et que même si nous quittions la ville, nous y laisserions une situation différente de celle que nous y avons trouvée. Les entretiens se poursuivent. M. Cambon essaye de s'entendre avec le représentant du Gouvernement allemand. M. de Kiderlen demande : " Mais enfin, que voulez-vous ? Si l'on s'occupe du Maroc seulement, on n'aboutira pas. Si on essaye de replâtrer ce qu'on a fait auparavant, on ne fera rien." M. Cambon dit : " On peut chercher ailleurs," et M. de Kiderlen conclut : " Rapportez-nous quelque chose de Paris." (Mouvements divers.)

Je ne dis rien, messieurs, qui n'ait été dit à la commission et il a été convenu, d'ailleurs, dès ses premières séances qu'aucun de ses membres n'était tenu au secret.

M. de Lamarzelle.—Parfaitement.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Quoi d'étonnant à cette demande de M. de Kiderlen ? On parlait du Congo depuis le commencement du mois de mai. Ceci est établi par des articles de journaux qui ne sont pas discutables. Dès le 7 mai, on annonce, dans un

journal : ". . . qu'un accord honorable et définitif est possible entre la France et l'Allemagne. Voici sur quelles bases : " Le Gouvernement allemand serait disposé a reconnaître un protectorat français au Maroc et même à nous céder la colonie allemande du Togoland, qui est une enclave gênante entre le Soudan et le Dahomey. En échange, la France abandonnerait à l'Allemagne sa colonie du Congo qui, jointe au Cameroun, constituerait pour l'Empire germanique l'immense déversoir nécessaire à l'excédent de sa population et de ses produits industriels."

Mais voici quelque chose de plus. A l'heure même où MM. Cambon et de Kiderlen échangeaient à Kissingen les propos contenus dans la dépêche de notre Ambassadeur communiquée à la commission, M. de Schoen enregistrait à Paris la déclaration officielle que nous devions nous entendre avec l'Allemagne en vue de la solution de la question marocaine et que cette entente devait porter sur d'autres régions que le Maroc. Cela résulte avec la dernière évidence de documents dont M. Poincaré a eu connaissance comme rapporteur de la commission, qui figurent aux archives du Quai d'Orsay et qui sont de la même date que la dépêche de notre Ambassadeur à Berlin.

Ainsi, M. Cambon—et d'ailleurs, je n'en ai jamais douté—était parfaitement autorisé à terminer, comme il le faisait, la dépêche qui a été reproduite par la presse et dans laquelle il disait qu'il avait, " suivant les instructions qu'il avait reçues, tâté le Gouvernement Impérial," et dans laquelle il ajoutait :—

" Il ne nous est plus permis de nous retirer ; il importe de déterminer dès aujourd'hui, les éléments qui serviront de base aux conversations ultérieures."

Maintenant d'où est venue l'idée de parler d'échange de territoires au Congo ? Il est difficile de le savoir. Personne ici n'a osé prétendre, comme on l'a fait dans certains organes de la presse, que cela venait du consortium de la N'Goko-Sangha. (" Très bien ! très bien !") D'après les déclarations de M. de Kiderlen à la commission du Reichstag, le 27 novembre dernier, c'est en 1905, sous le Ministère de M. Rouvier, que pour la première fois, il fut question du Congo.

M. le Président du Conseil.—C'est exact !

M. Stéphen Pichon.—M. de Kiderlen ajoute :—

" L'Allemagne demanda des propositions précises. Cette tentative n'aboutit point."

Ne serait-ce pas, alors, l'Allemagne qui aurait pris, dans cette question, l'initiative d'une négociation portant sur le Cameroun et le Congo ?

C'est une hypothèse qui n'a rien d'invraisemblable, et que, pour ma part, je suis tenté de croire fondée. Dans tous les cas, je suis heureux de relever, en ce qui me concerne, et pour ce qui regarde la politique suivie de 1906 à 1911, la suite des déclarations de M. de Kiderlen :—

" M. Pichon n'a jamais fait de propositions à cet égard durant son Ministère." Vous pouvez en être bien sûrs.

Le Secrétaire d'État insiste ensuite sur les difficultés que " l'habile politique " de pénétration pacifique de la France créait au Gouvernement allemand, et voici ce qu'il dit :—

" Sa première action fut le meurtre d'un Français à Casablanca. La Puissance et l'influence de la France commencèrent à s'étendre comme une tâche d'huile sur toute la région de la Chaouïa. Des protestations de notre part étaient fort difficiles. Le Sultan, qui s'efforçat de profiter des rivalités franco-allemandes, vint un jour se plaindre à notre consul de Fez de l'occupation d'un village de la Chaouïa par les Français, mais il était impossible de déclarer la guerre pour un si mince prétexte. La situation était très difficile pour l'Allemagne, qui ne fut jamais à même de dire : ' En ce moment précis, par cette mesure, l'Acte d'Algésiras est violé. Nous protestons.' Ainsi elle attendait toujours."

Viennent alors la marche sur Fez, les négociations de Kissingen ; et c'est au moment où ces négociations se poursuivent qu'éclate l'affaire d'Agadir. C'est au moment où les deux Gouvernements semblent rechercher un terrain d'entente et où notre Ambassadeur discute courtoisement les vues de l'Allemagne au sujet de l'expédition de Fez, que brusquement, le 1er juillet, l'Europe apprend l'envoi d'un bateau de guerre allemand dans un port fermé du Maroc.

M. de Lamarzelle se demandait hier ce qui pouvait expliquer cet envoi. Il a conclu

que ce n'était certainement pas l'état de trouble d'Agadir, et qu'il devait y avoir d'autres motifs.

En effet, la "Gazette de Cologne" du 25 octobre, 1911, dans un article publié avec l'astérisque officieux, émanant par conséquent de la chancellerie, nous donne la clé de ce mystère :—

"L'acte d'Agadir était motivé en première ligne par la protection que demandaient les Allemands dans cette région. Mais il serait vain de vouloir prétendre aujourd'hui que c'était là le seul motif. Il s'agissait bien plutôt d'une intention bien réfléchie d'accélérer la marche des négociations en envoyant à Agadir un navire allemand. Le développement ultérieur des faits montre qu'on avait eu raison d'agir ainsi."

M. Dominique Delahaye.—Cette manière d'encourager la conversation est bien teutonne ! (Rires.)

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Alors commencent les négociations auxquelles avait voulu nous entraîner l'Allemagne et auxquelles nous avons eu, selon moi, le plus grand tort de nous prêter. (Vifs applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs.)

Elles se sont poursuivies pendant quatre mois, dans un mystère qui n'a été partiellement dévoilé qu'après leur conclusion. ("Très bien ! très bien !")

Pourquoi ce mystère, messieurs ?

Le Chancelier de l'Empire va nous l'apprendre. Voici ce qu'il dit dans son discours du 5 décembre, 1911 :—

"Quel était au fond l'intérêt principal dans cette affaire ? C'était de nous entendre avec la France, et avec la France toute seule, sur la base que nous désirions. Nous avons donc dû subordonner à ce but tous les autres désirs, y compris celui de satisfaire à l'impatience du public et de l'éclairer sur les négociations. . . . . Nous devions tenir compte de l'opinion publique française. Si nous ne l'avions pas fait, je crois qu'il eût été difficile au Gouvernement français de triompher de la résistance de l'opinion publique." ("Très bien !")

Ainsi, c'est parce que l'opinion française se serait soulevée qu'on lui a caché la vérité si longtemps ! ("Très bien ! très bien !" et applaudissements.)

C'est si vrai que, lorsqu'elle a connu pour une part cette vérité et les sacrifices qu'on se préparait à imposer à son patriotisme, elle a, suivant la forte et juste expression de M. de Mun, "redressé le Gouvernement." ("Très bien ! très bien !")

Eh bien, le premier des regrets que j'ai à formuler, c'est que notre Gouvernement n'ait pas à cette époque suffisamment connu le sentiment du pays, c'est qu'il ne se soit pas suffisamment appuyé sur lui, c'est qu'il n'ait pas senti toute la force que lui donnait l'unanimité de l'opinion . . . .

M. Jénouvrier.—Une force irrésistible !

M. Stéphen Pichon.—. . . . pour tout dire, qu'il n'ait pas eu assez confiance dans la force matérielle et morale de la nation. (Vifs applaudissements.)

Ah ! je reconnais que, si l'opinion avait été complètement renseignée, nous n'aurions pas été exposés à nous trouver dans la situation singulière que révèle une conversation du mois d'août, entre le conseiller de l'Ambassade d'Allemagne et l'un des plus hauts fonctionnaires du Quai d'Orsay, et au cours de laquelle ce dernier, protestant contre les demandes excessives de l'Allemagne, s'attirait cette réponse de son interlocuteur: "Mais on nous a offert davantage." Le fait est constaté—on l'a dit à cette tribune—dans un procès-verbal officiel de cette entrevue qui est conservé au Quai d'Orsay.

J'ai un autre regret à formuler, et ici je m'associe complètement aux paroles de M. de Lamarzelle : c'est que nous ayons accepté le maintien du bateau allemand au Maroc jusqu'à la conclusion des pourparlers—("Très bien ! très bien !")—que nous ayons débattu avec le Gouvernement Impérial la cession de territoire français sous la menace permanente d'un débarquement à Agadir. Je crois que notre premier devoir eût été de nous libérer de cette menace. (Applaudissements unanimes.)

Mais, messieurs, j'ai d'autres griefs à formuler au sujet des négociations.

Le premier c'est qu'au lieu de les engager avec l'Allemagne seule, nous ne les ayons pas engagées avec toutes les Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

La question n'était pas une question franco-allemande, mais une question européenne. (Nouveaux applaudissements.)

A cela mon honorable ami M. de Selves a répondu devant la commission de la Chambre : "Mais il ne pouvait être question d'une conférence !"

Je ne parle pas, messieurs, d'une conférence : il y a d'autres moyens de converser

diplomatiquement avec les Gouvernements. L'acte d'Agadir n'intéressait-il pas l'Angleterre et l'Espagne aussi bien que nous ?

M. Jénouvrier.—Certainement.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—L'Angleterre, dont on connaît l'opinion formelle en ce qui concerne l'établissement d'un port allemand, sur la côte marocaine de l'Atlantique ; l'Espagne, avec laquelle nous sommes liés par les traités que vous connaissez. Était-il indifférent de s'appuyer notamment sur ces deux Puissances, sans parler de la Russie, alliée, et de l'Italie, avec laquelle nous avions des accords méditerranéens ?

Pourquoi avons-nous renoncé au bénéfice de cette situation ? Serait-ce que les négociations officieuses étaient déjà trop avancées ? ("Ah ! ah !") Serait-ce que nous nous étions trop engagés au sujet du Congo ? Est-ce à dire que nous espérions échapper aux conséquences de nos traités avec l'Espagne.

Oh ! quelle erreur et quelle chimère !

Des révélations ultérieures nous ont singulièrement éclairés sur le rôle et sur le concours que nous pouvions attendre de l'Angleterre. Si l'on s'est trompé en France sur le sentiment public, on s'est trompé en Allemagne sur l'attitude qu'adopterait l'Angleterre. On y a cru à beaucoup plus de détachement de sa part.

Rappelez-vous le discours prononcé aux communes par Sir Edward Grey, le 27 novembre dernier. Il indique les conditions dans lesquelles a été faite, le 1er juillet, la notification de l'envoi du bâtiment allemand à Agadir et il dit :—

"Cette communication était accompagnée de l'explication suivante :—

"Toute la question marocaine est ouverte par l'envoi du cuirassé. Le Gouvernement allemand regarde le retour au *statu quo* comme douteux, sinon impossible. Il a en vue une solution définitive de la question marocaine, à laquelle participeraient l'Allemagne, la France et l'Espagne."

Immédiatement se produisent des demandes réitérées d'explications de la part du Gouvernement britannique, les 3, 12 et 21 juillet, et, le 22 juillet, Mr. Lloyd George prononce le discours retentissant que je vous demande la permission de citer :—

". . . . Si nous nous trouvions acculés à une situation dans laquelle la paix ne pourrait être maintenue qu'en sacrifiant la grande, la bienfaisante situation que la Grande-Bretagne s'est acquise par des siècles d'héroïsme et d'efforts, en permettant que la Grande-Bretagne soit traitée, quand ses intérêts vitaux sont en jeu, comme si elle ne comptait pas dans le concert des nations, alors, je le dis avec force, la paix à ce prix serait une humiliation intolérable à endurer pour une grande nation comme la nôtre. L'honneur intact n'est pas une question de parti, la sécurité de notre commerce international n'est pas une question de parti."

Plusieurs sénateurs à droite.—Voilà le langage d'un homme d'État !

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Ce discours est du 22 juillet. Le 24 juillet, l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne à Londres vient déclarer à Sir Edward Grey qu'aucun débarquement n'a eu lieu à Agadir et que l'Allemagne n'a jamais eu l'intention d'y installer une base navale, et les communications entre les deux Gouvernements, dit Sir Edward Grey, prennent, à partir de cette date, un caractère plus amical.

M. Asquith, le 27 juillet, confirmait les déclarations de Mr. Lloyd George, et disait :—

"A notre sens, ce serait une grande erreur (et c'eût été une grave erreur) que de laisser aller les événements à la dérive et de permettre que l'affirmation des intérêts que nous y avons pût, survenant après notre silence, causer de la surprise et du ressentiment, au moment même où cette affirmation serait devenue on ne peut plus impérieusement nécessaire. J'ai confiance que nous avons suffisamment paré à cela par les déclarations déjà faites."

Ainsi, l'Angleterre dit nettement, publiquement : "Nous ne laisserons pas traiter en dehors de nous des affaires qui touchent à nos intérêts vitaux." Elle déclare qu'elle n'accepterait pas une paix obtenue au prix d'un tel sacrifice ! Alors, pourquoi n'avons-nous pas associé l'Angleterre à notre action dans les négociations ouvertes avec l'Allemagne ? (Applaudissements sur un très grand nombre de bancs.)

Et l'Espagne, messieurs ! Combien il est grave d'avoir rompu avec la politique qui consistait à traiter d'accord avec elle toutes les questions marocaines ! Avec elle, en communion d'idées avec son Gouvernement, nous étions allés à la conférence d'Algésiras ; avec elle, nous avions organisé la police des ports marocains ; avec elle,

nous étions intervenus à Tanger à la fin de 1906; avec elle, nous avions organisé les principaux services publics du Maroc; avec elle, nous étions allés à Casablanca; avec elle, nous avions négocié la reconnaissance du Sultan Moulay Hafid et fait adopter par l'Europe les conditions de cette reconnaissance; avec elle nous avions reçu mandat de réprimer la contrebande des armes; avec elle, nous avions négocié à Fez en 1909 et nous lui avions donné notre concours durant ses propres négociations avec le Maroc à la fin de 1910; nos deux politiques étaient liées.

Sans doute, nous discutions ensemble sur l'application de notre politique; nous n'étions pas toujours d'accord; il se produisait certains dissentiments, certaines divergences d'appréciation, mais nous finissions toujours par régler ces différends en bonne amitié.

En 1907, nous nous étions entendus avec l'Espagne en même temps qu'avec l'Angleterre, par des accords qui ont été publiés dans un Livre jaune, pour déclarer que "dans la Méditerranée et dans la partie de l'Atlantique qui baigne les côtes d'Europe et d'Afrique, le but de la politique des trois Gouvernements était de maintenir le *statu quo* territorial," et que "si des circonstances se produisaient qui seraient de nature à modifier le *statu quo*, chacune des parties contractantes entrerait, en communication avec l'autre afin d'être en état de se concerter sur les mesures à prendre en commun."

Pourquoi n'avoir pas tenu compte de cet accord? Pourquoi avoir rompu avec cette politique? Est-ce la faute de l'Espagne? On ne peut le soutenir, car au moment où nous nous engagions dans l'expédition de Fez, elle nous a offert spontanément et formellement son concours. Je crois même pouvoir dire qu'elle nous l'a offert d'une façon plus étroite encore dans des documents que M. le Président du Conseil connaît certainement. (Mouvements divers.)

M. Jules Cambon avait pris soin pourtant, dans une dépêche qui contient un avertissement grave, d'appeler l'attentien la plus sérieuse du Gouvernement sur les inconvénients nombreux qu'il y aurait à séparer notre action de celle de l'Espagne. Nous l'en avons pourtant séparée, et je le déplore.

Voilà, messieurs, ce qui, à mes yeux, à pesé le plus lourdement sur nos négociations: leur mystère excessif qui a comprimé l'essor et l'appui de l'opinion publique, les contradictions et les engagements graves résultant de pourparlers officieux; le fait que nous avons accepté sans nécessité une conversation à deux avec l'Allemagne; l'isolement de l'Espagne, en dehors de laquelle nous avons traité, comme on l'a dit, pour tout le Maroc, alors que nous avions avec elle des engagements inéluctables pour la création de zones espagnoles dans l'Empire chérifien. ("Très bien! très bien!")

C'est dans ces conditions que nous avons signé le traité du 4 novembre dernier.

Ce traité, dont personne ou à peu près personne ne veut et que la majorité subit plus qu'elle ne l'accepte, porte fatalement la marque des fautes commises pendant les pourparlers qui l'ont précédé.

Quel est-il?

Il s'inspire, dans son préambule, de la nécessité "de préciser et de compléter l'accord de 1909"—et ceci est une réponse péremptoire à ceux qui dénoncent ledit accord comme une œuvre viciée dans son principe et stérile dans ses applications ("Très bien! très bien!"); il proclame, en même temps, la nécessité "de poursuivre, dans l'intérêt général, l'œuvre de pacification et de progrès prévue par l'Acte d'Algésiras"—ce qui indique comme je le disais hier, dans une interruption, que sa portée n'est pas de nous libérer complètement des obligations internationales de cet Acte.

M. le Président du Conseil.—C'est certain!

M. le Rapporteur.—Personne n'a pu émettre cette supposition.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Nous sommes bien d'accord sur ce point. Sans doute il a des avantages que n'avait pas l'accord de 1909; à quoi aurait-il servi de donner 275,000 kilom. carrés à l'Allemagne s'il ne devait pas avoir quelques avantages de plus que l'accord de 1909? (Rires approbatifs.) Mais il a aussi des charges lourdes, écrasantes, peut-être, et il soulève toute une série de difficultés que nous n'étions pas appelés à envisager auparavant.

Il est lui aussi un compromis, une étape; vers quel avenir?—(mouvement)—c'est le point sur lequel il est permis de n'être pas complèment rassuré! (Marques nombreuses d'approbation.)

M. de Bethmann-Hollweg disait au Reichstag, le 9 novembre: "Avant Fez et Agadir, le Maroc était nominalement indépendant—en fait déjà au pouvoir de la France . . . . Nous n'avions pas de garanties de porte ouverte, et nous avions renoncé aux aspirations politiques. Or, quelle est la situation actuelle? Nous n'avons rien donné au Maroc que nous n'ayons déjà donné et nous avons gagné un agrandissement de notre domaine colonial."

Il est excessif de dire, messieurs, que l'Allemagne ne nous a rien donné au Maroc, par le traité de 1911: elle nous a donné d'abord des charges considérables que nous n'avions pas—(rires)—charges militaires, financières, administratives, diplomatiques. Elle a déclaré qu'elle ne ferait pas obstacle à l'établissement de notre protectorat sur l'Empire chérifien le jour où nous croirions pouvoir en assumer la responsabilité et où nous serions d'accord avec le Sultan; elle a admis que, dès maintenant, ce serait nous qui serions substitués au Makhzen pour ce qui concerne l'ordre, la sécurité des étrangers, protégés, censaux et autres, sur le territoire marocain. "Ce n'est plus," a-t-elle dit, "les autorités marocaines auxquelles nous aurons affaire, c'est la France qui devient responsable vis-à-vis de nous des engagements qu'elle a pris par traité." (Vives exclamations.)

M. Dominique Delahaye.—La guerre pourrait bien sortir de cette responsabilité.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Il nous reste à tirer de cette situation les avantages qu'elle comporte.

Nous nous heurtons là à un certain nombre d'embarras.

D'abord, c'est la nécessité d'une entente avec l'Espagne.

Nous avons traité avec l'Allemagne pour tout le Maroc, comme l'ont très bien dit M. de Las Cases et M. de Lamarzelle.

Mais notre protectorat ne peut s'étendre que sur une partie du pays. Quels seront les droits de l'Espagne par rapport à nous? Comment sera réglée la situation respective des deux pays et leur situation vis-à-vis des Puissances et du Sultan du Maroc? Qu'adviendra-t-il des services internationaux fonctionnant déjà dans la zone espagnole, des entreprises françaises appelées à la traverser, du régime à instituer à Tanger?

En ce qui touche notre situation dans la partie du Maroc qui doit inévitablement tomber sous notre protection, combien nos droits ont été limités et notre liberté d'action réduite!

Il semble que la pensée secrète des négociateurs allemands ait été ou bien de nous retirer d'une main les avantages qu'ils nous concédaient de l'autre, ou bien de se réserver pour l'avenir la possibilité de réclamer de nous de continuelles compensations en charge des concessions qu'ils pourraient avoir plus tard à nous consentir. ("Très bien! très bien!")

"Nous ne voulions pas," disait la "Gazette de Cologne" du 25 octobre dans l'article que j'ai déjà cité, "qu'il en advînt du Maroc comme de Tunis, de Madagascar et des Indes françaises . . . . La tunisification devait être empêchée."

Et, de fait, l'Allemagne nous a mis, par le traité, en face d'un régime qui est un enchevêtrement de complications et d'embûches, et qui nous ôte, dans les plus graves matières, la liberté de nos mouvements.

Je ne veux pas m'appesantir sur la critique des détails du traité; elle a été très bien faite à cette tribune. Je la résume.

La juridiction consulaire est maintenue dans les conditions que vous savez. Le Chancelier allemand a déclaré qu'il faudrait l'approbation du Reichstag pour la supprimer. Cela permet de pressentir les difficultés que rencontrera l'abrogation du régime actuel au Maroc. On aurait compris la nécessité de conserver ce régime jusqu'au jour où nous serions en mesure, comme cela s'est fait en Tunisie, d'installer la juridiction française. Pas du tout! Il faudra l'assentiment de toutes les Puissances pour supprimer la juridiction consulaire, et l'Allemagne s'est réservé la possibilité de se prononcer la dernière.

Le régime des protégés est maintenu. Il faut que j'en parle, que j'en dise un mot—j'en demande pardon au Sénat—("Parlez! parlez!")—pour le définir autant de précision que possible. Il existe dans d'autres pays, en Orient. Il n'y a pas de pays où il ait autant d'inconvénients qu'au Maroc. Il ne s'applique pas seulement aux indigènes employés par les légations et consulats: interprètes, gardes, domestiques; il s'étend aux agents indigènes des commerçants étrangers, à leurs associés agricoles répandus dans la campagne, à des notables, à des personnages politiques.

"Ces protégés ne relèvent que de la juridiction consulaire. Ils sont exempts des impôts personnels.

"Les associés agricoles font bénéficier de leurs privilèges leur famille, leurs domestiques, on pourrait presque dire leur village."

Il existe plusieurs milliers de protégés. Les plus nombreux sont ceux qui relèvent de la protection allemande. Il y en a des quantités dans la Chaouïa.

Enfin, messieurs, voici ce que nous lisons dans une note rédigée en 1908 au Quai d'Orsay pour M. Clemenceau, qui était alors Président du Conseil :—

" Le jour où la question marocaine prendrait pour nous un autre aspect et si nous considérions que notre principal intérêt fût d'exercer auprès du Makhzen un rôle de conseillers, la protection apparaîtrait comme un des premiers abus à éliminer."

C'est précisément celui qu'on maintient.

Au point de vue économique—M. Méline l'a démontré avec la plus grande force à votre commission—nous avons constitué au profit de l'Allemagne de véritables privilèges. Je sais que mon honorable collègue doit prendre la parole à ce sujet. Je ne veux pas m'étendre sur les déclarations qu'il a faites à la commission, il les présentera beaucoup mieux que moi au Sénat.

Le traité allemand de 1890 est un traité en quelque sorte *sine die*, parce qu'il ne pourra y en avoir d'autre que lorsque l'Allemagne sera d'accord avec le Maroc. Ce traité porte que " les droits perçus sur les produits et les marchandises importés par des sujets allemands dans les ports de l'Empire marocain ne depassent pas 10 pour cent de leur valeur."

Et, naturellement, toutes les Puissances qui bénéficient de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée profitent de cette disposition.

Avons-nous du moins—ici, je me permettrai de répondre un mot à M. Baudin et à ceux qui partagent sa manière de voir sur l'accord de 1909 au point de vue économique —avons-nous du moins supprimé, vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne, l'engagement que nous avions pris en 1909 de favoriser les entreprises en commun entre nos nationaux et les nationaux allemands ? Mais non ! Et si vous avez adressé de ce fait des critiques à l'accord que le traité actuel a pour but " de préciser et de compléter," pourquoi des critiques disparaîtraient-elles aujourd'hui ?

Le " Journal des Débats," qui a traité toutes ces questions avec une remarquable indépendance et beaucoup d'autorité, a fait à ce sujet une observation fort juste. Elle part du texte du paragraphe 4 de la lettre explicative de M. von Kiderlen-Waechter, qui est ainsi concu :—

" Le Gouvernement allemand renonçant à demander la détermination préalable du parti à faire à l'industrie allemande dans la construction des chemins de fer."

Mais jamais, messieurs, nous avions pris, vis-à-vis du Gouvernement allemand, l'engagement de lui donner une part dans l'organisation des chemins de fer. Qu'est-ce donc que cette renonciation subite qui apparaît dans le texte de notre traité ? Le Gouvernement allemand renonce à une chose que nous ne lui avions jamais offerte, qu'il n'avait pas demandée et que, pour ma part, je lui aurais refusée. Il y renonce et il demande une compensation. (Rires.)

Il demande au Gouvernement français " de déclarer qu'il sera toujours heureux de voir des associations d'intérêts se produire entre les ressortissants des deux pays, pour les affaires dont ils pourront respectivement obtenir l'entreprise."

Et le Gouvernement français s'empresse d'accéder à cette demande.

Eh bien ! voilà le condominium ; la voilà l'entente dont vous ne vouliez pas entre financiers et industriels allemands et financiers et industriels français ! Le voilà le texte de l'accord de 1909 reproduit de façon à peu près identique dans le fameux traité qui devait l'abroger si complètement ! (Vive approbation sur de nombreux bancs.)

Le " Journal des Débats " écrit avec raison :—

" C'est un marché et une servitude. Et elle paraît très périlleuse " ; il n'est que temps qu'on nous donne des explications précises sur ce point ! (Applaudissements)

Je répète que je ne veux pas entrer dans les détails du traité. Les articles, je dois le dire, ont fait l'objet, à la commission, d'une analyse sévère de M. Poincaré, qui, avant notre rapporteur (M. Baudin) et d'accord avec lui comme avec les membres de la commission en a relevé les obscurités.

M. le Président du Conseil.—Voulez-vous ajouter qu'après cette analyse je concluais déjà au vote du traité ?

M. Stéphen Pichon.—C'est un traité dont personne ne veut et que tout le monde accepte, je l'ai dit tout à l'heure. (Sourires. Mouvements divers.)

Mais je suis bien sûr de ne pas trahir la vérité en constatant, comme je le faisais tout à l'heure, qu'il avait été de votre part l'objet d'une analyse sévère, que vous en avez montré les obscurités, les dispositions sujettes à controverses, en même temps que les imperfections et les défectuosités.

M. le Président du Conseil.—Je recommencerai volontiers à la tribune, et je maintiendrai mes conclusions. (Mouvements divers.)

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Le caractère international de l'administration marocaine telle qu'il résultait de l'Acte d'Algésiras est, en somme, loin d'être supprimé.

Il subsiste pour une grande part, dans des institutions qui, non seulement sont maintenues, mais reçoivent une nouvelle investiture, de nouvelles attributions et sont ainsi consolidées. Il en est ainsi des commissions qu'on a énumérées : Commission des Adjudications et des Marchés (article 6, § 4) ; Comité spécial des Travaux publics (article 6, § 5) ; Commission des Valeurs douanières, Comité permanent des Douanes (article 4 § 3) ; de la Banque d'État, en général, pour lesquels nous devons veiller à ce que l'élément étranger ait toujours une part de surveillance de contrôle et de direction.

Après avoir constaté la situation prépondérante de l'Allemagne, son monopole de fait au point de vue minier dans certaines régions du Maroc, M. Poincaré a reconnu, dans une séance de la commission, que ce serait une source continuelle d'embarras si les rapports se tendaient entre les deux pays.

En somme, le Maroc demeure internationalisé sous le rapport industriel et financier avec des garanties particulières pour l'Allemagne, à laquelle nous avons concédé un véritable privilège économique et le droit de priorité dans la construction de la ligne de chemins de fer Tanger–Fez qui l'intéresse spécialement.

Puis nous avons laissé dans le vague un certain nombre de questions fort importantes dans lesquelles je considère notre droit comme certain : postes, écoles, maintien ou suppression du corps diplomatique. Mais quelque certain que soit notre droit, il faudra—comme il est contesté—que nous arrivions à le faire triompher. Et par surcroît, tout cela reste soumis à l'adhésion des Puissances signataires de l'Acte d'Algésiras. (Article 14.)

Et si, ce que je ne crois pas d'ailleurs, une seule refuse son adhésion, quelle sera notre situation vis-à-vis d'elle ? Que ferons-nous avec les autres ?

On a fait la comparaison avec la Tunisie—j'ai peut-être quelque qualité pour en parler—mais il y a des différences fondamentales ! La Tunisie ne nous a coûté aucune compensation territoriale. Pour y établir notre protectorat, nous n'avions donné à aucune Puissance aucune parcelle de nos colonies, nous occupions la totalité du territoire, il n'y avait pas de traité international, tel que l'Acte d'Algésiras s'appliquant à la régence et nous ligottant de telle manière qu'aujourd'hui encore, pour le Maroc, il est impossible de savoir exactement ce qui subsiste de cet Acte et ce qui en est supprimé. Nous ne nous étions pas engagés à ne pas modifier à notre profit le régime économique de la régence. Il n'y avait aucune banque d'État, aucune commission internationale de contrôle, ni de surveillance sur les chemins de fer, sur les mines, et les travaux publics. Nous nous étions simplement portés garants de l'exécution des traités existants entre le Gouvernement de la régence et les diverses Puissances européennes. Il n'y avait ni associés agricoles, ni censaux, ni la multitude de protégés qui existent au Maroc. Nous étions sûrs de la suppression de la juridiction consulaire et de l'assentiment de toutes les Puissances qui avaient approuvé, sauf une, et qui avaient même encouragé notre intervention dans la régence.

Notre action diplomatique en était singulièrement facilitée.

D'ailleurs, il n'y avait pas de corps diplomatique à Tunis, mais simplement un corps consulaire, qui était bien loin de posséder les droits que possède le corps diplomatique de Tanger. Et pourtant, nous avons eu des difficultés nombreuses ; M. d'Estournelles le sait mieux que personne, il les a admirablement racontées dans un livre excellent sur le protectorat tunisien. Nous avons eu des affaires de portégés, des affaires d'école qui ont failli engendrer de véritables conflits ; et si nous avons pu réaliser, dès 1884, la suppression des juridictions consulaires, il a fallu attendre jusqu'en 1896 et 1897 pour nous entendre avec l'Italie et l'Angleterre ; et ce n'est qu'en échange de concessions fort importantes que nous nous sommes entendus avec ces deux pays.

Et tandis qu'en Tunisie, nous pouvons réaliser aujourd'hui l'union douanière et résoudre la question des mines, nous avons un régime spécial pour le commerce de certains produits importés ou exportés de France ou d'Algérie ; tandis que les produits algériens entrent par terre en franchise en Tunisie, nous nous sommes interdit, par le traité du 4 novembre, 1911, la possibilité de conclure un traité de commerce entre le Maroc et l'Agérie, sans que ce traité soit au bénéfice de toutes les Puissances qui jouissent de la clause de la nation la plus favorisées. (Exclamations sur de nombreux bancs.)

On a fait une autre comparaison avec l'Égypte.

Mais l'Égypte n'est pas à proprement parler—les Anglais s'en plaignent—un pays de protectorat. En droit, elle reste encore vassale de la Turquie.

En raison de nos rapports d'entente étroite avec l'Angleterre, et d'ailleurs comme une condition pour les établir, nous avons pris vis-à-vis d'elle, en ce qui concerne l'Égypte, un certain nombre d'engagements, engagements politiques, engagements commerciaux ; nous les tiendrons assurément et nous ne pourrions mieux faire. Mais l'Angleterre ne trouvera peut-être pas de la part des autres Puissances les mêmes dispositions amicales et sa tâche pourra continuer à en être compliquée. Ne s'en plaint-elle pas, d'ailleurs ? Il faudrait n'avoir pas lu les livres de Lord Milner et de Lord Cromer pour en douter. Il faudrait n'être pas au courant de ce qui se passe dans le pays du Khédive.

Je reconnais volontiers que nous sommes, à certains égards, vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne, dans une situation analogue, au Maroc, à celle où se trouve l'Angleterre vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne, en Égypte. Mais, si vous trouvez que c'est là un régime très rassurant, je ne partage pas votre opinion. (Approbation.)

Et d'ailleurs, on nous le fait bien savoir. Dans les journaux allemands, en effet, on déclare tenir de source autorisée que "les relations diplomatiques de l'Allemagne au Maroc évolueront dans le même sens qu'avec l'Égypte." Croyez-moi, cela peut nous ménager un certain nombre d'embarras.

Maintenant, à quel prix avons-nous payé notre traité marocain ?

Quelles sont les compensations territoriales acceptées par l'Allemagne après avoir été "offertes" par nous ? Je dis "offertes" . . . .

Plusieurs sénateurs à droite.—C'est cela !

M. Stéphen Pichon.— . . . . d'après les affirmations officielles allemandes non contestées. "Les Français," a-t-on dit au Reichstag, "ont offert des compensations sur lesquelles, après de longues négociations, l'accord s'est fait." Nous avons cédé 275,000 kilom. carrés . . . .

M. Dominique Delahaye.—On a même dit 300,000.

M. Stéphen Pichon.— . . . . de territoire au Congo. Nous avons donné à l'Allemagne l'accès au Congo et à l'Oubanghi, c'est-à-dire aux deux grandes voies fluviales du Centre africain, par les deux coupures que nous avons consenties. Nous lui avons donné deux points de contact avec le Congo belge ; en lui ouvrant accès au sud de la Guinée espagnole nous lui avons donné la faculté de créer un port qui—on l'a dit—fera concurrence aux nôtres. Nous lui avons donné la possibilité, si elle s'entend avec l'Italie, maîtresse de la Tripolitaine, de faire un chemin de fer de la Méditerranée au Congo par le Cameroun.

Nous avons, en somme, rompu le bloc de nos possessions territoriales en Afrique. ("Très bien ! très bien !") Nous avons brisé l'unité géographique de notre Empire.

A Fachoda nous avions perdu notre débouché sur l'Océan Indien ; mais, au point de vue diplomatique, nous avions acquis la liaison entre les deux parties de notre Empire.

Nous possédions au Chari le nœud stratégique des chemins de fer.

Ces vues, qui furent celles de tous nos explorateurs et de notre Gouvernement, sont sacrifiées.

On dira, comme l'a fait M. Lebrun à la commission, que la liaison hydrographique subsiste entre le Moyen- et le Bas-Congo, et que notre navigation sur les fleuves est assurée.

M. Dominique Delahaye.—Ce n'est pas démontré. (Exclamations.)

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Attendez, mon cher collègue. Oui ! pourvu que notre droit sur la possession des îles soit nettement établi. (Adhésion.)

M. Dominique Delahaye.—A la bonne heure !

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Pour moi ce droit n'est pas douteux, il résulte du texte même du traité ; mais on le conteste en Allemagne M. de Kiderlen a soutenu, à ce propos, une interprétation différente de la nôtre. Et c'est encore une contestation à régler.

D'après certaines déclarations faites à la commission et que l'on a rappelées, ce que nous aurions cédé à l'Allemagne, au Congo, ce seraient principalement des territoires infectés par les moustiques et par la maladie du sommeil. Souhaitons que les réveils ne nous ménagent pas trop de déceptions.

Nous avons dans tous les cas encerclé la Guinée espagnole de telle manière que nous en avons fait une proie désignée pour des revendications futures . . . .

M. Dominique Delahaye.—Très bien ! Et nous avons abandonné notre droit de préemption.

M. Stéphen Pichon.— . . . . et nous avons, pour accentuer ce sacrifice—fait aux dépens d'une Puissance amie—abandonné les droits de préemption que nous tenions de notre traité du 27 juin, 1900, avec l'Espagne.

N'avons-nous pas, d'ailleurs, modifié l'exercice de notre droit de préemption en ce qui concerne le Congo belge ? Alors qu'il ne dépendait antérieurement que d'une entente entre la Belgique et la France, n'avons-vous pas stipulé que nous ne pourrions l'exercer qu'après en avoir conféré avec les Puissances ? M. de Kiderlen n'a pas manqué de faire valoir cette concession de notre part à la commission du Reichstag, le 16 novembre :—

"Le jour où la question du Congo s'ouvrirait," a-t-il dit, "l'Allemagne serait appelée à jouer un rôle."

Et cette clause n'a-t-elle pas provoqué des inquiétudes et des regrets de la part du Gouvernement belge ?

N'est-ce pas à cet ensemble de dispositions si fâcheuses pour la Belgique comme pour la France qu'il faut attribuer des articles aussi regrettables que celui que citait M. de Lamarzelle et que publiait, tout récemment, l'un des principaux organes de la presse belge ? Vous savez que cet organe officieux disait que la Belgique, au lieu de maintenir sa neutralité, devrait essayer, en cas de conflit, de s'adresser à la Puissance qui lui offrirait le plus de garanties ?

Quoi d'étonnant, si l'on songe, comme l'a dit très justement M. de Courcel à la commission, que les Belges en sont venus, peu à peu, à considérer l'indépendance du Congo, que leur a cédé le Roi Léopold, comme liée en fait à l'indépendance de la Belgique ? Et comment n'auraient-ils pas été émus par les déclarations de M. Caillaux, faisant prévoir, dès le lendemain du traité, dans le centre de l'Afrique, de nouveaux échanges et de nouveaux partages de territoires "où chacune des diverses parties contractantes aurait à trouver son profit" ?

Enfin, l'enclave que nous avons conservée entre le fleuve et les nouvelles possessions allemandes n'est elle pas déjà convoitée comme le prix de compensations ultérieures ?

La surface de friction qu'elle contient et les appétits qu'elle provoque ne sont-ils pas de nature à nous faire prévoir des querelles ou tout au moins des contestations ?

Si ce n'est le Président du Conseil, c'est je crois un membre du Gouvernement qui a déclaré à la commission que, déjà, des associations se forment en Allemagne pour négocier l'acquisition de cette enclave. Déjà, les journaux allemands en escomptent la possession ; et voici ce que disait récemment l'un d'entre eux :—

"Dans deux ans d'ici, après une étude attentive du pays, nous aurons pu choisir l'emplacement où doit aboutir le chemin de fer du Cameroun ; le moment sera venu. Alors, nous proposerons aux Français d'échanger les deux pattes du canard contre un territoire convenable situé sur la frontière du Congo belge. Si les Français n'y consentent pas, nous attendrons, mais il est probable qu'ils y consentiront, parce qu'ils ne sont pas tous déraisonnables." (On rit.)

M. Gaudin de Villaine.—D'ailleurs, il y a une carte allemande, imprimée à Hambourg qui le prouve.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Voilà, messieurs, les conditions d'acquisition de notre protectorat. Maintenant, il reste à l'organiser et à le pratiquer. Il reste tout d'abord, comme l'a demandé si justement M. Ribot, à conclure une convention avec le Sultan et c'est de cela que le Gouvernement s'occupe. Mais avant toute organisation l'embarras commence. "Ah ! prenons garde," s'écrie-t-on. "Soyons prudents, évitons de rien brusquer, de rien compromettre ; allons lentement ; procédons avec circonspection ; ménageons nos efforts, nos ressources, notre diplomatie."

Je ne blâme pas le Gouvernement de cette sagesse ; je constate seulement à quel point il la juge nécessaire, reconnaissant sans doute par là qu'il aurait peut être été préférable de ne pas s'exposer à tant de hasards, de charges et de périls. Oh ! ce n'est pas à vous qu'on reprochera—fort heureusement !—de vouloir refaire la carte d'Afrique et de préparer de nouveaux règlements de comptes. La carte qu'on nous a faite et les comptes qui restent à régler vous suffisent ; je ne puis que vous en féliciter ; ils nous suffisent également.

Mais je ne puis m'empêcher, et je dois le dire, de vous trouver optimistes dans les calculs que vous avez faits en ce qui touche l'organisation de notre protectorat.

M. le Président du Conseil.—Je ne les ai faits que sous toutes réserves.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Je le sais ; j'allais le dire.

M. Clemenceau.—Mais le vote, lui, n'est pas sous réserves. ("Très bien !" et applaudissements.)

M. le Président du Conseil.—Chacun prend ses responsabilités.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Je sais bien que vous êtes prudent ; je sais que vous nous avez dit à la commission : "Je ne vous apporte que des prévisions, des prévisions qui peuvent être modifiées ; je ne puis pas vous donner des chiffres dont je sois absolument certain ; main enfin, voici quelles sont les premières impressions du Gouvernement : Pour 1911, la charge supplémentaire serait de 61,000,000 à 61,500,000 fr."

Les crédits demandés au Parlement sont actuellement, je crois, de 58,000,000 de francs. . . . .

M. le Président du Conseil.—J'avais donné d'abord un chiffre trop fort.

M. Clemenceau.—Continuez ainsi !

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Je souhaite qu'il en soit de même pour le reste.

En 1912, il faudra entre 70,000,000 et 100,000,000 de francs—vous vous laissez une grande marge—contre 10,000,000 de francs de recettes, dans l'état actuel des taxes et des impôts.

Les dépenses actuelles de la guerre, de la marine, s'élèvent d'autre part à un chiffre de 42,000,000 à 45,000,000 de francs en surcroît des dépenses métropolitaines, c'est-à-dire en surcroît de ce que coûteraient les mêmes troupes dans la métropole.

M. le Président du Conseil.—Mais en deçà du chiffre de 70,000,000 de francs, les chiffres ne s'additionnent pas.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Je m'efforce, croyez-le, de ne rien exagérer.

M. le Président du Conseil.—Ce n'est pas pour vous que j'apporte cette précision ; c'est afin d'éviter toute méprise.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Il y a actuellement 27,000 hommes débarqués ; il en faudra 38,000 au printemps. Cela suffira pour parer aux premières nécessités du protectorat ; vous le pensez.

Le Ministère de la Guerre estime que l'armée chérifienne, de 5,000 hommes environ, pourra être portée à 10,000 hommes en 1913 et s'accroître de 5,000 hommes chaque année jusqu'à un total que j'hésite à indiquer, car je ne comprends pas que le Ministère de la Guerre ait pu aller jusque-là—jusqu'à un total de 40,000 à 50,000 hommes.

Je ne vois pas une armée chérifienne de cette importance.

M. Clemenceau.—C'est impossible.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Je n'y crois pas, je ne crois pas à la sécurité que l'on pourrait en attendre pour nous ; je ne crois pas que la sécurité française, au Maroc, puisse être laissée à la merci d'une pareille organisation si je la jugeais possible.

Pourra-t-on réduire l'occupation ? C'est bien douteux : on ne pourra pas rester l'arme au pied. On n'a pas tenu compte, dans les évaluations qui ont été faites, de l'état des tribus, de leurs rivalités, de leurs dissensions, de leurs luttes, du contre-coup du protectorat—qui déjà se fait sentir, avant même que ce protectorat soit même organisé—de la nécessité de créer des postes, d'organiser des colonnes mobiles, de ravitailler les garnisons, de construire des routes, de faire des opérations dans des régions montagneuses, d'assurer partout la sécurité des Européens, de pourvoir aux vides causés par la maladie, aux pertes subies, &c.

Nos pertes résultant de toutes ces causes, d'après un journal qui puise ses informations à très bonne source, "Le Matin," auraient été considérables.

Du 1er mai au 1er novembre, nous aurions eu 80 tués, dont 30 officiers et 50 sous-officiers ; nous aurions perdu 14 officiers et 680 hommes pour cause de maladie ou d'accident, nous aurions évacué 4,171 hommes pour cause de maladie ; cela représenterait, au total, le cinquième de nos effectifs.

Je sais bien, M. le Président du Conseil, que vous vous considérez comme nous devant la vérité et que vous vous efforcerez de nous la dire. Je vous demande de ne pas être optimiste ; il faut, je crois, envisager pleinement le protectorat, puisque nous sommes en face du protectorat ; que nous sachions exactement à quoi nous en tenir ; que le pays n'ait pas de désillusions ni de déceptions sous ce rapport, car il en aura sous beaucoup d'autres. (Vive approbation sur de nombreux bancs.)

Voilà le traité par lequel on déclare avoir donné le Maroc à la France. "Donné" est un bien gros mot. L'Allemagne avait indiqué qu'il n'était pas question pour elle de nous installer gratis dans l'Empire chérifien. J'estime, quant à moi, qu'elle s'est tenu parole et que les abandons qu'elle nous a consentis sont loin d'être dégrevés de toute hypothèque. Ici, M. de Las Cases, le mot est juste, car ce sont des hypothèques que nous avons consenties. C'est d'autant plus extraordinaire qu'après tout le Maroc n'était pas la propriété du Gouvernement allemand. ("Très bien ! très bien !") Je ne crois pas qu'il se soit montré aussi exigeant lorsque l'Italie, usant d'une faculté qu'elle tient de son entente avec nous—entente que je désire de plus en plus étroite et cordiale—(vifs applaudissements)—a manifesté la résolution de s'installer en Tripolitaine.

M. Dominique Delahaye.—Voilà où vous devenez chimérique, à votre tour.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Cependant, les négociateurs de la convention du 4 novembre ont célébré sa conclusion comme une grande victoire pour eux et pour nous. Le lendemain du jour où elle avait été signée—à moins que ce ne soit le jour même, car il fallait se hâter de la glorifier—M. Caillaux disait à Saint-Calais :—

"Nous avons voulu que la France eût au Maroc sa pleine liberté d'action." Et il déclarait avoir rejeté les privilèges économiques, "qui auraient entraîné pour ceux auxquels nous les aurions concédés une domination plus complète."

Il reste à concilier cette affirmation avec celle de M. de Kiderlen au Reichstag, le 22 novembre :—

"La politique allemande est vraiment parvenue à ses fins. . . . L'Allemagne a seulement abandonné des droits qu'elle partageait avec d'autres Puissances, tandis que la France, elle, a cédé des territoires français."

Et le Ministre allemand s'est efforcé de démontrer que son pays conservait au Maroc une situation économique privilégiée et que, même au point de vue administratif et politique, il gardait des positions de nature à la rassurer pour l'avenir.

Voilà des affirmations opposées qui donnent une idée des interprétations contradictoires que le traité permet et des complications qui peuvent s'en suivre.

De même, M. Caillaux avait dit, au cours des pourparlers du mois de septembre dernier, en reprenant une formule qu'il attribuait à M. Thiers : "Les affaires ne sont bonnes que quand elles sont à l'avantage des deux parties contractantes." Je m'imagine que M. Thiers n'aurait pas traité l'affaire de cette façon. (Rires et applaudissement à droite et au centre.)

En Allemagne, où la facilité de nos négociations officieuses et la gravité des propos qu'elles avaient permis d'échanger avait fait naître des espérances bien supérieures à celles que l'événement a réalisées, il ne semble pas que le traité ait été accueilli avec une satisfaction sans mélange.

La mélancolie de l'automne a fait évanouir les rêves de l'été. Il y a eu des déceptions dans le monde colonial, et le Secrétaire d'État des Colonies, M. Lindequist, a donné sa démission.

Si je disais qu'en France tout le monde considère comme une bonne affaire l'œuvre que nous discutons, je m'imagine que je soulèverais des objections à peu près générales —("Très bien ! très bien !" sur les mêmes bancs)—et la première protestation que je provoquerais sans doute serait singulièrement autorisée, je pense que ce serait celle de M. le Président du Conseil ; car personne n'a fait, devant la commission, une critique plus lucide, plus ferme, plus serrée, plus convaincante des négociations, de leur origine, de leur développement, de leur forme et de leur conclusion.

M. le Président du Conseil.—Je n'ai pas changé d'avis.

M. Stéphen Pichon.—Les journaux allemands n'ont d'ailleurs pas laissé ignorer à M. Poincaré, au lendemain même de son arrivée au Ministère, si heureuse à nos yeux pour le pays—(vifs applaudissements à gauche, au centre et sur divers bancs à droite) —qu'il pouvait s'attendre à voir surgir, dans le ciel marocain, certains nuages dont je souhaite qu'ils n'obscurcissent pas plus l'horizon que le feront les incidents survenus avec l'Italie, car je repousse de toutes mes forces l'idée qu'il puisse y avoir un relâchement dans l'amitié qui existe entre l'Italie et nous. (Nouveaux applaudissements.)

"L'application de la convention franco-allemande," a dit la "Gazette de Cologne," réserve à M. Poincaré quelques difficultés."

Voilà l'un des malheurs de cette convention, que M. de Lamarzelle a très bien mis en lumière ; c'est qu'elle est conçue de telle manière, elle contient tant d'obscurités, elle est sujette à des interprétations si diverses et contentieuses, elle soulève ou elle laisse posés de tels problèmes, qu'il dépend du bon ou du mauvais vouloir de l'un de ses signataires d'en tirer à son gré la paix ou le conflit. ("Très bien ! très bien !") Sa valeur n'est pas intrinsèque, elle dépend de l'accord entre les deux contractants, et cet accord ne se fera que s'il est dans la volonté systématique et réciproque de l'un et de l'autre. (Nouvelles marques d'approbation.)

On comprend à quelles aventures nous expose une si grande part laissée à l'inconnu et aux incertitudes dans l'état d'instabilité où se trouve malheureusement la politique européene. N'a-t-on pas déjà le sentiment profond que le changement survenu dans notre politique marocaine et les bouleversements qui en ont été la suite ont porté une sérieuse atteinte à la confiance qui régnait dans les rapports entre les différents États ?

Les améliorations à introduire dans le traité, les clauses limitatives à en faire disparaître, les textes à élucider, les contestations à résoudre nous obligeront à de continuelles conversations avec l'Allemagne. Tout dépendra de l'esprit dans lequel se poursuivront ces inévitables négociations.

Je suis parmi ceux qui croient qu'étant partisans de la paix nous devons faire, pour la garantir, absolument tout ce qui est compatible avec nos intérêts, nos droits et notre dignité. Je suis de ceux qui croient, suivant le mot d'un général—le Général de Gallifet, je crois—cité par M. Denys Cochin, que l'on ne fait pas la guerre pendant la paix.

C'est de ces pensées que je me suis inspiré pendant tout le temps que j'ai eu l'honneur de diriger les affaires étrangères. Je me suis toujours efforcé de concilier nos obligations nationales, les devoirs qu'elles nous imposent, et le souci d'entretenir avec l'Allemagne des rapports conformés à nos vues pacifiques et aux besoins des deux pays. En déclarant que les Gouvernements dont j'ai fait partie y avaient réussi, je crois ne rien dire qui ne soit conforme à la vérité. Je suis certain que c'est également le but du Gouvernement que M. Poincaré préside, et nul n'est plus qualifié que lui pour nous inspirer toute confiance dans l'autorité avec laquelle il saura le poursuivre. ("Très bien! très bien!" et applaudissements.)

Mais je crains que sa tâche soit plus compliquée qu'on ne l'imagine par toute la série des difficultés qu'on a soulevées en posant prématurément et dans des termes redoutables des problèmes qu'il aurait été sage de ne pas affronter dans d'aussi mauvaises conditions. ("Très bien! très bien!") Je crains qu'on n'ait exposé notre pays à des charges trop lourdes pour ses ressources financières—("Très bien! très bien!")—qu'on n'ait pas exactement calculé ses capacités contributives et qu'on ait risqué de l'affaiblir gravement en Europe en disséminant ses forces en Afrique—("Très bien! très bien!" à droite)—après les avoir émiettées dans d'autres parties du monde—("Très bien! très bien!")—à l'heure où, plus que jamais peut-être, il est nécessaire d'avoir toutes ses forces sous la main. ("C'est cela!" "Très bien!" et vifs applaudissements à droite.)

L'avenir dira si ces inquiétudes sont fondées. Mon patriotisme me fait souhaiter de me tromper. Ce n'est pas moi, dans tous les cas, qui marchanderai mon concours au Gouvernement pour le mettre en mesure de faire face à toutes les nécessités d'une situation dont la responsabilité remonte à d'autres. Je connais ses intentions, elles me suffisent. Je sais qu'il ne nous demandera rien—tout au contraire—qui puisse impliquer un changement dans l'orientation générale de la politique française. Il pense, je n'en doute pas, comme le disait Sir Edward Grey à la Chambre des Communes, "qu'un n'acquiert pas de nouvelles amitiés, des amitiés qui en valent la peine, en désertant les anciennes." ("Très bien! très bien!")

Et il nous conservera nos anciennes amitiés en les resserrant et les affermissant sans cesse. C'est le dessein qu'il poursuit aujourd'hui dans ses négociations si délicates avec l'Espagne, se souvenant que nous n'avons j'amais eu à nous féliciter dans l'histoire ni de nos ruptures, ni de nos dissentiments avec ce noble et valeureux pays—("Très bien! très bien!")—se souvenant aussi des marques de sympathie que nous a toujours données son Roi. ("Très bien! très bien!")

Je me rappelle que, dans le dernier discours que j'ai prononcé au Sénat comme Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, je représentais notre situation diplomatique comme parfaitement assurée par notre alliance et par nos amitiés. On ne m'en voudra pas de constater aujourd'hui que les déclarations de mes successeurs, comme les faits dont nous avons été témoins au cours des négociations qu'ils ont conduites ont attesté l'exactitude de mes paroles.

"Il est superflu de déclarer," disait M. de Selves dans une note lue par lui à la commission, "que nous avons été constamment en communion de pensée avec l'Angleterre et la Russie." Je n'exprime qu'un regret: c'est que nous n'ayons pas su tirer un meilleur parti de la force que nous donnait cette triple entente—(applaudissements)—et de l'irrésistible appui que nous apportait l'élan de notre opinion publique, unanime à se grouper autour du Gouvernement pour la sauvegarde de nos droits. (Nouveaux applaudissements.) Que du moins la leçon nous profite! Une alliance qui date de vingt ans, qui n'a pas cessé d'être pratiquée depuis son origine et qui est sortie fortifiée de toutes les épreuves par lesquelles elle a passé pendant cette longue durée, constitue un élément de paix et de puissance sur lequel nous pouvons nous appuyer avec confiance et avec fierté. (Applaudissements.)

Il n'y a pas beaucoup d'exemples dans l'histoire d'une pareille continuité diplomatique, et ce n'est pas un médiocre éloge à adresser à la république que de lui faire honneur d'avoir su maintenir, avec prudence et énergie, ce gage de sécurité pour la France et de tranquillité pour l'Europe. (Applaudissements.)

Quant à notre entente avec l'Angleterre, permettez-moi de m'associer à ce qu'en disait Sir Edward Grey dans son mémorable discours du 27 novembre dernier:—

"J'ai confiance que le fait qu'en compagnie de la France, durant sept ans, nous avons traversé un grand nombre de tempêtes, suffira pour perpétuer entre la France et nous les relations de confiance mutuelle et de bonne volonté."

Et le Secrétaire d'État britannique affirmait, autant qu'il peut le faire dans les limites de la constitution anglaise, que dans les moments difficiles nous pourrions compter sur le concours de son pays. (Applaudissements.)

Retenons cette assurance et sachons y conformer nos vues et nos actes.

Nous sommes loin d'être à l'abri de toutes les tempêtes. Gardons-nous de pratiquer la politique qui consisterait à ne pas prêter l'oreille aux bruits parfois peu rassurants qui nous parviennent, et à fermer les yeux devant les manifestations qui se produisent et qui dénoteraient des mouvements d'opinion différents de ceux qui nous soutiennent dans notre désir si sincère d'affermir la paix.

Il faut à notre puissance militaire que nous entourons de toute notre sollicitude, et dans laquelle nous avons foi—(applaudissements)—l'appui d'une diplomatie qui ne flotte pas au gré des événements et n'attende pas, pour faire un choix et pour prendre parti, le moment où l'horizon serait subitement devenu trop sombre. Ce fut l'une des erreurs du second Empire; gardons-nous de la renouveler.

Il faut un point solide et fixe où s'établisse notre amitié. (Vifs applaudissements.) Notre entente avec l'Angleterre n'aura pas épuisé sa vertu parce que nous aurons réglé avec l'Allemagne—à quel prix et dans quelles obscurités!—un des problèmes de notre politique africaine. Elle devra subsister et se développer comme l'une des garanties les plus sûres de notre force et de l'équilibre de l'Europe.

Si l'on avait eu tendance vers d'autres idées à certain moment des négociations qui ont abouti au traité du 4 novembre on se serait gravement trompé. (Vive approbation.)

Mais je sais que ce n'est pas le Gouvernement actuel qui céderait à des préoccupations de cette nature. Je sais que les hommes qui en font partie sont dévoués, comme nous, à l'idée générale dont s'est inspirée notre diplomatie dans la détermination de ses préférences. Et si je ne puis me résigner à les suivre jusque dans l'approbation d'un acte . . . .

M. le Président du Conseil.—L'acceptation!

M. Stéphen Pichon.—. . . . contre lequel plusieurs d'entre eux, leur chef en tête, ont élevé les plus sévères critiques, je leur affirme du moins ma pleine confiance dans les sentiments qui les animent, dans les efforts qu'ils feront pour surmonter les périls de leur lourde tâche, et, suivant un mot de la déclaration ministérielle, dans "la claire compréhension qu'ils auront de l'intérêt public," n'ayant à suivre pour cela que l'exemple vivifiant et salutaire que, dans toutes les crises que nous avons traversées, nous a donné notre pays. (Triple salve d'applaudissements. L'orateur, de retour à sa place, reçoit les félicitations d'un très grand nombre de ses collègues.)

M. le Président.—Je pense, messieurs, que le Sénat désire renvoyer à demain la suite de la discussion. (Assentiment général.)

[6273] No. 59.

Memorandum communicated by M. Cambon, February 10, 1912.

L'AMBASSADEUR de France a l'honneur de communiquer, ci-joint, au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères un projet d'organisation municipale de la ville et du territoire de Tanger.

Dans la rédaction de ce projet, M. Poincaré a tenu le plus grand compte des vues indiquées dans la note adressée le 14 décembre dernier à M. de Selves par l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Paris, et notamment des analogies entre le statut politique et administratif de la concession internationale de Shanghaï et les institutions envisagées pour Tanger, qui étaient signalées dans la note précitée. Toutefois, il n'a pas paru possible d'appliquer complètement à Tanger les principes du régime de Shanghaï.

En premier lieu, la concession internationale de Shanghaï ne comporte aucune représentation des intérêts chinois; les Chinois n'ont même pas le droit de propriété sur ce territoire. Ce fait s'explique par l'origine de la concession, qui fut attribuée,

libre de tous droits particuliers et de tous établissements, aux Puissances étrangères ; les Chinois n'étant pas autorisés à s'y installer, on conçoit que le statut municipal ne leur ait reconnu aucune ingérence dans l'administration ; ceux qui sont venus s'y fixer dans ces conditions l'ont fait en connaissance de cause et en acceptant la situation qui leur était imposée. Il en va tout autrement à Tanger, qui, sur 40,000 habitants environ, compte 30,000 indigénes, musulmans et Israélites, contre 10,000 étrangers (dont 5,000 Espagnols et 1,400 Français). On ne peut refuser toute participation de cette population indigène à l'administration municipale. Le projet, ci-joint, admet cependant que sa représentation ne soit pas proportionnée à son importance numérique et que le nombre des conseillers marocains ne dépasse pas un tiers du corps municipal.

Ces conseillers marocains ne pourraient être choisis par élection. Il n'y a pas d'exemple d'un système électoral reposant sur le suffrage universel du censitaire dans une population marocaine, ni même tunisienne. Les musulmans ne prennent part aux élections municipales en Algérie que depuis une trentaine d'années et l'introduction de ce régime à Tanger n'irait pas sans de graves inconvénients. La population n'y est pas préparée et ne pourrait être contenue aussi facilement qu'en Algérie ; les élections causeraient des désordres ; elles seraient livrées au fanatisme ou à la corruption. Le seul système praticable consisterait à faire désigner les représentants indigènes par l'autorité marocaine : il paraîtrait le plus naturel à la population ; quelques objections qu'il soulève, on n'aperçoit pas comment on pourrait en suggérer un autre qui répondît aux institutions et à l'état d'esprit des indigènes. Il pourrait être appliqué tout au moins à titre provisoire ; la délégation indigène pourrait à la rigueur se recruter ensuite par cooptation. Sur ce premier point, le projet français diffère du statut de Shanghaï.

D'autre part, à Shanghaï, la concession internationale est placée sous le contrôle des consuls et du corps diplomatique de Pékin. L'unanimité est nécessaire dans toutes les discussions portées devant les agents des représentants étrangers et les règlements municipaux, par exemple, doivent être soumis à leur approbation. Il ne nous a pas paru qu'il y eût lieu de réaliser à Tanger un système aussi rigoureusement international. On risquerait ainsi de compliquer les questions d'ordre purement municipal en y faisant intervenir des agents officiels dont la tendance au Maroc a toujours été de subordonner les intérêts économiques généraux à des rivalités politiques. Cependant, on ne concevait pas que le territoire de Tanger fût livré sans aucune espèce de contrôle à une administration municipale, qu'elle parût distraite complètement du Maroc et qu'aucune souveraineté ne s'y exerçât, sauf celle d'un pouvoir élu par une majorité de résidents étrangers. Le Gouvernement français pense que la souveraineté du Sultan devrait y être maintenue nominalement. On tiendrait compte ainsi du principe de l'intégrité du Maroc ; et la négociation avec Moulay Hafid serait facilitée par cette concession assez légitime. Le contrôle effectif pourrait être attribué à un comité directeur comprenant un agent français, un agent espagnol et l'agent d'une tierce Puissance. Ce contrôle serait limité à l'approbation des mesures intéressant le statut politique de la ville et de ses habitants, de manière à garantir contre toute décision de la municipalité qui constituerait une infraction à la neutralité.

Quant à l'électorat étranger, le système proposé par M. Poincaré s'inspire de celui qui est appliqué à Shanghaï. L'élection est pratiquée à Tanger, depuis vingt ans, pour le recrutement de la Commission d'Hygiène, qui a quelques-unes des attributions municipales. De même, le principe d'un cens basé sur la taxe urbaine a déjà été admis dans les délibérations qui ont eu lieu entre les différentes colonies de Tanger, puis entre les délégués du Makhzen et le corps diplomatique, pour la préparation du règlement organique de la municipalité prévu par l'Acte d'Algésiras. Le représentant anglais y a donné son assentiment, comme à l'une des garanties jugées nécessaires pour sauvegarder l'indépendance des résidents non espagnols, certains d'être placés dans la dépendance d'une majorité espagnole par le système du suffrage universel. A Tanger, les Espagnols sont, en effet, de beaucoup les plus nombreux ; ce sont pour la plupart des journaliers, de condition sociale inférieure et d'existence misérable, ne prenant qu'une part très faible au commerce de la ville ; ils ne seraient pas qualifiés pour dominer la vie municipale. Un certain nombre d'entre eux appartiennent à des milieux anarchistes violents dont l'intervention dans les affaires municipales risquerait d'être dangereuse.

Le Ministre d'Espagne à Tanger n'a d'ailleurs pas repoussé le principe d'un suffrage censitaire, mais il a proposé qu'on admît au vote tout titulaire d'un loyer de 40 pesetas hassani par mois. La fixation du cens pourrait être réservée dans la négociation diplomatique ; il y aurait avantage à la faire décider par les agents des Puissances à Tanger qui, en l'examinant, prendraient nécessairement en considération les conditions et les nécessités locales.

Les questions des douanes et du chemin de fer de Tanger à Fez sont réservées, ces deux questions étant actuellement soumises aux discussions des Gouvernements français et espagnol.

Enfin un dernier point reste à signaler. Le premier projet communiqué au Gouvernement britannique en décembre dernier constituait autour de Tanger une zone rurale jugée indispensable pour laisser à l'agglomération urbaine son libre développement, ses moyens d'approvisionnement, son alimentation en eau potable et une zone d'action de sa police suffisante pour la sécurité de la ville. La constitution de cette zone ne paraît pas avoir soulevé d'objections de la part du Gouvernement britannique ; mais on est obligé de se préoccuper des susceptibilités de l'Espagne qui seraient éveillées par un empiétement trop marqué du territoire municipal sur la zone d'influence espagnole environnante. On pourrait donc s'en tenir dès maintenant au principe d'une simple banlieue aussi étroite que possible, et laisser aux agents étrangers le soin d'en proposer les limites.

La lecture du projet annexé, montre combien M. Poincaré s'est efforcé de donner satisfaction aux désirs exprimés par le Gouvernement britannique ; il a voulu ménager un règlement de la question de Tanger qui fût acceptable pour l'Espagne et qui permît le développement commercial de ce port. Il devait tenir compte, en effet, du rôle considérable que doit avoir Tanger dans le progrès économique du Maroc et de l'importance des intérêts étrangers déjà réunis dans cette ville. Si la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Espagne se mettent d'accord sur les grandes lignes de ce projet, l'organisation de détail sera plus utilement discutée sur place afin de répondre pleinement aux besoins réels de la colonie internationale.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 10 février, 1912.

Enclosure in No. 59.

Projet de Municipalité internationale à Tanger.

UNE municipalité internationale sera instituée pour la ville de Tanger et sa banlieue.

2. Le corps municipal se composera d'un conseil délibérant ayant pouvoir de réglementation, d'une commission administrative, chargée du pouvoir exécutif, et d'un président de municipalité.

3. Le Conseil municipal comprendra vingt-quatre conseillers élus dont huit marocains.

4. Seront électeurs les étrangers remplissant les conditions suivantes :—

Etre majeur de vingt-cinq ans ;
Jouir de ses droits civiques ;
Résider depuis deux ans à Tanger ;
Occuper un immeuble d'un loyer annuel de .

5. Les conseillers musulmans seront désignés, parmi les notables, par les représentants du Sultan à Tanger.

6. Le président sera désigné par le Conseil municipal. Il pourra déléguer, à titre temporaire ou à titre permanent, une partie de ses attributions aux vice-présidents.

7. Le Conseil municipal délibère sur toutes les questions réglementaires, administratives et budgétaires. Il choisit dans son sein les membres de la Commission administrative.

8. La Commission administrative se compose du président de la municipalité, de deux vice-présidents et de deux conseillers municipaux. Les chefs de service de l'Administration municipale sont appelés à délibérer sur les affaires de leur ressort, mais seulement à titre consultatif.

9. La Commission administrative est chargée de la mise à exécution du budget et des décisions du Conseil municipal. Elle met en application les règlements quand ils ont été votés.

Elle surveille la direction des services municipaux et nomme les chefs de ces services.

10. La Commission administrative établit et soumet à l'adoption du Conseil municipal :—

(*a.*) Les projets de règlements municipaux, concernant l'ordre, la sécurité générale, la police de la ville, l'hygiène et la santé publiques, la voirie, les travaux publics municipaux, les écoles ;
(*b.*) Le projet de budget ordinaire et extraordinaire ;
(*c.*) Le projet d'emprunt ;
(*d.*) Le projet de règlement définitif de chaque budget.

11. Les décisions municipales intéressant le statut politique de la ville de Tanger et de ses habitants devront être soumises à l'approbation d'un comité de contrôle de l'agent français, de l'agent espagnol et de l'agence d'une tierce Puissance européenne. Elle ne seront exécutoires qu'après avoir reçu cette approbation.

12. Les questions de législation musulmane, de juridiction et de compétence immobilières restent régies par les lois islamiques et les édits rendus par Sa Majesté chérifienne.

Les questions de législation, de juridiction et de statut personnel resteront, en ce qui touche les étrangers, réglées par les traités, conventions, décrets intervenus ou à intervenir dans l'Empire chérifien.

13. Les conventions aux règlements municipaux seront déférées à une délégation du tribunal, qui devra être institué à Tanger, par application de la réforme judiciaire prevue à l'accord du 4 novembre.

14. Les services administratifs et techniques concernant les travaux publics d'intérêt général, tels que chemins de fer, routes, ponts, lignes télégraphiques et communications postales, qui auront leur prolongement naturel au delà du territoire municipal, feront l'une entente entre les administrations d'État et la municipalité.

Les services administratifs et techniques ayant un intérêt purement local ressortiront à la municipalité de Tanger.

15. Le port de Tanger pourra être créé par la municipalité avec le concours des fonds de la taxe spéciale qui sont perçus par la douane de cette ville.

16. L'État marocain fait concession à la municipalité de Tanger des droits, taxes et produits locaux.

17. Il est fait, au profit des emprunts de 1904 et 1910 et de l'annuité française, réserve expresse des droits qui leur sont conférés, par les contrats qui les régissent, sur le produit et la perception des taxes précitées.

Pour tout ce qui concerne la création et la perception des ressources constituant son budget, la municipalité se conformera au principe de l'égalité économique et de la liberté commerciale. Il ne sera créé aucun droit de transit sur les marchandises traversant le territoire municipal.

18. Le Gouvernement marocain réserve pour tous ses agents en service dans le territoire municipal la liberté d'action nécessaire à l'exercice de leurs fonctions.

Même réserve est faite au profit de l'Administration de la Dette et de la Régie des Tabacs, qui continueront d'exercer librement dans le territoire municipal, notamment en ce qui concerne la répression de la contrebande, les droits et prérogatives inscrits dans les contrats qui les régissent.

19. Les hôpitaux, dispensaires, écoles publiques et privées, instituts scientifiques et les établissements d'assistance ou d'hygiène conserveront leur existence propre, et ne subiront aucune entrave dans leur organisation et leur fonctionnement.

La municipalité fera respecter sur le territoire municipal la liberté et la pratique extérieure de tous les cultes existant au Maroc.

Elle sauvegardera le respect et l'exercice de la religion et des institutions religieuses musulmanes, notamment celle des habous.

20. Les convois de ravitaillement destinés au Makhzen circuleront sans entraves sur le territoire municipal. Il en sera de même des fonctionnaires étrangers et chérifiens, munis de pièces d'identité, ainsi que de leurs domestiques avec leurs bagages. Pour le port d'armes on se conformera au règlement chérifien.

21. Aucune fortification, aucun ouvrage stratégique quelconque, ne pourront être élevés sur le territoire municipal de Tanger.

[6015] No. 60.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, February 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 7 of 9th February : Casa Blanca lighter shelter.

Assistant State engineer tells me that larger scheme of "épi" has been decided on by State engineer, and he has been instructed to get credit opened for 85,000 fr. on Shawia indemnity to begin work ; French appear, therefore, to have dispensed with consent of other Powers. He anticipates that total cost will be little short of 100,000*l.* He tells me that work on this scheme could be begun at once by Compagnie marocaine, who have all their plant on the spot, and anticipates that sufficient progress will have been made by next autumn to afford a certain amount of shelter for lighters.

I continue to consider it most unfortunate that a work of the first importance should be withdrawn from adjudication, but, in view of M. Porché's decision (which I can hardly believe to be free from political bias) and undoubted urgency of the need, I suppose we must acquiesce. Shelter to be constructed now forms integral part of port works in progress, and cannot well be given to any other company, but I believe Netherlands Minister will strenuously oppose payment by Shawia indemnity.

In any case I consider it essential that there should be stringent clause in contract providing for completion of work at a certain date, and of sufficient portion to afford shelter to lighters by next autumn.

[4232] No. 61.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, February 12, 1912.*

I HAVE given my most careful consideration to the memorandum respecting harbour works at Casa Blanca which your Excellency was good enough to communicate to me on the 27th ultimo.

The arguments advanced by the French Government in support of their proposal that the contract for these works should be awarded without previous adjudication appear to be four in number.

1. The contention that article 106 of the Algeciras Act does not apply to the present case, since money provided by the French Government from the Shawia indemnity cannot be considered as "foreign capital" in the sense of that article.

I would venture to point out to your Excellency that if the validity of this contention were admitted, there would be nothing to prevent any foreign Government in future from advancing money for some particular work, and then claiming the right to execute it. The result would be to frustrate entirely the purpose for which it was laid down, that public works should be submitted to adjudication.

2. The fact that a portion of the Shawia indemnity has already been applied to port works at Casa Blanca without objection being raised.

The Algeciras conference specifically recognised the validity of the concession for certain port works at Casa Blanca previously granted by the Sultan to French capital. These works were carried out by a French company, and I understand that the French Government then devoted a certain part of the Shawia indemnity to their completion. The works now contemplated, however, have never, so far as His Majesty's Government are aware, been considered as forming part of the original French concession, as is borne out by the fact that the new proposals were in the ordinary course brought before the Public Works Committee at Tangier. In these circumstances, the precedent of previous disbursements from the Shawia indemnity would not seem to be applicable to the present case.

3. The award without adjudication of the contract for certain drainage works at Tangier to a German firm in 1908.

I would wish to lay before your Excellency certain facts in connection with the award of that particular contract, which I trust may modify the views of the French Government.

The drainage works in question were not included in the original German concession for the construction of a mole, and when it was proposed that the contract should be awarded without adjudication to the German firm which had carried out the original

scheme, His Majesty's Government strongly protested against such a course as contrary to the adjudication provisions of the Algeciras Act. It was only on being urged by the French Government to make an exception in this particular case that His Majesty's Government reluctantly consented, being desirous of showing their good-will towards France. In order, however, to avoid all possible misunderstanding as to their attitude, they placed on record the objections which they were prepared to waive as an exceptional measure, and the following resolution dealing with the subject was formally adopted by the Sanitary Council :—

" Il est entendu que l'adoption de ce projet ne constitue pas un précédent et que le principe de la liberté économique pour l'industrie publique et le principe de l'adjudication établis par l'Acte d'Algésiras seront appliqués sans exception à l'avenir dans tous les ports du Maroc sauf pour les travaux déjà autorisés et dont il est question dans le procès-verbal de la 18e séance de la Conférence d'Algésiras."

As I have already observed, the works now contemplated at Casa Blanca are not included in the "travaux déjà autorisés"; and your Excellency will no doubt agree that, in view of the above resolution, His Majesty's Government can hardly be expected to assent to the proposal now put forward on the ground of the precedent afforded by the contract for the drainage works at Tangier.

4. The urgency of the need for harbour works at Casa Blanca and the provision in the adjudication regulations that in cases of urgency adjudication may be dispensed with.

The provision referred to is article 24 (5) of the regulations, which lays down that adjudication may be dispensed with in the case of " . . . . travaux qui dans les cas d'urgence évidente amenée par des circonstances imprévues ne peuvent pas subir les délais des adjudications." It can hardly be contended that unforeseen circumstances have arisen at Casa Blanca, where for a long time past British merchants have complained of the inadequacy of the lighterage service; and it seems clear that an altogether different kind of emergency was contemplated by the article. His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the necessity that some shelter for lighters should be constructed at Casa Blanca, and of the grave inconvenience caused by the want of such shelter at present, and they earnestly desire to avoid raising unnecessary difficulties. But an important principle is at stake, and the information in their possession tends to show that the state of the sea and the winds at this time of the year render it quite impossible to begin immediately on works of this kind. They therefore do not understand how the necessity can be considered of so urgent a character as to demand the abandonment of the principle of adjudication. I may also observe that if the proposal for a "marché de gré à gré après concours" which His Majesty's Minister at Tangier put forward in December last had been accepted at the time the works might, if the weather allowed, have been begun in a month from now.

In order to show their earnest desire to co-operate with the French Government and to avoid opposition to their proposals, His Majesty's Government are referring the question of urgency again to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier, and if on receipt of his further report they are convinced that work can be begun before the spring they will, if all the other Powers agree, be prepared once more to waive their rights in respect of such part of the work as could really be begun at once, whilst the rest of the works should be made the subject of a "marché de gré à gré après concours."

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[6569] No. 62.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 14.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, February* 14, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 12th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has written to French Ambassador proposing immediate appointment of suggested mixed commission to report on best means of effecting desired arrangements in respect of collection of customs, &c., in Spanish zone. Mixed commission composed of three French and three Spanish members might sit at Madrid or Paris, as preferred by French Government. During its deliberations negotiation on other points, including Tangier, might proceed as before.

French Ambassador is supporting this proposal.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[6914] No. 63.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 17.)

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Tangier, February* 10, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a list brought up to date for the year 1911 of the heads of foreign missions at Tangier.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 63.

Heads of Missions at Tangier, February 1912, *brought up to date from List dated February* 1911.

France.—M. Regnault, the French Minister, entered the service in 1883, and has been mostly employed in Tunis, but in 1904 he represented the French bondholders in this country, and accompanied M. Saint René-Taillandier on the mission to Fez.

He has some reputation as a financier, and was employed as an expert at Algeciras, eventually signing the Act as one of the delegates.

Of untiring energy and activity, he brings to bear on the great variety of subjects now dealt with here a technical knowledge seldom at the command of a *diplomat de carrière*, and during the very numerous meetings held here for the construction of the "règlements," the outcome of the Act of Algeciras, he displayed a considerable power of clearly exposing his views with fairness and moderation. Of admirable temper and free from all excitability, he generally produced a better impression on the meetings than his more nervous though more learned German colleague, Dr. Rosen.

Of bourgeois origin, he represents the best type of Frenchman of the professional classes, and possesses all the dignity engendered by simplicity and rectitude, by remarkable lucidity of thought and expression, and by great elevation of ideas. He has always acted towards me with the utmost frankness, not unfrequently discussing with me beforehand the measures he proposes to recommend to his Government. Our relations, both official and private, are of the very best.

It appears practically certain that M. Regnault will be appointed French Resident when the protectorate over Morocco is established.

He is married to a simple, pleasant lady, and has a large family of daughters.

He was in Paris during the whole of the year 1911, and I consider that French interests have distinctly suffered since M. de Billy has been in charge.

The latter possesses a considerable amount of culture, both literary and artistic, and is agreeable and even witty in conversation. I have no doubt that he was an excellent head of the press bureau at the Quai d'Orsay, but he is lacking in the main qualities necessary for the post he now fills. He has little judgment, and rushes headlong into action, which one would have thought one moment's reflection must show him could only lead to disaster. He has no tact in his dealings with his colleagues. His attitude towards his colony, which unfortunately contains a number of clever scoundrels, is deplorably weak; he is, I think, afraid of their attacks in Paris and the press, and rather than incur their hostility, he shuts his eyes to abuses which have done more than anything else to make the French name odious in Morocco. Moreover, I regret to say that my personal experience confirms the charges brought against him by the Spanish Minister of a great want of loyalty and frankness in his dealings.

During the difficult years which followed the conference of Algeciras, M. Regnault succeeded in making himself almost universally popular with his colleagues, and his rectitude and loyalty won their respect. M. de Billy, on the contrary, has managed to alienate their sympathies, and to create a general distrust of his actions and motives.

He has considerable private means, and is married to a rich lady, the daughter of the French banker, Mirabeau. She is, however, delicate, and hardly ever comes to Tangier. M. de Billy is very "careful," and lives in a small way, though he is now spending a good deal of money on a small property he has bought on the cliffs just outside the walls of the town. He is a Protestant.

Holland.—Owing to the absence from Morocco of the French Minister during the whole of the year the Décanat devolved on the Dutch Minister. M. de Rappard is a man of some 44 years, of considerable ability and energy, a good linguist, and with a desire to be extremely impartial; but his sympathy with Germany, where he has spent some years of his previous career, was apt at times to predominate. I am inclined to think, however, that since the arrival of Baron Seckendorff, who personally irritates him, especially as a partner at bridge, there is a tendency to change in his feelings. He followed with great care and attention the discussions of the diplomatic corps for the construction of the "règlements" arising out of the Act of Algeciras, and was often most useful in finding a formula to satisfy all parties. His opinion and support will be of great value when the municipality comes up for discussion.

He continues to push Dutch trade in Morocco with great vigour and success, and the Dutch steam-ship lines, which he induced to call at Tangier, are doing wonderfully well. He is married to a somewhat unpolished lady, remarkable for her *gaffes* and for the excellence of her household and domestic arrangements. They entertain a good deal.

Russia.—Mr. Botkine was appointed in 1907, and has since been promoted to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. He is younger than most Russian Ministers. He has previously been employed in Washington, Lisbon, Sophia, and Brussels, and was in London before coming to Tangier. He is married to a pretty agreeable American lady. They have a pleasant house and give a good many small dinners.

The object of Mr. Botkine's mission is to support the French in Morocco, and he openly says that beyond that his Government is more or less indifferent as regards the affairs of this country. His personal leanings incline towards Germany, but he kept them in check as long as M. Regnault was at Tangier. Since his departure they have become more evident, as M. Botkine is not on particularly good terms with the French chargé d'affaires, and criticises his actions very freely.

Belgium.—The Belgian Minister is M. Garnier. He occupies one room at a rather squalid hotel, and has never been known to offer so much as a glass of water to anybody. He is practically non-existent.

Austria-Hungary.—M. de Callenberg is a heavy and methodical man with little sense of humour. He takes his duties, political and municipal, very seriously. He was very much guided by his cleverer and stronger German colleague, Dr. Rosen, but since the departure of the latter he appears to take a more independent view.

His wife suffered from ill-health for the greater part of last year, and they neither of them went out very much. They are both very amiable and friendly.

America.—Mr. Carpenter is a very quiet man, and does not speak a word of French. He appears to have good judgment and intelligence, but plays but a small part at Tangier.

Germany.—The importance of the German Legation has decreased very much since the departure of Dr. Rosen and the arrival of Baron Seckendorff. The latter is a pompous but amiable man, and prides himself upon having the reputation of being most conciliatory. I gather that he is not thought very much of at the German Foreign Office, and he told me himself that his views were often diametrically opposed to those of Baron Langwerth, who, I believe, is still head of the Morocco department at the Wilhelmstrasse! He is married to an uninteresting lady considerably younger than himself. They appear very happy and thoroughly self-satisfied.

Italy.—The post of Italian Minister was held during 1911 by the Marquis of Carignani, but he went on leave at the end of the year, and is not expected to return. He was a very pleasant colleague, intelligent, cultivated and well informed, and I personally shall miss him. He was unmarried, and did not live at the Italian Legation. M. de Pretis, a son of the late Minister, is to be sent to take charge of the legation.

Spain.—The Marquis of Villasinda arrived at Tangier in February. I have found him very loyal and straightforward. He is distinctly intelligent, has plenty of courage, and kept his head and his temper fairly well in moments of considerable difficulty. He certainly came with the idea of improving the relations between the Spanish and French Legations, but by the end of the year he admitted to me that all his efforts in that direction had failed. M. de Billy, he said, had thwarted all his attempts by his want of loyalty and the petty meannesses to which he resorted. I have always done my best to calm him down, but, as stated above, my personal experience has made me realise that his complaints were probably well founded. I have no doubt that a great deal of harm has been done by minor officials on both sides (*e.g.*, Boisset, Luciardi, and Villalta), whose reports were grossly exaggerated, and whose one idea appears to be to foment trouble.

M. de Villasinda is married to a very charming lady, and their house is agreeable. They both write, and both are the children of distinguished Spanish authors.

Portugal.—Count Martens Ferrão has been at Tangier for ten years, and up to the revolution in Portugal was doyen of the diplomatic body. Having no axe to grind, and practically no interests to safeguard, he rarely finds himself in disagreement with his colleagues. Married to an Italian lady with private means he used to entertain to a considerable extent. He has never been to Fez, and has practically nothing to do with the Moorish authorities. Having represented his Government at Algeciras as second delegate, he considered himself entitled to a higher post, and did all in his power to obtain it. He was in Lisbon at the time of the revolution, but returned to Tangier immediately after, and notified to the Makhzen the fall of the monarchy and the constitution of the republic. He gave a long interview to the editor of the "Dépêche marocaine," explaining his reasons for not resigning, as the majority of the Portuguese Ministers abroad appear to have done. His action has been very severely criticised by some of his colleagues, notably the Russian and Dutch Ministers. As the Portuguese Republic had not been recognised by various Powers, and as, moreover, he had not been confirmed in his appointment, he was no longer considered to be doyen. He practically never attends any of our meetings, and has withdrawn almost entirely from society, hardly ever dines out or allows his wife to accept any invitations. He seems to me to be acting foolishly, as by thus hiding his head he looks as if he were ashamed of what he did, and plays into the hands of those who criticised him in none too friendly a spirit. My relations with him have remained the same as they were before, and he generally asks me to represent him at the meetings of the corps diplomatique and the Conseil sanitaire.

[6915] No. 64.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 17.)

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Tangier, February* 11, 1912.

M. GAILLARD arrived in Tangier last week on his way to Fez. He had luncheon with me yesterday, and gave me a certain amount of interesting information as to the views of his Government with regard to the future organisation of their protectorate. M. Gaillard tells me that as a matter of fact no definite decision has yet been taken as to who is to be appointed High Commissioner, although he imagines that it will be M. Regnault, but perhaps only for a short time in order to set the machine working. The post would then be given to a political man of the class of M. Jonnart. On account of this uncertainty it appears that it was not M. Regnault, but he himself who drew up the broad lines of a scheme for the organisation and administration of the country. He tells me he is very much in favour of taking Egypt as the model rather than Tunis, where he considers the system followed has not given particularly happy results, and with this idea he has been studying Lord Cromer's book very carefully. He wishes to maintain intact the façade of Shereefian rule and authority—the Sultan, the Viziers, the Viceroys—and, as in Egypt, to place behind them, but as much concealed from view as possible, the French advisers. For this reason the French representative is to be given the title of High Commissioner, not resident. The Grand Vizier will be maintained, and he will be advised by a French secrétaire général who will have a considerable staff. There will be two Moorish under-secretaries, one for public works, the other for public instruction. There will also be a Moorish Minister

of Justice whose powers will be larger than those of the present Vizier Shakaia, who is really nothing more than the channel through which complaints may reach the Sultan. Military matters will, of course, really be settled by the French military mission, but a Shereefian Minister of War will be maintained.

In the other capitals, Rabat and Marrakesh, the Khalifas of the Sultan, or Viceroys, will be maintained, but they will be given more real power, and cease to be the mere figure-heads which they are at present. They will of course have French advisers beside them, who will be known as commissioners; there will also be Khalifas in the Shawia and in the Oudja districts, but the conditions of those provinces are already so different to the rest of Morocco that they will hardly form part of the scheme. As other important towns come under more complete control—as, for example, Taza—a French sub-commissioner will be sent to superintend their administration. M. Gaillard says that he is most anxious to keep the whole thing as supple as possible. One of the greatest French qualities no doubt is their love of absolute clearness and precision, but in the present case he considers that it would become a fault; things should be left vague and consequently elastic, as no doubt many unexpected situations will arise, which will have to be dealt with and which will necessitate the modification or extension of the scheme. He is very anxious to avoid too many formalities and too many functionaries, which he fully recognises have proved the curse of French colonial administration. He says that he regrets very much that so little should have been done since last November, and that so much valuable time should have been wasted; this however was inevitable, owing to the internal political situation. The present transition stage for France in Morocco he considers a very dangerous one. She has not yet the power, she does not reap the advantages, and yet she is held responsible for all the mistakes and all the misdeeds which were committed. In speaking thus he had more especially in his mind the urgent necessity of a thorough and drastic rearrangement of the whole question of land tenure in Morocco. The present system gave rise to endless abuses. Subordinate officials who had their own interests at heart and their money to make, and who under the terms of their appointment had the right to trade, had, he feared, gone in with the unscrupulous kaïds and sheikhs and made use of their position to profit by the existing chaos; the result was deplorable, scandals must inevitably ensue, and all the blame would fall upon France. Moreover the Berbers, who formed a large proportion of the population of the interior, held far more to their material interests and above all their land than to their religion, and the present epidemic of land grabbing which was going on would do more than anything else to prejudice the natives against the French. I said I was glad to hear him speak in this way: that I had deplored most deeply all that was going on in this respect, and had not failed to urge upon M. de Billy the necessity of taking the question up most seriously. I hoped now that something would be done, but it appeared to me very regrettable that it should have been allowed to go on for so long, and I could not but feel that the legation had not adopted a sufficiently strong attitude. M. Gaillard agreed that if M. Regnault, with the weight of his personal authority and experience, had been here during the past year, things would never have reached their present pass. I told M. Gaillard that I personally was strongly opposed to the employment of unpaid consular agents with the right to trade in a country like Morocco, and that I considered that men of this category had to a large extent been responsible for much of the mischief that had been done in the past.

M. Gaillard tells me that he personally has asked to be moved from Morocco, as the strain of the last few years and the enormous amount of work and responsibility of every sort and kind which he has had on his shoulders have worn him out. His loss to the French will be very great, for he is certainly one of the ablest and most experienced men they have in Morocco, and one of the few whom I believe to be absolutely upright. Moreover he thoroughly understands the Moors, and knows how to deal with them.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[6916] No. 65.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Tangier, February 11, 1912.*

A CONSIDERABLE amount of excitement has been created latterly in Tangier by a particularly flagrant case of land spoliation by a Frenchman.

About fifteen months ago, M. Gautsch, a notorious scoundrel and landgrabber, but one of the richest and most influential members of the French colony, forcibly appropriated a lot of land in the neighbourhood of Tanja Balia, the village near Mr. Harris's villa on the beach. The wretched Moors to whom the land belonged were simply driven off the place by men armed with guns, sent down by M. Gautsch. They complained to the French Legation, but no attention was paid to them. They also went to Sid Guebbas, who remonstrated time after time with the French Legation, but with no effect. Finally, when the victims were reduced to the last extreme of poverty, and were on the verge of starvation, an absolutely inadequate compensation was offered and accepted by all except one: in two cases, where the lawful proprietors happened to have Russian and Italian protection, the compensation offered was far larger. The one who did not accept the compensation was a gardener employed by Mr. Harris. He recounted his grievances to Mr. Harris, who took his case up, and went with him to Sid Guebbas. The matter was again brought up before the French Legation, and this time it received attention. With Mr. Harris and the power of the "Times" in the background they realised that they must adopt a different attitude, and they declared themselves ready to do all in their power to remedy so shocking an abuse. M. Gautsch was summoned to appear before Shraa. The French Government, however, although they agreed by the Madrid Convention, with all the other signatories, that in land questions in Morocco European subjects should be within the jurisdiction of the Moorish courts, had never modified the French law in such manner as to compel their subjects to appear before the native cadis. M. Gautsch refused the summons, and the legation declared themselves powerless. Mr. Harris then suggested that the matter should be submitted to arbitration, and proposed M. de Billy as arbitrator, M. Gautsch equally refused to agree to this. The French Legation then said that the only course left open was to submit the matter for trial to the French tribunal, and expressed the hope that a judgment would be obtained, although it was doubtful, as the French Government by the same Madrid Convention had ceded its right to judge land questions by means of the French consular tribunal. After a delay of seven months the case come up for trial in the French consular court, which decided that it was incompetent to deal with the matter, having no jurisdiction. Mr. Harris reported the matter fully in the "Times," and I would absolutely endorse his summary of the result of the situation: the ruin of the Moorish families concerned, a strong sentiment against the French, and general hostility on the part of the natives to the introduction of reforms and to European intervention.

I understand that M. Poincaré has made a statement in the French Chamber to the effect that the whole question is to be thoroughly investigated, and I notice a feverish anxiety on the part of all French officials with whom I speak that the question of land tenure in Morocco should be the first to be settled. They are, I suppose, beginning to realise the incalculable harm which has been done to them by the indescribably nefarious system which they have complacently allowed to continue, so long as it was not exposed and French adventurers profited by it.

I regret to say that it is not only in the neighbourhood of Tangier, but also throughout the whole country, that abuses of this sort are going on. I hear privately through Menebhi, and other native sources, that numbers of natives in the Gharb have been despoiled of their lands. The most nefarious cases are being carried out under the ægis of Kaïd Sherkawi, and there is, I fear, little doubt that the French consular agent, M. Boisset, is in with all his robberies. Menebhi tells me that numbers of native land-owners in the Gharb are offering their land for a quarter and less of its value, as they feel that if they wait it will simply be taken from them by force, and that if the robber is a Frenchman there is no hope of redress.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—I understand that when M. de Billy was proposed as arbitrator, M. Gautsch offered him a sum of 150 dollars (about 13*l.*), to be offered to Mr. Harris as compensation for his gardener's loss. M. de Billy made the offer to Mr. Harris, which was of course refused. The piece of land in question was worth from 1,200 dollars to 1,400 dollars (180*l.* to 200*l.*).

R. L.

[6917] No. 66.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Tangier, February 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 8 of the 9th February relative to the method of construction of the proposed shelter for lighters at Casa Blanca reached me late that night by French cable, the Eastern Telegraph Company's cable having broken down more than a week ago.

As I stated in my telegram No. 10 of the 10th instant, I sent for M. Llorens, the assistant State engineer, on the following morning, in order to ascertain exactly how matters stood. He informed me that the far larger scheme of the "épi," a description of which was given in my despatch No. 13 of the 20th ultimo, had now been definitely adopted, and he had received a telegram from Casa Blanca instructing him to make arrangements for a credit of 80,000 fr. (3,400*l.*) upon the Shawia indemnity to be opened here at once, in order that the work might be commenced without loss of time. I could not help being surprised at this information, as it looked as though the French had decided to take the matter into their own hands, and to dispense with the formality of obtaining the acquiescence of the Powers to their proposal that the work, or at least a part of it, should be defrayed by the Shawia indemnity.

M. Luret had informed Mr. White a few days ago that the new plan had been submitted to the Contrôle de la Dette, and that it was even larger than it had appeared from M. Porché's first explanation; this is confirmed by His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, who has reported confidentially to Mr. White that the French naval port captain informed him that the new project was, in his opinion, more or less impracticable, as the new arm to be made abutting the mole would make it unsafe for lighters to try and enter the new enclosed space unless the arm were brought out as far as the lighter anchorage, which meant making a new port practically. He said that he could not regard M. Porché's proposal at all favourably, whereas the original scheme seemed exactly what was required. Mr. Madden begged, however, that the name of the French naval port captain might not be made use of, as the latter had not authorised him to state his opinion. I gather that the Dette have accepted the scheme, but they are by no means enthusiastic over it, and I imagine that pressure from Paris must have been applied.

I asked M. Llorens if he could give me a rough idea of the size and cost of the work as it was now to be. He said that he believed that the "épi" would have to be 250 metres long and of very great solidity, and that the expense was estimated at 2,400,000 fr. (96,000*l.*). He was of opinion that the work on the plan now adopted could be begun practically at once, as the Compagnie marocaine, to whom it would be entrusted, had all their plant on the spot. They would of course have to wait until the hurricane which had been raging on these coasts for the last week has subsided. He also thought that sufficient progress would have been made with the work by next autumn to afford a certain amount of shelter for lighters when the bad season began.

I continue to think that it is unfortunate that so important a work should be withdrawn from adjudication; and my opinion in this respect is only strengthened by the fact that the importance has now been quadrupled. Moreover, I cannot help thinking that political bias had a good deal to do with the sudden change in M. Porché's decision. When the question was raised before the Committee of Public Works, it was understood that the scheme of the "darse" and "terreplein" had been definitely adopted; and it was only when objections were raised by the representatives of the other Powers to the French proposal that the work should be withdrawn from adjudication that M. Porché suddenly reverted to the scheme of the "épi," although it is fair to him to say that, personally, he had always hankered after it. I suppose that in view of the urgency of the need we must withdraw our opposition. It is clear that the shelter in the form in which it is now to be carried out forms an integral part of the port works in course of construction at Casa Blanca, and cannot well be given to any other company: it is no doubt for this reason that the French Government have insisted upon its adoption. I hope, however, that we shall insist upon the introduction into the contract with the company of a stringent clause providing for the completion of the whole work at a certain date, and of a sufficient portion of it to afford shelter to lighters by next autumn; otherwise, I am afraid that it is more than likely that the French, having won this victory for French capital and industry, which they will make the most of for the benefit of the French public, will take little further interest in

the matter: the works will be allowed to drag on, as has been done in the case of the port itself, and the situation next autumn will be as disastrous as it has been during the last four months.

I have not mentioned the matter again to my Dutch colleague, as I do not wish to appear to be concerting with him in a matter in which we are both to some extent opposed to the French, but I know that he absolutely disapproves of the French idea that the works, or a part of them, should be defrayed by the Shawia indemnity and treated as forming part of the Casa Blanca port works.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[6923] No. 67.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Madrid, February 13, 1912.*

M. GEOFFRAY, the French Ambassador, returned to Madrid on the 9th instant from his visit to Paris, during which he informs me that he discussed fully with the new French Ministry the questions at issue with Spain. The Franco-Spanish negotiations concerning Morocco were accordingly renewed yesterday morning by his Excellency and the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Ministry of State. In accordance with a written invitation from Señor Garcia Prieto and a verbal assurance from M. Geoffray that my presence at these meetings was still desired by the French Government, I again took part in the conversations.

The French Ambassador began by assuring Señor Garcia Prieto that he had found M. Poincaré thoroughly well-disposed towards Spain and anxious to meet her wishes as far as his own parliamentary position would allow. Before handing to the Foreign Minister a new draft of the French proposals he remarked briefly on the concessions which it would be found to contain.

In the first place, there was no mention of general regulations. This meant that each Government would be free to concert general regulations for its respective zone with the competent Moorish authority, namely, the Sultan for the French and the khalifa for the Spanish zone. Only in respect of customs, posts, and telegraphs, was provision made (article 11) for previous agreement between the French and Spanish Governments. It was obvious that on these points identity of procedure and tariffs in the two zones was essential.

The Foreign Minister admitted that this conciliatory proposal showed much goodwill on the part of the French Government, and he thanked M. Geoffray for the part he had taken in securing its adoption in Paris.

M. Geoffray said he was further empowered to concede the demand of Spain to be allowed to extend her diplomatic and consular protection over Moors belonging to the Spanish zone (article 15).

On the question of loan guarantees his Excellency offered the way out of the deadlock, which is suggested in your telegram No. 1 of the 11th ultimo. He said that he had had some difficulty in inducing M. Poincaré to accept this solution. What the French Government feared was that, if they blindly adopted the Spanish proposal by which the credit of Spain is substituted for the existing guarantees, some refractory holder of the loan stock might be supported by the French courts in refusing to accept the new arrangements. The French Government would, in such a case, be compelled to withhold ratification. If, on the other hand, a competent mixed commision of financial experts declared the Spanish scheme, or another devised to secure the same end, to be legally feasible and acceptable, there would be no danger of a French court acting counter to such an expert decision, and the French Government would be protected against possible attacks in the Chamber. The proposal, as now approved by the French Government, provides (article 10) that existing arrangements securing the service of the loans and war indemnity shall be provisionally maintained; that a mixed Franco-Spanish commission shall be appointed without delay to examine the various expedients (and especially the one submitted by Spain) designed to procure a satisfactory settlement of the question; and that the said mixed commission shall report to the two Governments within the period of one year.

The Foreign Minister asked whether it was quite clear that the reference to the mixed commission would include not only the question of providing new security for

the loans, but also the question of the mutual exchange of guarantees proposed by Spain in respect of the two war indemnities. M. Geoffray said it would include both questions. If Spain felt unable eventually to accept the recommendations of the mixed commission, it would still be open to her to refuse ratification.

Having in mind your telegram No. 7 of the 12th instant, I remarked that you were acquainted with the new French text and saw no objection to it.

Señor Garcia Prieto thought that the necessary expert advice could be easily obtained without recourse to the cumbersome machinery of a mixed commission. What, he asked, was being done about Tangier? If Tangier was to be relieved off-hand of the intervention of the Commission de Contrôle de la Dette, why should not Spain enjoy the same treatment in her zone? Neither M. Geoffray or myself were in a position to give his Excellency any information with regard to Tangier. We both urged acceptance of the mixed commission. Señor Garcia Prieto promised to examine carefully this important question.

There followed some discussion of the French railway proposal (article 13). The Foreign Minister still held out for a scheme based on the formation of separate companies to construct and work the line separately in the two zones through which it must pass on its way from Tangier to Fez. The French Ambassador said that his Government must insist on a single company. The inconvenience arising out of joint construction had been exemplified by the history of the trans-Pyrenean railway, which was still far from completed. France could not risk the occurrence of similar delays in Morocco. She had bound herself to Germany to give priority to the line in question. All other railway construction in Morocco would therefore be dependent on the speedy termination of the Fez-Tangier line. This could only be secured by a unity of action unobtainable under a double system.

Señor Garcia Prieto was not convinced, but he promised to examine the new French text in the most conciliatory spirit.

M. Geoffray then handed to his Excellency the revised French draft, of which he also enables me to forward to you the enclosed copy.

The meeting passed off without any friction. M. Geoffray is more inclined to believe in a successful issue than he has hitherto been. Señor Garcia Prieto is also more hopeful. He told me at the opera in the evening that he had been favourably impressed by the perusal of the new French draft.

I trust this feeling may be confirmed, but it must be remembered that nothing has yet been settled with regard to the territorial compensation demanded by France. On this point it is hardly to be expected that Spain will submit without a struggle to some of the requirements, which M. Geoffray informs me he is instructed to put forward on the lines indicated in my despatch No. 18 of the 25th ultimo. They do not include, so far as I am aware, a demand for the mouth of the Muluya and the Chafarine Islands.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 67.

Draft Franco-Spanish Agreement.

PRÉAMBULE.

LE Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne déclarent qu'ils demeurent fermement attachés au principe de l'intégrité de l'Empire marocain.

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement de la République française reconnaît qu'il appartient à l'Espagne de prêter, dans la zone d'influence espagnole, son assistance au Gouvernement marocain pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes administratives, judiciaires, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin.

Les régions comprises dans la zone d'influence espagnole spécifiée à l'article 2 resteront placées sous l'autorité civile et religieuse du Sultan. Elles seront administrées par un khalifa nommé par Sa Majesté chérifienne avec l'agrément du Gouvernement espagnole. Le substitut destiné à le remplacer éventuellement sera nommé de la même façon.

Le khalifa résidera à Tétouan; il sera muni d'une délégation générale et permanente du Sultan, en vertu de laquelle il exercera les droits appartenant à celui-ci.

Le Gouvernement espagnol assumera la responsabilité de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans cette zone. Il assurera l'application des traités, conventions et engagements antérieurement souscrits par le Makhzen, et notamment des clauses économiques et commerciales inscrites dans l'accord du 4 novembre, 1911, entre la France et l'Allemagne, tant au regard de l'Allemagne qu'à celui des autres Puissances.

Le Gouvernement chérifien ne pourra être mis en cause ni supporter une responsabilité quelconque du chef des réclamations motivées par des faits qui se seraient produits dans la zone d'influence espagnole.

ARTICLE 2.

(Réservé.)

ARTICLE 3.

L'Espagne s'engage à n'aliéner ni à céder sous aucune forme, même à titre temporaire, ses droits dans tout ou partie du territoire composant sa zone d'influence.

ARTICLE 4.

Afin d'assurer le libre passage du détroit de Gibraltar, les deux Gouvernements conviennent de ne pas laisser élever de fortifications ou d'ouvrages stratégiques d'aucune sorte, autres que ceux déjà existants sur la partie de la côte marocaine comprise entre la Moulouya et le Loukkos.

ARTICLE 5.

(Tanger.)

ARTICLE 6.

Les écoles, les consulats et tous les établissements français et espagnols actuellement existants au Maroc seront respectés.

Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à faire respecter la liberté et la pratique extérieure de tout culte existant au Maroc. Les privilèges religieux conférés au clergé régulier et séculier espagnol seront désormais localisés à la zone d'influence espagnole.

ARTICLE 7.

Il ne sera apporté aucune entrave au passage des convois de ravitaillement destinés au Makhzen, aux voyages des fonctionnaires étrangers ou chérifiens qui se rendront de Tanger à Fez et inversement, non plus qu'au passage de leur escorte, de leurs domestiques, de leurs armes et bagages. Aucune taxe ou droit de transit ne pourra être prélevé pour ledit passage. En ce qui touche le port d'armes, on se conformera au règlement chérifien sur la matière.

ARTICLE 8.

Les ressources constituées par les impôts et taxes dans la zone espagnole seront affectées aux dépenses de ladite zone.

ARTICLE 9.

Le Gouvernement chérifien ne pourra être appelé à participer à aucun titre aux dépenses de la zone espagnole.

ARTICLE 10.

En ce qui touche la question du service des emprunts de 1904 et 1910 et la créance du Trésor français représentée par l'annuité de 2,740,000 fr., la situation présente sera provisoirement maintenue.

Une commission d'experts financiers représentant les Gouvernements français et espagnol sera constituée dans le plus bref délai: elle aura pour mission d'examiner tous arrangements qui pourraient être suggérés pour assurer un règlement satisfaisant de la question, notamment l'arrangement actuellement présenté par le Gouvernement espagnol.

Cette commission devra, dans un délai qui n'excédera pas une année, arrêter les

propositions qui seront soumises aux deux Gouvernements à l'effet d'arriver à un règlement de la question.

ARTICLE 11.

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique se concerteront en vue de :

1. Toutes les modifications qui devraient être apportées dans l'avenir aux droits de douane ;

2. L'unification des tarifs postaux et télégraphiques dans l'intérieur de l'Empire.

ARTICLE 12.

Le Gouvernement espagnol s'engage à établir, dans le délai de trois mois à dater de la signature de la présente convention, le bureau de douane de Melilla dans les conditions prévues par la convention hispano-marocaine de 1910.

ARTICLE 13.

La ligne du chemin de fer de Tanger à Fez par El Ksar sera concédée à une société unique qui sera formée conformément à la législation française sur les sociétés, et qui sera constituée au moyen de capitaux français et espagnols dans la proportion des longueurs respectives du tracé de chaque zone.

Une commission franco-espagnole établira, dans le plus bref délai possible, les statuts de ladite société, fixera le montant de son capital et déterminera les règles de la juridiction qui s'appliquera à la société en question, &c.

ARTICLE 14.

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Catholique s'engagent à provoquer la revision, d'accord avec les autres Puissances et sur la base de la Convention de Madrid, des listes et de la situation des protégés étrangers et des associés agricoles visés par les articles 8 et 16 de cette convention.

Ils conviennent également de poursuivre auprès des Puissances signataires toute modification de la Convention de Madrid que comporterait, le moment venu, le changement du régime des protégés et associés agricoles, et éventuellement l'abrogation de la partie de ladite convention concernant les protégés et associés agricoles.

ARTICLE 15.

Les sujets marocains originaires de la zone d'influence espagnole seront placés à l'étranger sous la protection des agents diplomatiques et consulaires de l'Espagne.

ARTICLE 16.

Pour éviter autant que possible les réclamations diplomatiques, les Gouvernements français et espagnol s'emploieront respectivement auprès du Sultan et de son khalifa pour que les plaintes portées par des ressortissants étrangers contre les autorités marocaines ou les personnes agissant en tant qu'autorités marocaines, et qui n'auraient pu être réglées par l'entremise du consul français ou espagnol et du consul du Gouvernement intéressé, soient déférées à un arbitre *ad hoc* pour chaque affaire, désigné d'un commun accord par le consul de France ou celui d'Espagne et par celui de la Puissance intéressée ou, à leur défaut, par les deux Gouvernements de ces consuls.

Cette procédure restera en vigueur respectivement dans chaque zone jusqu'au jour où aura été institué dans ladite zone un régime judiciaire inspiré des règles de législation des Puissances intéressées et destiné à remplacer, après entente entre ces Puissances, les tribunaux consulaires.

ARTICLE 17.

Les Puissances signataires s'engagent à prêter, dès maintenant, dans leurs possessions d'Afrique, leur entier concours au Makhzen pour la surveillance et la répression de la contrebande des armes et munitions de guerre.

Lorsqu'il s'agira du droit de visite dans les eaux territoriales marocaines, les deux Gouvernements établiront d'un commun accord les règles à observer pour l'efficacité de la répression en se conformant aux règlements douaniers chérifiens.

ARTICLE 18.

La convention du 26 février, 1904, renouvelée le 3 février, 1909, ainsi que la Convention générale de La Haye du 18 octobre, 1907, s'appliqueront aux différends qui viendraient à s'élever entre les parties contractantes au sujet de l'interprétation et de l'application des dispositions de la présente convention, et qui n'auraient pas été réglés par la voie diplomatique ; un compromis devra être dressé et il sera procédé suivant les règles de la même convention en tant qu'il n'y serait pas dérogé par un accord exprès au moment du litige.

ARTICLE 19.

Toutes clauses des traités, conventions et accords antérieurs qui seraient contraires aux stipulations qui précèdent sont abrogées.

ARTICLE 20.

La présente convention sera notifiée aux Gouvernements signataires de l'Acte général de la Conférence internationale d'Algésiras.

[6874] No. 68.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, February* 16, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 14th February.

French Ambassador informs me that French Government agree to Spanish proposal that mixed commission shall be appointed forthwith, on condition that Spanish Government consent to examine immediately question of territorial compensation demanded by France. Commission would meet at Madrid.

(Sent to Paris.)

[7031] No. 69.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, February* 18, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 16th February.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the French Ambassador yesterday that he was ready to discuss territorial demands of France, and to appoint immediately the three Spanish members of the Mixed Financial Commission which is to meet at Madrid. French Ambassador submitted an outline of French demands, including cession of Cap de l'Eau, but not that of the Chafarine Islands. French Government have adopted generally suggestions of the French Ambassador as set forth in my despatch No. 18. Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to study them.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[7044] No. 70.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic). R. *Tangier, February* 18, 1912.

SHELTER for lighters at Casa Blanca.

French chargé d'affaires to-day read me a telegram from his Government reporting your view as stated to me in your telegram No. 8 of 9th February. He was, he said, instructed to approach me at once in the matter and explain that the more urgent part of the work was to be divided into three lots :—

1. Installation of plant
2. Preparation of blocks of masonry.
3. Construction of caissons of reinforced cement.

F.O. 415/56
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

As work could be begun on all these at once it was proposed to put [? it] out by private contract, [?] remaining portion, which was less urgent, to be put up to tender. He asked me whether I would accept this proposal. I said that I had received no instructions, but would telegraph to you at once.

He is approaching German and Netherlands Ministers, and if replies are favourable will address circular to corps diplomatique.

His Majesty's consul and all British merchants at Casa Blanca are pressing for immediate commencement of work, and in view of extreme urgency I think that we must agree.

French chargé d'affaires would be glad to have a reply as soon as possible.

[7044] No. 71.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic). R. *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 12 of 18th February: Casa Blanca lighter shelter.

After consideration of your telegram No. 10 of 10th February, I am informing French Ambassador that His Majesty's Government agree to waive their rights and allow contract for urgent part of works to be awarded without adjudication, but that remainder should be submitted to adjudication in the usual way. They also consider it essential that a penalty clause should be inserted in contract binding contractor to complete by next autumn sufficient portion of works to provide proper shelter for lighters. At the same time, His Majesty's Government felt very strongly that instructions should not have been issued to assistant engineer before they had given their consent to scheme.

I authorise you to accept French proposal, but you should press for insertion of above-mentioned penalty clause.

[5316] No. 72.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1912.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of correspondence which has passed between the Anti-Slavery Society and the Foreign Office on the subject of slavery in Morocco.*

The society call attention to the holding of slaves by British protected persons as being "contrary to the rule which was understood to apply to those to whom British protection was extended." I observe that in a report written by Sir W. Ridgeway in 1893 (see Morocco print, Part 13, No. 83), it is stated that "about ten years ago British protégés were forbidden to hold slaves, and all such were supposed to be manumitted. Practically this order had no effect, as the slaves, when existent, remained as servants."

I should be glad if you would furnish me with a report on the subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5813] No. 73.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Carnegie.

(No. 83.)
Sir. *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1912.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of correspondence which has passed between Mr. R. D. Norton and the Foreign Office relative to the proposals of the Société marocaine de Travaux publics.†

If you see no objection, I should be glad if you would take a suitable opportunity to explain to M. Poincaré the views of His Majesty's Government as set forth in the letter to Mr. Norton of the 19th instant.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Nos. 50 and 76.

† Nos. 54 and 75.

[6015] No. 74.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1912.

IN accordance with the undertaking given in the note which I had the honour of addressing to your Excellency on the 12th instant, I referred again to His Majesty's Minister at Tangier the question of the urgency of the need for harbour works at Casa Blanca. I have now received a telegram from Sir R. Lister, in which he reports that he understands that some part of these works could be begun at once, and that it is anticipated that sufficient progress will have been made by next autumn to afford a certain amount of shelter for lighters.

In these circumstances, and in view of the great importance to British shipping of an adequate lighter basin at Casa Blanca, His Majesty's Government are prepared, as foreshadowed in my note of the 12th instant, to waive their rights and agree to such part of the works as is urgently required and can be begun immediately being awarded without the formalities of adjudication. They consider it essential, however, that a clause should be inserted in the contract binding the contractor, under heavy penalty, to complete by next autumn a sufficient portion of the works to provide proper shelter to lighters. As regards the remaining part of the works, His Majesty's Government are unable to depart from the view they have already expressed, that they must be submitted to adjudication in the usual manner.

From the same telegram, His Majesty's Government learnt with surprise and regret that the assistant State engineer had received instructions to commence immediately work on the scheme, and to open a credit of 85,000 fr. on the Shawia indemnity to defray the cost, and it would therefore appear that the French Government have not considered it necessary to await the consent of His Majesty's Government, for which they asked through your Excellency. His Majesty's Government feel very strongly that such instructions should not have been issued before the consent of His Majesty's Government had been given. Although they will not now withdraw the concession set forth in the preceding paragraph, His Majesty's Government must place on formal record their opinion that, in future, no contracts for public works in Morocco shall be awarded except by adjudication in accordance with the regulations.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[5813] No. 75.

Foreign Office to Mr. Norton.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1912.

SECRETARY Sir E. Grey has had under consideration your letter to Sir Eyre Crowe of the 9th instant, enclosing a copy of the communication which the President of the Société marocaine de Travaux publics addressed to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 8th ultimo.

Sir E. Grey thinks it desirable that the position of His Majesty's Government towards the société and similar syndicates should be made clear from the outset, and I am to inform you accordingly that His Majesty's Government are determined to adhere strictly to the rights they derive from international agreements, and especially from the recent Franco-German Convention, article 6 of which lays down that though the working ("exploitation") of railways, harbours, &c., in Morocco may be entrusted to third parties, the contracts for works and materials shall be allotted by the Moorish Government in accordance with the rules of adjudication.

His Majesty's Government would not raise any objection to the working of the port of Tangier or of the railways mentioned in the President's letter being conceded to a company by the Moorish Government, but all the contracts for the works and materials required in this connection will have to be submitted to adjudication; and the decision of the société to give to the English group compensation "sous forme de privilège dans les fournitures éventuelles" does not affect the principle of adjudication which His Majesty's Government are bound to maintain.

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Sir E. Grey would be glad if you would explain the views of His Majesty's Government to your colleagues on the board of the société, so as to obviate any possibility of misunderstanding in the future.

I am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[5316] No. 76.

Foreign Office to Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February* 19, 1912.

SECRETARY Sir E. Grey has had under consideration your letter of the 5th instant requesting that His Majesty's Government will endeavour to secure the co-operation of other Powers in suppressing slavery in Morocco, and calling attention to the statement that slaves are held by British-protected persons in Morocco.

You will remember that at the Algeciras Conference in 1906 the British delegate proposed a resolution in favour of the abolition of slavery in Morocco: and it is largely owing to His Majesty's Government's efforts in recent years that the public sale of slaves has practically been abolished except at Marrakesh. His Majesty's Government regret that the result of their action at Algeciras has not as yet fulfilled the hopes based on it, but after careful consideration Sir E. Grey does not feel that he is in a position to raise the question at the present time.

I am to add that Sir E. Grey has requested His Majesty's Minister at Tangier to furnish him with a report in regard to the holding of slaves by British-protected persons.

am, &c.
EYRE A. CROWE.

[6273] No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, February* 22, 1912.

I HAVE to express to your Excellency my best thanks for the memorandum which you were good enough to communicate on the 10th instant together with a copy of a draft scheme for an international municipality at Tangier.

His Majesty's Minister at Tangier is about to return to this country on leave, and I shall take the earliest opportunity of discussing the whole question with him, after which I shall have the honour to address a further communication to your Excellency on the subject.

There is, however, one important feature of the scheme, respecting which I think I ought to say at once that it does not at first sight appear to me to harmonise with what has always been viewed by His Majesty's Government as an essential condition of any system of real international control.

The French proposal would concentrate all power in the hands of a body on which the French and Moorish vote—the latter being practically placed at the disposal of France in virtue of the system of nomination by the Sultan at Fez—would, together with the Spanish representation, be in a standing and absolutely preponderant majority. The municipality would, for all practical purposes, be not so much an international as a Franco-Spanish body. It appears to His Majesty's Government most desirable that some means should be found of giving effective representation to at least all those of the treaty Powers who are willing, and justified by the importance of their interests, to take an active part in the municipal organisation.

As regards the check to be exercised in political matters by a committee of three, of whom one would always be French and the second always Spanish, whilst the third would be chosen from some other nationality, such an arrangement seems only too well calculated to introduce a most unwelcome element of rivalry between the treaty Powers other than France and Spain, and might, in particular, create unpleasant friction between Great Britain and Germany.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[7909] No. 78.

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 23.)

D'APRÈS les renseignements parvenus à l'Ambassade de France, les mesures prises à Tanger en vue des travaux du port de Casablanca n'auraient pas eu l'importance que leur donne la note du Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères en date du 19 courant.

Elles auraient seulement consisté dans l'imputation d'un crédit de 15,000 fr.—et non de 85,000 fr.—sur l'indemnité de guerre des tribus Chaouïa, de manière à permettre une régie des blocs de maçonnerie destinés à la construction de la future jetée; ce crédit a été ouvert, il y a très peu de temps, afin surtout de démontrer que le Service marocain des Travaux publics préparait dès maintenant l'exécution des futurs travaux et de donner ainsi un commencement de satisfaction aux réclamations chaque jour plus vives du commerce international de Casablanca.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 22 février, 1912.

[7993] No. 79.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 27.) *Tangier, February* 17, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a draft scheme for the municipality for the town and district of Tangier, which I have drawn up with the assistance of Mr. White, and which might possibly be of use to you when discussing the matter with the French Ambassador.

The scheme is largely based upon the Alexandria municipality, but we have added a certain number of articles from the scheme drawn up by the Makhzen last year, under the direction of the French Legation and M. Porché, which appeared to us to be useful. In order that the body should really be international, we are of opinion that the Moors should be placed on exactly the same footing as the other nationalities, all the electors being free to vote for the candidate, European or Moorish, whom they consider to be the most suitable.

We have limited the number to twenty-four, as beyond the twelve nominated members it would be difficult to find more than twelve other residents of sufficient standing; moreover, I think we may take it for granted that a small commission would transact its business more expeditiously and with greater efficiency. We have thought it advisable to erect the representatives of the Powers and the Sultan into a controlling body, which would take the place of the Egyptian Government in the case of the Alexandria municipality. We have also followed the Alexandria precedent and laid down that no member of the diplomatic or consular corps may serve on the council; consequently, the members nominated by the representatives of the Powers and the Sultan can, under no circumstances, be members of their staffs. In this way the controlling body will be kept absolutely apart from the actual working of the council and free from any bias in dealing with the points referred to them.

Our first idea had been that the president should be the representative of the Sultan of Tangier, but, on fuller consideration, this appeared undesirable. In the first place, he would be incapable of presiding the meetings and of taking all the measures which devolve upon him owing to his probable ignorance of any language but Arabic and his general inexperience; in the second place, he would retard the working of the council if he were stupid, and he might constitute a danger if he were too intelligent. Moreover, by allowing the council to select their own president, we have every likelihood of obtaining the most capable man, and the international character of the body will be more thoroughly maintained.

We have suggested alternative schemes for the duration of the mandate (article 27). It is desirable to avoid too frequent elections owing to the excitement which they might produce, and it seems a pity that the councillors should be called upon to retire just when they have gained experience and learned their work.

It is necessary to provide for a special tribunal in which actions against the municipality can be tried. It would avoid expense if advantage could be taken of the tribunal already existing under article 45 of the Act of Algeciras with regard to the State Bank.

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In the matter of adjudications for public works, &c., we have made the regulations under article 110 of the Act of Algeciras applicable. The question remains whether the municipality should take the place of the "Commission générale des Adjudications" (article 4 of the "Règlement sur les Adjudications en général"), or whether it should be regarded merely as the "administration intéressée." I incline to the former, as the "Commission générale des Adjudications," consisting as it does of two Moorish delegates and two delegates of the diplomatic body, with one delegate from the "administration intéressée," gives the Makhzen too great a preponderance. This would be especially the case when it became the turn of the French Legation to appoint one of the delegates of the corps diplomatique. The commission would then become practically a French body.

We have thought it advisable to leave as much elasticity as possible to the scheme, and have consequently not entered too fully into details which can be settled by the "Règlement intérieur" and subsequently modified as may be found necessary.

We have talked the matter over with the Dutch Minister, who is a man of sound common sense, and who is anxious as we are that the internationalisation of Tangier should be real. He agrees more or less entirely to the scheme as now drawn up.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 79.

Draft Scheme for the Tangier Municipality.

Titre I.—*Organisation.*

ARTICLE 1er. Il est institué à Tanger un conseil municipal dont l'organisation et les attributions sont arrêtées par le présent règlement.

Art. 2. Ce conseil est composé de vingt-quatre membres, comme suit :—

1. Douze membres, dont un sera nommé par chacun des représentants des onze Puissances à Tanger, et un par le représentant du Sultan. En cas d'absence d'un des membres ainsi nommés, le représentant pourra le faire remplacer par une autre personne de sa nationalité.

2. Douze membres élus dont on ne peut avoir plus de deux d'une même nationalité.

Il y aura un président et deux vice-présidents.

Ne peuvent être membres du conseil les membres du corps diplomatique et consulaire et tous fonctionnaires et employés relevants des consulats, à quelque titre que ce soit.

Titre II.—*Du Domaine de la Municipalité.*

Art. 3. Le domaine de la municipalité comprend un domaine public et un domaine privé.

Art. 4. Le domaine public dont le Makhzen fait remise à la municipalité est composé des rues et places publiques ainsi que des murailles formant l'enceinte de la ville, à l'exception des forteresses et batteries, qui continuent à faire partie du domaine du Makhzen.

Il n'est pas fait remise à la municipalité des immeubles et emplacements affectés à des services publics du Makhzen.

Le domaine public est inaliénable et imprescriptible tant que le déclassement n'en a pas été prononcé par une décision du conseil municipal expressément approuvée par les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Art. 5. Le domaine privé est composé des immeubles acquis ou édifiés par la municipalité ou de ceux provenant de dons et legs acceptés dans les conditions prévues au présent règlement, et des immeubles du domaine public qui ont été régulièrement déclassés.

Titre III.—*Des Elections.*

Art. 6. Nul n'est éligible s'il n'est électeur.

Sont électeurs :

Toutes les personnes du sexe masculin qui remplissent les conditions suivantes :—

(*a.*) Être majeur de 25 ans.

(*b.*) Ne pas avoir été frappé d'une peine entraînant suivant la loi nationale de l'intéressé la perte ou l'altération des droits civiques.

(*c.*) Résider depuis au moins un an à Tanger.

(*d.*) Y être propriétaire ou locataire d'une maison ou appartement d'habitation dont la valeur locative pour chaque cas particulier a déjà été fixée par l'administration de la taxe urbaine à une somme d'au moins 120 pesetas hassani par mois.

Art. 7. Ne peuvent être électeurs les membres du corps diplomatique et consulaire et tous fonctionnaires et employés relevants des consulats à quelque titre que ce soit.

Art. 8. Les douze membres nommés par les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan ne pourront être choisis que parmi les électeurs. Chaque devra appartenir à la nationalité du représentant qui l'a nommé.

Art. 9. Les élections se font au scrutin de liste.

Art. 10. La liste électorale est établie au commencement de chaque année par le conseil municipal, qui doit exclusivement tenir compte :

Pour la condition de résidence, des déclarations d'immatriculation inscrites au registre spécial, qui sera ouvert à cet effet au siège de la municipalité ;

Pour les conditions relatives à la propriété ou au loyer, des constatations et décisions de l'Administration de la Taxe urbaine ;

Pour les conditions de capacité civique et pour l'âge des déclarations fournies par les consulats respectifs.

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Art. 11. La liste électorale sera communiquée au public pendant quinze jours. Toutes observations et demandes de radiations ou d'inscriptions seront jugées par le conseil municipal dans le mois qui suivra la publication.

Toute personne se croyant lésée par une décision du conseil municipal pourra en appeler aux représentants des Puissances et du Sultan par l'intermédiaire du représentant de sa nationalité.

Art. 12. En attendant l'installation de la municipalité, l'établissement de la liste électorale sera confié à une commission comprennant un délégué de chacune des Puissances représentées à Tanger, et du Makhzen, et d'un délégué nommé par l'Administration de la Taxe urbaine.

Art. 13. L'assemblée des électeurs est convoquée par les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan à Tanger quinze jours au moins avant l'élection ; l'avis de convocation est publié par des affiches et par des insertions dans trois journaux paraissant à Tanger désignés par le conseil municipal, et, en attendant l'installation de ceci, par les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Art. 14. Le scrutin, sauf décision contraire du conseil municipal expressément approuvée par les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan, est toujours ouvert un samedi et le dimanche suivant de 10 heures du matin à 4 heures du soir dans le local où siège le conseil municipal.

Art. 15. Le bureau de vote est composé des membres du conseil municipal, nommés par les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan. Il désigne parmi ses membres deux scrutateurs titulaires, ainsi qu'un président et un secrétaire.

Art. 16. Trois membres du bureau au moins doivent être présents pendant tout le cours des opérations de vote.

Art. 17. Le bureau juge provisoirement les difficultés qui s'élèvent sur les opérations de vote. Ses décisions sont motivées. Toutes les réclamations et décisions sont insérées au procès-verbal et les pièces et bulletins qui s'y rapportent y sont annexés après avoir été parafés par le président et le secrétaire.

Art. 18. Pendant toute la durée des opérations, une copie de la liste des électeurs reste déposée sur la table autour de laquelle siège le bureau. Cette liste contient les noms, domicile et qualification de chacun des inscrits. Elle est certifiée par le président de la municipalité, et, en attendant l'institution de celle-ci, par le doyen du corps diplomatique.

Art. 19. Nul n'est admis à voter s'il n'est inscrit sur cette liste. Le vote par procuration ou par correspondance n'est pas accepté.

Art. 20. Les électeurs apportent leurs bulletins préparés en dehors de la salle de vote. Le papier du bulletin doit être blanc et sans signe extérieur. L'électeur remet au président son bulletin fermé. Le président le dépose dans la boîte du scrutin. Le vote de chaque électeur est constaté sur la liste en marge de son nom, par la signature ou le parafe avec initiales de l'un des membres du bureau.

Art. 21. Le président doit constater au commencement des opérations du vote l'heure à laquelle le scrutin est ouvert. Il constate également l'heure à laquelle le scrutin est clos. Ces constatations sont inscrites au procès-verbal. Après que le scrutin a été déclaré clos, aucun vote ne peut être reçu.

Art. 22. Après la clôture du scrutin, il est procédé au dépouillement de la manière suivante : la boîte du scrutin est ouverte et le nombre des bulletins vérifié. Si ce nombre est plus grand ou moindre que celui des votants il en est fait mention au procès-verbal. Le bureau désigne parmi les électeurs, s'il en est encore des présents dans la salle, deux scrutateurs adjoints. Le président et les autres membres du bureau surveillent l'opération du dépouillement, qui est effectuée par les deux scrutateurs titulaires aidés par les deux scrutateurs adjoints au cas où il en aurait été désigné.

Art. 23. Les bulletins sont valables même s'ils portent un nombre de noms supérieur ou inférieur à celui des conseillers à élire. Toutefois les derniers noms inscrits au delà de ce nombre ne sont pas comptés. Les bulletins blancs ou illisibles, ceux qui ne contiennent pas une désignation suffisante ou dans lesquels les votants se font connaître, n'entrent pas en compte dans le résultat du dépouillement, mais ils sont annexés au procès-verbal.

Art. 24. Immédiatement après le dépouillement le président proclame le résultat du scrutin. Nul n'est élu au premier tour s'il n'a pas obtenu :

1. Une majorité relative des suffrages exprimés.
2. Un sixième des suffrages exprimés.

Art. 25. Le procès-verbal des opérations et la liste des élus sont dressés séance tenante par le secrétaire et signés par les membres du bureau. Copie certifiée de ces deux documents est immédiatement adressée par le président du Bureau de Vote aux représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Art. 26. Si, au premier tour de scrutin il ne se trouvent pas douze membres élus selon les conditions susindiquées, on pro-

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Alternative.

Art. 27. La durée du mandat des membres du conseil municipal est de quatre ans, avec renouvellement tous les deux ans de la moitié des membres élus.

A la fin de la deuxième année les membres sortants seront désignés par le tirage au sort parmi tous les membres élus. Le roulement s'établira ensuite par l'expiration du mandat.

cédera à un second tour. Tout électeur peut se présenter comme candidat au second tour de scrutin. L'élection aura lieu à la majorité relative des suffrages exprimés.

Art. 27. La durée du mandat des membres du conseil municipal est de trois ans . Tous les membres sortants peuvent être réélus, ou nommés de nouveau.

Art. 28. En cas de vacance parmi les membres élus il ne sera procédé à de nouvelles élections partielles que si le nombre de ces membres élus est réduit d'un quart.

Art. 29. Les fonctions de membre du conseil municipal sont gratuites. Aucun membre du conseil ne peut, directement ou indirectement, se charger d'entreprises ou de fournitures municipales sous peine d'exclusion.

Art. 30. Le président et les deux vice-présidents sont élus au scrutin secret et à la majorité absolue des voix par les membres du conseil municipal lors de sa première réunion.

Art. 31. Si au premier tour de scrutin aucun membre n'a obtenu la majorité absolue, il est procédé à un second tour; si à ce deuxième scrutin le même résultat se produit, le troisième sera restreint aux deux membres ayant obtenu à la seconde épreuve le plus grand nombre de voix.

En cas de partage des voix, à la suite du troisième scrutin, l'élection sera faite par voie de tirage au sort.

Titre IV.—*Attributions du Conseil municipal.*

Art. 32. La circonscription de la ville de Tanger et de sa banlieue est

Art. 33. Le conseil municipal est compétent pour prendre et faire exécuter toutes questions relatives aux questions et services suivantes :—

(1.) Le budget de la ville;

(2.) L'assiette et la perception des droits municipaux, ainsi que l'administration des revenus municipaux de toute nature;

(3.) L'ouverture, la fermeture et l'entretien des rues, places, ponts, promenades et jardins publics; la fixation du tarif pour les voitures publiques, les bêtes de selle, de somme et de trait; les projets de voirie, d'alignement, et, d'une façon générale, l'ensemble des services publics de la ville, tels que : les eaux, l'éclairage,

le pavage, le nettoyage, les halles et marchés, les cimetières, les abattoirs, les égouts, les théâtres, tous les établissements et bains publics et tout ce qui peut contribuer à l'embellissement et la prospérité de la ville;

4. Le service des pompiers et toutes mesures relatives aux incendies;

5. L'assistance des indigents, les hospices, les hôpitaux, les écoles et autres établissements municipaux de bienfaisance;

6. Le service de santé et d'hygiène de la ville, sauf ce qui rentre dans les attributions du service sanitaire, maritime et quarantenaire;

7. Tous autres objets sur lesquels les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan l'appellent à délibérer.

8. Tout projet de constructions, de grosses réparations, de démolitions et, en général, de tous travaux à entreprendre par les particuliers, devra être préalablement soumis au conseil municipal pour l'examen des conditions d'hygiène et de sécurité public et l'autorisation à obtenir.

Titre 5.—*Dispositions diverses.*

Art. 34. Le conseil municipal préparera son règlement intérieur, dans les trois mois qui suivront la publication du présent décret, et le soumettra à l'approbation des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Art. 35. Le conseil municipal s'assemblera de droit, en session ordinaire, au moins une fois par mois, et en session extraordinaire, toutes les fois que le président l'estimera nécessaire, ou que six membres en auront fait la demande par écrit.

En cas de session extraordinaire le conseil municipal ne peut s'occuper que des objets pour lesquels il a été convoqué.

Art. 36. Le conseil municipal soumet ses délibérations dans le délai de trois jours à l'approbation des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan. Elles ne seront exécutoires qu'autant qu'elles auront été approuvées par eux ou si dans les huit jours après la transmission ils n'en ont pas suspendu l'exécution.

Si dans les trente jours après la transmission aux représentants des Puissances et du Sultan une délibération suspendue n'a pas été annullée, elle deviendra exécutoire.

Dans le cas où deux tiers du conseil vote l'urgence pour une délibération quelconque, elle sera soumise aux représentants des Puissances et du Sultan dans un délai de vingt-quatre heures. Elle ne deviendra

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exécutoire qu'autant qu'elle aura été approuvée par eux, ou si, dans les quarante-huit heures après la transmission, ils n'en ont pas suspendu l'exécution.

Art. 37. La force exécutoire des règlements ne s'étend pas au delà des questions réglementaires rentrant dans les attributions du conseil municipal. Les questions de droit individuel peuvent toujours être portées devant les tribunaux compétents.

Art. 38. Le conseil municipal de Tanger constitue une personnalité civile.

Art. 39. Le président du conseil municipal représente la municipalité dans tous les actes qui le concernent ; il est chargé, sous le contrôle du conseil municipal et la surveillance des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan :

1. De veiller aux intérêts généraux et particuliers de la municipalité.
2. De faire tous actes conservatoires de ses droits.
3. De la gestion des revenus et de la surveillance des établissements et services confiés à la municipalité.
4. De souscrire les marchés, de passer les adjudications des travaux dans les formes établies par le présent règlement.
5. De souscrire les actes de vente, d'acquisitions ou des transactions, lorsque ces actes ont été régulièrement autorisés.
6. De la proposition du budget voté en séance du conseil municipal, et de l'ordonnancement des dépenses sur les crédits régulièrement ouverts.
7. De représenter la municipalité en justice, soit en demandant, soit en défendant.
8. De contracter des emprunts avec l'autorisation des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Art. 40. Le président représente seul l'administration municipale, il nomme et révoque, dans les formes qui seront établies par le Règlement intérieur, tous les employés de la municipalité.

Les agents et employés de tout ordre et de toute catégorie attachés aux services municipaux relèvent directement du président du conseil municipal. Ils n'ont droit à aucune pension ou indemnité, à quelque titre que ce soit.

Art. 41. Toute infraction ou contravention aux arrêtés du président, rendus en conformité avec les délibérations du conseil municipal et sous l'approbation des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan entraînera les peines de simple police prévues par des règlements adoptés à cet effet.

Les poursuites seront intentées par le conseil municipal devant les tribunaux compétents.

Alternative.

Le tribunal spécial prévu à l'article 45 de l'Acte d'Algésiras, avec appel à la Cour fédérale de Lausanne.

Art. 42. Les actions intentées au Maroc contre le conseil municipal seront portées devant un tribunal spécial composé de trois magistrats consulaires et de deux assesseurs. Les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan établiront chaque année la liste des magistrats des assesseurs et des suppléants.

Ce tribunal appliquera à ces causes les règles de droit de procédure et de compétence édictées en matières commerciales par la législation française. L'appel des jugements prononcés par ce tribunal sera porté devant la Cour fédérale de,Lausanne, qui statuera en dernier ressort.

Art. 43. Le public n'est pas admis aux séances d'un conseil.

Art. 44. Les questions sur lesquelles le conseil municipal est appelé à délibérer sont portées à l'ordre du jour par le président.

Le conseil ne peut délibérer sur des questions étrangères à l'ordre du jour ; en cas d'infraction à cette disposition, le président doit lever la séance.

Art. 45. Le conseil municipal ne peut délibérer valablement qu'autant que quinze de ses membres au moins assistent à la séance et prennent part au vote.

Lorsque les membres du conseil ne sont pas réunis en nombre suffisant pour délibérer valablement, le président procède à une seconde convocation pour une nouvelle réunion, qui ne peut avoir lieu qu'après un délai de quarante-huit heures. Les délibérations de cette seconde séance sont valables quel que soit le nombre des membres présents.

Art. 46. Les délibérations du conseil municipal sont prises à la majorité des voix des membres présents.

En cas de partage, la voix du président est prépondérante.

Aucun vote ne peut être émis par un membre présent au nom d'un membre absent.

Art. 47. Les membres du conseil ne peuvent prendre part à des délibérations relatives aux affaires dans lesquelles ils ont un intérêt, soit en leurs noms personnels, soit comme mandataires.

Art. 48. Tout membre du conseil qui, sans motif légitime, a manqué à trois convocations consécutives peut être déclaré démissionnaire par le président sur le vote du conseil municipal.

Art. 49. Le conseil municipal décide valablement sous réserve des dispositions contenues à l'article 36 sur les projets, plans et devis des travaux neufs ou d'entretien.

La mise en exécution de ces travaux sera conforme aux prescriptions du règlement sur les adjudications en générale

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Alternative

Le conseil municipal, comme administration intéressée, déléguera un de ses membres pour siéger à la Commission générale des Adjudications (voir article 4 dudit règlement).

adoptées conformément à l'article 110 de l'Acte d'Algésiras.

La Commission générale des Adjudications et de Marchés instituée à l'article 4 dudit règlement est remplacée par une sous-commission nommée par le conseil municipal.

Art. 50. Les travaux exécutés avec le concours d'autres ressources que les fonds municipaux ne relèvent pas du service municipal, mais ces travaux peuvent, après exécution, être remis à la municipalité et, à partir du moment de la remise, ils relèvent du service municipal.

Art. 51. Si certains services municipaux sont assurés par des particuliers des sociétés concessionnaires ou permissionaires, le contrôle en est exercée par le service des travaux municipaux, sauf dans les cas où il en aurait été disposé autrement par les conventions ou règlements intervenues.

Art. 52. Le conseil municipal délibère sur le budget, les recettes et les dépenses ordinaires ou extraordinaires, et, en générale, sur toutes les questions qui intéressent l'édilité de la ville. Il ne peut créer, sous une forme quelconque, des taxes nouvelles, ni apporter des modifications aux taxes existantes, mais il peut faire toute proposition tendant :

1. A l'établissement de centièmes additionnels aux taxes existantes ;
2. A la création de nouvelles taxes ;
3. A l'ouverture d'emprunts en indiquant l'emploi proposé pour ces ressources extraordinaires.

Il appartiendra aux représentants des Puissances et du Sultan exclusivement de statuer sur ces propositions.

Art. 53. Il sera institué une police municipale, qui sera placée sous l'autorité du conseil.

Il y aura deux tabors : un urbain et un extra-urbain.

Chacun aura un cadre d'officiers européens nommés par les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Art. 54. Le conseil municipal ne peut accepter aucun legs ou don à titre gracieux ou onéreux sans l'autorisation des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Art. 55. Toute délibération portant sur un objet étranger aux attributions du conseil est nulle de plein droit.

Sont également nulles de plein droit toutes les délibérations prises par le conseil en dehors de sa réunion légale.

Art. 56. Le conseil municipal peut être suspendu ou dissous par décision des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

En cas de suspension ces derniers pour-

voiront à l'administration municipale, soit directement, soit par une commission spéciale, dont ils désigneront les membres. On procédera à de nouvelles élections dans un délai de trois mois.

Titre VI.—*Budget et Comptabilité de la Municipalité.*

Art. 57. Avant le 15 novembre de chaque année le conseil municipal vote un projet de budget de recettes et de dépenses, par chapitres et articles, pour l'exercice de l'année suivante.

Ce projet de budget n'est rendu définitif et applicable qu'après sa sanction par les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Art. 58. Si, au 31 décembre, l'approbation des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan n'a pas été obtenue pour le budget proposé, le budget de l'année qui prend fin continue à servir de base pour l'exercice suivant, jusqu'à l'approbation d'un nouveau budget.

Art. 59. L'état des prévisions budgétaires de la municipalité est établi pour une période de douze mois, commençant le 1er janvier et finissant le 31 décembre de chaque année, ou à toutes autres dates qui pourraient être fixées par les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Il est divisé en recettes ordinaires et recettes extraordinaires, et en dépenses ordinaires et extraordinaires.

Art. 60. Les recettes budgétaires se composent comme suit :—

Recettes ordinaires.

1. Le produit des taxes prévues par les articles 61 et 64 de l'Acte d'Algésiras sous les conditions fixées par les règlements établis en application de ces articles.
2. Le produit des revenus des biens du domaine privé municipal.
3. Le produit des droits de toute nature perçues dans les halles, abbatoirs, foires, et marchés, et la partie des droits de môle qui revient à la municipalité.
4. Le produit d'occupation temporaire du domaine public municipal.
5. Et généralement le produit des contributions, taxes, et droits dont la perception est légalement autorisée.

Recettes extraordinaires.

1. Le produit de l'aliénation des biens du domaine privé municipal.
2. Le produit des dons et legs.
3. Le produit des emprunts, avances et subventions.
4. Le produit de toutes autres recettes accidentelles.

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Art. 61. Les dépenses du budget ordinaire comprennent les dépenses annuelles et permanentes d'utilité municipale.

Les dépenses du budget extraordinaire comprennent les dépenses temporaires et accidentelles.

Art. 62. Les dépenses ordinaires énoncées à l'article précédent, ainsi que le montant des condamnations judiciaires qui pourraient être prononcées contre le conseil municipal, sont obligatoires ; toutes autres dépenses sont facultatives.

Si le conseil municipal ne vote pas les dépenses obligatoires, ou s'il ne vote que des sommes insuffisantes pour assurer les services, les allocations nécessaires sont inscrites d'office au budget par une décision des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Tous travaux et dépenses imprévues ne peuvent être faits que sur l'autorisation spéciale des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

En cas de travaux accidentels ayant un caractère d'urgence, si le conseil municipal ne prend pas les dispositions nécessaires pour leur exécution, les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan peuvent y faire procéder d'office, et inscrire la dépense au budget.

Art. 63. Dans le courant du premier mois de chaque exercice, le compte de l'exercice clos, avec les développements et explications nécessaires est soumis au conseil municipal pour lui permettre d'apprécier les actes administratifs du président.

Les comptes examinés par le conseil municipal seront soumis à verification selon la décision que prendront à cet effet les représentants des Puissances et du Sultan.

Les comptes administratifs sont rendus publics par voie d'insertion dans les journaux.

Titre VII.—*Disposition générale.*

Les discussions des représentants des Puissances et du Sultan sur les questions qui pourront, d'après le règlement ci-dessus, leur être soumises, seront prises à la majorité relative. En cas de partage de voix le président, qui sera le doyen des représentants étrangers à Tanger, a la voix prépondérante.

[7994] No. 80.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 28.) *Tangier, February* 17, 1912.

Sir,

WHEN I saw the Assistant State Engineer on the 10th instant in connection with the question of the construction of a shelter for lighters at Casa Blanca, he gave me his view as to expense, &c., as reported in my despatch No. 25 of the 11th instant, but promised to let me have more precise details. I have now received the enclosed letter from him.

You will observe that he states that the work is expected to cost roughly about 1,350,000 fr. He adds, however, that this figure is liable to modification, and from all I hear the original estimate which he gave me of 2,400,000 fr. is probably much nearer the mark. I imagine that he has been told to minimise the importance of the work as far as possible.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 80.

M. Llorens to Sir R. Lister.

Tangier, le 13 *février*, 1912.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI l'honneur de vous fournir quelques renseignements précisant ceux que je vous ai donnés verbalement au sujet de la construction d'un abri pour barcasses à Casablanca. Le projet est étudié par M. Porché à Paris, et j'ignore si le marché est conclu pour l'exécution des travaux. Toutefois, M. Porché a donné des instructions pour que, en raison de l'extrême urgence, les travaux soient immédiatement commencés directement par l'administration. D'après une estimation sommaire faite ici, le montant des dépenses pour la construction de l'abri, l'aménagement d'un terre-plein et l'édification de magasins, serait de 1,350,000 fr., mais ce chiffre est susceptible d'être modifié par l'étude définitive du projet ; j'ignore, d'autre part, si ces travaux seront divisés en plusieurs lots.

Veuillez, &c.
JAIME LLORENS.

[8061] No. 81.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 27.) *Madrid, February* 19, 1912.

Sir,

THE French Ambassador having informed the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 17th instant that his Government accept the Spanish proposal for the immediate nomination of a mixed financial commission to sit at Madrid, Señor Garcia Prieto has announced through the press that the three Spanish commissioners will be appointed without delay. He has also expressed to M. Geoffray his readiness to engage at once in a discussion of the question of the territorial concessions to be made by Spain in recognition of the sacrifices incurred by France in liberating Morocco from the weight of the German pretensions in that country.

M. Geoffray has accordingly placed in Señor Garcia Prieto's hands a statement of the French demands, founded on a telegram from M. Poincaré, which his Excellency received on the 17th instant. The following are the salient points :—

1. The Anglo-French declaration of the 8th April, 1904, having regarded the prospective Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco as extending westward from Melilla, and not, as does the subsequent Franco-Spanish convention, from the mouth of the Muluya, France considers that Spain may be fairly asked to surrender the position which she occupied in 1908 at Cap de l'Eau, a point lying between Melilla and the Muluya. M. Geoffray has already reported to M. Poincaré that he sees no hope of inducing Señor Garcia Prieto to entertain this demand.

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2. The line of partition between the French and Spanish spheres of influence, as drawn in the said Franco-Spanish convention of 1904, is found to take insufficient account of the true conformation of the country through which it passes. Instead of following, as was probably intended, the true watershed of the rivers running southwards into the Inauen and Sebu valleys, it cuts across those rivers; it divides in half several important Moorish tribes, and it brings under Spanish influence a region lying to the south of a high chain of mountains and therefore not easily controllable by Spain. For these reasons, and in the light of the latest geographical knowledge, France proposes that the frontier between the two spheres shall be taken as running from a point nearer the mouth of the Muluya than the point on the left bank of Wady Defla which is its starting point under the said convention. The new point of departure leaves on the French side the great bend of the Muluya containing the El Khorb district (see Roquevaire's map of 1908). Proceeding westwards from this new starting-point along the highest mountain ridges to a point lying a little to the north of Wazan, the frontier line would eventually reach the Lucus and follow that river down to the sea in such a way as to leave to Spain those portions of the left bank of the river along which passes the direct road from Alcazar to Laraiche. One of the chief objects in view is stated, in M. Poincaré's telegram, to be the retention of the important valley of the Uarga within the French zone. It is also desired generally, as M. Geoffray leads me to think, to secure the French lines of communication between Fez and Taza by pushing back the Spaniards to a safe distance from these places.

3. In the southern zone M. Poincaré sees no objection to Spain retaining the territory lying between the northern boundary of the Rio de Oro and the southern boundary of Morocco, as defined in article 6 of the secret convention of 1904; as also the territory immediately adjoining Ifni as shown in the sketch map communicated to Señor Garcia Prieto on the 11th December last, as reported in my despatch No. 199 of the 14th December last.

Although I have not seen the Foreign Minister since the above French demands have been in his possession, I have no doubt that his Excellency will feel compelled to reject them as they stand. M. Geoffray has, indeed, already shown me a letter, which he received yesterday from Señor Garcia Prieto, asking what are the grounds on which France requires Spain to surrender such a large portion of the territory conceded to her by a formal treaty.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

No. 82.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 24.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, February* 23, 1912.

MY despatch No. 27 of 20th February.

French Ambassador has communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs map showing the extent of French demands as regards line of delimitation between French and Spanish zones. Minister for Foreign Affairs is greatly disturbed by these fresh demands now mentioned for the first time, which would deprive Spain of one of the few fertile districts in her zone, namely, valley of the Propiga. He has not yet dared to [group omitted: ? show] map to the King or President of the Council. His Excellency showed me this morning telegram from Colonel Silvestre reporting establishment of Captain Thiriet with a Moorish force near left bank of the Lucus, and well within Spanish zone which France engaged to respect in the *modus vivendi* of 27th July, 1911. Force is face to face with the Spanish encampment in that neighbourhood, and it is evident that conflict might easily arise unless force is withdrawn to the south of recognised Spanish line.

(Sent to Paris)

[8282]

No. 83.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 26.)

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Paris, February* 24, 1912.

WITH reference to your despatch to Mr. Carnegie No. 83 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to inform you that in the course of an interview which I had with M. Poincaré yesterday evening I spoke to him on the subject of your views in regard to the communication which had been made to you on behalf of the Société marocaine de Travaux publics, and I gave to his Excellency for perusal the memorandum, of which a copy is enclosed.*

M. Poincaré said that the French Government hold that on the completion of the French protectorate the Makhzen, *alias* the French Government, will be entitled to grant to French or other companies as they may desire concessions for railways, but that the work of construction and the supply of materials must be by adjudication. His Excellency stated that nothing had been decided in regard to the railway from Tangier, and that as Tangier is to be internationalised, the French Government will not be free to grant a concession for the construction of a port there.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[8466]

No. 84.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received February* 27.)

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Madrid, February* 23, 1912.

AS I have already had the honour to report by my telegram No. 11 of the 21st instant, a further meeting was held on that day between M. Geoffray and Señor Garcia Prieto. I was again present. It was agreed that no discussion should take place on the question of the territorial compensations. Before entering on that question, the Foreign Minister desired to have before him a new map of the country, drawn up in the geographical department of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, to which M. Geoffray had several times referred as showing more clearly than any previous map the true physical features of the region through which the line of delimitation passes.

Señor Garcia Prieto communicated a Spanish text of the last French proposals. Though following the latter as far as possible, it introduces the modifications and additions desired by the Spanish Government. The most important amendments are contained in articles 1 and 12, of which I enclose a translation. The main object of the new text of article 1 is to make sure that within the Spanish zone the right of action reserved to Spain shall not fall short in any respect of the rights secured to France in the French zone under her conventions with England (1904) and with Germany (1911). The article also contains clauses respecting the manner of the Khalifa's nomination and his designated place of residence.

Article 12 contains the new Spanish proposals concerning the Tangier–Fez Railway. In order to meet as far as possible the French demands, it is suggested that the construction of the entire line shall be placed in the hands of a single company, though there will be separate tenders in respect of the two zones which the railway will traverse. Spain still contemplates the formation of two distinct companies for the working of the French and Spanish sections of the line respectively. She now proposes, however, that 30 per cent. of the capital of the French company shall be Spanish and 30 per cent. of the capital of the Spanish company French.

M. Geoffray raised no special objection, promising merely to submit the new Spanish draft to M. Poincaré.

It seems scarcely necessary that I should trouble you at this stage with the remainder of the Spanish draft, which accepts on many points the French text, and on others suggests amendments of secondary importance.

During this meeting there was an evident desire on both sides to reach an agreement.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

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* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 84.

Extracts from proposed Franco-Spanish Convention.

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 1.

THE French Government recognise that in the Spanish sphere of influence it is for Spain to assist the Moorish Government in the introduction of all the administrative, judicial, economic, financial, and military reforms which may be necessary, and, in general, to take action similar to that reserved to France in the rest of Morocco in accordance with the Anglo-French declaration of the 7th April, 1904, and with the Franco-German agreement of the 4th November, 1911.

The districts comprised in the sphere of influence specified in article 2 shall continue under the civil and religious authority of the Sultan under the conditions laid down in the present agreement.

The said districts shall be administered by a Spanish High Commissioner and a Khalifa named by the Sultan at the suggestion of the Spanish Government, which shall in each case come to an arrangement directly with the Sultan, it being understood that the French Government are not to be concerned in the matter.

The Khalifa shall reside in the Spanish sphere of influence habitually at Tetuan; he shall be provided with a general authority from the Sultan, in right of which he shall exercise the rights and functions pertaining to His Majesty.

The authority shall have a permanent character, so that in case of a vacancy, and while it is being filled, the Khalifa can be replaced by his next subordinate.

The action of the Moorish authorities in the Spanish zone shall be supervised by the High Commissioner and his agents. The Spanish Government will see to the observance of treaties, and especially to the economic and commercial clauses in the agreement of the 4th November, 1911, both as regards Germany and other Powers.

No responsibility shall be attributed to the Shereefian Government on account of claims based on what may take place under the administration of the Khalifa in the Spanish zone.

ARTICLE 12.

On the strength of the adhesion given by the Spanish Government to the immediate construction of the Tangier–Fez line, the said Government shall concert with that of the French Republic, so that invitations to tender for the construction of the Tangier–Alcazar Railway to the limit of the said sphere of influence may be announced in due course under the same conditions as that from the said limit to Fez, and in such form that the construction of the two lines be adjudicated to the same body.

The Spanish Government undertake that the concessionnaire company for working the railway from Tangier to the limit of the Spanish sphere of influence shall reserve to the concessionnaire company working the railway from the limit of the Spanish sphere of influence to Fez the right to subscribe 30 per cent. of the capital, with consequent participation in the board of administration. The French Government give a like undertaking that the company working the railway from the limit of the Spanish sphere of influence to Fez shall reserve to the company working the railway from Tangier to the limit of the Spanish sphere of influence the right to subscribe 30 per cent. of the capital with the consequent participation on the board of administration.

[8609] No. 85.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, February 26, 1912.*

I FOUND the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day in a rather despondent mood. He says that the French demand for the valley of Verga is one which he could not bring himself to lay before the Cortes. It would reduce Spanish zone to a mere strip along the Mediterranean. He is preparing a map showing the extent of French demand and will send a copy to Spanish Ambassador in London to be shown to you. Meanwhile

French members of mixed commission concerning customs, who were to arrive on Friday, have not been heard of yet.

As regards alleged breach of *modus vivendi* reported in my immediately preceding telegram of 23rd February, Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that French Government have ordered French instructor to keep his mehalla outside the Spanish zone.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[9104] No. 86.

Memorandum communicated by M. Cambon, February 29, 1912.

DANS sa note du 22 courant, le Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères avait indiqué les observations que lui suggéraient deux parties du projet français d'organisation internationale de Tanger, à savoir le régime électoral du corps municipal et l'institution d'un comité de contrôle composé de trois membres.

L'Ambassadeur de France est chargé de soumettre à Sir Edward Grey les propositions suivantes, qui paraissent de nature à donner satisfaction aux désirs du Gouvernement britannique :—

1. Élection de la municipalité de Tanger.

Sir Edward Grey fait remarquer que le régime électoral du projet français aboutirait en fait à donner la prépondérance aux éléments français et espagnol. M. Poincaré serait disposé à admettre que le nombre des conseillers d'une même nationalité fût limité à quatre ; cette règle est actuellement appliquée à la composition d'hygiène de Tanger, et n'a provoqué jusqu'ici aucune réclamation. Si le corps municipal de Tanger devait comprendre seize conseillers européens élus, les français et les espagnols ne disposeraient que de huit représentants, soit la moitié ; il serait difficile de restreindre davantage la représentation des deux colonies les plus nombreuses ; et, d'autre part, une coalition des éléments français et espagnols, étant moins probable que leur antagonisme, a peu de chance de dominer le corps municipal de Tanger.

Par contre, M. Poincaré aurait peine à comprendre qu'une représentation dans ce corps municipal fût nécessairement réservé à chacun des États en relations officielles avec le Maroc. S'il en était ainsi, des pays comme la Suède, la Norvège, les Pays-Bas, l'Autriche, la Russie, les États-Unis, qui n'ont peu ou point de nationaux établis au Maroc, seraient représentés par un minimum de six voix dans une assemblée dont on ne pourrait cependant augmenter outre mesure l'importance numérique. Ne serait-il pas contradictoire de déclarer que Tanger recevra une administration exclusivement municipale à pouvoirs très étendus, et d'introduire dans cette administration municipale un principe de représentation politique tel que les intérêts d'une colonie de 8,000 à 10,000 résidents étrangers seraient, en grande partie, confiés à des administrateurs ne représentant aucune fraction notable de la population ?

2. Comité de contrôle, composé de trois membres dont un français et un espagnol.

Tenant compte des objections de Sir Edward Grey, M. Poincaré proposerait que le contrôle visé par l'article 11 du projet français fût exercé par l'ensemble des agents étrangers ou par une délégation nommée périodiquement par eux ; à la condition expresse que les délibérations relatives au contrôle seront prises à la majorité. Tout système basé sur l'unanimité permettrait, en effet, à une Puissance quelconque de faire indéfiniment obstacle, pour des motifs politiques ne concernant pas la ville de Tanger, aux mesures commandées par l'intérêt de cette ville ; on peut penser, au contraire, que l'évidence de cet intérêt suffirait à créer une majorité dans la réunion internationale chargée du contrôle.

En transmettant au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères ces nouvelles propositions, l'Ambassadeur de France croit devoir lui rappeler qu'en raison des négociations actuellement en cours à Madrid, il serait très désirable que le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement britannique pussent s'entendre sans retarder sur la question de Tanger.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 29 février, 1912

[8973] No. 87.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 29.)

(No. 32.) [By Post.]
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, February 28, 1912.*

MOROCCO.

I saw the Spanish Ambassador this afternoon after his interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He told me that the French Government withdraw their demand for Cap de l'Eau, but claim as compensation a shifting northward of the frontier of the Spanish northern zone as delineated on the Delcassé map, on the plea that the mountains as shown on that map are in really farther north, and the map lines would assign Spain plains which it would be impossible for the Spanish authorities to police and administer from the north of the mountains. The French Government therefore claim the valley of Ourga.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs told the Ambassador that the French Government will proceed to a negotiation and declaration of protectorate, reserving the questions of the Spanish zones and Tangier for ulterior consideration.

[9012] No. 88.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Madrid, February 26, 1912.*

I REPORTED in my telegram No. 12 of the 23rd instant that the new French proposals concerning the territorial concessions which it would be proper for Spain to make to France in Morocco had produced upon the Spanish Foreign Minister, after a careful study of their purport, a very disagreeable impression. I saw Señor Garcia Prieto again to-day. His Excellency was, if possible, even more despondent, as the result of a further investigation, than he had been at our last interview.

Producing a tracing prepared in the Ministry of State, he enlarged upon the extravagant character of the new French demands as viewed from a Spanish standpoint. He reminded me that in 1902 France was prepared to sign with Spain a partition treaty leaving Fez and Taza in the Spanish zone. When the negotiation was renewed in 1904, France insisted on retaining Fez and Taza in the French zone. Spain then pressed for the line of the Sebu as the dividing line between the two zones. In the end she was with difficulty persuaded to accept the line put forward as a compromise by M. Delcassé himself, and traced on the map which formed an annex to the convention of October 1904. This is the line which France now seeks to "modify," at a time when Spain naturally expected that the *status quo* in Morocco, having been admittedly changed, the provisions of the said convention, which were framed to meet that contingency, would come into operation as they stood, subject only to fair compensation to make good a portion of the sacrifices which France had been compelled to make. The French idea of fair compensation was constantly growing. In September last the southern Spanish zone in Morocco was demanded, and when Spain demurred, she was told that she might retain Ifni, and a portion of the coast. Later on it was intimated to her that the southern Spanish zone in Morocco included the region lying immediately to the north of Rio de Oro, which region article 6 of the Secret Treaty expressly defines as lying beyond the limits of Morocco. Next came a demand for the triangle which forms part of the Spanish zone to the south of the mouth of the River Lucuc. Then there were ominous rumours that the Chafarine Islands and Cap de l'Eau would have to be surrendered. Though nothing is now said of the Chafarine Islands, France asks for Cap de l'Eau and the extensive and fertile valley of the Uarga in addition to her previous demands. As for Cap de l'Eau, he could not think that the demand was ever intended to be a serious one. It had been indignantly rejected by public sentiment all over Spain. But M. Poincaré was said to be uncompromising in the matter of the Uarga valley. Señor Garcia Prieto felt an equal reluctance on this point. He did not see how he could defend such a surrender before the Cortes. It was very doubtful whether any advance in the geographical knowledge of that region had been made since 1904. He could not admit that the Uarga valley was difficult of access for Spain. She could easily approach and control it by following upwards the valley of the Lucus, even if there were no practicable

passes from the north. He scouted the argument based on the alleged fact that the existing line divided important tribes in half. Almost any line which could be devised would do the same thing. Some of the tribes were nomadic, and could not be said to have any fixed boundary. It was clear that what France desired was to push Spain still further back into the mountains, and to retain in her own hands a fertile region which M. Delcassé, with his eyes open, had himself offered to Spain in 1904 to replace the line of the Sebu then claimed by Spain. His Excellency had consulted the Conservative opposition. Señor Maure was still of opinion that no compensation whatever was due to France, and that Spain was entitled to demand the execution of the 1904 treaty as it stood. It seemed to Señor Garcia Prieto an outrageous demand, and he had no doubt that the King and Señor Canalejas, to whom the matter would now be explained in the light of the map and statistics prepared by his Excellency, would be compelled to make a stand against it. Better have no Spanish zone at all than one which it was sought to reduce to a mere strip along the Mediterranean.

I advised his Excellency to avoid meeting the French demands with a direct negative. Much depended, I thought, on the accuracy or otherwise of the geographical facts alleged by France. If it was true that the Uarga region was cut off from the rest of the Spanish zone by an impenetrable range of mountains, it would hardly be to the advantage of Spain to retain it. Might not a commission be sent to examine the physical features of the country? Anything seemed to me better than a rupture on a boundary question of this kind, especially after the achievement of such a diplomatic success as his Excellency might fairly lay claim to in respect of the renunciation by France of her demand that the Makhzen should make laws for the whole of Morocco, and the reference of the financial difficulty to a mixed commission.

His Excellency was not disposed to agree. France, instead of starting from the 1904 convention, had asked Spain to agree to a set of conditions which would have made it impossible for her to exercise any independent action whatever in her own zone. She now represented the fulfilment of her treaty obligations, as regards the administration of the Spanish zone, as an act of extreme moderation. Spain could not so regard it, and she felt that she was being treated by France on the territorial question in a very inconsiderate manner.

His Excellency, though perfectly calm, was not in a mood to take full account of the difficulties with which the French Government is probably surrounded in its endeavours to satisfy the colonial aspirations of some of its supporters, consistently with a due regard for the text of a treaty signed seven years ago, in circumstances very different from those of the present day.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[9949] No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 5, 1912.*

THE Spanish Ambassador spoke to me to-day about Tangier. He said that it would make it easier for Spain to treat with France the question of territorial concessions and other matters if the question of Tangier could be dealt with at the same time. The zone to be assigned to Tangier had a bearing on other matters, for it would affect the limits of the Spanish sphere.

I said that the question of Tangier had not made much progress lately. Our view was that the internationalisation of the municipality must be real, and I was waiting to see Sir Reginald Lister to discuss the question with him.

The Ambassador remarked that he heard that the French would claim that goods for the French zone, or at any rate those destined for the French forces, should be allowed to pass through Tangier duty free, as being in transit. If this principle was adopted for all goods going through Tangier and not stopping there, very little revenue would be left for the municipality.

He asked me about M. Regnault's mission to Fez. He had heard that the French intended to declare a protectorate without waiting for recognition from other Powers. This, he thought, would be wrong.

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I said that the French had not asked us for any recognition of a protectorate. All that we knew of at present was the journey of M. Regnault to Fez. We could not object to that.

The Ambassador went on to say that the question he was putting to me was no doubt hypothetical, but he wished to know my view.

I told him that, so far, I had no view.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[10073] No. 90.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March 7.*)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, March 7, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's consul at Fez :—

"(Secret.)

"Sultan [?] hostile to French protectorate; talks [of] abdication if he is pressed to change status of Morocco. Details by post."

No trouble appears to be anticipated at the French Legation, as Regnault expects to be at Fez only 30th June, general principle of protectorate having been already settled through Mokri.

[10076] No. 91.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March 8.*)

(No. 119.)
Sir, *Paris, March 7, 1912.*

THERE is an outburst of ill-humour in the French press against the Spanish Government on account of the delay in the negotiations respecting Morocco. This manifestation was apparently provoked by a note published in the "Temps" two days ago to the effect that the Spanish Ambassador had been received by M. Poincaré, who had expressed to his Excellency the surprise which the *intransigeance* of the Spanish Government was causing the French Government, and who had added that such *intransigeance* was calculated to imperil the success of the negotiations. M. Poincaré, the note continued, had expressed in very cordial terms his earnest desire to reach a favourable solution of the question at issue, which was necessary in the best interests of both countries.

Since the appearance of this note, the French papers have devoted themselves to the question of the Franco-Spanish negotiations, and have lectured or covertly threatened Spain on the subject of her attitude.

The "Matin," in an article by its editor, M. Lauzanne, declares that the French protectorate over Morocco will be negotiated and rendered effective over the head of Spain, as she will not come to a settlement. The "Temps" publishes a severe article in the same strain. It remarks: "L'obstination et l'intransigeance de l'Espagne auraient donc pour conséquence de nous obliger à agir au Maroc sans attendre qu'un accord avec elle fût intervenu, afin de ne pas retarder indéfiniment une action qui devient tous les jours plus urgente pour la tranquillité et la sécurité du pays. C'est là une conséquence de son attitude à laquelle l'Espagne ne saurait rester indifférente, si comme nous elle persiste à attacher du prix à une cohabitation amicale avec nous dans l'empire chérifien."

Other papers write in a less veiled manner on the consequences to Spain which may arise from continued opposition to France. The "Liberté" alludes to the Spanish difficulties in the Riff, and observes that if Spain does not care to come to an arrangement with France she will be deprived of the support of France, which means also that of the Makhzen, in dealing with local movements.

The "Lanterne" (Socialist-Radical) declares that prompt action on France's part is now necessary. If Spain will not come to an arrangement the French occupation will continually be extended, even on to the Spanish zone. French public opinion is, the "Lanterne" says, tired of the diplomatic comedy played by the Ministers of Alfonso XIII.

Whenever a hitch occurs in the negotiations, the French press adopts the hectoring tone of a strong Power to a weak one, which is not calculated to create a favourable atmosphere for future negotiations.

It is obvious that great irritation has been caused in France by the firmness shown by the Spanish Government in refusing to grant certain territorial concessions in Morocco which the French Government were anxious to obtain, and in declining to allow any French interference in the Spanish zone until an arrangement has been reached. A case in point is the reported refusal of the Spanish authorities to allow the Shereefian administration to proceed to set up telegraph poles between Arzila and Laraiche in the Spanish zone, which were intended to form part of the future telegraph line from Tangier to Rabat, Casa Blanca, and Fez.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
L. D. CARNEGIE.

[10307] No. 92.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March 9.*)

(No. 2. Confidential.)
Sir, *Fez, February 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I had an audience of the Sultan to-day to pay my respects on returning to Fez after leave of absence.

Sid Taib Al Mokri was present. The Sultan was in exceptionally good humour.

In the course of exchange of compliments, the Sultan expressed his satisfaction about his representative, Sid Mohammed Guebbas, having been received by His Majesty the King at Gibraltar, made polite inquiries for His Majesty's Minister at Tangier, and congratulated me on the honour I had recently received from His Majesty.

Some conversation followed of the general kind usual on such occasions, but the Sultan made some allusions to political matters which perhaps I should mention. He seemed very keen to know what was being arranged about the future of Tangier, and whether any other ports were to be settled on the same footing as Tangier, but, of course, I could give no particulars, for I knew none. He then asked whether it was the fact that the British Government would not consent to any "strong Power" occupying Tangier. He had been told that Mr. W. B. Harris had stated this recently in the "Times." I answered that, of course, the "Times" could only give its own opinion, that I had not seen that statement, and, in any case, all I knew of the matter was what was stipulated in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904.

The Sultan then asked whether this stipulation by treaty was sufficient guarantee? If, for instance, the French were to fortify the Straits, how could we prevent them except by war?

I said that nations, it must be supposed, wished to observe treaties, or they would not enter into such engagements. Had the British Government desired further security in the matter doubtless they would have procured it, and I pointed out the engagement of a similar nature on our part about the Suez Canal.

Reverting to the future of Tangier, the Sultan then asked me a series of questions about our methods of "self-government" as practised in our towns, counties, and colonies, and these I described to him, pointing out that the effect of such methods was to interest the public in the government and ensure their co-operation in everything. Very especially these methods resulted in the people becoming patriotic, prosperous, law-abiding, and loyal to the succession of monarchs who had trusted them so much.

The Sultan replied that there was no patriotism in this country, and added, bitterly: "This is the reason why things had come to the present pass. Here everybody works just for himself."

I have mentioned this attitude of the Sultan about the internationalisation of Tangier because it is remarkable how it coincides with the views on that matter one hears amongst the more intelligent natives here. The well-to-do, independent people hereabouts these days are constantly saying: "Oh, we shall all go to live at Tangier by-and-by." Of course this may be only a passing sentiment, but still it shows how the plan strikes them.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

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[10257] No. 93.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 40.)

Sir, *Tangier, March 1, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 18 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to inform you that I am not aware of any person under British protection holding a slave. It is, however, quite possible that some Semsars residing in the interior, or even at the ports, may hold slaves without the fact coming to the knowledge of the consular officers, and I would suggest that Mr. Mackenzie be invited to supply the particulars of the cases he refers to, in order that enquiries may be made.

In the meantime I am addressing a circular to all British consular officers, reminding them of the rule that no person under British protection may hold slaves, and instructing them to take such steps as they can to see that the rule is duly observed. I have instructed them to report to me should they hear of any case of a British protégé dealing in slaves, and I propose to at once withdraw British protection from any such person. I doubt, however, if any such case exists.

As stated by Sir W. Ridgeway in his report quoted in your despatch under reply, many slaves, after manumission, remain in the service of their former masters for choice. They are, however, free to leave if they wish.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

[10261] No. 94.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 44.)

Sir, *Tangier, March 2, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 21 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to report that, on learning that His Majesty's Government had agreed to the more urgent portion of the Casa Blanca port works, which could be begun at once, being awarded without the formalities of adjudication, the French chargé d'affaires addressed the doyen of the diplomatic body a letter, copy of which I beg leave to transmit herewith. In this letter M. de Billy suggests that contracts be at once entered into for (1) blocks of masonry, (2) the caissons of reinforced cement, and (3) the getting together of the necessary plant without adjudication, and that the remainder of the work be given out by "marché de gré à gré après concours."

M. de Billy, in this letter, passes over in silence the question whether the contracts for the urgent works in question are to be entered into by the Public Works Department or by the Adjudications Commission. This is a point of considerable importance, and one on which some of the foreign representatives, especially the Dutch and Spanish Ministers, feel very strongly. It appears to me clear, under article 3 of the "Règlement sur les Adjudications en général," that all contracts for public works or for "fournitures d'État" of any importance must be dealt with by the Adjudications Commission. The Makhzen, however, has lately shown a tendency to endeavour to avoid this obligation, and attention has been called to the matter by the Spanish Minister on two occasions.

M. de Rappard having expressed to me the hope that M. de Billy would not suggest that the contract in this case should be made by the Public Works Department, I mentioned this point to M. de Billy immediately before he addressed his letter to the doyen. He seemed at first to hold that, as the work would be paid for out of the Shawia indemnity, the contracts could be made by the Public Works Department without the intervention of the Adjudications Commission, but when I informed him that, in my opinion, the contract for the works in question must be made by the Commission générale des Adjudications et des Marchés, even though they are to be paid for out of the Shawia indemnity, and pointed out to him that their position was very strong on that commission, he apparently acquiesced. I was consequently somewhat surprised at his avoiding all mention of the Adjudications Commission in his letter to the doyen.

M. de Rappard, however, was determined that there should be no question as to the rights of the commission, and in his circular to his colleagues, copy of which I have the honour to transmit herewith, he makes the point quite clear by expressing the hope that the Adjudications Commission will insert in the contract a penal clause requiring the works to be completed by a given date.

In my annotation on the circular I observed that I considered it essential that there should be a severe penal clause as suggested by the doyen, both in the contract for the preliminary works and in those for the main works, so as to ensure a sufficient shelter being provided for tugs and lighters before the autumn. I proposed that a letter to this effect be addressed to the president of the Adjudications Commission, and that the president be also requested to hasten the invitation to tenders in the "concours" for the main works.

All the representatives agreed to the proposal of the doyen, who has addressed a letter to the president of the Adjudications Commission in the terms suggested by me.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 94.

M. de Billy to the Dean of the Diplomatic Body.

M. le Doyen, *Tanger, le 21 février, 1912.*

L'ENCOMBREMENT du port de Casablanca, les faibles moyens mis à la disposition du commerce pour les opérations d'acconnage et la quasi-impossibilité de les augmenter en raison de l'état de la mer, qui détruit remorqueurs et barcasses à mesure qu'ils sont envoyés sur cette rade, ont provoqué d'unanimes protestations des colonies étrangères.

C'est pourquoi l'urgence d'exécuter les travaux nécessaires pour mettre à l'abri le matériel de débarquement et permettre ainsi d'augmenter ce matériel me paraît démontrée.

Le projet que le Service des Travaux publics vient de terminer en vue de remédier à la situation comprend une partie qui peut être immédiatement commencé. Ce sont les trois lots consistant en blocs de maçonnerie et de caissons en béton armé, qui doivent être construits à terre et ne peuvent être employés que plusieurs semaines après leur confection pour donner aux matériaux le temps de durcir. De plus, il faut immédiatement constituer un outillage spécial.

Il a paru indispensable au Service des Travaux publics de passer dès maintenant les marchés nécessaires pour constituer cet outillage et préparer les blocs et caissons qui seront employés au printemps. En conséquence, j'ai l'honneur de prier le corps diplomatique d'autoriser pour ces travaux des marchés de gré à gré.

Il reste entendu que les travaux qui ne seraient pas compris dans la catégorie précitée devraient être l'objet d'un marché de gré à gré après concours.

Veuillez, &c.

ROBERT DE BILLY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 94.

M. de Rappard to Members of the Diplomatic Body.

Messieurs et chers Collègues, *Tanger, le 22 février, 1912.*

J'AI l'honneur de faire circuler ci-jointe une lettre de M. le chargé d'affaires de France, en date d'hier, dans laquelle M. de Billy prie le corps diplomatique d'autoriser, pour quelques travaux préparatoires à effectuer au port de Casablanca, des marchés de gré à gré.

Nous avons reçu si souvent et de différents côtés des plaintes au sujet des tristes conditions dans lesquelles se trouve le port de Casablanca, que, pour ma part, je suis disposé à autoriser par exception un marché de gré à gré pour les trois lots compris dans le projet du Service des Travaux publics et mentionnés par M. de Billy dans sa lettre précitée.

Toutefois, vu l'extrême urgence, et pour assurer l'exécution immédiate des trois travaux en question, j'ose espérer que la Commission pour les Adjudications, par l'intermédiaire de laquelle le Service des Travaux publics, devra passer les marchés de gré à gré dont il s'agit, fixera dans les conditions de ces marchés une forte amende pour chaque jour qui dépasserait le délai stipulé pour la livraison.

Veuillez, &c.

DE RAPPARD.

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[10285] No. 95.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 34.)

Sir, *Madrid, March 5, 1912.*

I HAVE just held a conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the present state of the negotiation with France concerning Morocco. Señor Garcia Prieto had communicated to me on the 3rd March a copy of his observations on the last French text. Our conversation began with a discussion of some of the points at issue :—

Article 1.

The Spanish text (see enclosure in my despatch No. 202 of the 21st December) stipulates in paragraph 1 that Spain shall exercise generally, within her zone, powers analogous to those which France has reserved to herself in the remainder of the Empire under her agreements with England (1904) and Germany (1911).

To this text, France objected that the word "generally" might be held to invest Spain, as regards her sphere, with all the powers acquired by France under the latter agreement, including the right to represent the Sultan in the conduct of the foreign affairs of Morocco, a right specially reserved to France under article 3 of the agreement with Germany. The French text (see enclosure in my despatch No. 23 of the 13th February) cuts out, accordingly, the word "generally," and makes it clear that the powers vested in Spain exclude the right to represent the Sultan diplomatically.

Spain now replies as follows : To make the French contention clear, it will suffice to say that the powers to be exercised by Spain shall be analogous to those which France has reserved to herself in the remainder of the Empire under her agreement with England of 1904 and under articles 1 and 2 of her agreement with France.

But, though disclaiming the diplomatic powers reserved to France by article 3 of the Franco-German treaty, Spain claims that "the relations which other Powers may wish to establish with the administration of the Spanish zone shall not be conducted through the intermediary of the Sultan or of the French Government, but through that of the Spanish Government and its agents." This conclusion appears to the Spanish Government to result naturally from the fact that the Spanish zone is administered, jointly with the Khalifa, by a Spanish High Commissioner ; that the Sultan will not be held responsible for anything which occurs there ; that foreign claims will be submitted to the Spanish consul and to the consul of the interested country, acting jointly ; and that natives of the Spanish zone are placed under the protection of Spain.

As regards paragraph 3 of article 1, Spain still presses for the right to propose to the Sultan the name of the person who is to be appointed Khalifa for the Spanish zone. According to the French text, the Khalifa was "nommé et destitué par le Sultan avec l'agrément du Gouvernement espagnol, qui à cet effet s'entendra directement avec le Sultan." The Spanish Government now proposes that "the Khalifa shall be nominated and dismissed by the Sultan on the proposal of the Spanish Government, such nomination and dismissal being the affair exclusively of Spain and the Sultan."

Spain desires, by the concluding phrase, to exclude French advice being tendered to the Sultan in respect of matters concerning the Khalifa. I doubt whether any written stipulation would secure this end, and I have told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in my opinion, the interests of Spain in the matter are sufficiently guaranteed by the French text as it stands.

In the concluding sentence of paragraph 4 of article 1 the Spanish Government revert to their own text, in accordance with which the Khalifa is invested in the Spanish zone with all the powers belonging to the Sultan, and not merely with the powers expressly delegated to him by the Sultan, as the French text had it.

In paragraph 5 of article 1 the Spanish Government makes a suggestion which seems to me to have a good deal to be said for it The French text contemplated the appointment simultaneously with the Khalifa of a "substitute" who should automatically replace the Khalifa in the case of a vacancy occurring in that office. Señor Garcia Prieto remarks that the substitute would have to be paid, and that there would be nothing for him to do so long as the Khalifa was exercising his functions. His Excellency would prefer to have it understood that, in case of a vacancy, the Khalifa should be replaced by the highest remaining Moorish official of the Spanish zone, as, for instance, by the Basha of the Riff or the Basha of Tetuan.

Corrections without much importance were also suggested in paragraphs 6 and 7.

Article 6. Paragraph 1.

The French text (not forwarded in my despatch No. 28 of the 24th February, with the text of articles 1 and 12) provides that "les écoles, les consulats et tous les établissements français et espagnols actuellement existant au Maroc seront respectés."

Señor Garcia Prieto, in his last observations, remarks that he had not previously included schools and other establishments in the Spanish text, inasmuch as they were already protected under the terms of article 2 of the convention with France of October 1904. As regards consulates, he remarks that their position is regulated by existing treaties with the Sultan, "which remain in force," but he does not refuse to insert a stipulation concerning consulates, if the French Government so desire.

In M. Geoffray's opinion the continued validity of the stipulations of former treaties in respect of consulates is open to doubt.

Paragraph 2 *of Article* 7.

The following is the last edition of the French and Spanish texts :—

Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à faire respecter la liberté et la pratique extérieure de tout culte existant en Maroc. Le Gouvernement espagnol fera en sorte que les privilèges religieux conférés aux missions franciscaines espagnoles soient désormais localisés à la sphère d'influence espagnole ; dans la zone française ces missions conserveront leurs établissements et propriétés actuelles, mais le Gouvernement du Roi ne s'opposera pas à ce que des religieux de nationalité française y soient affectés.

(Translation from Spanish.)

Both Governments engage to secure respect for the freedom and external practice of every form of worship existing in Morocco. The Spanish Government will not claim on behalf of the Spanish regular and secular clergy any religious privilege outside the Spanish zone, it being understood that the Spanish missions shall preserve their properties and liberty to establish themselves at any time in the French sphere of influence.

The French text differs from the Spanish mainly in seeking to obtain Spanish acquiescence in the gradual substitution of French Franciscan monks for those of Spanish nationality in the establishments of that order which exist in the French zone. Spain, in short, is asked to surrender the religious protectorate, which she claims to exercise throughout Morocco. Señor Garcia Prieto does not refuse. He merely remarks that the Spanish religious protectorate rests on a concession granted by the Holy See ; that Spain can do no more than promise not to oppose its suppression or substitution ; and that she would have to inform the Holy See.

As regards the right of the Spanish Franciscan missions to establish themselves in any part of Morocco, this privilege rests on treaties concluded between Spain and Morocco. Spanish public opinion would not tolerate the revocation of these treaties. The surrender of the Spanish religious protectorate constitutes in itself a considerable concession, nothing having been said on that point in the treaty of 1904.

Spain, therefore, while agreeing to surrender her protectorate, if the Holy See concurs, is not disposed to give up the treaty right of her Franciscan missions to settle at will in any part of Morocco.

Article 12.

Tangier–Fez railway. Spain adheres to her proposal (see text in my despatch No. 202 of the 21st December last).

On this question M. Geoffray informs me that the Spanish proposal is regarded in Paris as entirely impracticable. His Excellency hopes that a solution may be found by the formation of a Franco-Spanish financial group which will draw up a scheme for approval by the two Governments. M. Massenet, of the Franco-Spanish Mining Company in the Riff, is understood to be in communication with certain Spanish financiers on the subject.

Article 18.

Paragraph 1. France accepts the Spanish text providing that "international agreements with Morocco shall not be extended henceforth to the Spanish zone without the previous consent of the Spanish Government."

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Paragraph 2. France objects to the Spanish text which provides that international agreements "to which the Spanish Government is a party may be extended to the Spanish sphere of influence in Morocco with the consent of the Khalifa."

On this paragraph the French Government remarked that it could not be accepted, inasmuch as it would allow, for instance, for treaties of commerce being concluded by Spain with other Powers and extended to her Moorish zone, to the detriment of the uniformity admitted to be desirable as between the two zones in commercial matters.

The Spanish Government now reply that, as treaties of commerce are intimately allied to customs questions, and as no change in the customs duties of the two zones can be made without concurrence between the French and Spanish Governments, they hope that the French Government will withdraw their objection to the Spanish text.

During my conversation with the Foreign Minister I endeavoured to induce him to abstain as far as possible from pressing unimportant objections to the French text, as it seemed to me that he had done on some of the points included in the above-mentioned articles.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[10547] No. 96.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Madrid, March 5, 1912.*

IN the course of my conversation with the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, reported in my previous despatch, I asked his Excellency how the labours of the mixed commission were progressing. He said that the attitude of the French members had been so far distinctly discouraging. They had shown no sign of being willing to accept the guarantee of the Spanish State as a substitute for the customs revenues of Morocco, which form the principal security for the service of the loans of 1904 and 1910. In respect of the customs, they said they must insist on the maintenance of the Board of Control, which, as everybody knows, is to all intents and purposes a French institution. The only concession they could make was to hand over to Spain the remaining sources of revenue, which were likewise assigned to the service of the loans.

Señor Garcia Prieto thought the French commissioners had shown an uncompromising spirit. If Spain was to make territorial concessions to France, she must at least secure for herself a zone free from French intervention. A proposal was to be made by the Spanish commissioners at the next meeting of the mixed commission, which he trusted would prove the base of a settlement, for it was impossible for Spain to go further in the way of concession. According to this proposal, the Board of Control of the Debt would continue to exist, but its functions would be suspended from year to year on the punctual payment annually by the Spanish Government of the sum required for the full service of the loans. Failing such payment, the board would automatically resume its control.

Meanwhile M. Geoffray, the French Ambassador, with whom I am in daily contact, is less concerned about the settlement of the customs difficulty, as to which he anticipates that the French commissioners will be prepared to accept a reasonable compromise, than about the vexed question of the territorial demands put forward by M. Poincaré. His Excellency is well aware that on this point Spain is by no means disposed to modify to the extent claimed by France the line of frontier between the two zones, which is drawn on the map attached to the treaty of 1904. Also as regards the Spanish southern zone, there is as yet no approach to an agreement. Spain so far has agreed only to cede a portion of the hinterland. France, on the other hand, demands the whole of the coast except a strip including Ifni.

Señor Garcia Prieto is much preoccupied with these territorial questions. The reports already received from the Spanish military authorities in Morocco do not bear out the French contention that the valley of the Uarga is uncontrollable by Spain. There is said to be easy access to it from Alcazar. It is admitted that it cannot well be approached by an armed force from the north. Spanish travellers describe the region in question as rich and fertile, especially along the left bank of the Uarga. Its geographical features, however, are little known, and Spain is not at present

disposed to sign away a district which may prove to be one of the most valuable portions of her zone. The Foreign Minister is preparing a full reply to the French demand. Meanwhile, he is forwarding to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris a preliminary statement for use in conversations with M. Poincaré, showing the extent in square kilometres of the regions ceded by France to Germany in the French Congo as compared with the much greater area now claimed from Spain by France, as compensation for the result of a negotiation in respect of which Spain was persistently denied the right to be consulted. His Excellency explained to me that his object was to prepare the French Government for his answer to their territorial demands, which would necessarily show a wide discrepancy between the views of the two parties to the negotiation.

His Excellency indignantly denied the accusations which continue to appear in portions of the French press, to the effect that Spain is purposely dragging out the negotiation by putting forward unreasonable pretensions. On the contrary, it lies with France, he urged, to justify a set of demands involving a manifest departure from treaty conditions solemnly laid down in 1904 to meet the contingency of a change in the *status quo* of Morocco. Spain could not be expected to acquiesce without a struggle in the dismemberment of her zone.

To revert to the customs question, I may mention that M. Geoffray has informed me of a proposal about to be made by the French commissioners. These gentlemen are impressed with the difficulty of devising regulations to secure that the duty paid in the ports of Morocco subject to Spanish control on imported goods destined for consumption in the French zone shall accrue, as seems to them right that it should, to the benefit of the French zone. The French contention is that each zone should benefit by the customs duty paid on the merchandise which it imports, and that the Spanish zone should not profit by revenue derived from duty paid, for instance, at Laraiche, on goods which would proceed thence overland to their destination at Fez. To avoid a cumbersome system of refunds, the alternative is being considered of establishing a line of customs-houses along the northern frontier of the French zone. Goods for the French zone, imported through a customs-house in the Spanish zone, would pay no duty till they reached the frontier customs-house in the French zone. This scheme has not yet been put forward. M. Geoffray agrees with me in regarding it as tending to impair to some extent the principle of the integrity of Morocco, which both France and Spain still profess a desire to uphold. His Excellency expects, however, to be instructed before long to sound the Spanish Government on the subject. He presumes that his Government will previously have ascertained the views of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[10901] No. 97.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 124.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 11, 1912.*

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day on the subject of the French negotiations with Spain. They were being conducted in a very cordial spirit, but were not making progress. He said that, when the agreement was made with Spain in 1904, the delimitation was very vague. It had since been found that there were very grave errors in the Spanish map of 1904: a river which was supposed to run parallel to the Straits of Gibraltar was found to run from north-west to south-east, and to fall into the Lukus; mountains were marked where none existed; and so forth.

What the French Government now wished to propose was that the watershed between the rivers which ran into the Mediterranean and those which ran into the Atlantic should be taken in principle as the boundary, and that the delimitation of this boundary should be referred to a commission appointed for the purpose. He asked me to instruct Sir M. de Bunsen to come to an understanding with M. Geoffray about this proposal, and to support it in Madrid.

I said that I was not familiar with these territorial details. I would look into the matter, discuss it with Sir R. Lister, and speak to M. Cambon again.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[10902] No. 98.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 125.) *Foreign Office, March* 11, 1912.

Sir,

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day about Tangier. He asked me to expedite our reply to M. Poincaré's proposal. It was felt to be impossible to give an equal share in Tangier to all the Powers, as some of them had no interest at all in Morocco.

I said that I had been waiting to see Sir R. Lister on this subject, and would do so as soon as possible.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11238] No. 99.

Tangier Municipality: Notes by Sir Eyre Crowe.

THE French and Spanish governments are both anxious that an agreement should be arrived at without delay respecting the organization of the municipality, as this question has an important bearing on the pending negotiations between France and Spain respecting their respective zones in Morocco.

The French government have submitted to us confidentially a draft scheme. At the same time Sir R. Lister has, on Sir E. Grey's instructions, prepared a draft for our consideration. Both schemes go into details. The French government are agreed with us that the details can be finally settled only by discussion between the legations on the spot. What is now required is a statement of the principles on which any scheme must be based in order to be acceptable to the respective governments. Sir R. Lister, whom I have consulted, thinks we should not at this stage communicate his draft to the French government, so as not to provoke their criticism on the details. We must, therefore, prepare a separate statement, which should be confined to the governing and essential features. Mr. Clerk's minute (on No. 7993/12) has enumerated these under thirteen headings, which with a little rearrangement, reducing their number to nine, seem to me to afford an excellent basis for such a paper as we can properly lay before the French government. I propose to deal with the points seriatim.

1. *Mode of setting up the Municipality.*

In order that the municipality should have a secure title, it must be established in virtue of a treaty between the Sultan and the Powers. All the essentials of the scheme must be covered by the treaty or by a Sultan's decree annexed thereto.

2. *Powers of the Municipality.*

The only way in which the rights and duties of the municipality can be satisfactorily circumscribed would, I think, be to declare its authority within the municipal area to be supreme and unfettered, except in so far as the treaty otherwise provides. Failing such a categorical delegation of powers there would be a grave risk of future conflicts with the Sultan (*i.e.*, France) on the one hand, and with the treaty Powers on the other.

3. *Area.*

The French government originally proposed a rather liberal boundary, so as to provide for natural growth of the township, a self-contained water supply, a proper means of security under police protection, &c. That was when they still contemplated exercising a controlling influence in the municipality, under the guise of Moorish predominance in the administration. Now that this dream has vanished, they will undoubtedly be less anxious for a wide area. This will also be the attitude of Spain, as the municipal territory will be cut out of the Spanish zone. The French propose to leave the area to be settled by the legations at Tangier, and to agree for the present merely to declare that the surroundings to be included in the municipal borders ("banlieue") shall be restricted as much as possible. I think we should agree to this, provided it is clearly understood that due regard will be had to the essential require-

ments of an important township which is certain, under good government, to develop and expand.

4. *Machinery of Government.*

Under the latest French proposals the municipality would consist of three bodies:—

1. A partly elected (European members) and partly nominated (Moorish members) municipal council, exercising legislative functions;
2. An administrative council composed of a deputation of five municipal councillors (including the chairman and the two deputy chairmen) wielding the executive authority; and
3. A committee of control consisting of the representatives of the treaty Powers at Tangier, to whom is given a right of veto over municipal decisions affecting "the political status of the town and its inhabitants."

On the other hand, Sir R. Lister's scheme contemplates a municipal council, of which one-half is elected, whilst the other half of the members are nominated, in equal numbers, by each of the Powers (including Morocco). No administrative council is provided for, but all decisions of the municipal council are made subject to the approval of a committee of control composed in the same way as now proposed by France.

Both schemes fix the number of municipal councillors at twenty-four; but in most other respects they reveal a wide divergence.

France wants to have eight Moorish members and sixteen European, of whom not more than four may belong to the same nationality. Assuming, as we may do, that France and Spain will each secure their maximum of four members, this would leave eight Europeans of other nationalities. Clearly, however, the eight Moors would be nominees of France, who would thus command absolutely one-half of the council.

Sir R. Lister starts from the principle that real internationalization is not compatible with giving to Morocco herself a preponderant position by allowing the Sultan to nominate one-third of the council. The Sultan should have neither more nor less than the other Powers. Sir R. Lister, moreover, strongly dissents from the French view that it would be impracticable to resort to an election as regards Moorish members. He accordingly proposes that the eleven treaty Powers and the Sultan, should each nominate one member, the remaining twelve being freely elected, but so that not more than two elected members should be of the same nationality.

Besides cutting down the position of Morocco to that of all the other Powers, Sir R. Lister's scheme will be seen to accentuate the equal interests of all the treaty Powers by the system of letting each of them nominate a member. This will not be palatable to the French, who have expressed their objection to equal influence being wielded in the municipality by such Powers as Belgium, Holland, Austria, Russia, and the United States, who have no persons of their own nationality, or very few, residing at Tangier. The French opposition will be accentuated if, with Sir R. Lister, we give the diplomatic (or consular) corps at Tangier practically a veto over every measure of the municipality, instead of confining such right of veto, as France proposes, to "political" questions.

I confess to a feeling that under Sir R. Lister's scheme the position assigned to the Powers having little or no commercial interests at Tangier is rather too generous; and that France will be justified in objecting. I think we shall have to be content with giving a more or less decisive voice to the eleven Powers equally, either within the Council itself (by some such means as proposed under Sir Lister's scheme of nomination) or in the Committee of Control, but not in both. Otherwise it might happen, as was pointed out in M. Cambon's memorandum of the 29th February, that the measures and general policy of the municipality are governed by the political considerations inspiring the grouping of the legations and of their respective governments in their general relations to each other.

5. *Franchise.*

It is common ground that the franchise for the municipal elections shall be based on the assessment for the "urban tax" already in existence. The Spaniards are interested in extending the franchise as widely as possible, as a large proportion of the Spanish residents at Tangier belong to the lowest classes, and it is these which give the Spanish population a large preponderance over every other foreign colony. The French, on the other hand, would prefer a higher limit of assessment than the

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occupation of real property of the value of 40 pesetas a-month, which is what Spain would desire. Sir R. Lister proposes a minimum of 120 pesetas, and there can be no doubt that the exclusion of the low-class residents from the franchise will make for efficiency. The French propose to leave the figure open for subsequent settlement by agreement between the legations, and this would suit us also. The same might be said as to the qualification by length of residence. France suggests a minimum period of two years, Sir R. Lister prefers one year.

6. *Method of Election. Duration of Mandates. Language.*

Sir R. Lister's draft contains detailed provisions respecting the method of election. This is based on the system known in France as "scrutin de liste," which I believe secures a fair measure of proportional representation. It will probably be acceptable to the French, and, if so, it might be put forward as one of the principles to be adopted without going into more details. The French scheme does not deal with this question, and, if the French government prefer to omit reference to it from the statement of principles, I do not think we need insist at this stage.

The French scheme is equally silent as to the period for which the members of the council are to sit. Sir R. Lister suggests two alternatives: either general elections every three years, or a partial renewal of the council every two years by a system which fixes the period at four years, but provides for one-half of the members retiring every two years. Both systems have advantages. The choice might stand over for discussion at Tangier.

The same may be said concerning the language to be used at the meetings of the council. This is likely to prove a rather thorny question.

7. *Revenue.*

Both the French and the English drafts provide for the cession of all the local revenues by the Makhzen to the municipality. Sir R. Lister goes into greater detail than M. Cambon's proposals. These are eminently matters to be settled by the experts at Tangier. It seems probable that there will be some real difficulty in providing an adequate revenue. Nothing is said in either scheme as to the proceeds of the customs. The French memorandum of the 10th February last states that this point is "reserved," as it is under discussion at Madrid. The customs revenues are pledged to the holders of the French loans. The Spaniards will no doubt succeed in arranging for terminating the hypothecation, by substituting, as security for the bondholders, an engagement on the part of the Spanish treasury to pay the coupons.

It is unlikely that any closely analogous arrangement could be made as regards the Tangier customs. At least I see two rather important difficulties which would have to be overcome: In the first instance, even if France were willing to free the Tangier customs revenue by accepting, for the bondholders, some other security than the proceeds of the Tangier customs house, how is that security to be found? On the analogy of the ports in the Spanish zone, the eleven treaty Powers would have to arrange for a joint guarantee of their respective treasuries. Even if that were a feasible operation, it would involve setting up some sort of international Caisse de la Dette, a very cumbersome and probably expensive piece of machinery.

The second objection arises from the restricted area of the municipal territory. The revenue yielded by the customs at the treaty ports has hitherto gone to the exchequer of the central Moorish government. Under the contemplated Franco-Spanish agreement it will be divided so that the amounts taken at the ports in the French zone will fall to the administration governing that zone, the proceeds from the ports in the Spanish zone will become available for the general purposes of that Spanish zone. In neither case is there any question of restricting the application of the revenues collected at the ports to their local needs alone, as would be the case if the customs collected at Tangier were to be allocated as a whole to the municipality. On the other hand, the revenues collected at each port will undoubtedly and naturally, both in the French and in the Spanish zones, be partly utilized for certain public purposes at those ports, and, similarly, it would seem only equitable that some portion at least of the yield of the Tangier customs should be handed over to the municipality. It might perhaps be possible to declare so much in the proposed statement of principles.

Some arrangement will be necessary concerning the service of posts and telegraphs. It would probably be convenient that any arrangement come to under this head as regards the Spanish zone should, *mutatis mutandis*, be adopted in the municipality.

The same consideration applies to the existing government monopolies.

In both cases the government revenues might be made to contribute in some way to the expenses of the municipality.

It should be made quite clear that, with the exception of the customs duties and possibly of the monopoly charges, residents in the township will not pay any taxes to the Makhzen.

8. *Judicial Arrangements.*

Sir R. Lister proposes no change in the existing arrangements for the administration of justice, except that he would create a special tribunal for hearing suit against the municipality. In all other respects the existing courts would retain their present jurisdiction. This means the retention of both the consular courts and of the purely Moorish tribunals, such as the Kadi's courts, which generally administer Moslem religious law. This is probably the best possible provisional arrangement. The question as to what should be done at Tangier, where the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the foreign consuls is abolished in the French and Spanish zones, may well be allowed to stand over for the present. Possibly some sort of mixed court will ultimately have to be established, but it seems unnecessary to make any stipulations or reservations under this head now.

The French draft alludes to the establishment of a special tribunal at Tangier in conformity with the scheme of judicial reforms provided for in the Franco-German convention of the 4th November, 1911, and makes any infraction of municipal regulations amenable to trial before a branch of that tribunal. I am uncertain as to the precise significance of this proposal, but do not see any real difficulty in its adoption, unless it hides some pitfalls.

The French will no doubt be ready to welcome Sir R. Lister's suggestion that the new tribunal should administer French commercial law. As however their scheme is silent on this point, it may be prudent to keep that suggestion up our sleeve, as it may enable us to put it forward eventually as a concession in case some bargaining on connected points becomes necessary.

9. *Limitation to be imposed on the Powers of the Municipal Authority.*

If the municipal authority is, as I have suggested (above, under 2), to be supreme within the municipal territory in all things except those specifically exempted, it becomes important to set down with the utmost care the list of excepted matters. I would suggest the following:—

(1.) All treaties and conventions at present in force between the Sultan and the Powers must be respected, provisions of the treaties being held to override any contrary municipal enactments or decisions. This will, among other things, cover the maintenance of the State bank.

(2.) Even should at any time the existing treaty stipulations respecting the absolute equality of all nations in matters of trade and industry be abrogated, the municipal authority must remain precluded from departing from the principle of international equality in all matters under its jurisdiction.

(3.) The municipality shall have no power to raise or keep up any military or naval forces, or to allow the erection of any fortifications or military works, provided always that it shall be free to employ such police force as may be required.

(4.) There must be freedom for the exercise of all religions.

(5.) It is a question whether anything should be said about slavery. It would probably create considerable confusion and trouble with the French and Spanish zones if at any time slavery were made illegal within the municipality when it remained lawful in the rest of Morocco. From this point of view it would seem just that the municipal authority should be debarred from decreeing such a step, except after coming to an agreement with the neighbouring French and Spanish protectorates.

On the other hand, it is possible that if, at some future day, an enlightened public opinion in the municipality were to become convinced of the feasibility of abolishing slavery gradually (as has been done in Zanzibar), whilst no such movement made itself felt in the French and Spanish zones, where the general condition of the population will always be somewhat different, it would then be felt to be an irksome restriction that France and Spain should be able to veto a liberation policy in the municipal territory.

On the whole, I would recommend not including the abolition of slavery among the questions removed from the competency of the municpal authority.

(6.) There are, lastly, a number of subjects in regard to which it is desirable that the largest possible measure of uniformity should prevail in all parts of the present Moorish Empire. Of these the most important is the customs tariff, which is already fixed by the treaties. Other subjects are: post and telegraph administration, coinage, and the laws relating to the tenure of land. It might therefore perhaps be stipulated that, as regards these several matters, the municipality should not legislate without previous agreement with the French and Spanish protectorate authorities.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, March 13, 1912.

[11121] No. 100.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, March* 14, 1912.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs handed this morning to French Ambassador and myself Spanish reply to French territorial demands explained in my despatch No. 27 of the 19th February.

It gives France left bank of the River Uarga east as far as confluence with River Asra. In exchange Spain presses for extension of eastern end of her northern zone so as to include portions of the Riff tribes lying to south of frontier drawn in 1904, This exchange of territory is regarded by Spain as a mere rectification of frontier, and not as compensation due to France, which must be taken exclusively from southern Spanish zone. In latter region Spain offers to cede only hinterland, keeping coast for herself. Minister for Foreign Affairs added, however, he was personally not opposed to cession of a portion of the coast as well if France insisted, but in that case Spain could only yield strip of the coast lying between point a little to the south of Ifni and southern point of French zone.

French Ambassador seemed to think proposed rectification in north not unreasonable, but he thought that French Government would reject as entirely inadequate offer made by Spain in southern zone.

(Sent to Paris.)

[7993] No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 14, 1912.

I HAVE received and read with great interest Sir R. Lister's despatch No. 27 of the 17th ultimo, enclosing a draft scheme for the municipality of Tangier, drawn up by him with your assistance.

I appreciate very highly the care and skill with which this draft has been prepared, and the completeness of its provisions for ensuring a genuine internationalisation of Tangier. I consider that this scheme provides an excellent basis for the discussions which I can now take up with the French Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[11238] No. 102.

Memorandum communicated to M. Cambon, March 15, 1912.

TANGIER MUNICIPALITY.

1. *Mode of setting up the Municipality.*

IN order that the municipality should have a good and secure title, it must be established in virtue of a convention between the Sultan of Morocco and the treaty Powers represented at Tangier. All the essentials of the scheme must be covered by the convention or by a Shereefian decree annexed thereto as an integral part of it.

2. *Powers of the Municipality.*

The only way in which the rights and duties of the municipality can be satisfactorily defined is to declare its authority to be supreme and unfettered, except in so far as the convention otherwise provides. Failing such a comprehensive delegation of powers, there would be a grave risk of future conflicts with the Sultan, on the one hand, and with the treaty Powers on the other.

3. *Area.*

The municipal territory should comprise, besides the town and harbour of Tangier proper, so much of the surrounding district—but no more—as would allow, within reasonable limits, for future growth and development. It should include the sources of the water supply and of the natural market produce required for the sustenance of the population. These purposes would, it is believed, be served by a radius of 15 kilometres, it being understood that local deviations of the boundary are arranged to meet the above requirements, where necessary, any extensions in one direction being compensated by drawing in the line at other points. (The water supply comes from a distance of 19 kilometres.)

4. *Machinery of Government.*

The composition of the governing body (Municipal Council) should reflect, on the one hand, the equality of all the Powers, including for this purpose Morocco itself, and, on the other, the relative importance of the local residents and interests to be represented. These requirements would be equitably met by an arrangement by which each of the eleven governments having a diplomatic Representative at Tangier, and the Makhzen, were to nominate one member—who should never be an official or employé of the legation or consulate—to sit in a council of 24, the 12 remaining members of which would be freely elected, with a proviso that not more than two of the elected members should belong to the same nationality.

The council would elect its own chairman, who would have a casting vote in any question on which the members were evenly divided. In other respects it would be well to leave the council free to make its own rules and arrangements for carrying on the work of the municipality (" Règlement intérieur ").

A general supervision in all political questions and important matters of legislation would be exercised by a Committee of Control consisting of the Representatives of the Powers at Tangier. The decisions of this Committee of Control would be taken by a majority of votes.

5. *Franchise, Elections, &c.*

The right to exercise the franchise should be made to depend on a suitable residential qualification and assessment to the "urban tax" to a substantial amount, say 120 pesetas a-month, but the exact figure might be left open to be eventually agreed upon among the diplomatic Representatives at Tangier. In the same way, the method of election, duration of the mandates, and the languages to be permitted in debate are questions that need not be decided at this stage.

6. *Revenues.*

The municipality must have full powers to levy rates and taxes and contract loans. The collection and appropriation of all existing taxes hitherto levied by the Makhzen should be transferred to the municipal authority. Special arrangements will have to be made regarding the customs, and the yield of government monopolies, which are at present pledged for the service of certain loans. In any case, a sum representing a reasonable proportion of the revenue from customs and monopolies should annually fall into the municipal treasury. And it should be clearly understood that except as regards charges under these two heads, no government taxes shall be levied in the municipal territory on behalf of the Makhzen. It will have to be part of the detailed settlement to be eventually agreed upon between the diplomatic Representatives at Tangier and the Sultan, that the fiscal resources at the disposal of the municipality are adequate for the purposes of an efficient administration.

7. *Public Works.*

Contracts for public works will continue to be governed by the stipulations of the Algeciras Act and the provisions of the General Adjudication Rules framed in pursuance

to article 110 of that Act. The "Commission générale des Adjudications et des Marchés" instituted under article 4 of those Rules should, so far as the municipality is concerned, be replaced by a committee or sub-committee of the Municipal Council to be appointed for this purpose.

8. *Judicial Arrangements.*

Pending a general judicial reorganisation, such as may have to be carried out *pari passu* with the changes contemplated for the rest of Morocco under the Franco-German convention of the 4th November, 1911, the existing tribunals in the municipal territory should provisionally continue on their present basis. A special court will however have to be set up at once in order to hear cases brought against the municipality. Such court might consist of three consular judges and two assessors, to be appointed according to a list annually drawn up by the diplomatic body at Tangier in consultation with the Makhzen. Appeals would lie to the Federal Court at Lausanne.

In the case of actions brought by the municipality, the latter would have to take proceedings before whatever would be the competent court in each particular case.

9. *Limitations to be imposed on the Powers of the Municipal Council.*

The general authority of the municipality within the municipal territory must remain subject to the following limitations:—

(i.) All treaties and conventions applicable to Tangier, which are at present in force between the Sultan and the Powers, must be respected, provisions of such treaties being held to override any contrary municipal enactments or decisions.

(ii.) Even should, at any time, the existing treaty stipulations respecting the absolute equality of all the treaty Powers in matters of trade and industry be abrogated, the Municipal Authority must remain precluded from departing from the principle of international equality in all matters under its jurisdiction.

(iii.) The municipality shall have no power to erect or allow to be erected any fortifications or military works of any kind, nor to raise or keep up any military or naval forces, provided always that it shall be free to organise and employ such purely police forces as may be required for the maintenance of order.

(iv.) There must be freedom for the exercise of all religions.

(v.) There are, lastly, a number of questions in regard to which it is desirable that the largest possible amount of uniformity should prevail in all parts of Morocco. Of these, the most important is the customs tariff, which is already fixed by treaty. Other subjects of this kind are:

Posts and telegraphs;
Coinage;
Land Regulations.

As regards these several matters, the Municipal Council should not legislate without previous agreement with the authorities representing the Sultan in the French and Spanish zones.

E. A. C.

Foreign Office, March 14, 1912.

[11297] No. 103.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 45.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 7, 1912.

WITH reference to Sir R. Lister's despatch No. 19 of the 3rd ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mogador, reporting that Kaïd Hajji has abolished the road dues formerly levied by him, and that Kaïd Guellouli has abolished those between Mogador and Agadir.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 103.

Vice-Consul Johnstone to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Mogador, February* 28, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 3 of the 29th ultimo, in which I reported the abolition of road-dues by Kaïds Anfluss and Khuban, I have the honour to report that Kaïd Hajji has also abolished the road dues formerly levied by him, and at last Kaïd Guellouli has abolished the road dues between Mogador and Agadir, as far as they concerned him, but has raised the dues at Agadir. However, the tolls to be paid on merchandise transported between Mogador and the Southern "Sus" country are now infinitesimal as compared with those formerly demanded.

I have, &c.
H. B. JOHNSTONE.

[11298] No. 104.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 46.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 6, 1912.

THE Spanish Minister informed me yesterday that he had lately been much preoccupied with the question of the future position in Tangier. It would entirely meet his views were it to become purely international in fact as well as in name, but he had grave doubts as to whether this could be obtained, as the French had already created for themselves too strong a position here. Not only will the Makhzen officials be mere tools in their hands, but they will also practically control the situation through the State Bank, the Contrôle de la Dette, the Public Works Department, and the Tobacco Monopoly. The State Bank, besides its special position in other respects, derives considerable power through its ability to manipulate the rate of exchange; the Contrôle de la Dette not only controls the customs and other taxes, but also have the management of the port service and the control of all Government lands; the Tobacco Monopoly maintains a private service of armed guards to prevent smuggling. If these institutions are to retain their powers here intact the internationalisation of Tangier would, M. de Villasinda considered, be a fiction, and this district would become a source of trouble, and even of danger, to Spain. He was therefore of opinion that some arrangement should be come to for curtailing the powers of these bodies, and for establishing complete international control over all departments in the Tangier district. The municipality should, at any rate, be enabled to take over the rights and powers of the Contrôle de la Dette.

M. de Villasinda added that the extent of territory to be assigned to Tangier must depend in great measure upon the degree of internationalisation. He was in favour of a fairly extensive zone if it was to be genuinely international, but if French influence was to predominate he would wish to have the zone as restricted as possible. He showed me a copy of the Spanish staff map of 1906, embracing the north-west corner of Morocco down to the level of Arzila and Tetuan, on which had been marked out the proposed Tangier zone, the boundaries being formed by "Wad Mharhar," "Wad-el-Kebir," and the smaller streams to a junction with the head waters of the river marked as "Wad Liaan" at his mouth and "Wad Haddad" and "Wad-el-Fraza" in its highest reaches, which river formed the eastern boundary. In answer to his enquiry I said that personally I was of opinion that Tangier should be assigned a fairly wide district which should at least embrace the whole of the "Fahs" and the immediately adjoining portion of Anjera, the people of which frequent this market. This would correspond practically to the zone as marked on the map M. de Villasinda showed me.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[11299] No. 105.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 47.)
Tangier, March 7, 1912.

Sir,

THE Spanish and Dutch Ministers have spoken to me on the subject of the tendency recently shown by the Makhzen to make purchases by private contract without reference to the Commission des Adjudications. The question was formally brought to the notice of the diplomatic body by the Spanish Minister on the purchase by the Makhzen of printing presses, &c., from the "Imprimerie marocaine," with the object of establishing a Government printing press and publishing an official journal, and it was decided to await Sid-el-Mokri's arrival here and request him to furnish explanations on the subject. A more recent case is the laying of a telegraph-wire from Tangier to Fez. The work has been entrusted to the Makhzen wireless telegraph department, which has an entirely French staff, who purchased a number of telegraph poles in Marseilles, and presumably intend to continue purchasing poles, wire, apparatus, &c., as required, by private contract.

M. de Villasinda and M. de Rappard hold that the Makhzen are bound to purchase all "fournitures d'État," however small the value may be, through the Commission des Adjudications, and the point will doubtless come up for discussion shortly, when a decision will have to be arrived at.

The only article in the Algeciras Act which refers to "fournitures d'État" is the 107th, wherein it is provided that: "La validité des concessions . . . . pour les fournitures d'État sera subordonnée au principe de l'adjudication publique . . . . pour toutes les matières qui, conformément aux règles suivies dans les législations étrangères, en comportent l'application." The concluding portion of this article introduces an element of uncertainty as to the cases in which the principle of adjudication should be applied. Unfortunately, the regulations made under article 110 of the Act do not make this point quite clear. Article 3 of the "Règlement sur les Adjudications générales" stipulates that: "Toutes les adjudications et tous les marchés des travaux, fournitures et transports mentionnés dans les cas prévus à l'article 1er sont soumis aux règles édictées par le règlement sur les adjudications de la Caisse spéciale," but article 1 merely refers to "travaux publics," and does not mention "fournitures d'État." The second paragraph of article 3, however, apparently implies that no "fournitures," except produce of Morocco, can be purchased by the Moorish Government without the intermediary of the Adjudication Commission.

M. de Rappard observes that it would be dangerous to admit the principle that goods below a certain value could be purchased by the Makhzen direct, as in many cases it would be possible to purchase small quantities at a time, although the total amount required may be large.

I should be grateful if I could be furnished with your views on this point, for my guidance when the matter is discussed.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[11300] No. 106.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 48.)
Tangier, March 9, 1912.

Sir,

M. REGNAULT arrived at Tangier on the 5th instant, and Sid-el-Mokri on the following day, being conveyed from Gibraltar in a French man-of-war. M. Regnault expects to start for Fez on the 15th instant, and will be accompanied by a somewhat large staff, including M. de Billy, M. Gaston Boulogne, conseiller de Gouvernement, who occupies a high position in the Public Works Department in Algeria; M. E. Bertrand, Minister Plenipotentiary, who has had a large experience of consular work in Oriental countries; and M. Max Choublier, who is an authority on questions of Mussulman law. Dr. Weissgerber, a correspondent of the "Temps," who has made a special study of this country, accompanies the mission as doctor. General Moinier left Casa Blanca on the 3rd instant for Rabat, with the intention of joining the mission *en route*, so it is probable that M. Regnault will enter Fez with an escort of French troops as well as the Moorish cavalry sent by the Sultan.

Sid-el-Mokri told me he would start for Fez before the French mission so as to be at Fez to welcome M. Regnault on his arrival.

Upon receipt of Mr. Consul MacLeod's radiogram foreshadowing strong opposition on the part of the Sultan to a treaty establishing a protectorate, I called on M. Regnault with a view to ascertaining whether he anticipated any trouble. Unfortunately M. Regnault was engaged, so I saw the second secretary, who informed me that it was anticipated that the mission would soon conclude its business and return to Tangier; no opposition was expected, as the general principles of the treaty had been discussed with the Grand Vizier at Paris. I did not mention the report I had received from Mr. MacLeod.

Yesterday afternoon, when calling on Sid-el-Mokri, I was surprised to learn from him that he was ignorant of the terms of the treaty to be submitted to the Sultan, which, he said, had not been discussed with him at Paris. The Vizier did not, however, appear to anticipate that M. Regnault would have any difficulty on the subject with Mulai Hafid, who, he implied, would have to accept the terms, whether he liked them or not.

This morning I took an opportunity of seeing M. Regnault, who confirmed what the Vizier had told me. I observed that I understood that the Sultan was not now to be asked to sign a treaty establishing a protectorate, but some agreement of a less explicit character. M. Regnault smiled, and said it would establish a protectorate. He did not, however, appear to expect that full force would be given to it until the negotiations with Spain were concluded and an agreement come to regarding the internationalisation of Tangier. I enquired whether this latter question would be discussed by the foreign representatives here, but he seemed opposed to that course being followed, and said that his Government wished to come to an agreement on the subject with His Majesty's Government in the first instance and then submit it to the approval of the Spanish Government.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[11301] No. 107.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 16.)

(No. 49.)
Tangier, March 9, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir R. Lister's despatch No. 10 of the 14th January, I have the honour to report that Mr. Consul MacLeod having informed me a little time since that his French colleague had not received any instructions as to the dismissal of Hadj Driss Wold Mennou, the Basha of Marrakesh, I mentioned the matter to M. de Billy, who replied that he had left the matter to be dealt with by M. Regnault on his mission to Fez. M. Regnault was to suggest a scheme for the reorganisation of the Government in the southern provinces, and Hadj Driss's dismissal would then be brought about.

Hadj Driss, being probably aware of the uncertainty of his tenure of office, is in the meantime exacting as much as he possibly can from those under his jurisdiction, and is sending large sums to the Sultan with a view to retaining His Majesty's favour.

Mulai Hafid is also receiving contributions from other sources in the south. Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox reports that a son of His Majesty, a lad of about 9 years old, left Marrakesh for Fez last month, taking with him 100,000 dollars received from the various kaïds. The Kaïd of Mesfiwa has also been ordered to remit 35,000 dollars to the Sultan, a Government official having been sent to enforce payment. His Majesty evidently sees the time approaching when his power of exacting contributions will be limited, and is anxious to make the most of his opportunities.

Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox reports that land speculation has become very active in Marrakesh, Kaïd Driss Wold Mennou setting the example; other Moorish officials and some French companies are also buying up gardens in and near the town. The price of land in the district has consequently risen very considerably.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[11441] No. 108.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, March 16, 1912.*

CASA BLANCA port works.

Hearing yesterday that a meeting of the adjudication commission was to be held to-day to award contract for construction of jetty, quay, and terreplein, for which tenders were to be received from three French firms, I saw president of commission and French Minister, and explained that this was contrary to agreement.

French Minister showed me this morning telegram received from his Government on 21st February, in which three lots which His Majesty's Government agreed could be awarded without formal adjudication were given as—

1. Concrete blocks to cost about 30,000 fr.
2. Construction of jetty, quay, and terreplein to cost about 1,000,000 fr.
3. Works in reinforced cement to cost about 400,000 fr.

I pointed out that these were not three lots in regard to which we had given our consent, and I referred him to letter of French chargé d'affaires, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 44. I said that His Majesty's Government had agreed to preparatory works being given out at once without adjudication, but had expressly stipulated that remaining works should be submitted to adjudication, and I showed him your letter of 19th February to French Ambassador.

French Minister said that there was evidently a misunderstanding, and that meeting of adjudication commission would be postponed to 21st March, so as to enable us to refer to our respective Governments.

[11573] No. 109.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 136.)
Sir, *Paris, March 16, 1912.*

I HAD the honour to transmit to you in my despatch No. 135 of yesterday's date the declaration of French policy in Morocco and foreign policy generally made by M. Poincaré in the Chamber of Deputies. M. Poincaré's object was to forestall M. Jaurès and other deputies who had announced their intention of speaking, and to render it unnecessary for MM. Briand, Cruppi, and Caillaux to answer the allegations and charges brought against them, which it was considered would only increase the unfortunate impression of division and internal controversy in the eyes of Europe.

The Ministers in question were understood to have agreed for the present to leave their case in his hands, and none of them showed any disposition to speak during yesterday's sitting. Private members, however, refused to let the discussion drop. M. Deschanel made a long speech, which was listened to with impatience by the Chamber, a fact which appeared to irritate him to such an extent that he abruptly ended his speech, observing that the Chamber did not seem inclined to listen, and that an interruption which he had just heard to the effect that the Chamber wanted to hear "the explanations of the guilty parties" appeared to resume the general sense of the House, and that he would therefore leave the tribune.

His place was taken by M. Delahaye, a member of the Right, who made an attack of unexampled violence on M. Caillaux for negotiating the "shameful treaty," and was called to order by the president of the Chamber.

M. Violette then gave a long account of the N'Goko Sangha affair, and defended the commission of 1910 for its action in refusing an indemnity to that company—an action which was alleged to have indirectly brought about the crisis with Germany over the Moroccan question.

M. Jaurès followed M. Violette in the tribune. He protested against the attempt made by M. Poincaré to evade a debate which would have established the responsibility of former Ministers for the policy followed by them. He gained the ear of the House at once by witticisms at the expense of M. Poincaré and his readiness to take on his shoulders the faults of his predecessors. *Agnus Dei qui tollit peccata mundi*, he said,

amidst the laughter of the House. "J'admire," he continued, "les Ministres qui immolent sur l'autel de la patrie les griefs qu'elle a contre eux."

Much of M. Jaurès' speech was devoted to establishing a connection between the obscure negotiations connected with the N'Goko Sangha and other affairs and the crisis with Germany. M. Pichon seemed to have finally turned his eyes towards the Congo and to have let matters go from bad to worse in Morocco. All the Sultan's resources were taken for the service of the loans; he could not pay his troops, who took to pillaging the tribes, and M. Pichon did nothing but let the abscess grow. M. Cruppi and M. Caillaux, by their communications with unofficial agents, financiers, &c., whetted the appetite of Germany for compensations. These persons went back to Berlin saying: "Ne vous impatientez pas; ne vous alarmez pas des progrès que les Français font au Maroc. Nous avons des compensations sérieuses. Des Ministres en activité dans le Cabinet" (viz., the Monis Cabinet), "MM. Cruppi et Caillaux, nous ont donné mandat: nous étudions au Congo une grande opération qui donnera à l'Allemagne une admirable force économique, qui lui donnera bientôt une grande force politique." By June of last year it became evident that none of these schemes were practicable. M. Cruppi knew by then "que la grande pensée de son règne avait croulé." All these negotiations, however, and their failure had left a bitterness in the mind of Germany which led to the brutal coup of Agadir.

M. Jaurès went into the question of the dispatch of French and British ships to Agadir, which, he declared, was not favoured by M. Caillaux (President of the Council) nor by M. Delcassé (Minister of Marine). M. de Selves, however, forced their hand by suggesting to the British Government the possibility of sending ships.

Many other questions connected with the negotiations were touched upon by M. Jaurès, who was unable to finish his speech. At a late hour the Chamber decided that the debate on foreign affairs should be adjourned until the 22nd instant.

For the last two months a bewildering mass of accusations and denunciations has descended on M. Caillaux' head. According to one of the speakers in yesterday's debate (M. Delahaye), M. Caillaux walks about the lobbies saying: "C'est idiot. C'est idiot."

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[11514] No. 110.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, March 17, 1912.*

FRENCH Ambassador informed Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday that the Spanish reply to the French territorial demands had been received by the French Government with painful surprise. It was entirely inadequate, and French Government hoped that it would be reconsidered. Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to consult Cabinet without delay.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has just called to ask my views on the delicate situation which has arisen? I said that it was not surprising to me that the offer of a barren inland region without any coast should have been regarded in Paris as insufficient. It would be for the Spanish Government to consider how much of the coast they would be prepared to surrender in the interest of a peaceful settlement with France. I did not suppose that this coast was of any real value to Spain, or that she could easily patrol it. He admitted that it was chiefly a question of sentiment, adding, however, that there would be great outcry in the Canary Islands if France were allowed to establish herself on the opposite coast.

As regards northern zone he repeated that nothing would induce Spain to surrender right bank of the [?] River Uarga. In that region Spain would not budge another inch. She would prefer rupture with all its possible consequences. I said that everything pointed to the necessity of her making ample concessions in the south.

From conversations with French Ambassador, I am led to think that French Government might be satisfied with an offer of entire coast with the hinterland south from Wady Mesa to Wady Dra, and that Ifni, with a radius of a few kilometres, might be left to Spain, if necessary as an enclave in the French zone thus extended. Minister for Foreign Affairs is telegraphing fully to the Spanish Ambassador in London, who will probably consult you on the question of compensation to France.

(Confidential.)

French Ambassador has also been to see me this morning. He thinks that a little wholesome advice from you to the Spanish Ambassador would be [?] very useful at the present moment, and that it would also conduce to a settlement if you thought fit to intimate clearly to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that if satisfaction is given in the south it would be unreasonable to break off the negotiations on the ground that Spain refused to make further concessions in the north. French Ambassador thinks that friendly counsels are as much needed on one side as on the other.

(Sent to Paris.)

[11709] No. 111.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, March 18, 1912.*

M. CAMBON came to see me this morning with a message from French Minister for Foreign Affairs to say that he wished to see me on a pressing matter, but owing to business in the Chamber he would not be able to receive me before this evening or to-morrow morning. His object, so M. Cambon explained, is to put before His Majesty's Government for their [?] favourable consideration the following circumstances :—

1,200*l.* has been spent out of Shawia indemnity fund of 100,000*l.*, which is the absolute property of the French Government, on blocks for jetty at Casa Blanca. These blocks will not serve to create the temporary accommodation so urgently required and demanded by commerce without further expenditure of 56,000*l.*, which the French Government propose to give out of the Shawia indemnity. British chargé d'affaires does not consider that he is authorised to agree by contingent consent given by His Majesty's Government to execution of works at Casa Blanca without adjudication. French Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes that you will give the requisite authority, so that it may be communicated to the committee, which meets at Tangier on Thursday next. Minister for Foreign Affairs' point is that the money to be used is an absolute gift from the French Government.

[11514] No. 112.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, March 18, 1912.*

SIR M. DE BUNSEN'S No. 16 of 17th March.

Spanish Ambassador has spoken to me urgently about this. I have told him frankly that Spain ought to offer more in the south if she is to keep what she wants in the north of Morocco. Ambassador said he would report this opinion to his Government; he doubted whether Spanish Government could sacrifice coast in the south opposite Canaries, and was sure she could offer no more in the north. I urged that possession of islands would depend in war so entirely on size of fleet that it was not affected by possession of coast opposite. Spanish Ambassador emphasised difficulty of Spain taking next step in negotiations to enlarge her offer. I would suggest that French Government should continue negotiations by asking what they think essential in the south, and being as moderate as possible as regards the north. You should inform French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Madrid.)

[11756] No. 113.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 41.) *Madrid, March 15, 1912.*

Sir,

MY telegram No. 14 of yesterday gives the upshot of the Spanish reply to the French demands for territorial compensation in Morocco, which was handed to the

French Ambassador and myself at a further conference with Señor Garcia Prieto yesterday morning. I now have the honour to forward a translation of this document. The maps in my possession do not show very clearly the extent of the new Spanish proposals, but their general purport is clear. They fall into two parts.

1. A rectification of the southern boundary of the Spanish northern zone. France having demanded the whole basin of the Uarga, the principal northern affluent of the Sebu, Spain surrenders so much of her zone, defined by the 1904 convention, as lies to the south of the Uarga along that portion of its course which most closely approaches Fez. In exchange she asks France to surrender a strip of the French zone in the neighbourhood of the left bank of the Muluya.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs explained that this part of his proposals was to be regarded as a mere rectification of the frontier line in question. It formed no part of the territorial contribution which France demanded. That would be taken entirely from the Southern Spanish zone.

He said the whole of the French demands had been very carefully considered. The experts, who had been consulted, did not admit the French contention that a rectification of the 1904 line was necessary in view of certain newly-discovered facts with regard to the geographical features of the region in question. The main features of the country had been made known by the work of M. de Segonzao, published a year before the convention of 1904 was signed. It was perfectly recognised in 1904 that the Uarga was an affluent of the Sebu, and that the region through which it passed was fertile and easily accessible. In full possession of this knowledge, M. Delcassé had drawn the said frontier line on a map which formed an integral part of the convention. It deprived Spain of a considerable portion of the zone to which she laid claim at that time. Spain, nevertheless, accepted it under French pressure. But she always regarded it as a line drawn by the French Government itself to suit the requirement of France, and not subject, therefore, to modification to the further detriment of Spain. The demand for the cession of the Uarga basin had been received by the Spanish Government with painful surprise. They desired, however, to meet French wishes as far as they could, and they were now prepared to accept the extension of the French zone northwards up to the left bank of the Uarga. Further than this they could not go, for, if Spain was entirely excluded from the Uarga valley, she would not only be deprived of one of the few fertile regions in her zone, but her strategic position would be materially weakened. His Excellency explained that it was only by taking the route of this valley that the armed forces of Spain could attack the Riff tribes from the south. Spain was therefore compelled to retain the right bank of the Uarga, and without it the remainder of her northern zone would hardly be worth keeping.

In return for the above concession, Spain demands a strip of the French zone lying to the west of the Muluya and to the south of the eastern extremity of the Spanish zone. The latter would thus be made to embrace an important fraction of the Buyazi and Mtalsa tribes now lying beyond Spanish control.

M. Geoffray offered no observations on this part of the Spanish proposals.

2. The territorial compensation offered by Spain for the sacrifices made by France in her colony of the Congo consists of a portion of the hinterland of the Spanish southern zone, namely, a broad strip of territory lying to the north of the Wady Dra and to the east of its northern affluent Wady Ymi Ugadir.

M. Geoffray remarked that the regions comprised within the indicated limits were believed to be worthless. The Spanish proposition would do little to advance matters. It would certainly cause disappointment at Paris. Señor Garcia replied that as spokesman of the Council of Ministers he could not extend his offer. Personally, if France could not be persuaded to accept it, he would not be opposed to including within the French zone a strip of coast extending from a point lying a short distance to the north of Ifni to Wady Massa, which formed the southern limit of the French zone according to the 1904 convention. The hinterland ceded to France would thus have a direct outlet to the sea. He asked M. Geoffray to bear in mind that he had no authority to make any such proposal.

I drove away from the Ministry of State with the French Ambassador, who told me that he considered the Spanish offer to be entirely inadequate, even including the portion of coast-line mentioned by the Foreign Minister.

I may mention that Señor Garcia Prieto paid me a long visit the evening before the interview related above. He read to me the full statement he had made to the Council of Ministers on the 10th instant. It was on one or two points slightly more advantageous to France than the offer actually sanctioned by the Council. He asked

me what I thought of the offer as finally drafted. I said that I felt sure that France would reject any settlement which did not include the cession of a portion of the coast of the Spanish Southern zone. I thought it would be much better to let the French Ambassador know at once that the Spanish Government would be inclined to offer, if pressed, an outlet to the sea. He thanked me for the suggestion, and said he would consider if he could say anything in the sense I had indicated, as coming from himself. This he subsequently did, as reported above. I urged further that he should not lead M. Geoffray to think that the Spanish proposals were incapable of enlargement. Otherwise, I said that I feared that they were not calculated to satisfy the expectations of M. Poincaré. Señor Garcia Prieto said it would be difficult to persuade the Council of Ministers to make further concessions. They had been impressed by recent demonstrations on the part of the population of the Canary Islands, which strongly objected to a French occupation of the opposite coast. I said that, for my part, I thought the coast in question would prove a useless possession to Spain, especially in view of the freedom of fishery rights reserved under the Franco-Germany treaty to all alike. If satisfactory arrangements could be made as regards the northern zone, it seemed to me that Spain could yield something more than she seemed as yet disposed to do in the southern zone.

His Excellency said that, as regarded the northern zone, he could tell me positively that rather than surrender the right bank of the Uarga the Government would break off the negotiation and face the doubtful and dangerous situation which might thus be created by no fault of their own.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 113.

Spanish Reply to French Territorial Demands.

(Translation.)

THE line of demarcation in the north shall start from the mouth of the Muluya in the Mediterranean and follow the thalweg of that river until its confluence with the Za ; thence it shall go as directly as possible to the point of intersection of longitude 0° 35′ east of Madrid with the parallel of latitude north 34° 30′, and shall continue along the latter until it crosses the Uady Asru, and shall follow the thalweg thereof until its source. Thence it shall go along the line dividing the basins of the Kert and Uarga and Ynauen to the source of the last right-hand tributary of the Ued Aim, and, as directly as possible, to the confluence of the Uarga and Asra, and shall follow the thalweg of the first-named river until its intersection of the line fixed by the agreement of 1904.

The manifest disadvantage to Spain from the military point of view of abandoning one of the banks of the Uarga will be diminished in a measure if France will allow the passage of convoys of provisions from Laraiche to Alcazar through her zone to the rest of the Spanish sphere of influence.

In the south the line of demarcation, starting from the intersection of longitude 11° east of Paris with the Wady Dra, shall follow in a westerly direction the thalweg of that river until its confluence with the Wady Ymi Ugadir, which it shall follow up to its source. Thence it shall proceed as directly as possible to longitude 11° east of Paris, and shall continue along the said meridian until it meets the boundary hitherto fixed.

[11812] No. 114.

Count Metternich to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *German Embassy, March* 16, 1912.

UNDER instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that the ratifications of the Franco-German Agreement of the 4th November, 1911, respecting Morocco were exchanged at Paris on the 12th March last.

I have, &c.
P. METTERNICH.

[11724] No. 115.

Sir F Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, March* 18, 1912.

CASA BLANCA.

I showed to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs this evening my telegram No. 45 of to-day to you. He said that it correctly represented communication which he intended to make to me, and that he had nothing to add to it.

[11725] No. 116.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 47. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, March* 18, 1912.

FRENCH Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to me this evening on the subject of the Morocco negotiations with Spain. He hopes that you will urge moderation on the Spanish Government, for at present they are intractable. His Excellency says that the French Government have made great concessions to Spain in the question of finance and customs, and they have gone beyond their treaty obligations with a view to giving satisfaction to Spain, but the Spanish Government offer only practically valueless territory in the south as compensation for advantages obtained by Spain through French sacrifices, and ask for counter-compensations from France for slight variations in Spanish zone's boundaries in the north. They are particularly intractable in rrgard to territory in the valley of the Ouerga, which it would be impossible foe them to police and administer if it were assigned to them.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that it is important for all concerned that negotiations should be concluded as soon as possible, and he hopes that you will give him your assistance to that end.

French Ambassador will return to London on Wednesday, I believe.

[11802] No. 117.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, March* 18, 1912.

FRENCH Ambassador has received telegram from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs stating categorically that the French Government will not be satisfied with concessions by Spain, however large, in the southern Spanish zone, and must insist on the surrender of the entire basin of the Uarga, in addition to concessions in the south.

French Ambassador agrees with me in thinking it probable that Spain will prefer rupture to giving up the right of [?] cultivation on all the Uarga. Minister for Foreign Affairs has held to both of us very strong language on this point. King of Spain, all the military authorities, and leaders of the Opposition groups support him in refusing to yield further in the northern zone.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs states that he is instructing the French Ambassador in London to place the matter fully before you.

I trust that my despatch No. 41 and my telegram No. 16 of 17th March sufficiently explained the situation.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[11892] No. 118.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, March 19, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Fez :—

"At drill this morning French instructor of Moorish troops, Lieutenant Guyas, was shot dead by Filali recruit. French say assassin mad. Moors currently report that deceased officer had been striking assassin, but circumstances so far as yet learnt point to inexactness of this."

[11709] No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 119.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 45 of 18th March (see Mr. White's telegram No. 20 of 16th March).

For the reasons fully explained in my note to M. Cambon of 12th February, His Majesty's Government cannot consent to put aside entirely the important principle of adjudication solemnly guaranteed by treaties. They have already, out of consideration for the French Government, agreed to waive their rights as regards those portions of the works at Casa Blanca which are really urgent. These comprise, according to Sir R. Lister's reports, (1) installation of plant ; (2) preparation of blocks of masonry ; (3) construction of caissons of reinforced cement.

I am unable to see that there is any reason for departing from the principle of adjudication in regard to the rest of the works, or that any inconvenience will be caused thereby, and I therefore feel that in justice to British interests I could not defend any further infringement of so important a treaty right.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 12.)

[12181] No. 120.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Madrid, March 17, 1912.*

AS reported in my telegram No. 15 of the 16th March, I have received a visit from M. Guiot, representative of the French holders of the 1904 and 1910 loans to Morocco and member of the Mixed Commission now sitting in Madrid. M. Guiot was good enough to give me an outline of the proceedings before the Mixed Commission up to the present time.

The Customs question has formed a principal part of the deliberations. Though he has himself advocated a settlement on the lines desired by Spain, M. Guiot still thinks that it is impossible to vary the security on which the loans were made without producing a situation which will not be strictly legal. Moreover, he thinks that it is evident that any departure from the strict terms of the engagements under which the loans were issued is calculated to diminish the confidence of the general public in the advertised terms of future loans, which it will regard as being equally subject to modification for some political reason. In accordance, nevertheless, with their general instructions, the French commissioners have treated the matter apart from strictly legal considerations and in a spirit of compromise. They have, in short, accepted with slight modifications the proposal put forward by their Spanish colleagues on the commission. It is now practically settled that, though the Board of Control of the Public Debt of Morocco is maintained, its functions shall remain in abeyance at Laraiche and Tetuan from year to year, on punctual payment being made at a fixed date by the Spanish State of the whole amount annually required, in respect of those ports, for the service of the loans and French war indemnity.

The Mixed Commission has, moreover, adopted the principle that each zone shall profit by the duties paid on the goods destined to be consumed within its limits. Thus, for instance, the duty leviable on goods landed at Laraiche, a port in the Spanish zone, but assigned to Fez, a place in the French zone, accrues to the revenue of the latter

zone. Similarly, the duty leviable on goods landed at Casa Blanca for consumption at Alcazar accrues to the revenue of the Spanish zone. Goods landed in one zone for transmission to the other will not pay duty at the port of arrival, but will proceed to their destination in transit, accompanied by an *acquit à caution*, showing that the duty is still leviable. In order to carry out this system it becomes necessary, as explained by M. Guiot, to establish a French *ligne de contrôle* along the frontier dividing the zones. The officials placed on this line will levy the duty on goods crossing the frontier which have not yet paid it. Similarly, a Spanish line of control can be set up on the south side of the frontier line if necessary.

I remarked that the *ligne de contrôle* would not be easily distinguishable from a line of custom-houses. M. Guiot thought it was not quite the same thing. At all events, some inspection at the frontier would be indispensable, not only to levy duty on goods passing from one zone to the other, but to prevent the penetration into the French zone of the contraband articles (tobacco, explosives, arms, &c.), of which the Spanish zone would probably become a vast emporium.

The Mixed Commission is also dealing, I understand, with questions connected with coinage, the tobacco monopoly, the State bank, and other institutions.

M. Guiot added that he and his colleagues had proceeded on the assumption that questions relating to Tangier were entirely excluded from their purview. He did not consider personally that the arrangements made with a view to substituting the guarantee of the Spanish State for that of the custom-houses of Laraiche and Tetuan would be found applicable to the case of the Tangier custom-house. On the latter, he would himself be in favour of maintaining the existing Makhzen (that is, French) control in the interest of the loan holders. Any part of the Tangier Customs revenue remaining over after satisfying the service of the loans and French war indemnity would naturally, he thought, be available for municipal uses in Tangier. He referred only to revenue derived from goods destined to be consumed in Tangier itself. Goods destined to be consumed in the Spanish or French zone would, he presumed, pay duty only on entering those zones, and would yield nothing for the benefit of Tangier. But he said that most of the goods imported at Tangier would be for consumption within the town limits. Goods destined for the French zone would tend to be imported at Casa Blanca, so as to save cost of the longer land transit from Tangier.

M. Guiot explained, however, that the foregoing only represented his personal opinions. The Mixed Commission had not considered that its mandate included Tangier.

M. Guiot seemed to be sincerely desirous of bringing about a settlement which should satisfy Spain. I gathered from him that the proceedings in the Mixed Commission had been quite friendly. Almost daily meetings continue to be held.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[12098] No. 121.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 140.)
Sir, *Paris, March 20, 1912.*

AT an interview this evening with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, I explained to his Excellency the views of His Majesty's Government as set forth in your telegram No. 119 of yesterday's date regarding the principle of adjudication in connection with the Casa Blanca Port Works, and I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the memorandum on the subject which I gave to his Excellency.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 121.

Note communicated to M. Poincaré by Sir F. Bertie.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador has the honour to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he is in receipt of the reply of His Majesty's Government to the telegram which he addressed to them on the 18th instant respecting the Casa Blanca Port Works in consequence of the wish expressed to him by his Excellency through M. Paul Cambon.

His Majesty's Government, for reasons fully explained in Sir Edward Grey's note of the 12th ultimo to M. Cambon, cannot consent to put aside entirely the important principle of adjudication solemnly guaranteed by treaties. They have already out of consideration for the French Government agreed to waive their rights as regards those portions of the works at Casa Blanca which are really urgent. These works comprise, according to the reports received from His Majesty's representative at Tangier—

1. Installation of plant.
2. Preparation of blocks of masonry.
3. Construction of caissons of reinforced cement.

His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs does not consider that there is any reason for departing from the principle of adjudication in regard to the rest of the works or that any inconvenience will be caused thereby, and he therefore feels that in justice to British interests he could not defend any further infringements of so important a treaty right.

[12091] No. 122.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, March 20, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed French Ambassador and myself to-day that, in deference to the wishes of the French Government, the Spanish Government would amplify concession of territory already offered in southern Spanish zone by inclusion in it of about 90 kilom. of coast from Wady Mesa south. Concession would then amount to half of zone. In her northern zone they could make no further concession. French Ambassador said that he would forward the new proposal, but it would not satisfy the French Government. Meeting was quite friendly.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[12092] No. 123.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, March 20, 1912.*

CASA BLANCA port works.

State engineer informs me that contract for which three French firms are tendering provides for fine of 1,000 fr. per day if jetty is not completed by 15th September, the quays and 50 metres of terreplein adjoining by 1st March, 1913, and the rest of the terreplein by 1st July following. He declares that to afford shelter for lighters jetty must be completed, and that it will be impossible to effect this unless actual work be commenced within a month, which means preparations for work being made at once.

He explained that he had wished not to begin work until mole had been run out considerable distance, but that, in view of the great losses of merchants and steamship companies this winter and the pressing demands for shelter made to him in December, he decided to commence work at once, hoping that urgency would be admitted and contract be made without loss of time entailed by adjudication. Three firms he applied to were selected because they knew Casa Blanca and were at Paris, and could prepare tenders at once.

[12202] No. 124.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, March 21, 1912.*

IT is proposed to invite tenders for Tangier waterworks, with which will be combined tramway, electric light and power, and option for a stated term for gasworks. State engineer told me that he has everything ready, but before asking the adjudications committee to call for tenders, he wishes to know whether we approve of proceeding at once in the matter, or prefer leaving it for future municipality to deal with.

[12240] No. 125.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Madrid, March 18, 1912.*

THE French Ambassador had the goodness to read to me yesterday the telegraphic reply of the French Government to the Spanish proposals respecting rectification of the 1904 frontier between the French and the Northern Spanish zones, and territorial compensations in the Southern Spanish zone. It was brief and to the point. The demand of Spain for an extension of her zone southwards in the neighbourhood of the Muluya was inadmissible. Her offer to cede to the French zone a portion of the left bank of the Uarga was insufficient. Her idea that she could satisfy the French demand for compensation by surrendering a desert region in the interior of her southern zone was preposterous. She had obviously taken no account of the new and friendly spirit in which M. Poincaré had taken up the negotiation on his accession to office. An offer of a very different kind would be necessary if the negotiation was to proceed.

M. Geoffray told me that, after informing Señor Garcia Prieto on the evening of the 16th instant of the general purport of the above instruction, he had had a long conversation with his Excellency, during which he urged him, in the most friendly language, to face the delicate situation which had arisen by making a really serious proposal. If the Foreign Minister had any doubt on the subject, he advised him to take counsel in London, where M. Geoffray felt sure that the position was fully realised, and that advice would be tendered to the effect that some genuine and extensive concession to France was imperative. He pointed out that Spain had won the battle all along the line in the matter of the administrative independence of her zone. She owed this to the conciliatory disposition shown by M. Poincaré. It was not too much to ask that, in recognition of her debt of gratitude to M. Poincaré, she should take a broad view of the question and surrender a long stretch of coast as well as the desert hinterland to France. This was the only way of avoiding a rupture, or one of the inevitable results of which would be the retention by France of her control over the custom-houses in the Spanish zone, and the continuance and even increase of the heavy military burdens imposed upon Spain by the present unsettled condition of her zone.

Though M. Geoffray did not fail to mention to Señor Garcia Prieto that his Government still demanded further concessions in the north, I understand from him that he realised the uselessness of laying much stress on this part of the question in the face of the unmistakable determination of the Foreign Minister to retain for Spain at least the right bank of the Uarga.

Señor Garcia Prieto seems to have been impressed by the earnestness of M. Geoffray's language, for he came to see me at the embassy the following morning, and expressed the wish to learn from me what I thought of the situation. I said I knew from M. Geoffray that M. Poincaré had expected a much more ample response to the French demands than that which Señor Garcia Prieto had felt entitled to make; that I regretted that he had not expressed more clearly at our meeting on the 14th his personal readiness to concede a portion of the coast of the southern zone; that I thought very ample concessions on that coast would be necessary if a rupture was to be avoided; and that it seemed to me that Spain was exaggerating the sacrifice which would be entailed by the loss of a coast-line, which she had never occupied, which would be difficult to patrol if she kept it, and the possession of which by France would deprive Spain of no privilege which she at present enjoyed.

As already remarked in my telegram No. 16 of the 17th instant, it will be, in my opinion, very difficult for Spain to satisfy France in this region with any concession less than that of the entire Southern Spanish zone, including the coast, from Wady Mesa in the north to Wady Dra in the south. My impression on this point is derived from conversations with M. Geoffray.

Señor Garcia Prieto said he would place the matter again before the Council of Ministers immediately after the return of the King and Prime Minister from Alicante on the morning of the following day (the 18th March). It would be a difficult task to persuade the Cabinet to give up the coast opposite the Canary Islands, and he feared that Spain was near the end of her tether in the way of concessions. I pointed out that the coast nearest to the Canary Islands extended along the southern portion of the Spanish southern zone, beginning from a point considerably to the south of Ifni. The northern portion of the southern zone could not be accurately described as lying opposite the Canary group.

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Señor Garcia Prieto said he was instructing Señor Villa Urrutia by telegraph to explain to you in detail the very difficult position in which Spain was placed by the peremptory demands of France. He repeated with much emphasis that in the northern zone no Spanish Minister could be found to give up the entire valley of the Uarga and so to reduce that zone to a mere strip along the Mediterranean.

His Excellency had hardly left me when the French Ambassador called to give me his account of his interview with Señor Garcia Prieto the evening before. Finding myself in complete agreement with M. Geoffray with regard to the course which Spain may now be fairly urged to take, I ventured to send you my above-mentioned telegram, suggesting the expediency of friendly counsels being now offered by His Majesty's Government, both to the Spanish Government in respect of the necessity of extensive concessions at least in the south, and to the French Government in the sense that insistence on their full territorial demands in the north would be calculated to bring about a rupture which might entail regrettable consequences.

What exactly would happen if France proceeded to establish a *de facto* protectorate at Fez, and to take in hand the administration of her zone without previous agreement with Spain, it is, of course, impossible to say. It seems, however, more than probable that Spain would take corresponding action within the Spanish zone. She could, I presume, occupy without much difficulty Tetuan and Arzila. She might then appeal to the Algeciras signatory Powers, explaining that the action she had taken had been forced upon her by the action of France, and that she felt entitled to protest against the inauguration by France of a new political system in Morocco until the general Act of Algeciras had been replaced, in agreement with all the Powers concerned, by the régime of the Franco-German Treaty of the 4th November, 1911. She would claim to receive the full benefit of her secret convention with France as the price of her concurrence with the new order of things. At all events, a situation of some complexity would be likely to ensue. Such a contingency might still, in M. Geoffray's opinion, which I share, be easily avoided. Spain will probably make, under pressure, considerable further concessions in the south. In the north, the position of France, commanding Fez, is so strong that her influence seems destined to predominate eventually throughout the entire Uarga region, whatever may be the precise line of frontier drawn between the two zones.

However this may be, the present language of the Spanish press, as well as that held by Spanish statesmen of all political groups, with the possible exception of the Republican, points to the probability that Spain will refuse to surrender the region of the right bank of the Uarga, and that a rupture of the negotiation will ensue, unless means can be found to satisfy elsewhere the territorial demands of France.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[12092] No. 126.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March* 22, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 22 of 20th March.

I fail to see why works which were "less urgent" on 18th February (see Sir R. Lister's telegram No. 12 of 18th February) have now become so immediate. Arguments now adduced by State engineer were equally cogent then. His Majesty's Government cannot abandon principle of adjudication, though they recognise that special circumstances would oblige commission to allow shortest time possible, consistent with fair opportunity, for competing firms to tender.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 126.)

[12400] No. 127.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 23.)

(No. 54.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca regarding the recent attacks on Europeans at Marrakesh during

the celebration of the seventh day of the Moorish feast. In all Moorish towns where the natives are not accustomed to Europeans it has been considered imprudent for Christians, or even for native Jews, to mix with the crowd on such occasions, and even at Tangier cases have occurred of comparatively recent years where foreigners pushing through the crowd have had stones thrown at them. I do not, therefore, personally attach much importance to the incident, especially as the town remained perfecty quiet on the few ensuing days. It is also a satisfactory sign that the native soldiers intervened to protect the persons attacked. The local authorities can always control the populace and check any fanatical outbursts if they wish. In unofficial French circles there is apparently a tendency to exaggerate the importance of the incident and to advocate prompt action in the matter. I took an opportunity, therefore, when talking of the incident to M. Regnault, to enquire whether any action was contemplated. He replied that he had as yet no information as to the manner in which his Government regarded the incident. In his own reports he had endeavoured to prevent undue importance being given to it, but it would be sure to create a great impression in France, especially as there had not been merely an isolated attack, but a series of attacks on different people at different times in the day, and apparently at different places. Reports from the south, he said, had lately been unsatisfactory, and they had heard of an anti-French agitation on the part of several governors, especially Mtougui. It might therefore be considered necessary to take some action.

I observed that I had heard of discontent in the south, owing to the exactions of the governors, especially Hadj Driss Wold Mennou and Mtougui, but that no reports of anti-French agitation had reached me. I added that any excitement there may have been at Marrakesh on the day of the feast had apparently at once died out, and complete tranquillity reigned in the town during the two following days; there did not therefore appear to be any need for sending troops there, especially as the native soldiers had acted well and had protected the Europeans. The advent of French troops might, I feared, give rise to serious troubles, as the tribes would probably combine to attack them, and the fanatical spirit of the natives would be roused.

M. Regnault said that, even if it were decided to dispatch a column to Marrakesh, it could not start for some little time, as the necessary preparations would first have to be made.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 127.

Consul Madden to Mr. White.

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Casa Blanca, March* 13, 1912.

I HAVE received three letters from Mr. Lennox, vice-consul at Marrakesh, relative to an incident which occurred there on the seventh day after the Mahommedan feast of Milud. Mr. Lennox having promised me an official report, which has not come to hand, I take the following account from his letters to me.

Several Europeans were watching the performance in the Sok-el-Khamis, and were taking photographs quite unmolested, until a Frenchman named Conzalis came up in a dog-cart, the road being very crowded, and there was difficulty in getting through. The people were irritated by having to make way for such a thing as a cart. The basha and other kaïds were present and saw the danger, and sent soldiers to escort Conzalis, who, it appears, escaped uninjured.

Between twelve and one on the same day, that is, the 8th March, a M. Kunz, a Swiss, returned from the country and found the city gate closed and the religious fair over. His men with the loaded mules were surrounded by a large crowd of country Arabs, who threatened to seize the mules. One man fired two rifle shots, and the crowd withdrew, enabling M. Kunz, who had got the gate opened, to enter a store. M. Kuntz had been struck on the head from a native cudgel, and was fainting when he reached his house.

Two other Frenchmen, who were riding, had stones thrown at them as they passed the Sok, and were followed along the road by a crowd. At that moment a British mokhalata, Hosein-el-Gidmeewa, employé of Fernau and Co., was coming along the road, and when he saw the Frenchmen being stoned, he joined them and remonstrated with the crowd, but as the mob would not desist he fired his rifle, which frightened them.

Then two other Frenchmen went to the Sok-el-Khamis, and they also had stones thrown at them, but got in without any serious injury.

In the afternoon, when the fair assembled outside the Dabaghar Gate, a German connected with the Mannesmann Company went out to see the fair. The crowd became hostile to him, and when the soldiers of the basha took his part, the crowd threw stones, and the soldiers were forced to fire on the mob. They retreated to the gate with the German, the gate was closed, and the soldiers continued to fire upon the people from the wall. The khalifa of the Basha Driss was on the wall too.

A report from the French doctor at Marrakesh gives the number of natives killed by the soldiers as six.

Mr. Lennox states that the native huts occupied by country people inside the city, near the European cemetery, are being removed by the basha's soldiers, and native soldiers were placed after the affair all over the city.

On the 9th and 10th instant the city was quite tranquil, Mr. Lennox states, and there was no appearance of any disturbance. No British subjects were molested in any way.

There were a great many deaths among the crowd that were shut out of the city the night after the affair. Some were murdered and others fell into the water courses, and a very large number were robbed, especially women, so the vice-consul informs me.

The affair seems to have been a purely religious incident, and not anti-European. The time of the fair is always a dangerous one, and it is foolhardy of Europeans to venture into it merely to see the performances that go on.

Basha Driss Wold Mennou tells the vice-consul that he thinks this incident may hasten the advent of the French at Marrakesh, which I understand the basha dreads very much.

When I receive Mr. Lennox's promised official account I will forward it to you without delay.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[12401] No. 128.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 23.)

(No. 55. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, March* 16, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 48 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting a conversation with Sid Taib Mokri regarding the Sultan's supposed intention to abdicate rather than accept a French protectorate.

Meeting the Grand Vizier last night at dinner, and having an opportunity for quiet conversation with him, I endeavoured to ascertain his views on the present situation. Sid el Mokri is always somewhat cautious and reserved, but on this occasion he spoke a little more freely than usual. He said that whilst still in Paris he was continually pressed by the Sultan to return at once to Fez, but that he could not leave until M. Regnault was also starting. Since his arrival at Tangier he had received almost daily telegrams from Mulai Hafid telling him to hurry to Fez, and, from the great anxiety of the Sultan to see him, he inferred that His Majesty was very uneasy in his mind as to the situation, and desired to consult him about the demands to be put forward by M. Regnault, and the line he should adopt in regard to them. His Majesty was, he thought, afraid that he was to be reduced to the position of the Bey of Tunis, and would be left with no power whatever. He did not, however, see what His Majesty could do; he had accepted the Franco-German agreement of the 4th November and must now accept the consequences.

The Grand Vizier, who appeared depressed at the present position, said he had expected that the form the protectorate was to take would have been discussed with him at Paris, so that he could have consulted the Sultan and settled the principal points before M. Regnault proceeded to Fez, but this had not been done. A purely French commission had drawn up a scheme which had never been communicated to him, and the French Government was apparently desirous of rushing the Sultan in the matter. He was of opinion that the French Government were making a great mistake in pushing matters forward too quickly; the Sultan and the Makhzen were prepared to accept the protectorate, if it were introduced gradually and not too openly.

An arrangement on the lines of Egypt they would readily agree to and it would be accepted by the people, but he believed the intention was to adopt the precedent of Tunis and to openly assume the Government of the country and deprive the Sultan of all semblance of authority, and this His Majesty would probably be unwilling to accept.

I observed that I was quite in the dark as to the proposals to be put forward by M. Regnault, but that, from conversations I had recently had with M. Gaillard, I had gathered that the outward authority of the Sultan and Makhzen would be maintained, though, of course, under proper guidance, which, indeed, experience had shown to be absolutely necessary. I added that matters had come to the point at which it appeared to me the Sultan had no course open to him but loyally to accept the assistance of the French.

Sid el Mokri replied that he was fully aware of this, and he repeated that the Sultan and Makhzen were quite prepared to accept the protectorate and to have their hands securely tied. It was merely a matter of form: they did not want it done too openly. He was aware of M. Gaillard's views, but feared that they were not shared by M. Regnault and the French Government. M. Gaillard had not been hurried back to Fez to assist in M. Regnault's negotiations, but merely to put a stop to the land speculations of the Sultan.

From the language held to you by M. Cambon (see your despatch to Sir F. Bertie No. 63 of the 7th February), it would appear that the fears of the Sultan and the Vizier are exaggerated, and that the protectorate is, for the present at any rate, to be established in a form in which His Majesty would be willing to accept it. M. Regnault, however, mentioned to me that he had not brought with him the agreement to be submitted to the Sultan, as when he left Paris it had not yet been drafted in its final form, but that he expected to receive it shortly after his arrival at Fez. It is possible that the views of the French Government may have undergone some change since the 7th February, and that the agreement to be submitted to the Sultan may be of a more categorical character than was previously intended. Should this be the case, and should Mulai Hafid carry out his alleged intention to resign rather than accept it, the situation would become somewhat complicated. It could not, I think, fail to create a considerable impression on thinking people in the country, who would say that the French proposals must be bad indeed if even Mulai Hafid would not accept them.

M. Regnault started for Fez this afternoon; Sid el Mokri leaves to-morrow morning, and will reach Fez before the arrival of the French Minister.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 14. Confidential.)

Sir, *Fez, March* 7, 1912.

WHEN I called upon Sid Taib Mokri the evening before last to offer the good wishes of the present Moorish festival, the following conversation ensued. It was understood on both sides to be of an entirely personal and confidential kind, but though on that footing I communicate it, as its subject-matter appears of special interest at this time, and, should the Sultan carry out what he is saying, some serious complications might arise.

When I had moved to leave him, Sid Taib asked me to remain for a little, as there was something he wished to talk about quite privately. The fact was that the Sultan and all the Makhzen were greatly troubled about the ensuing French mission to Fez as regards the proposal that Morocco should become a French protectorate. They were quite unable to understand how this could be proposed. Was it not a fact that by certain treaties, particularly by the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, France had engaged not to alter the political status of Morocco in the same way as the British Government had agreed not to alter the political status of Egypt? Now the situation was that the Sultan was absolutely resolved not to consent to a protectorate. Rather than do so the Sultan would prefer to abdicate and retire into private life, either in Morocco or abroad, and leave the French and the Moors to settle the matter between themselves. It was impossible for the Sultan to comply with such a proposal without

the consent of the Moorish people, for they alone could modify it. Now there was not even any suggestion of the calling of a meeting of notables from all parts of the country to deal with the matter, but the Sultan was to be asked to assent to the protectorate straightaway! On the other hand, however, the Sultan was apprehensive that if he refused his assent, the "French would do him personally some great harm." Could they do this?

I answered that I had no information as to what the French side of the case was. They might be arguing that they had not altered the political status of Morocco, the fact being that it was the Sultan who had invited them to occupy Fez, to preserve him from his enemies, and to secure the lives and interests of Europeans, by which in point of fact he came under their protection. But for the exercise of that protection where would the Sultan have been now? Or perhaps they might be saying that they still meant to preserve the political status of Morocco as far as the actual state of things admitted, and were only assisting towards the Sultan really exercising his sovereignty. Anyway, had not the Sultan assented to the recent Franco-German agreement? And was not a protectorate stipulated therein? Here Sid Taib interposed: "No, no. It is true the Sultan did assent to that agreement, but therein all that is said is that if France should wish to make a protectorate of Morocco, Germany would raise no objection. That France meant to establish a protectorate straightaway without trying any other expedients, or even without the consent of the people of the country, we never imagined! What the Sultan expected was the placing of advisers, &c., at the various departments, some such plan as was followed in Egypt, and to such a plan the Sultan would agree readily, but now he is to have no power at all!"

I answered that this was what monarchs had often thought when asked to rule otherwise than absolutely, but it was a great mistake all the same. Such arrangements as that of Egypt just now, or of Morocco in the future, practically took the place of constitutions in other countries, and it was undeniable that under constitutions there had been many instances of monarchs exercising really greater power and accomplishing far more for their countries than absolute monarchs did. To this Sid Taib rejoined warmly: "But the Sultan is to have no power at all! He is to become just like the Bey of Tunis, and who cares a farthing whether the Bey of Tunis is wise or foolish?"

No answer occurring to me on this point, I then asked what exactly the Sultan feared the French would do to him should he wish to abdicate? Was he afraid of being left to the Moors and consequently exposed to further rebellions? Or of risings against the French? or what? Sid Taib repeated that the Sultan's fear was that the French "would injure him personally, as by death or imprisonment, or the like." "But," I asked, "on what grounds?" Sid Taib said he could not tell how the French might proceed, and so I replied that this being the case, I could not answer his question, but could not the Grand Vizier have discussed such matters as these at Paris, for instance, with the British Ambassador there? Sid Taib said he did not know whether or not the Grand Vizier had discussed these matters with anybody. I then remarked: "But if you wish to speak of these things, why not tell Sid Mohammed Guebbas to speak to our legation at Tangier?" "That," laughed Sid Taib, "would be the same as to ask M. Regnault to do so!" and there the matter dropped.

I should point out that during the last two or three weeks there has been no further talk of the Sultan visiting Paris, and the last two or three days I had begun to suspect that some tension must exist between the Sultan and the French. So, on the morning after the foregoing conversation, I remarked to the French consul (M. Gaillard)—without mentioning who was my informant or giving any details—that, judging from things I had been hearing, I feared the Sultan might give trouble when M. Regnault came, at which M. Gaillard laughingly said: "Oh, quite possibly he may do so. Indeed he may even want to resign, but if Mulai Hafid does not wish to be Sultan any more, one of his brothers, or somebody else, can doubtless soon be found for that office, and one will do as well as another!"

Of course, the Sultan may change his mind when the case is put before him by M. Regnault, but I concluded that it would be best that the possibility of his resistance to the protectorate proposal should be speedily and fully known to you, so as to have as long as possible to provide against it. I thought it well to give the French consul a hint of it, too, for the French in general, here at any rate, are somewhat apt to imagine when they meet opposition at the Court that it is due to foreign influence. Also, I thought that, should the Sultan become unmanageable and the French Minister take some course injurious to what might be considered our interests, the hint given would

prevent their being able to say that we should have told them at the proper time of what we had heard.

As regards the changing of the status of Morocco, that doubtless must have been matter of arrangement with His Majesty's Government, and so, besides its being a question of so high a kind, would not be fitting to touch upon herein, unless, perhaps, as regards the effect upon the Moors in the interior. I should not think they would be dangerously moved by one course or the other, but, naturally, they would prefer the plan which made as little difference as possible in the appearance of things.

As to whether the French would do better to go on with Mulai Hafid or to have another Sultan, the issue seems to me thus: Mulai Hafid is so unpopular everywhere in the country that the French task is much facilitated thereby, as they are enabled to act as protectors of the tribesmen and the Kaïds against his exactions, and thus gain their confidence, and when anything disagreeable has to be done, the French can always say: "Mulai Hafid is your lawful Sultan, of your own choice, and you are bound to obey him" A new Sultan, even supposing that a new Sultan could be lawfully appointed by the French, would always be merely the foreign Sultan, and would therefore have no natural claim to their obedience. Then it may be observed that just now the country, except in Zemmur and the Rif, is peacefully settling down. As seen here, the balance of advantage would appear, therefore, to lie in retaining Mulai Hafid if he can be brought to at all reasonable terms.

In connection with the Sultanate, there remains the question of the succession to it on the demise of Mulai Hafid, there being no law of hereditary succession, and the choice, hitherto, having lain with the notables of the various cities. These generally accepted someone who had obtained the support of the nearest body of troops, hitherto, of course, always Moorish. The choice just now in such an emergency would seem to lie between some of the sons of Mulai Hafid, all of whom are still young children, or his brother, the ex-Sultan Mulai Abdalaziz, or Mulai Zeen. The latter is little known here, and the former has become more popular in this neighbourhood of late years. None of the other sons of Mulai Hassan are held in any account in these parts, and are by common knowledge men below the ordinary level of intelligence. One of them, Mulai Bilghait, is indeed quite insane.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

[12402] No. 129.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received March* 23.)

(No. 56.)
Sir, *Tangier, March* 16, 1912.

IT having come to my notice yesterday that a meeting of the Commission des Adjudications was to be held this afternoon to take a decision in regard to the contract for the shelter for lighters at Casa Blanca, I called upon Cid Ali Zaky, who is president of the commission, and asked for explanations.

He informed me that the object of the meeting was to open the tenders of three French houses for the construction of the *épi*, or jetty, the quays, and the terreplein; that M. Porché, the Chief Engineer of Public Works, had been in communication with these firms and had invited them to send in their tenders, or rather "offers." I said that this was contrary to our agreement, which was that only the preparatory works, viz. (1) masonry blocks, (2) caissons of reinforced cement, and (3) workshop plant, were to be privately contracted for at once, whilst there was to be adjudication, or rather "marché de gré à gré après concours," for the construction of the jetty, &c.

Cid Ali Zaky asked me to see the Grand Vizier, who was in the adjoining room, and a similar conversation took place there. Cid-el-Mokri said that he was not well acquainted with the matter, but that M. Porché had said that His Majesty's Government had given their consent to the course that was being adopted. I replied that M. Porché was under a misapprehension in the matter, and that His Majesty's Government had not consented to the construction of the jetty, &c., without adjudication.

M. Regnault was absent from the legation, being busy with the preparations for his journey to Fez, so I saw M. de Billy, who could not tell me much, and referred me to M. Porché.

I wrote a note to M. Porché, asking him to let me know when I could see him that

afternoon, and I telephoned on several occasions to his office, but without success. I consequently saw M. Llorens, the assistant engineer, who, however, could only confirm what Cid Ali Zaky told me. I subsequently received a note from M. Porché saying that he had been occupied all the afternoon and would come and see me in the morning.

M. Regnault called upon me late in the afternoon to say good-bye, and I was able to speak of the matter to him. He, however, said that he had been occupied with other matters at Paris, and had not been able to follow this question very closely, but would enquire into it.

I met Cid-el-Mokri and Cid Ali Zaky at dinner that evening. They arrived late and informed me that they had been kept by a long discussion with M. Porché, in which M. Regnault had joined after having seen me, and that it had been decided to put off the meeting of the Commission des Adjudications.

M. Regnault called at the legation early this morning and read to me the telegram which had been received by M. de Billy on the 21st ultimo, informing him that His Majesty's Government had given their consent to the contract for three lots to be given out without adjudication. I beg leave to transmit herewith copy of that portion of the telegram which specifies the lots in question, as follows: (1), The making of concrete blocks, estimated cost about 1,200*l.*; (2), the building of the jetty, quays, and terre-plein, estimated cost about 40,000*l.*; (3), works in reinforced cement (caissons), estimated cost about 16,000*l.* M. Regnault added that he understood that his Government had pointed out to you that, under article 24 of the Adjudications Regulations, adjudication could be dispensed with in cases of urgency like the present one.

I replied that I was aware that this argument had been put forward, but that it had been fully met by your reply to M. Cambon of the 12th February. You had, it was true, agreed to the contracts for three lots being entered into at once without the formality of adjudication, but the lots were different from those mentioned in M. Poincaré's telegram. They comprise merely the preparatory works—(1) blocks of masonry, (2) caissons of reinforced cement, and (3) workshop plant—as stated by M. de Billy to Sir R. Lister on the 19th ultimo and telegraphed by him to you, and as confirmed in M. de Billy's letter of the 21st ultimo to the doyen of the diplomatic body, copy of which was included in my despatch No. 44 of the 2nd instant. I showed these letters to M. Regnault, who observed that M. de Billy had apparently made some mistake as to the lots, and that the only thing to do now was to put off the meeting of the Adjudications Committee till the 21st instant, and refer the question to our respective Governments.

M. Porché joined us at this point, and was at a loss to understand on what M. de Billy had based his letter, as there had never been any question of workshop plant. He informed me that it had been necessary to make a slight change in the plan, and there would now only be two lots instead of three—(1) the concrete blocks, (2) the jetty, quays, and terreplein to be constructed in reinforced cement. I enquired what remained for adjudication, and he said the sheds only. I asked M. Porché to make a note for me on the subject, so that there could be no further misunderstanding. I requested him to let me have it as soon as possible, as I would awaits its receipt before telegraphing to you. I did not, however, receive it till late in the afternoon. I beg leave to enclose copy herewith.

It is much to be regretted that there should be further delay in a work which is of extreme urgency, but I felt that there was no other course open to me than to prevent the contracts being made before I had reported to you, as it was never contemplated that practically the whole works to the value of about 57,000*l.*, and probably more, should be given out by *concours* limited to certain French firms, nothing being left to submit to adjudication but minor works, such as the construction of sheds. I cannot help thinking than an open *concours* might have been held before this had it been desired.

In order that the works should be delayed as little as possible, I urged M. Porché to push forward the construction of the blocks of masonry or concrete regarding which there was no question, and M. Regnault supported me in this. I understand that the Public Works Department are, in the meantime, themselves proceeding with the manufacture of these blocks, so no delay will occur in this respect.

I have, &c.

HERBERT E. WHITE.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 129.

Note by M. Llorens.

CI-JOINT copie de télégramme d'explications adressé le 21 février, 1912, par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à la Légation de France à Tanger, en vue de saisir le corps diplomatique de la passation des marchés pour la construction de la darse-abri de Casablanca, conformément aux vues échangées entre le Gouvernement britannique et le Gouvernement français.

La consistance des trois lots pour lesquels la passation des marchés de gré à gré était demandée est nettement définie dans ce télégramme. Ces trois lots comprenaient l'ensemble d'ouvrages dont la construction devait être mené de front et d'urgence, c'est-à-dire: la jetée, les quais et les terre-pleins. Ce sont ces ouvrages auxquels s'appliquaient, dans l'esprit du Gouvernement français, l'acceptation formulée dans la note du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique en date du 19 février, 1912, de concession sans formalité d'adjudication, et ainsi que la délibération du corps diplomatique visant les trois lots. Les travaux complémentaires envisagés comme devant donner lieu à adjudication ou à marché de gré à gré après concours, seront étudiés et présentés ultérieurement: dans cette catégorie étaient visés notamment des hangars à établir sur les terre-pleins après la construction de ces derniers.

Depuis, une modification d'application, ne touchant en rien aux principes admis, a été nécessaire: l'entrepreneur du troisième lot n'ayant pas été en mesure de donner suite à ses propositions, le troisième lot a été fondu avec le second, en sorte que les travaux pour lesquels la passation d'un marché de gré à gré ordinaire a été demandée se reduisent à deux lots, savoir:—

1. Un lot de préparation d'environ 30,000 fr., comme ci-dessus.
2. Un lot de travaux en maçonnerie et en béton armé, comprenant l'épi, les quais et terre-pleins d'environ 1,400,000 fr.

Tanger, le 16 *mars*, 1912.

Enclosure 2 in No. 129.

Extract from Telegram.

LES trois lots de travaux envisagés pour l'abri de Casablanca seraient dotés entièrement sur les fonds de l'indemnité de guerre des tribus Chaouïa. Il pourra être ultérieurement fait appel aux ressources de la Caisse spéciale des Travaux publics pour des travaux complémentaires tels que la construction de hangars le long du nouvel abri, mais ces travaux seront donnés par adjudication ou par marché de gré à gré après concours dans les formes normales.

Les trois lots sur marché de gré à gré ordinaire à doter sur les fonds Chaouïa comprendront: (1) Un lot de confection de blocs en béton d'environ 30,000 fr.; ce lot est prévu pour permettre de faire préparer à un entrepreneur local les travaux en attendant l'installation de l'entrepreneur du second lot; (2) un lot de construction de la jetée, des quais et terre-pleins d'environ 1,000,000 de francs; (3) un lot de travaux en béton armé d'environ 400,000 fr.

Ces chiffres ne sont qu'approximatifs; notamment, l'importance relative de chaque lot pourra varier suivant l'état d'avancement des autres lots.

[12875] No. 130.

Draft Scheme for the Internationalisation of Tangier.—(*Communicated by M. Cambon, March* 23, 1912.)

L'ORGANISATION internationale de Tanger fera l'objet d'un arrangement entre la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Espagne, déjà liées par des traités qui visent cette question. Un règlement chérifien promulguera la constitution municipale de Tanger conformément aux propositions qui auront été admises par les trois Puissances. Cette organisation procédera des principes que la municipalité devra avoir les pouvoirs les plus étendus.

2. Elle s'appliquera à l'agglomération urbaine de Tanger et à un territoire suffisant pour assurer le développement de la ville, son approvisionnement et son alimentation en eau potable.

3. Le corps municipal se composera de vingt-quatre membres élus, dont un tiers ou tout au moins un quart marocain.

Il ne pourra y avoir plus de quatre conseillers étrangers d'une même nationalité.

Les conseillers marocains seront élus par les notables marocains.

Les conseillers étrangers seront élus par les électeurs censitaires étrangers.

4. L'électorat reposera sur un cens établi d'après les rôles de la taxe urbaine et dont le chiffre exact pourrait être discuté par les représentants étrangers à Tanger.

5. Le conseil municipal aura les attributions les plus étendues en matière d'administration, de règlements et de finances. Il élira son président et il pourra choisir parmi ses membres une commission administrative, chargée du pouvoir exécutif.

6. La réunion des agents officiels étrangers aura un droit de contrôle général sur les actes de la municipalité, en vue de prévenir toute infraction aux traités, au statut municipal, à la neutralité politique et à l'égalité des différentes nationalités. Les décisions en cette matière seront prises à la majorité des voix.

7. La municipalité disposera de tous les revenus locaux, sauf le produit des douanes et la redevance du monopole des tabacs. Le produit de la taxe spéciale à Tanger sera réservé pour une combinaison financière qui permettra la construction du port. La municipalité pourra établir toutes taxes nouvelles qu'elle jugerait nécessaires.

8. Les travaux publics d'intérêt général qui auront leur prolongement naturel au delà du territoire municipal feront l'objet d'une entente entre les administrations d'État et la municipalité. Pour tous les travaux exécutés par la municipalité on observera le règlement sur les adjudications, en confiant à un comité issu du conseil municipal les attributions de la Commission générale des Adjudications et Marchés.

9. Les juridictions actuelles subsisteront jusqu'à la réalisation de la réforme judiciaire prévue par l'accord du 4 novembre, 1911, article 9. Un tribunal composé de juges consulaires jugera les procès intentés à la municipalité avec appel devant la Cour fédérale de Lausanne.

10. En ce qui concerne les matières administratives d'intérêt général, telles que le régime de la propriété foncière, le conseil municipal ne pourra établir de règlements que d'accord avec les autorités représentant le Makhzen dans les zones d'influence française et espagnole. Les questions de droit musulman resteront régies par la loi religieuse.

11. Les règlements et décisions de la municipalité devront respecter les clauses des traités conclus entre le Maroc et les Puissances. La municipalité pourra d'ailleurs invoquer le bénéfice du traité du 4 novembre, 1911.

La municipalité ne pourra élever ou laisser élever des fortifications et travaux militaires quelconques, ni se constituer des forces militaires ou navales, à l'exception de la police nécessaire pour son territoire.

Il y aura liberté entière pour l'exercice de tous les cultes.

D'une façon générale la municipalité de Tanger appliquera le principe d'une égalité absolue entre toutes les nationalités.

[12538] No. 131.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 23.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, March 23, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 14 of 22nd March: Casa Blanca port works. See my despatch No. 56.

Engineer states that with adjudication, allowing shortest possible time, construction of jetty could not be commenced before the end of July, and the jetty would not be sufficiently advanced by the autumn to afford shelter for lighters He suggests that a contract be made at once without adjudication for first hundred metres of jetty, which would cost about 16,000*l.*, and the remainder of jetty and other works to the value of about 48,000*l.* be subject to adjudication.

[12202] No. 132.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 146.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 23, 1912.*

WITH reference to Mr. White's telegram, No. 23 of the 21st instant, respecting certain proposed works at Tangier, the figures of which were sent to you in my despatch No. 145 of the 22nd instant, I request that your Excellency will inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government are most anxious not to impede the setting up of these works, of which they fully recognise the value and necessity. At the same time it is clear that the works must be brought under the direct control of the municipality, as soon as the latter is instituted, and a difficult situation would be created if in the meanwhile important vested interests had been allowed to grow up which the municipality might be compelled to buy out, without any guarantee that inordinate compensation might not be demanded.

In these circumstances, whilst His Majesty's Government would not oppose the call for tenders, they think it essential that some arrangement should be made by which a guarantee is afforded that the works in question may pass into the control of the municipality on equitable terms. As to the reasonableness of such terms, the diplomatic body at Tangier might perhaps be allowed to be the judge.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12828] No. 133.

Notes communicated by M. Cambon, March 25, respecting the Draft Scheme for the Internationalisation of Tangier.

1. *Mode d'Organisation de la Municipalité.*

L'ORGANISATION de la municipalité de Tanger doit faire l'objet d'un arrangement entre la France, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Espagne, déjà liées par des traités qui visent cette question. Il n'y a pas la même nécessité pour le Gouvernement marocain de prendre des engagements internationaux à l'égard des autres Puissances sur ce sujet. Il appartiendra au protectorat marocain de décréter la constitution de la municipalité et de définer les droits qu'y exerceront les étrangers, en vertu de l'article 1er du traité du 4 novembre, 1911. On concevrait donc : (1) une convention entre la France, l'Angleterre et l'Espagne ; (2) un règlement chérifien. Cette procédure faciliterait les modifications éventuelles qu'après expérience les trois Gouvernements intéressés jugeraient utile d'apporter au régime de Tanger et que la nécessité d'une négociation avec toutes les Puissances compliquerait fâcheusement.

2. *Nature des Pouvoirs de la Municipalité.*

Le Gouvernement français est d'accord avec le Gouvernement anglais pour attribuer à la municipalité de Tanger des pouvoirs effectifs et complets et pour préciser ce point par une formule très nette dans l'arrangement à conclure entre les trois Cabinets. Mais il paraît difficile que le décret constitutif de la municipalité proclame formellement la déchéance de la souveraineté officielle du Sultan sur cette ville.

3. *District rural.*

Les propositions du Gouvernement anglais concordent avec les vues du Gouvernement français. Elles pourraient servir de base à l'étude d'une délimitation poursuivie sur les lieux.

4. *Mécanisme gouvernemental.*

Le système préconisé par le Gouvernement anglais appelle de très sérieuses objections.

Il a pour objet de concilier deux principes : l'égalité des Puissances et l'importance relative des diverses colonies et de leurs intérêts. La combinaison envisagée ne serait que l'application du premier et la négation du second. En effet, elle donne les mêmes droits à un groupe de douze conseillers désigné par les Gouvernements, et au même nombre de conseillers élus, de sorte que l'ensemble des électeurs n'est par assuré de faire

prévaloir ses vues contre les opinions d'administrateurs irresponsables vis-à-vis de leurs administrés. Il y aurait là, semble-t-il, une combinaison d'un caractère peu libéral, que le Gouvernement français, en ce qui le concerne, aurait peine à justifier devant l'opinion. Le Gouvernement britannique avait proposé, dès le début, le statut municipal de Shanghaï comme le modèle dont il conviendrait de s'inspirer pour établir le nouveau régime de Tanger. Le statut de Shanghaï est conçu dans un tout autre esprit et il laisse aux seuls élus l'entière responsabilité de l'administration municipale.

Le Gouvernement français verrait des inconvénients à faire intervenir les agents étrangers dans la composition du corps municipal. Il estime que ce serait engager leur responsabilité morale, dans des questions qui risqueraient de la compromettre, et que leur véritable rôle étant d'exercer un contrôle supérieur sur la municipalité ils ne sauraient le bien remplir qu'à la condition de n'avoir aucune part au choix des administrateurs dont ils auraient à surveiller les actes.

La proposition anglaise ne tient donc pas un compte suffisant de l'importance collective des colonies et des intérêts étrangers. Elle ne tient pas assez compte non plus de leur importance relative. La limitation à deux du nombre d'élus d'une même nationalité paraît trop restrictive. Le régime électoral de Shanghaï ne comprend aucune disposition de ce genre. Le règlement de la municipalité d'Alexandrie, qui pourrait être également étudié à ce propos, admet un maximum de trois élus d'une même nationalité sur un total de quatorze. Notre proposition indique le nombre de quatre sur seize.

Le Gouvernement français ne pourrait admettre que l'élément marocain eût une participation aussi réduite à l'administration de Tanger que l'envisagent les propositions du Foreign Office. Il n'est pas besoin de rappeler que la concession internationale de Shanghaï, où les Chinois n'ont pas de droits électoraux, a été établie dans des conditions très différentes, que le terrain fut concédé libre de toute construction et de tout occupant, et que les indigènes qui sont venus s'y fixer par la suite connaissaient le régime auquel ils seraient soumis. Il en va tout autrement à Tanger, où la future administration internationale trouvera une population marocaine et nombreuse et des droits acquis dont elle ne peut faire abstraction. Il ne saurait être question de subordonner les Européens à une majorité arabe ; mais il serait presque au même point critiquable de ne donner qu'une représentation de deux élus tout au plus aux trois quarts de la population totale de Tanger. Le Gouvernement français serait d'ailleurs prêt à rechercher, dans l'esprit le plus conciliant, le système qui conviendrait le mieux pour la désignation ou l'élection des conseillers indigènes.

Sous ces réserves, il croit devoir maintenir les propositions qu'il avait présentées et qui comporteraient un conseil municipal de vingt-quatre membres, dont un tiers ou tout au moins un quart marocains, avec limitation à quatre du nombre des élus étrangers pour une même nationalité.

En ce qui concerne le contrôle à exercer sur l'action du conseil municipal, le Gouvernement français ne se refuserait pas à en investir la réunion des agents étrangers, délibérant à la majorité des voix, suivant la proposition britannique. Mais il considère que ce contrôle devrait consister essentiellement à prévenir les infractions aux traités, au statut municipal et à l'égalité des différentes nationalités. Il ne pourrait s'agir de donner au corps consulaire des attributions établissant, la nécessité de son ingérence dans le travail législatif et administratif de la municipalité. Il suffit qu'il ait qualité pour s'opposer aux actes qui porteraient atteinte aux principes constitutifs de l'organisation municipale.

5. *Electorat.*

Le Gouvernement français est d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique pour admettre un cens électoral, établi d'après le rôle de la taxe urbaine en qui pourrait avoir pour base, conformément à la proposition anglaise, un loyer mensuel de 120 pesetas ; il pense également qu'il y aurait intérêt à laisser aux agents étrangers le soin de fixer ce dernier point, ainsi que le suggère la note du Foreign Office.

6. *Ressources de la Municipalité.*

Le Gouvernement français estime, comme le Gouvernement anglais, que la municipalité doit avoir pleins pouvoirs pour l'établissement de taxes et la conclusion d'emprunts. On lui remettrait la perception et l'établissement des taxes jusqu'ici perçues par le Makhzen.

Il ne semble pas toutefois qu'on puisse distraire du service de la dette marocaine les revenus qui y ont été affectés en garantie, tels que le produit des douanes et la

redevance du monopole des tabacs. On réserverait seulement pour une combinaison financière qui permettrait la construction du port le produit de la taxe spéciale de Tanger.

Quant à la redevance du monopole des tabacs, le contrat d'emprunt 1910 s'oppose à ce qu'il en soit fait d'état dans les ressources de la future municipalité.

Le Gouvernement français estime que les autres revenus laisseraient à la municipalité des moyens suffisants ; ce seraient :—

L'achour et le zekkat, dans le district municipal, ou le tertib lorsqu'il aura été substitué aux impôts coraniques ;
La taxe urbaine et les taxes prévues par l'article 64 de l'Acte d'Algésiras ;
Les droits perçus dans les halles, abattoirs, foires et marchés ;
Les permis de stationnement et locations sur le domaine public municipal ;
Les droits de voirie et d'occupation temporaire du domaine public ;
Les taxes ou parts contributives perçues sur les riverains pour la construction et l'entretien des rues, trottoirs, caniveaux et égouts ;
Les taxes d'éclairage et de balayage ;
Enfin le produit des emprunts contractés par la municipalité.

La municipalité aurait d'ailleurs la faculté de créer des impositions nouvelles et, comme il est spécifié dans la note du Foreign Office, le Makhzen n'aurait pas à tirer de la ville et région municipale de Tanger d'autres revenus que ceux qui résultent des douanes et monopoles engagés.

7. *Travaux publics.*

Le Gouvernement français est d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique sur la nécessité de maintenir en cette matière le règlement sur les adjudications, en confiant à un comité issu du conseil municipal les attributions conférées à la Commission générale des Adjudications et Marchés.

8. *Institutions judiciaires.*

Le Gouvernement français est également d'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique pour maintenir les juridictions actuelles jusqu'à la réalisation de la réforme prévue par l'article 9 du traité du 4 novembre et pour les compléter par un tribunal chargé de juger les procès intentés à la municipalité, conformément aux suggestions du Foreign Office, avec appel à la Cour fédérale de Lausanne.

9. *Limitation des Pouvoirs de la Municipalité.*

Ainsi qu'il est dit dans la note anglaise, les règlements et décisions de la municipalité devraient respecter les clauses des traités, qui resteraient en vigueur.

Les stipulations de ces traités qui établissent l'égalité de toutes les Puissances en matière économique devraient continuer, même après l'abrogation éventuelle des traités, à régler l'administration municipale.

Mais il serait bien entendu que la municipalité aurait également le bénéfice des dispositions du traité du 4 novembre, qui lui permettraient seules d'établir une administration efficace.

La municipalité n'aurait le droit ni d'élever ou de laisser élever des fortifications et travaux militaires d'espèce quelconque, ni de se constituer des forces militaires ou navales à l'exception de la police nécessaire pour son territoire.

Il y aurait liberté entière pour l'exercice de tous les cultes.

Il serait désirable, comme l'indique en outre la note anglaise, que le régime établi à Tanger fût autant que possible conforme à celui qui existera dans le reste du Maroc, en ce qui concerne les matières administratives, telles que notamment les postes et télégraphes et la propriété foncière. Le conseil municipal devrait donc se concerter préalablement sur ces questions, avec les représentants de l'administration chérifienne dans les deux zones d'influence.

Toutefois, le régime douanier ne pourrait être laissé, même avec cette réserve, à la discrétion du corps municipal. Il a été établi par traités et les recettes douanières sont le principal gage des deux emprunts de 1904 et 1910. On ne saurait donc modifier le tarif en dehors du Gouvernement marocain, qui garde sur cette question sa liberté d'initiative.

Quant à la monnaie, il ne semble pas qu'on puisse en soumettre l'émission et la circulation au conseil municipal de Tanger. En cette matière, la ville de Tanger ne peut

qu'être soumise aux conditions générales du Maroc. La question monétaire est essentiellement du ressort de la Banque d'État—institution internationale. Il n'y aurait pas lieu de porter atteinte aux droits déjà constitués.

En se prononçant ainsi sur toutes les propositions qui lui ont été soumises par le Gouvernement britannique, le Gouvernement français croit avoir donné la preuve qu'il entrait dans les vues du Cabinet de Londres et qu'il envisageait comme lui la création à Tanger d'un organisme réellement international; mais il estime que pour atteindre complètement un pareil résultat, il est essentiel de donner à ce régime un caractère exclusivement administratif et municipal en le dégageant des compétitions politiques. Il importe donc que les résidents étrangers et indigènes aient la possibilité et la responsabilité de diriger eux-mêmes le développement économique de leur ville, étant directement intéressés à sa prospérité. Ils ne peuvent espérer y réussir que si leur action n'est pas entravée par des considérations étrangères et contraires aux intérêts locaux.

[12538] No. 134.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, March* 25, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 25 of 23rd March: Casablanca Port Works.

His Majesty's Government, in view of urgent necessity for jetty, agree to proposed contract for first hundred metres, provided that cost does not exceed 16,000*l.*; that remaining works are submitted to open tender without any further delay; and that other Powers also agree.

You should explain to French representative that we feel that we have reason to complain seriously of the manner we have been treated in this matter. If our advice had been taken at first, there would have been ample time to get tenders out, and the work could have been started on 1st April. I trust that the present proposals are final and that we shall not be met with further demands.

It is only our general consideration for French Government that has prevailed upon us to make these successive concessions.

[12858] No. 135.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 47.)
Sir, *Madrid, March* 21, 1912.

I ATTENDED this afternoon a further meeting between the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador.

Señor Garcia Prieto said that Sunday, the 17th instant, had been a very trying day for him. The King and the Prime Minister were away at Alicante. M. Geoffray had made to him the evening before a communication which, though couched in very friendly terms, amounted to a refusal of the French Government even so much as to discuss with Spain the propositions she had put forward regarding the concessions she was prepared to make to France. Spain was perhaps over-sensitive, but that was her way, and she was difficult to deal with when her pride was hurt. M. Geoffray protested that he had said nothing to hurt Spanish pride. The Foreign Minister went on to say that, happily, Señor Perez Caballero had had with M. Poincaré a very friendly conversation on the following day. M. Poincaré, while holding out for further concessions, had disclaimed any desire to push Spain further than would be consistent with her true interests, and he had used very friendly expressions with regard to Señor Garcia Prieto himself. The difficulty arising out of the form of the last French communication was thus removed. It became clear that after all the French Government were not refusing to accept the Spanish proposal as a basis for discussion. They merely asked that it should be amplified. At least, this was the sense in which Señor Perez Caballero had reported the language held to him by M. Poincaré. The

Government had accordingly met immediately after Señor Canalejas's return, and Señor Garcia Prieto was now authorised to make a new proposal, by which the southern boundary of the French zone would be extended southwards along the coast nearly as far as Ifni.

His Excellency handed to M. Geoffray and myself a written statement to the following effect:—

"During the course of the negotiation, the Spanish Government has not failed to point out that an important body of public opinion in Spain dissents from the French theory that Spain owes France compensation. Compensation moreover is already implied in the text of several clauses of the draft convention, which go further than anything required by the convention of 1904. If any additional compensation was due it could only be taken from the interior of the southern zone. Though the discrepancy was great between these views and the demands put forward by France, the Spanish Government did not refuse to submit the latter to a detailed and impartial examination. This being so, the Spanish Government had some reason to be surprised at the reception given in Paris to their proposals. These were founded on a sincere desire to meet the French demands in so far as the latter were compatible with the essential interests of Spain. Thus, Spain offered to exchange a portion of the left bank of the Uarga for a piece of territory, notoriously inferior in quality, belonging to the Benibuyagi and Mtalse tribes. But this proposal was only made and is only now maintained in the belief that French interests would be served thereby.

"As regards the southern zone, the Spanish Foreign Minister on the 14th March expressed to M. Geoffray the hope that the Spanish proposal would be found to constitute an equitable offer, in view of its extent and contiguity to the French zone. In reply to the objection that there was no issue to the sea, he declared that he would be prepared to examine any reasons which France might desire to put forward in support of her wish to obtain a portion of the coastline.

"France has put forward no reasons, but, in deference to her desire, and in view of the language held by M. Poincaré to Señor Perez Caballero on Monday last, the Spanish Government consents to the frontier-line between the two spheres of influence being drawn as directly as possible from the source of the Temamart to the mouth of Wady Ain Mireleft. The French Government will no doubt appreciate the full value of this concession, which involves the surrender by Spain, not of any portion of a sphere of influence, but of territory recognised by the 1904 convention as destined to come under the full sovereignty of Spain."

Señor Garcia Prieto proceeded to show M. Geoffray the proposed new frontier on a map. According to M. de Roquevaire's map of 1909, Wady Ain Mireleft reaches the coast at a point some 30 kilom. north of Ifni and 70 kilom. south of Wady Mesa, the southern extremity of the French zone. The latter distance was erroneously given in my telegram No. 18 of the 20th March as 90 kilom. The same map shows Wady Tamanart as forming an extension northwards of Wady Imi Ougadir, a northern confluent of Wady Dra. The region proposed to be ceded is stated by Señor Garcia Prieto to amount to exactly half the area of the entire Spanish zone. It includes of course the inland region defined in the offer made on the 14th March.

M. Geoffray received the proposal in a perfectly friendly manner, saying that at least it showed that the negotiation was still proceeding. He expressed, however, his certain conviction that it would be regarded in Paris as entirely insufficient. He enquired incidentally what was meant by the statement that compensation had already been given on some points in the text of the draft convention under discussion between the two Governments. Señor Garcia Prieto replied that the surrender of the religious protectorate of Spain in the French zone was a very great concession not required by the text of the 1904 convention.

Señor Garcia Prieto made it clear that no concession beyond the left bank of Wady Uarga could be made by Spain in her northern zone.

I regret that Señor Garcia Prieto should not have seen his way to making the more extensive concessions in the southern zone, which I have indicated to him in private conversations as being calculated possibly to satisfy the French territorial demands. What he has now offered is only likely to cause fresh irritation in Paris. Possibly the Spanish Government will yield further under pressure, though I am not led to think so by anything that Señor Garcia Prieto has said.

Meanwhile, M. Regnault's journey to Fez gives rise to speculation in the Spanish press as to what will happen if France sets up her protectorate before coming to terms with Spain. The prevailing idea is that Spain will then consider herself at liberty to

act as she pleases in her own sphere of influence, and that she will seek to justify that course by appealing to article 3 of the secret convention of 1904. In a recent conversation with Prince Ratibor, the German Ambassador, I was struck by his Serene Highness's observations on this point. He said that, in the German view, the political status of Morocco would be manifestly changed if France proceeded to administer the country, and Spain would be justified in retaliating by doing what she pleased in her own zone. He did not tell me whether this impression was shared by his Government.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[13293] No. 136.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 58.)
Sir, *Tangier, March 22, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 20 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to report that Sir Edgar Speyer, who has lately been spending a few days at Tangier, expressed to Mr. Harris a desire to participate in the shares of Messrs. Harris and Dixon in the Société marocaine de Travaux publics, with a view to financing the English group. Mr. Harris tells me that he has reason to believe that this proposal will be accepted by the firm, who will be glad to have so important a financier in the English group. Through his Paris and Berlin houses Sir Edgar Speyer would, Mr. Harris thought, be able to considerably increase the British participation in any loans that may be issued by the Société marocaine de Travaux publics in Morocco.

Should it be decided to increase the British participation in the Société marocaine de Travaux publics there would be no difficulty in placing the additional shares that may be offered, as Sir Edgar Speyer would in all probability be prepared to take them up.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[13295] No. 137.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 60.)
Sir, *Tangier, March 22, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Porché, the engineer of public works, called on me on the 20th instant and enquired whether this legation would have any objection to tenders being at once invited for the Tangier waterworks. He stated that it was proposed to include in one concession the waterworks, the tramways service, the supply of electric light and electric power, and also an option for a given term for gasworks. He explained that, the source of the water supply being at a low level, it would be necessary to have several pumping stations to bring the water to Tangier. This would necessitate the installation of a powerful electrical plant, and considerable economy would be effected if the same plant could be utilised for other purposes, such as tramways and electric lighting. The population of Tangier is not sufficiently large to support tramways if run as an independent concern, but they could be worked at a profit if combined with the other services. The same applies to electric lighting, as the rights of the Spanish company in the district assigned to them under the agreement of 1910 (see my despatch No. 229 of the 5th November, 1910) must be respected. With regard to gas, it was proposed merely to give an option for a short term of years, which could subsequently be extended if necessary.

M. Porché said that all the plans, estimates, &c., had already been prepared, and the notice calling for tenders could be issued at once, but that in view of the special position to be established at Tangier and the interest taken by His Majesty's Government in this place, he did not wish to take any step in the matter without first ascertaining privately whether we were willing that tenders should be called for now, or

whether we preferred to let the matter stand over until the arrangements regarding Tangier had been concluded and the municipality established.

I thanked M. Porché for his courteous communication, and said that though at first sight it appeared to me advantageous that the work should be commenced without delay, it might be better not to definitely settle such important works until the future municipality had had an opportunity of considering them. I should therefore prefer not to express any definite opinion until I had had time to think the matter over.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[13296] No. 138.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 61.)
Sir, *Tangier, March 23, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 56 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report that when M. Porché came to see me in connection with the proposed Tangier waterworks, he reverted to the subject of the Casa Blanca lighter shelter. He said that unless the work was actually commenced within a month from the present date he did not see how the jetty could possibly be completed before the autumn storms.

I observed that I could not understand why the matter had not been taken in hand at an earlier date, as the necessity for a shelter for lighters at Casa Blanca had been evident for a long time past. In December a scheme for the construction of a basin had been put before the Adjudication Committee, who had been asked to enter into a contract for the work at once without any adjudication. Mr. Rattigan pressed for adjudication with a short term of notice. If this had been agreed to, the work could have been commenced by now, but the Public Works Department had then suddenly condemned the scheme and put forward the much more important one of a jetty with quays and terrepleins. If the first scheme was bad, why had it been put forward, and why had not the present scheme been put forward in December instead of the basin scheme?

M. Porché replied that the basin scheme had been proposed by the local engineer at Casa Blanca and the naval authorities, and had been adopted by the Public Works Department here during his absence at Paris, but that when it was communicated to him, he saw that it was not practicable and substituted the jetty scheme. In this, however, I think M. Porché is not entirely accurate. He was, I know, always opposed to the basin scheme, but I understand that he had been brought to accept it, though reluctantly, before it was submitted to the Adjudications Committee.

M. Porché continued that though he had desired for some time past to build the jetty, quays, and terrepleins in accordance with the present scheme, he had not wished to risk commencing the work until some protection could be afforded to them by the extension of the main mole in course of construction. He had indeed commenced work on it experimentally by depositing large blocks of stone as foundation, but found it useless to continue, as the stones were at once washed away by the sea. The cranes at Casa Blanca were not powerful enough to move very large blocks of concrete, so he had purchased a titan crane suitable for the work, and had pushed forward the mole, intending to construct the jetty, &c., in the summer of 1913. The numerous and fully justified complaints he had received in the autumn from merchants, ship-owners, Contrôle de la Dette, and others regarding the paralysation of trade owing to the destruction of lighters and tugs by the exceptional storms of last autumn and to the deficiency of quays had, however, forced him to undertake the construction of a shelter at once, notwithstanding the risks and greater cost of constructing the jetty before more protection was obtained from the very heavy seas prevalent on that coast. It was on these grounds that he claimed urgency under article 24 (5) of the Adjudications Regulations, as he could not have foreseen that the work would have to be undertaken this summer instead of in 1913 as he had intended.

I reminded M. Porché that in your reply to M. Cambon of the 12th ultimo, you had explained why you could not admit that the above-mentioned article could be held to apply.

M. Porché then proceeded to explain to me that when he was informed by M. Poincaré that you had, as it was understood in Paris, agreed to contracts without adjudication being entered into for (1) concrete blocks, (2) construction of jetty, quays, and terrepleins, and (3) caissons of reinforced cement, he had immediately entered into

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communication with three French firms who were in a position to do the work satisfactorily, and who, being acquainted with Casa Blanca, could make their calculations without having to visit that place, and invited them to present tenders for the work. He had inserted in the conditions a penal clause providing for payment of a fine of 1,000 fr. for every day beyond the dates fixed for completion of the works, viz.: the 15th September for the jetty, the 1st March of next year for the quays and a strip of terrepleins behind them of a breadth of 50 metres, and the 1st July for the remainder of the terrepleins. He was entirely at a loss to understand how the mistake as to the three lots had occurred, and "installation of plant" had been substituted for "construction of jetty, quays, and terrepleins."

I told M. Porché that I would acquaint you with what he had told me, but that a very important principle was involved, and it would be difficult to yield on it. We were in no way responsible for the mistake that had occurred as to the three lots, as we accepted what the French chargé d'affaires told us; you would not have given your consent had the construction of practically the whole work been included in the three lots.

This morning, after receipt of your telegram No. 14, I called on M. de Billy and found M. Porché with him. They had heard from Paris that you maintained your decision that all the work except (1) concrete blocks, (2) caissons of reinforced concrete, and (3) installation of plant should be given out by adjudication. M. Porché appeared much disturbed, and said that if there was to be adjudication the construction of the jetty could not possibly be begun before the end of July and but little progress could be effected by the middle of August, so that there would be no shelter for lighters and tugs from the storms of next winter, when the losses of merchants and ship-owners would probably be heavier than ever. I observed that if it was now too late for any benefit to be derived from haste, it appeared to me that it would be better to allow more time and to carry out the adjudication in the ordinary way, by publishing a "cahier des charges" and allowing ample time for engineers to study the question on the spot and prepare their tenders.

M. Porché, however, did not agree with this, and said that in any case a beginning should be made as soon as possible, as a portion of the jetty would be better than none at all. He then made another proposal which he asked me to submit to you. This was that a third of the jetty should be contracted for at once and tenders invited for the remainder of the jetty, the quays, and terrepleins. In this manner some progress would be made with the jetty pending the adjudication, and the engineer who ultimately obtained the contract would start with a third of the jetty already completed; there would thus be a better chance of the jetty being concluded before the autumn storms. He added that this course would add considerably to the expense, but that was a lesser evil which must be faced.

I asked M. Porché to give me a note in writing explaining his new proposal and promised to submit it to you. I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the note subsequently given to me by M. Porché.

I expressed no opinion whatever to Mr. Porché on this proposal, but I venture to submit that it is most desirable to find some solution, if it is possible to do so, without sacrificing the principle of adjudication, as the matter is one of great importance to British merchants and ship-owners, whose losses have recently been very heavy owing to the deficiencies of the lighter service, which cannot be put upon a satisfactory footing until shelter is afforded for lighters and tugs and additional quay space is provided.

After M. Porché's departure, I enquired of M. de Billy if he could explain the mistake which had occurred with regard to the three lots. He replied that he was quite unable to do so, as in the telegram he had received from M. Poincaré the lots were stated as quoted by him to Sir Reginald Lister. M. de Billy must have been referring to an earlier telegram, as in that of the 21st ultimo the three lots comprised the construction of the jetty, quays, and terrepleins. M. de Billy, however, may not have received this telegram until after he had dispatched his letter of that date to the doyen.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 138.

Note respecting Casa Blanca Lighter Shelter.

LES trois lots prévus constituaient l'ensemble des travaux de l'abri de Casablanca. Il n'avait pas été envisagé d'autres travaux préparatoires que ceux du premier lot de confection de blocs, adjugé par la Commission des Adjudications le 16 mars.

Si on mettait l'ensemble des travaux en adjudication il ne pourrait commencer avant la fin de juillet; en effet, les délais, même aussi réduits que possible, devront permettre aux concurrents de se rendre à Casablanca pour étudier l'affaire; l'adjudicataire devra ensuite acheter et amener sur place le matériel spécial nécessaire et recruter du personnel. Comme on ne peut espérer travailler en mer à Casablanca après le 15 septembre, les travaux seraient à peine commencés l'hiver prochain, et la situation actuelle se reproduirait en s'aggravant.

Dans ces conditions, on pourrait admettre la division des travaux en deux tranches: la première, consistant en une centaine de mètres de jetée et coûtant environ 400,000 fr., ferait immédiatement l'objet d'un marché de gré à gré; la seconde, comprenant le reste de la jetée, les quais et les terre-pleins, d'un total de 1,200,000 fr., serait mise en adjudication avec délai restreint.

Il n'est pas possible de réduire la première tranche à moins de 400,000 fr. pour des travaux qui exigent l'amortissement d'un matériel spécial important: le chiffre de 400,000 fr. est déjà faible à ce point de vue.

On calmerait ainsi l'opinion publique, et on poursuivrait les travaux en attendant les délais d'adjudication de la tranche principale.

[13297] No. 139.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 62.)

Tangier, March 23, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 55 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez in regard to the Sultan's alleged intention to abdicate rather than sign a protectorate treaty. In a telegram received this day Mr. MacLeod states that His Majesty continues to maintain the same attitude.

Dr. Verdon, who is in touch with a number of persons in the Sultan's entourage, gives me similar information, and states that the Sultan is showing great hostility towards the French, with whom he is much enraged owing to the language held to him by M. Gaillard in regard to his land speculations and also as to his extravagance in building, on which he is engaged on an extensive scale. It is said that when Mulai Hafid observed that he was free to spend his money as he liked, M. Gaillard retorted that it was not his money, but that of the State.

Sid el Menebhi, and, indeed, all the Moors who have correspondents at Fez, have received reports to the same effect, and it would appear that the Sultan has purposely made as public as possible his intention to abdicate. His Majesty is very cunning, and it is quite possible that he is playing a part with a two-fold object: first, to bluff the French and obtain as favourable terms as possible for himself personally, and, secondly, to win popularity with his people and lead them to believe that he resisted to the last, and only yielded to the inevitable when further resistance was useless. M. Regnault will doubtless have a difficult task and will require all his tact, but I think that he will succeed in obtaining the acceptance of his treaty by Mulai Hafid; but, on the other hand, with a man of His Majesty's temperament, it is difficult to see what may happen, and it is quite possible that if he fails to obtain favourable terms for himself His Majesty may carry out his threat to abdicate.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 139.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 17.)

Fez, March 16, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 14 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to call attention to certain further indications of the Sultan's hostility to the proposals of the ensuing French mission to Fez.

There are so many stories current, and with so many particulars which may be mere embellishment, that it would be hazardous to state any detail as certainly true; but the general facts are that the Sultan removed from the Palace proper at New Fez to

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the Betta Gardens in Old Fez a few days ago. Since then he has continued removing his household valuables thither and is giving out that he intends to live there permanently, and is resolved to abdicate rather than assent to Morocco becoming a French protectorate.

He is reported also to be gathering in all the jewellery worn by his female entourage, and to be reducing his establishment considerably by sending away old female dependents and slaves.

Another explanation of this conduct is, that the Sultan fears that the French may demand the Betta Gardens for use as a residency (for which indeed they would be most suitable), and so he seeks to forestall this by occupying them himself, feeling that the French would scarcely instal the resident in the Palace.

The proposed military arrangements by which the Makhzen troops will be included amongst the forces at the disposal of the French general and steps which the French are reported to have begun to take in Mequinez district for the payment of the "tertib" have also, it is said, greatly displeased the Sultan.

Though these subjects are commonly talked about in the town, there is no sign yet of any popular feeling arising in his favour.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[13292] No. 140.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, March 28, 1912.*

FRENCH Ambassador communicated to-day to Minister for Foreign Affairs draft convention of eleven articles concerning organisation of Tangier municipality. His Excellency has given me a copy, and I understand from him that details are to be worked out at Madrid by consultation between Minister for Foreign Affairs, French Ambassador, and myself.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[13874] No. 141.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 26.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, March 29, 1912.*

THE Spanish Ambassador said to-day that M. Poincaré had spoken of a rupture of negotiations between France and Spain about Morocco as being possible, and the French had given it to be understood that, if they did break off negotiations, they would have our support, and we would have nothing more to say on behalf of Spain. He explained the difficulty which Spain had in offering more than she had already offered.

I said that we had not exchanged with the French Government any views of the purport described.

The Ambasssador asked me whether I had any suggestion to make.

I replied that I had not studied the matter closely on the map recently. I must find out exactly how things stood.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[12875] No. 142.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. White.

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 30, 1912.*

TANGIER municipality.

French Government consider that British proposals give too wide authority to committee of control composed of foreign representatives, and want to restrict its

powers of intervention to cases of infringement of treaties or statutes of municipality and violation of principle of international equality. They urge that otherwise political considerations will tend to predominate in municipal affairs with undesirable results. I think there is force in this argument.

For the same reason they object to any system of nomination of members of council by foreign representatives or Governments. They agree to give up nomination of Moorish members by Sultan, but wish to fix their number at one-third, or at least one-fourth, of total of twenty-four, leaving them to be elected by Tangier notables, whilst of remaining members not more than four would be allowed to belong to the same nationality.

If principle of election by notables should be acceptable I should be disposed to adopt it, but to allow only four Moors to be so elected, leaving twenty members to be freely chosen by foreign residents, with maximum of four for any one nationality.

Please let me have your observations on above several points.

[13292] No. 143.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, March 30, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 21 of 28th March: Organisation of Tangier municipality.

His Majesty's Government are considering French draft convention, and will shortly submit observations thereon. Whilst agreeing generally, they feel objections to several of the proposals.

In any case, the three Governments can only agree on broad lines of project; details must be worked out at Tangier. I will shortly telegraph instructions to you.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 138.)

[13745] No. 144.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Madrid, March 28, 1912.*

ALTHOUGH M. Geoffray has not yet received from his Government a definite reply to the last Spanish proposals respecting the territorial compensation due by Spain to France in Morocco, he has been supplied with a memorandum, commenting on those proposals in the light of two sketch maps which have been drawn up to show how difficult it is to form a clear idea of what it is that Spain really offers. His Excellency kindly enables me to forward you herewith a copy of this memorandum. I also enclose copy of one of the sketch maps. The memorandum states that Wady Aim, the eastern limit of the proposed new frontier line in the neighbourhood of the Uarga, is not to be found even in the Spanish map. It assumes that Wady Amellil is meant, but shows that, if this is the case, the new line, if drawn on the French staff map, would deprive the French zone of a piece of territory about equal to the piece surrendered. The Spanish line, in short, cannot be intelligibly transferred to any other existing map. The wadys or rivers indicated cannot be identified with any certainty; the frontier line, even accepting the Spanish map as accurate, is drawn a great deal too far to the south; and the present geographical knowledge of Northern Morocco is too meagre to allow the physical features of the country to be fixed even approximately.

M. Geoffray informs me that, pending the receipt of definite instructions, he intends advising the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to abandon for the present the apparently hopeless task of delimiting the two zones by any hard and fast line drawn across the practically unknown region in dispute between the two countries. He thinks this task should be left for a future time, when the precise source of the Uarga and its affluents, as well as the nature and position of the other principal features of the region, shall have been determined by a mixed commission appointed for the purpose. His Excellency will also continue to urge that the Spanish Government should declare at once their readiness to cede to France a much more

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extensive stretch of coast-line than that which is offered in the proposals made on the 20th instant.

Señor Garcia Prieto is aware that, in my opinion, it would be well to offer as far south as the mouth of the Wady Dra.

Meanwhile, the progress of events in the Riff country, and especially the losses sustained in the recent fruitless engagement related in Colonel Fairholme's report forwarded in my despatch No. 49 of the 25th instant, have given rise in the Madrid press to severe comments on the manner in which the Riff campaign has been conducted from its commencement in 1909 to the present time. Though the opinion has been often expressed that the hostility of the Riffians will be disarmed by the conclusion of the hoped-for treaty between France and Spain much doubt on this point is now beginning to be displayed, and the Government is beginning to be called upon to explain more clearly than it has yet done what is the true objective of its military policy in Morocco, and whether the country is to understand that the accomplishment of that policy, whatever it may be, will require indefinitely the employment, as at present, of over 40,000 of the best Spanish troops in the Riff region alone.

Señor Canalejas, in his interview with the representatives of the press, has sought to minimise the significance of the recent reverse, and to throw on the military authorities the responsibility for the present state of affairs. He does not deny, however, that the Government is considerably pre-occupied with the Riff question, and it is generally believed that extensive preparations are already being made in view of military operations on an enlarged scale being shortly undertaken in the basin of Wady Kert. General Weyler's sudden return to Madrid a few days ago from Barcelona, where he commands the military district, is thought in some quarters to point to his designation eventually to take over the command of the Spanish forces in the Riff. The Government disclaim any present intention to remove him from his Barcelona command.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[13295] No. 145.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, April* 1, 1912.

MY despatch No. 37 of the 23rd March: Tangier waterworks.

On reconsideration of the matter, and having regard to the fact that there is no special urgency, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the tenders should be postponed, as suggested in your telegram No. 23 of 21st March, until after the new municipality has come into existence.

[13295] No. 146.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 161.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 1, 1912.

SINCE my despatch No. 146 of the 23rd ultimo was sent off, I have learnt from His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tangier that there is no special urgency in the matter of the proposed contracts for the Tangier water-works In these circumstances, it appears on reconsideration preferable that the tenders should be postponed until after the new municipality has come into existence, and Mr. White has accordingly been so informed. It will not therefore be necessary for your Excellency to make any communication to the French Government in the matter for the present.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14177] No. 147.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 1, 1912.

THE Spanish Ambassador told me to-day that the French Government had now sent their reply as to the proposed arrangements in Morocco, but it took matters no further forward. All the French Government did was to put in black and white the concessions which they had already offered verbally; they abandoned the request for the Cap de l'Eau and for certain territory in connection with the Lukus, south of Larache, and for territory in the south outside the limits of Morocco. The Ambassador feared that there would be a deadlock.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[14178] No. 148.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 1, 1912.

THE Spanish Ambassador said to-day that he wished to speak to me privately and very confidentially about Tangier. The French proposals would not do at all: eight Moors and four Frenchmen on the board would practically give the French a representation of twelve and the control of Tangier.

I said that we had objections to some of the details of the French proposal, and the number of Moors suggested was one of the points which we should raise.

The Ambassador then asked me whether I thought that Spain might not claim Tangier for the Spanish zone. He told me that you had said that such a solution would be quite consistent with British interests, but that the French would be sure to oppose it.

I said that the French would certainly oppose it, and we could not support it, as we were pledged to a solution by internationalisation.

The Ambassador replied that he understood this, and did not expect our support, nor did he expect that France would accept what he suggested; but it might be useful to put it forward as an element in the negotiations. Spain would, however, not do even this if it was likely to be disagreeable to us.

I said that *primâ facie* it seemed to me that such a proposal would produce only irritation. As the Ambassador continued to press me on the subject, I told him that, as the proposal was quite new to me, I could not say anything more at present except that we were pledged to a solution by internationalisation, and could not support anything else.

He asked whether he might come to see me on Thursday next week (the 10th), and whether in the interval I would consider what he had said.

To this I agreed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[13983] No. 149.

M. de Fleuriau to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 2.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 1er avril, 1912.

M le Secrétaire d'État,

LES ratifications de la convention franco-allemande relative au Maroc, dont l'Ambassade de France a communiqué à votre Excellence le texte définitif à la date du 22 novembre, 1911, ont été échangées à Paris le 12 mars dernier. M. le Président de la République a signé, le 13 du même mois, un décret portant promulgation de cet acte diplomatique.

J'ai l'honneur d'en informer officiellement votre Excellence, pour me conformer aux instructions de mon Gouvernement.

Veuillez, &c.
M. DE FLEURIAU.

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[14079] No. 150.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 51.)

Sir, *Madrid, March 29, 1912.*

SEÑOR GARCIA PRIETO informed me at his weekly reception this morning that the conversation which he had just held with the French Ambassador had not led to any advance being made in the negotiation. As M. Geoffray was not yet in a position to communicate a reply to the last Spanish proposals, the Spanish Government would certainly abstain from making any fresh suggestions. The offer made on the 20th instant was a serious offer, and Señor Garcia Prieto had expected an early and serious rejoinder. All that M. Geoffray had been able to show him had been some sketch maps of the Uarga region, illustrating the difficulty of defining an accurate frontier in the present state of the geographical knowledge of the country. He had made no other commentary on the Spanish offer, and he seemed to adhere to M. Poincaré's quite inacceptable demand for the surrender by Spain of the entire basin of the Uarga.

I said I was sorry that there should be a hitch on the mere question of who was to make the next move. The French sketch maps, which I had also seen, certainly seemed to show that it was premature to talk of drawing an accurate frontier line. Why, I asked, should not Spain propose that the district in dispute should be first surveyed by a mixed commission appointed *ad hoc*? Meanwhile, it would be enough to agree generally that the course of the Uarga, and not the watershed between that river and Wady Inauen, should form the basis of the eventual line of demarcation between the two zones. A suggestion of this kind, coupled with an offer to let France have the Atlantic coast line of the Spanish zone down to Wady Dra, would constitute a substantial proposal, affording proof of the intention of Spain to make a serious contribution towards the sacrifice, which France had made in order to liberate Morocco from the incubus of Germany.

Señor Garcia Prieto demurred to making any further proposal at all until he received an answer from Paris, showing that France was in a mood to discuss the question with Spain in a spirit of equity. Hitherto, the French attitude had been that of the strong Power expecting immediate compliance from the weak. Spain might be led to increase her offer by fair discussion, but not by any form of menace. M. Regnault's hasty mission to Fez was a French attempt to cut the Gordian knot with the sword. It was outrageous to set up a protectorate before the formal repeal of the Algeciras settlement had been secured. M. Geoffray had also communicated a draft convention concerning Tangier. It appeared to Señor Garcia Prieto, at first sight, to place the chief control in French hands, for the Moorish town councillors, however selected, would be French puppets. Moreover, it left the door open to further encroachments on the Spanish zone. No one could say how far the limits of the Tangier district would be extended into the interior. The document required careful study, but he did not at all like the look of it.

Señor Garcia Prieto asked me why England objected to Tangier being administered like any other town in the Spanish zone. I discouraged the idea, which his Excellency is fond of putting forward, that a solution of the difficulty might be found by handing over Tangier to Spain. The secret convention between France and Spain of October 1904 had settled the question by stipulating that Tangier should retain its "special position." This was not an English proposal, for the secret articles of the Anglo-French treaty of April 1904 had apparently contemplated the inclusion of Tangier in the Spanish sphere of influence. But England had accepted the Franco-Spanish treaty, and there was no probability that either she or France would now listen to any other settlement of the Tangier question than one based on the principle of internationalisation. England did not wish Tangier to become French and France did not wish it to become Spanish. Internationalisation was the accepted compromise.

His Excellency seemed discouraged. Though evidently desiring a settlement with France, he fears that unless the French Government adopt a more conciliatory attitude, a rupture may prove inevitable.

I endeavoured to convince his Excellency that, if Spain desires to be in the right, she will be well advised to consider whether she cannot make some further territorial concession to France.

On leaving the Foreign Minister's room, I had some conversation with the French Ambassador. He would personally accept a settlement on the lines of my suggestion

to Señor Garcia Prieto. He told me, however, that his last instructions did not permit him to abandon the demand for the whole valley of the Uarga. He had therefore not been able himself to propose the appointment of a mixed commission to study the configuration of the Uarga district, but he quite approved me having done so. He will endeavour to elicit from his Government a reply to the last Spanish propositions of a kind to facilitate further negotiations.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[14198] No. 151.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 3.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, April 3, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Fez, 3rd April:—

"According to French Minister and Grand Vizier, treaty on the lines of Treaty of Bardo was signed 31st March. Signature kept secret here. Meanwhile mission remain until 23rd April."

French chargé d'affaires now confirms the news, although until yesterday they assured His Majesty's chargé d'affaires that no telegram reporting signature had been received from the French Minister, nor had any passed through from him to Paris.

[14435] No. 152.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 67.)

Sir, *Tangier, March 28, 1912.*

I LEARN from the print of Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch No. 35 of the 5th instant, which, owing to the wreck of the "Oceana," has only just reached me, that the French members of the commission sitting at Madrid proposed that duties paid in the ports subject to Spanish control on imported goods destined for consumption in the French zone should accrue to the benefit of the French zone.

I venture to point out that, should this principle be admitted and applied to Tangier, this place would be left with but very little revenue to be derived from customs duties. With the exception of such objects as groceries, wines, and other articles of local consumption, all goods imported at Tangier are destined for Fez, Mequinez, and other parts of the interior. Moreover, once the principle is admitted as regards imports, its extension to exports would naturally follow, and there again Tangier would be a serious loser, for nearly all the exports come originally from beyond the limited *banlieue* that is to be ascribed to Tangier.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

[14436] No. 153.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 68.)

Sir, *Tangier, March 29, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 61 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to report that upon receipt of your telegram No. 15 of the 25th instant I called upon the French chargé d'affaires and informed him that if the other foreign representatives likewise gave their consent, I was authorised to agree to a "marché de gré à gré" for the first hundred metres of the Casa Blanca jetty, provided that the cost did not exceed 400,000 fr. and that the remainder of the works were at once put out to public tender. I pointed out that, had the suggestion we made last December been accepted, the work would have been started by this time, and I added that His Majesty's Government felt that they had reason to complain of the treatment they had received, and that it was only out of consideration for the French Government that they accepted these successive proposals; they trusted, therefore,

that the present one was final and that they would not be asked to make any more concessions.

M. de Billy looked ill at ease on receiving this communication, and seemed upset at our acceptance being conditional on that of the other Powers. He wished to authorise the "marché de gré à gré" forthwith without consulting the other representatives, but I gave him clearly to understand that I could not consent to this, and he ultimately agreed to address a letter to the doyen on the subject.

The Dutch Minister, who is acting doyen, subsequently brought me the letter addressed to him by M. de Billy, which was vague and unsatisfactory; it assigned no reason for the change of plans, quoted no length for the jetty to be built by private contract, but merely stated that the cost would be about 400,000 fr., and no mention was made of any penal clause. M. de Rappard said he did not wish to put this letter into circulation before he had seen me, as he did not think that the representatives would accept the new proposals unless it was explained why the change had become necessary and unless more precise particulars were given as to the new proposal. He told me that he had seen M. de Billy and explained this to him, but he would not change his letter, and said that I could, in my annotation on the circular, give the information required. M. de Rappard therefore proposed to send the circular first to me, and asked me to explain all the circumstances and conditions under which I was prepared to give my consent.

By agreement with M. de Rappard I again saw M. de Billy and succeeded in inducing him to redraft his letter, giving more particulars. I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of this letter as modified.

The doyen, in his letter communicating M. de Billy's letter to his colleagues, made no comment on the proposals which it contains. He sent it first to me, and in my annotation I stated that M. Porché had declared to me that it would be impossible to complete the jetty before the autumn unless the work was commenced at once, and that, as it was absolutely necessary to provide a shelter at Casa Blanca for lighters and tugs before the stormy season, I was prepared to accept the proposals contained in M. de Billy's letter if the other representatives agreed to them, provided that the cost of the hundred metres of jetty should not exceed 400,000 fr. and that the remainder of the works were put out to adjudication without delay. I added that it must be clearly understood that the acceptance of a "marché de gré à gré" in the present exceptional circumstances must not be considered to create a precedent, and that the principle of adjudication must be preserved intact.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 153.

M. de Billy to Doyen of the Corps diplomatique.

M. le Doyen, *Tanger, le 27 mars*, 1912.

L'OBLIGATION où l'on se trouve d'activer la construction de l'épi destiné à protéger les barcasses du port de Casablanca et les difficultés rencontrées pour l'exécution des caissons en béton armé prévus dans ma dernière lettre sur ce sujet a amené le chef du Service des Travaux publics à modifier de la manière suivante l'exécution des travaux projetés.

Pendant que la première tranche de travaux sera exécutée par un marché de gré à gré, la procédure des adjudications jouera pour le reste du travail, et il n'y aura pas d'interruption dans la construction de l'épi. Une centaine de mètres de cet ouvrage, jusqu'à concurrence de 400,000 fr. environ, pourra être commencée immédiatement si vous autorisez le marché de gré à gré pour cette tranche. En même temps, un projet d'adjudication pour le reste du travail—c'est-à-dire environ 1,200,000 fr.—sera présenté à la Commission des Adjudications.

J'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir soumettre au corps diplomatique l'approbation des dispositions qui précèdent.

Il est bien entendu que des clauses pénales seront inserées au marché de gré à gré au cas d'inexécution des travaux avant la date où la seconde tranche pourra être commencée.

Veuillez, &c.
ROBERT DE BILLY.

[14437] No. 154.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 6.)

(No. 69.)

Tangier, March 30, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter addressed to the doyen of the diplomatic body by the State Bank, containing a statement of the sums paid into the bank on account of the tax on urban buildings levied at the various ports since the institution of the tax at the commencement of the year 1910.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

Enclosure in No. 154.

State Bank to Doyen of Diplomatic Body.

M. le Président, *Tanger, le 25 mars*, 1912.

NOUS avons l'honneur de vous donner sur le tableau ci-dessous le détail des sommes que nous avons portées au crédit du Conseil sanitaire à Tanger et à celui des différentes municipalités, à la suite de la liquidation des recettes de la taxe urbaine, effectuée d'accord avec M. le Directeur général de cette administration depuis l'origine des perceptions jusqu'au 29 février, 1912 :—

Ports.	Liquidation 30/6.	Liquidation 30/9.	Liquidation 30/11.	Liquidation 29/2.	Totaux.
Tanger	63,534,67	17,574,33	24,307,21	9,676,37	115,092,58
Tétouan	712,64	3,338,32	2,006,22	779,76	6,836,94
Larache	2,089,57	471,43	1,417,66	4,071,69	8,650,35
Rabat	12,915,30	..	1,367,17	6,346,11	20,628,58
Casablanca	29,289,31	5,876,22	5,287,72	168,45	40,621,70
Mazagan	8,664,64	..	..	..	8,664,64
Safi	..	20,624,65	13,710,87	..	34,335,52
Mogador	8,350,62	817,85	11,661,33	..	20,829,80
Totaux (P.H.)	125,556,75	48,702,80	59,758,18	21,042,38	255,060,11

Nous vous prions, &c.
Banque d'État du Maroc :
Le Directeur,
H. GAURAN.

Le Sous-Directeur,
T. CARILLO.

[14439] No. 155.

Mr. White to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 6.)

(No. 71.)

Tangier, April 1, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez regarding Franco-Moorish fighting which has occurred in the Taza district.

I have, &c.
HERBERT E. WHITE.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 155.

Consul MacLeod to Mr. White.

(No. 23.)

Sir,

Fez, March 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum of news just received from Taza district by a native here whom I have often found very well informed.

It will be seen that this news corroborates the reports in the "Dépêche marocaine" of the 15th and 20th instant, and shows that the French had at least six killed. The main points, however, to which I would call attention are the gathering of those tribes at Sidi Mbarek, the excitement which has been raised by these hostilities, and the tribes' precautions against an attack from Fez while they were engaged on the east side of Taza.

It would seem obvious that if this fighting continues it must lead before long to an occupation of Taza.

As yet, so far as I can learn, the French still remain on the east side of the Moulouia river.

I have noticed a number of Hiayna kaïds (or ex-kaïds) frequenting the Bureau de Renseignements militaires here these days, and from remarks made to me by Commandant de Lamothe a minute study of the Fez–Taza route is in progress.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 155.

Memorandum.

ON the 18th and 19th instant, Beni Warain, Ghiata, Ulad-el-Hadj, Arabs of Fahama and Huara, engaged the French at Moulouia. French wanted to cross river. Tribes objected. Ghiata brought in two of themselves dead, and six heads—French soldiers—as trophies to Taza, on Wednesday, 20th instant. The Beni Warain suffered very severely in the affair, and brought back a great many dead to their lands near Taza. A meeting was held on Thursday, 21st instant, of deputations from Ghiata, Beni Warain, Dsul, Branes, Arabs of Huara, and decided that all tribes west of Akba Beni Magara* should form a harka against the French. Defaulters in attending to that decision to be fined 50 dollars each. Thereafter, that harka was formed and went off too Moulouia. The French still remain on east bank of Moulouia. The Taza tribes are tremendously excited over this business. For instance, they decided that any person caught carrying news—spying—or the like would be put to death and his dwelling, &c., be destroyed.

The Spaniards are falling into much contempt in Taza district. Numbers of Guelaya people pretend to join Spaniards, do some plundering, and then come with the booty to Taza tribes. The Taza tribes have no fear of the Spaniards, but only of the French. The Taza tribes quite understand that they are now liable to attack from Fez as well as from the east, and that is why those west of Akba Beni Magara have not been drawn upon for the present hostilities with the French forces east of Taza.

Fez, March 26, 1912.

[14442] No. 156.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 52.)

Sir,

Madrid, April 2, 1912.

I REPORTED in my immediately preceding despatch that the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs was anxiously awaiting a reply from Paris to the last Spanish proposals regarding territorial concessions to the French zone in Morocco. M. Geoffray having represented to his Government that a definite reply was necessary if it was desired to sooth Spanish susceptibilities, his Excellency was enabled by M. Poincaré to communicate a statement to Señor Garcia Prieto on the evening of 30th March. I was

* A hill a few miles west of Taza.

not myself favoured with a copy of this document, but M. Geoffray has since had the goodness to explain its purport to me verbally, and Señor Garcia Prieto allowed me to read the text itself yesterday afternoon when I paid him a visit at the Ministry of State.

The reply takes the form of a fresh French proposal. In the eastern portion of the northern Spanish zone the 1904 frontier line between the two zones is reverted to. In the western portion, parallel 35 north latitude is taken as the frontier from the Atlantic to the river Lucus. In the central portion France renews her demand for the entire basin of the Uarga. M. Geoffray intimated, however, to Señor Garcia Prieto that, if the Spanish Government still felt unable to concede the entire basin of the Uarga, he was prepared to urge upon M. Poincaré the acceptance of a line following, not as at first proposed, the watershed between the Uarga and the Mediterranean, but a ridge of hills running just north of the river along that portion of it which approaches Fez. This would mean that France would surrender her claim to the Upper Uarga, which flows generally in a southerly direction from its source to the point where in the French maps it is made to turn sharply to the west. As regards the southern portion of Morocco, France claims the whole of that part of the Spanish zone which lies to the north of Wady Dra except a small *enclave* at Ifni.

Señor Garcia Prieto expressed to me yesterday his gratification at having elicited a a reply from the French Government. It had been made in courteous terms, and he was now only anxious to proceed with the negotiations. Though he could hold out no hope that the Spanish Cabinet would be able to accept the new French proposal as it stood, he would do his best to induce them to agree to an answer which would give reasonable satisfaction to France. General Jordana, chief of the staff at Melilla, and Colonel Silvestre, military governor of Alcazar, were both arriving that day in Madrid. They were well versed in the geography of Northern Morocco, and he intended to consult with them during Holy Week as to the precise effect and extent of this last French proposal. Meanwhile, he could assure me that on one point the Spanish Government would be inexorable. They could never consent to regard any divergence from the 1904 frontier which they might agree to in their northern zone as forming part of the territorial concession due to France. The latter could only be taken from the southern zone, and any redistribution of territory in the north could only be accepted as a rectification of the frontier in which Spanish concessions at one point would have to be compensated for by French concessions at another. As regards the Uarga, he thought it would be impossible to consent to the frontier being shifted to the ridge along the northern bank of the river. He would have to insist on the river itself being the boundary, and this was already a considerable concession which would require a corresponding rectification elsewhere, perhaps in the region of the Lucus. In the southern zone he did not see how Spain could give way as far as Wady Dra. But he did not wish to prejudge anything, as the Cabinet had not yet been consulted.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[14443] No. 157.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 6.)

(No. 53.)

Sir,

Madrid, April 2, 1912.

IN the course of a conversation which I held yesterday with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, his Excellency spoke somewhat excitedly on the subject of Tangier. Throughout the negotiation with France he reminded me that he had constantly enquired what was being done with regard to that important port. All that M. Geoffray or I had been able to tell him had been that an exchange of views was proceeding between London and Paris as to the best means of investing it with an international constitution. He had never doubted that before adopting a decision on the subject the two Governments in question would invite the Government of Spain, which was at least equally interested in the question, to offer suggestions. But Spain had been simply ignored, and a few days ago M. Geoffray had communicated a cut-and-dried draft convention for acceptance by the Spanish Government. Señor Garcia Prieto could not believe that this document would receive the concurrence of His Majesty's Government as it stood. It appeared to him to hand over Tangier to a scarcely disguised system of French control. The Municipal Council would be French,

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FREE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

for the six or possibly eight Moorish town councillors, however selected, would vote as desired by the Makhzen, and would generally be able, by supporting the French councillors, to secure a majority. The custom-house would be French, for it was evidently intended to keep it under the management of the board of control, a purely French institution, whose activity would no doubt be displayed, as had been the case at Casa Blanca, in placing impediments in the way of all merchandise not consigned to a French firm. Finally, the Tangier–Fez Railway was to be run by a single company in which the prevailing influence would undoubtedly be French. What more was wanting to place the contemplated municipality completely under the control of France? Then what was to be the extent of the new township? His Excellency had no doubt that its needs would be supplied by carving another slice out of the long-suffering Spanish zone, already threatened with partial dismemberment to satisfy the demands of France. Yet all this Spain was expected meekly to accept, though Tangier lay within sight of her coast, and contained more Spaniards than all the other foreign nationalities put together. He greatly desired an agreement with France, but if he tamely acquiesced in this last demand he would deserve to be driven from office by an indignant people. "My ears," he said, "are already singing with the hisses of my countrymen."

I tried to bring Señor Garcia Prieto to a truer comprehension of the situation. I said that, though some points were still under discussion between London and Paris, I had reason to believe that the draft in question represented, in its general lines, the views of His Majesty's Government as to the best obtainable means of securing the internationalisation of Tangier. I thought that his Excellency must have read the draft rather hastily, for he did not seem to me to have realised that the proceedings of the Town Council would be constantly checked by the representatives of the Powers, who had power to intervene at any time to prevent violation of the principle of equality between the nations. Moreover, the Moorish councillors would be in no sense the nominees of the Makhzen, it was impossible to say how they would vote. I was sure that there was no intention on the part of either the British or the French Governments to exclude consideration of any suggestions which Spain might desire to put forward. Only the main principles to be observed in the elaboration of the definite regulations for the government of Tangier had been set forth in the draft. Spain would thus have ample opportunity to make useful suggestions in the course of the discussions which must still take place in Madrid and Tangier before a final result would be reached. Meanwhile it was as much the interest of England as that of Spain to prevent Tangier from becoming a French port. It was hardly likely that His Majesty's Government would have given their consent to arrangements which did not, in their opinion, adequately exclude such a contingency. The draft, moreover, was still subject to modification as the result of the last observations with regard to certain points which I understood from you that His Majesty's Government had submitted to that of France.

Señor Garcia Prieto evidently held fast to his belief that the text before him contained provisions which would enable France to exercise a prevailing influence at Tangier. He said that he intended to call your attention to the matter before it was too late, and would lose no time in sending the necessary instructions to the Spanish Embassy in London.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN

[14630] No. 158.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, April 8, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Fez, dated 6th April, Secret :—

"My telegram of 2nd April.

"I am informed by French Minister that French Government communicated their proposal to His Majesty's Government; this statement appears to be at variance with the reply made to a question in Parliament on the 27th ultimo.

"Moorish authoritative statement of the contents of treaty, save as regards sequence of its nine articles, is as follows :—

"1. Sultan authorises French Government to occupy militarily any part of Morocco, supervise general administration, finance, army, education.

"2. French Government will respect Islam and mosque property. Tangier town remains apart under local council. Sultan recognises rights of Spain under Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish agreements of 1904.

"3. French Government will uphold Sultan personally.

"4. French Government carry out treaty by means of Sultan and Moorish authorities; French submit proposals from time to time for his assent.

"5. French resident in charge of Moorish affairs will reside at Moorish Court.

"6. French officials abroad will protect Moorish subjects.

"7. Budget will be prepared regulating revenue and expenditure.

"8. Sultan will not borrow money nor grant concessions without the assent of the French Government.

"9. Treaty will be submitted to French Government for ratification and legalisation and copy thereof will be furnished to Sultan."

Despatch with comments follows.

[14648] No. 159.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 110.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 4, 1912.*

THE Spanish Ambassador informs me that the Imperial Government will not fill up the vacant post of Russian Minister at Tangier, and that they will leave the legation in charge of a chargé d'affaires till the French protectorate over Morocco has been definitely established. In informing his Excellency of this decision, M. Sazonof remarked that Russia, as the ally of France, wished to be the first to meet her wishes with regard to the protectorate.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[14768] No. 160.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 160.)
Sir, *Paris, April 5, 1912.*

THE Havas Agency publishes the text of the treaty signed at Fez on the 31st ultimo for the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco, and I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the treaty extracted from the "Figaro."

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 160.

Extract from the "Figaro" of April 5, 1912.

TEXTE DU TRAITÉ.

VOICI le texte du traité instituant le régime du protectorat de la France au Maroc :—

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan, soucieux d'établir au Maroc un régime régulier, basé sur l'ordre intérieur et la sécurité générale, qui permette l'introduction des réformes et assure le développement économique du pays, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement de la République française et Sa Majesté le Sultan sont d'accord pour instituer au Maroc un nouveau régime comportant les réformes administratives, judiciaires, scolaires, économiques, financières et militaires que le Gouvernement français jugera utile d'introduire sur le territoire marocain.

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Ce régime sauvegardera la situation religieuse, le respect et le prestige traditionnel du Sultan, l'exercice de la religion musulmane et des institutions religieuses, notamment de celle des habous. Il comportera l'organisation d'un Makhzen chérifien réformé.

Le Gouvernement de la république se concertera avec le Gouvernement espagnol au sujet des intérêts que ce Gouvernement tient de sa position géographique et de ses possessions territoriales sur la côte marocaine.

De même, la ville de Tanger gardera le caractère spécial qui lui a été reconnu et qui déterminera son organisation municipale.

ARTICLE 2.

Sa Majesté le Sultan admet dès maintenant que le Gouvernement français procède, après avoir prévenu le Makhzen, aux occupations militaires du territoire marocain qu'il jugerait nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité des transactions commerciales et qu'il exerce toute action de police sur terre et dans les eaux marocaines.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Gouvernement de la république prend l'engagement de prêter un constant appui à Sa Majesté chérifienne contre tout danger qui menacerait sa personne ou son Trône ou qui compromettrait la tranquillité de ses États. Le même appui sera prêté à l'héritier du Trône et à ses successeurs.

ARTICLE 4.

Les mesures que nécessitera le nouveau régime de protectorat seront édictées, sur la proposition du Gouvernement français, par Sa Majesté chérifienne ou par les autorités auxquelles elle aura délégué le pouvoir. Il en sera de même des règlements nouveaux et des modifications aux règlements existants.

ARTICLE 5.

Le Gouvernement français sera représenté auprès de Sa Majesté chérifienne par un commissaire résident général, dépositaire de tous les pouvoirs de la république au Maroc, qui veillera à l'exécution du présent accord.

Le commissaire résident général sera le seul intermédiaire du Sultan auprès des représentants étrangers et dans les rapports que ces représentants entretiennent avec le Gouvernement marocain. Il sera, notamment, chargé de toutes les questions intéressant les étrangers dans l'Empire chérifien.

Il aura le pouvoir d'approuver et de promulguer, au nom du Gouvernement français, tous les décrets rendus par Sa Majesté chérifienne.

ARTICLE 6.

Les agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France seront chargés de la représentation et de la protection des sujets et des intérêts marocains à l'étranger.

Sa Majesté le Sultan s'engage à ne conclure aucun acte ayant un caractère international sans l'assentiment préalable du Gouvernement de la République française.

ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement de la République française et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté chérifienne se réservent de fixer d'un commun accord les bases d'une réorganisation financière qui, en respectant les droits conférés aux porteurs des titres des emprunts publics marocains, permette de garantir les engagements du Trésor chérifien et de percevoir régulièrement les revenus de l'Empire.

ARTICLE 8.

Sa Majesté chérifienne s'interdit de contracter à l'avenir, directement et indirectement, aucun emprunt public ou privé et d'accorder, sous une forme quelconque, aucune concession sans l'autorisation du Gouvernement français.

[13408]

No. 161.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 172.)

Foreign Office, April 9, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 152 of the 26th March, I transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a memorandum communicated by the French Ambassador at this Court respecting the contracts for the port works at Casa Blanca.

Sir Arthur Nicolson gave M. Cambon, in reply to this communication, a summary of Mr. White's telegram No. 25 of the 23rd March recording the suggestion of the State engineer that the first 100 metres of the jetty should be contracted for at once, without adjudication, and that the remainder of the jetty and the other works should be subject to adjudication. Sir Arthur Nicolson also gave his Excellency the substance of my telegram No. 15 of the 25th March to Mr. White, in which I agreed to the above suggestion, under reservations and protest, adding that these telegrams must have crossed his present communication. M. Cambon said that the above put a new light on the matter, and that he would refer again to his Government.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 161.

Memorandum communicated by M. Cambon, March 29, 1912.

LA difficulté qui s'est élevée au sujet de la construction de la darse-abri de Casablanca résulte d'un malentendu portant sur la nature et l'étendue des travaux reconnus urgents et soustraits, en raison de leur extrême urgence, à l'application du principe de l'adjudication.

Ces travaux consisteraient, d'après une note adressée à Paris le 20 de ce mois à M. Poincaré par son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, dans l'installation du matériel, la préparation de blocs de maçonnerie, la construction de caissons de ciment renforcé.

Or, il résulte d'une communication émanant du directeur des Services des Travaux publics du Maroc et transmise le 23 de ce mois à M. Poincaré que l'administration compétente n'a jamais prévu une telle division des travaux immédiats projetés à Casablanca, et que des raisons techniques rendent même cette division impossible.

A l'exception d'un lot d'ailleurs très restreint de préparation de blocs (30,000 fr.), il n'a jamais été prévu et il ne peut y avoir de travaux " préparatoires." Ce n'est pas successivement, mais bien simultanément que doivent être adjugés et exécutés les deux autres lots, qui constituent le reste des travaux, à savoir, la construction d'une jetée et de quais par l'emploi de la maçonnerie (1,000,000 de francs) et au moyen de caissons en béton armé (400,000 fr.). Pour gagner du temps et permettre l'achèvement complet des travaux avant l'hiver prochain, les deux lots ci-dessus définis doivent être entrepris en même temps, poursuivis simultanément, et, pour les mêmes raisons aussi, adjugés à un seul et même entrepreneur. C'est pour cet ensemble de travaux déterminés que l'administration compétente sollicite l'autorisation de passer un marché de gré à gré.

A défaut de cette autorisation, il lui faudrait mettre au concours le même ensemble de travaux, et il est à peine besoin d'indiquer quelle perte de temps il en résulterait. Les délais d'adjudication devraient permettre aux concurrents de se rendre à Casablanca ; l'adjudication devrait ensuite constituer et amener sur place le matériel, recruter et transporter le personnel nécessaire. L'exécution ne pourrait commencer avant la fin de juillet au plus tôt, et le travail ne pourrait être poursuivi après le 15 septembre, la partie terminée à cette époque serait très peu importante.

La division considérée comme possible par le Gouvernement britannique entraînerait des inconvénients non moins fâcheux. Les mêmes délais seraient nécessaires avant de pouvoir entreprendre le lot de travaux qui, n'ayant pas été adjugés de gré à gré, devrait être mis au concours ; et les installations qu'exige la sécurité des navires seraient encore loin d'être terminées avant le commencement de l'hiver prochain. En outre, il serait très douteux que les entrepreneurs, disposés à soumissionner pour l'ensemble de l'ouvrage, consentissent à se charger seulement d'une fraction minime des travaux, exigeant de leur part des dépenses coûteuses de matériel et de personnel.

* Also to Sir R. Lister (No. 43), *mutatis mutandis*.

Il est donc certain que, si le Gouvernement britannique n'étend pas à l'ensemble des travaux ci-dessus déterminés le bénéfice de la concession qu'il s'est montré disposé à faire pour une partie d'entre eux, la navigation maritime ne trouvera pas de longtemps à Casablanca le minimum de conditions que le service compétent avait en vue de lui offrir le plus tôt possible. Et il est malheureusement probable d'ores et déjà que, par suite des délais résultant des pourparlers actuels, l'abri projeté à Casablanca ne pourra pas être livré à l'époque prévue.

Dans ces conditions, l'Ambassadeur de France ne peut qu'appeler de nouveau la plus sérieuse attention du Gouvernement britannique sur le caractère d'extrême urgence que présentent les travaux projetés à Casablanca et sur les graves inconvénients qu'il y aurait à ce que l'ouvrage en question ne fût pas, l'hiver prochain, assez avancé pour offrir au moins au matériel d'acconage une protection suffisante. Le Gouvernement français ne ferait évidemment pas abandon, pour solder la dépense de ces travaux, d'une somme qui lui appartient en propre, s'il n'en considérait pas l'exécution immédiate comme absolument nécessaire.

Dans le cas où, pour des raisons indépendantes de sa volonté, la construction de la darse-abri de Casablanca ne pouvait être achevée en temps utile, le Gouvernement de la république ne pourrait être rendu responsable d'un retard dont le commerce anglais, comme celui des autres nations, supporterait les conséquences.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 28 *mars*, 1912.

[15530] No. 162.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 33.) *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1912.

Sir,

THE Spanish Ambassador left with me to-day the following draft of the answer which his Government proposed to send to the French proposal for the internationalisation of Tangier. He wished us to see it first, as his Government would not send it in until they knew our opinion, which they desired to have as soon as possible.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 162.

Observations of the Spanish Government upon the French Draft with respect to Tangier.

(Translation.)
(Strictly Confidential.)

Article 1.—(*a.*) What treaties bind England in connection with the question of Tangier? How far is England disposed to enter as a party into the arrangement defining the juridical situation of that town?

(*b.*) The special character of Tangier does not go so far as to place that town outside the Spanish zone. It seems natural that it should be the administration of that zone which should promulgate the municipal constitution of Tangier.

(*c.*) The "powers" of the municipality relate, of course, to local questions.

Article 2.—If, in assigning to Tangier sufficient territory to ensure "its being provided with water for drinking purposes," it is intended that the municipal district shall include the springs which steps are now being taken to utilise, the result would be that, on the south-west, even the radius of 15 kilom. of which France spoke in September would not be sufficient. Such a diminution of the territory under the general régime of the Spanish zone is not at all needed, nor would it be acceptable. A radius of 6 kilom. from the limits of the area within which the town police tabor now exercises its duties would be more than equitable.

The Spanish Government would consent forthwith to allow the utilisation of the springs, as already projected, even though they should be situated outside the municipal district.

Article 3.—The number of Moorish councillors should be fixed at six. The eighteen others should be elected in common by all foreigners of full age under their own national laws, who could read and write and who had been resident for four years in Tangier. No limit to the representation of each nationality. Anything else would convert the municipality into a political body, to the prejudice of the colonies which have the greatest interests in the towns.

Article 4.—See the preceding observations.

Article 5.—The president should be appointed, from amongst the councillors, by the administration of the zone in which Tangier forms an enclave.

Article 6.—Infractions interest perhaps the diplomatic and consular body accredited at Tangier, but they do not interest less the administration of the zone in which Tangier forms an enclave. A right of censure or intervention analogous to that exercised by the said body therefore belongs to the administration of the zone, and in any case that administration, on its own initiative or at the request of the majority of the official foreign agents, is in the best position to put in practice the necessary measures intended to restrain the municipality within the limit of their functions.

In this connection, admitting the right of censure on the part of the diplomatic and consular body, see observations on article 3 above.

Article 7.—The customs will be under the administration of the Spanish zone, of whose fiscal frontier they form a part, otherwise serious damage would result to the interests of that zone and even considerable impediments to trade in general. On the other hand, there is no reason why a portion, to be determined, of the profits of the tobacco monopoly should not belong to the municipality. The rights of the holders of the loans would, of course, be safeguarded.

Article 8.—The Spanish zone alone surrounding Tangier, there is no reason for agreements except between the municipality and that administration of the zone.

Article 9.—The administration of justice between and over natives now, and between and over foreigners when the present rights of jurisdiction have been modified in accordance with article 9 of the Franco-German Agreement, should, it would seem, properly belong to the administration of the Spanish zone, as also the right of protecting abroad natives of Tangier not being subjects of other Powers.

Article 10.—It is not understood for what reason it is suggested that the Makhzen of the French zone should intervene in the matter. In general, and as it is not probable that the municipality of Tangier would issue regulations governing all the questions, nor necessary that they should do so, it would be desirable to lay down the principle that in all matters which had not been dealt with by special local regulations, the provisions should be applied which are in force in the zone in which Tangier is an enclave.

Article 11.—Will military forces be able to enter Tangier?

[15531] No. 163.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 34.) *Foreign Office, April* 11, 1912.

Sir,

THE Spanish Ambassador informed me to-day that his Government had given in Paris yesterday their latest proposals to the French Government about territory in Morocco. M. Poincaré had said that he was very much disappointed, and had again spoken as if the negotiations might be broken off. The Ambassador said that M. Geoffray had indicated that his Government might be content with a small strip on the right bank of the Warga, but M. Poincaré claimed the whole valley up to the watershed, and it was impossible for the Spanish Government to concede this.

The Ambassador left with me the accompanying memorandum as to the Spanish proposals.*

He also informed me that M. Poincaré had suggested to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris that Tangier should be given up to Spain in return for the Cap de l'Eau and the Chafarinas Islands. The Spanish Government felt that the compensation asked for was too great. The Chafarinas Islands were not Moorish, but Spanish territory, and their cession would require the consent of the Cortes, which it might be impossible to obtain. Subsequently, M. Poincaré had informed the Spanish Ambassador in Paris that M. Cambon had said that England would never agree to anything but the internationalisation of Tangier, and that it was therefore useless to propose that it should go to Spain. At first it had been thought in Madrid that M. Cambon had expressed this view after consulting us, but the Spanish Ambassador when in Paris had found that we had not been consulted, and that M. Cambon had expressed only his personal opinion.

I said that I had not before heard of this proposal on the part of the French. The recognition of the special position of Tangier had been an integral part of the secret treaty between Spain and France in 1904; I had assumed that France could never consent to anything but internationalisation, and I had therefore looked upon this question as settled. I should have to consider the British view with regard to any departure from this settlement.

The Ambassador pointed out that, now that France found that Tangier would be really internationalised, and would not be under French control, she was probably more ready to part with it. In addition, France no doubt realised that the internationalisation of Tangier would keep Germany in Morocco. He went on to say that a further argument against internationalisation was that, in view of the *entente cordiale* between us and France, we should have to support France in Tangier, in which case she would get her own way there in everything, or else the *entente cordiale* would be strained. This would be a daily dilemma.

I said that I did not think that, when the whole question of Morocco was settled, municipal affairs in Tangier would be so political as that.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15331] No. 164.

Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society to Foreign Office.—(*Received April* 12.)

51, *Denison House, Vauxhall Bridge Road, London, April* 11, 1912.

Sir,

REFERRING to your letter of the 14th ultimo in regard to the holding of slaves by British protected persons in Morocco, I have communicated with Mr. Donald Mackenzie, asking him to supply particulars of the cases to which he referred in his letter of January last. I now beg to enclose an extract from a letter which I have just received from Mr. Mackenzie, in which he gives the names of two British protected persons of influence who, he believes, hold slaves I note from your letter that it is proposed that enquiries shall be made on this subject, and, in the meantime, that His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tangier is circularising the British consular officers in Morocco.

I am, &c.
TRAVERS BUXTON.

Enclosure in No. 164.

Extract from Letter, dated April 9, 1912.

"WITH reference to your letter of the 15th ultimo, informing me of a letter you had received from the Foreign Office regarding the question of British protégés not holding slaves or having any dealings in them, and seeking further information, I may say that it was my impression on a former visit that British protégés were fairly free from having any dealing in slaves or holding them, but when, during my recent visit, I found that a British subject was financing a notorious slave dealer (which, I

* See Enclosure in No. 173.

fear, is by no means an isolated case), I could not help believing the reports that were made to me that British and other European protégés were engaged in the same unholy business. One could not expect anything else from native Moors, who believe in slavery and are living in a Mahommedan and slave-holding country. I had no opportunity of making proper enquiry into the general reports I had received regarding the Simsars. . . . I am, however, informed on good authority that there are two important British protégés holding slaves: one, Si Mihdi-el-Menebhi, Tangier, former Minister of the Sultan, and the other is the Shereef of Tamslaught, a village situated a short distance from Marrakesh (Morocco city). It would be well if the British Government would start with these and threaten to withdraw British protection unless they freed their slaves and gave them papers of freedom. This would show other British protégés and Simsars that they would be required to free their slaves. . . . I am glad to learn that Mr. White has sent circulars to the consular agents reminding them that British protégés may not hold slaves; this will undoubtedly do good. The only practical method, as I have mentioned before, is to abolish the whole institution of slavery in Morocco; then the holding of slaves would be unlawful, which is not the case at present."

[15418] No. 165.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 13.)

(No. 24. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, April 12, 1912.

I AM forwarding by post text of last Spanish proposals as communicated to French Ambassador on 12th April, and presumably made known to you by the Spanish Ambassador in London on his return from Madrid. French Ambassador informed Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning that they are regarded in Paris as unsatisfactory; that no official answer can be returned till after the Cabinet Council fixed for 16th April; but that French Minister for Foreign Affairs is so much impressed by the existing divergence of views that he personally fears that a rupture will ensue compelling France to organise her protectorate and administer Moorish custom-houses regardless of claims of Spain.

I agree with French Ambassador that there is not sufficient ground at present for breaking off the negotiations, by which many important points have already been practically settled. Moreover, France could hardly break off without consultation with His Majesty's Government, whose interest in negotiation she has fully recognised.

I have good reason to believe that Spain has not yet reached her limit of concessions, and I think that she might fairly be urged to surrender the whole of her southern zone down to Wady Dra except a small enclave at Ifni, and also to [group omitted: ? withdraw], in the northern zone, her demand for French concessions equivalent to those made by Spain in the Uarga region, by which river itself is taken as the boundary, to a point to be subsequently determined by a mixed commission.

French Ambassador thinks that Spain could be induced to offer, and France to accept, a settlement on those lines if you thought fit to recommend this course both at Madrid and Paris. His Excellency attaches importance to your views being made known to the French Government before meeting of Council of Ministers.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[15418] No. 166.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 156.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 13, 1912.

MY telegram No. 14 of to-day to Sir M. de Bunsen.

Inform French Government, and urge them in any case not to break off negotiations, in which event Spain would either ask for arbitration or appeal to all the Powers signatory to the Algeciras Act, when France proceeded to a protectorate. Either step on part of Spain would be likely to give rise to embarrassment.

[15418]

No. 167.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 13, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 24 of 12th April.

In the interest of a settlement, failing which situation in Morocco may become exceedingly grave, you should earnestly urge Spanish Government to make further effort at conciliation. I am pressing French Government to restrict their demand in the Warga region to district bounded to the north by that river as far as a point to be subsequently determined by mixed commission.

If French Government agree to this, Spanish Government might meet them by waiving their demand for equivalent counter-concession in eastern part of northern zone, and by giving up whole of southern zone to Wad Dra except Ifni, so long as a reasonable radius is allowed around Ifni.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 155.)

[15729]

No. 168.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)

Sir,

Fez, March 29, 1912.

THIS morning I paid the usual call of salutation on the Grand Vizier, Hadj Mohammed Mokri, upon his return to Fez, and a conversation ensued, of which I have the honour to report the substance as follows:—

The Vizier said that he had been in daily converse with the Sultan about the French Minister's proposals for a protectorate, and the Minister also had had one conversation with His Majesty, and was to have another this afternoon.

The position was that the Sultan was willing to accept a protectorate by which France would have the same position here as the British Government have in Egypt, as far as the circumstances of the two countries allowed of the similarity. That was to say, there was to be no ambiguity about the realness of the French supervision; but that, as far as possible, in principle and in outward appearance, the Government should remain as before.

Instead of this, however, the French Minister had brought a treaty in nine articles for signature without addition or amendment. The treaty was very short, but very wide indeed.

The Vizier had not the draft at hand, but would, confidentially, let me have it if desired. Certain articles were unobjectionable, *e.g.*, the appointment of advisers for each department, the exclusion of French intervention with regard to mosque property, and as regards education not being compulsory. The scheme was neither the Tunis one nor the Egyptian one, but had some features of both plans. The Sultan's main objections to it were:—

1. The extent to which all Moors—including His Majesty—were excluded from Government, even in appearance. For instance, in the Department of Foreign Affairs, there would not be, as in Egypt, a native Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom the natives would see foreigners doing business, but a number of French officials would be substituted for the Makhzen officials.

2. The article which provides that the French may send their troops to any part of Morocco merely on notifying the Sultan. In the recent Franco-German accord it was specified that France would be able to do this by agreement on each occasion with the Sultan, but now the Sultan is only to be told of such intention.

3. The exclusion of the Sultan from participation in the negotiations between France and Spain. This means that his territories are being disposed of and arranged about without his having any voice whatever in the matter.

4. The exclusion of the Sultan from any control of the army, and the unification of the Moorish army with the French troops now in Morocco.

5. The general attitude of the French Minister, who demands that the treaty he has brought be signed without reasonable time for discussion and without any amendment or addition soever.

6. The absence of any clause securing that Moorish soldiers will not be required to serve outside Morocco. (In this connection, I would remark that in French military circles here there is talk of Morocco eventually having an army of from 50,000 to 80,000 men, and it is obvious that if enlistment in future were made compulsory, even a larger force than that could be raised in Morocco.)

7. The absence of any clause specifying how long the French occupation is to last.

8. That, though Tangier was to be internationalised, the various public services were to be French. (On this point, however, the Vizier was very vague.) The Vizier asked whether the British position in Egypt was founded on any specific treaty between the British and Egyptian Governments, like the Treaty of Bardo, for instance, about Tunis. I answered that, so far as I could recollect, as regards Egypt itself, there was no such treaty, the situation there having been developed gradually by circumstances; but, of course, there were many signed agreements on particular subjects. He then asked whether Egyptian troops would be liable to serve outside of Egypt, *e.g.*, in parts of the British Empire or in foreign countries. I said that I did not suppose they would be liable so to serve. At any rate, I did not remember reading of such liability in any works on Egypt. He then asked whether Egyptian troops were incorporated with the British troops in Egypt, commanded by the same officers, and so forth. I said that the two forces had ordinarily been kept quite distinct, but that on occasions of expeditions, *e,g.*, to the Soudan, British troops had been added to Egyptian ones, and the forces, when acting unitedly, had always been commanded by the Sirdar of the Egyptian army, who was, of course, a British officer. The Vizier then remarked that what was perplexing the Sultan and himself most was the speed at which the French Minister was seeking to drive matters just now. Surely even a few weeks should, reasonably, be allowed for discussion before signing so very important a treaty. This was the most perplexing difficulty of all. Could not I, possibly, the more so that the French Minister was to see the Sultan that very afternoon, give him some ideas about it?

This was a request which I had foreseen might quite possibly be made, and so I had given it some study beforehand. If refused, the Vizier might think the whole business absolutely hopeless, make some private terms for himself (as the Sultan also might do, or the latter, in his neurasthenia, might be driven to some impulsive act, such as abdication, which would raise many complications), and tell the Sultan to sign anything at once, or abdicate, and such a hasty settlement might include conditions in which British interests had been overlooked, and, perhaps, an examination of them beforehand would be more useful than regrets after the treaty was signed, and that should His Majesty's Government see anything harmful in them, it would be easier to rectify them now than when the signed treaty was communicated to the Powers.

On the other hand, the present proposals might already have been submitted to and approved by His Majesty's Government (though that was not what happened in regard to the French reform proposals made at Fez in 1905), and, besides, it might be incompatible with our position towards the French, to say anything against the present French scheme. I reflected that, on the whole, the answer which would be most likely to gain us full information as to the negotiations before the treaty was signed was the one to make, and in any case, if I were wrong, the harm meant no more than a week or two's lengthening of the negotiations.

I therefore answered that I could not but think the Vizier was mistaken as to the speed the French Minister was using. A few days, or two, or three weeks, at least, were reasonable for such important discussions, and would doubtless be procurable if they were sought for in the right way, *e.g.*, not by raising objections, or threatening refusals, but by asking for fuller information and exact details of this point and that.

The Vizier said he quite saw the force of this, and would keep it in mind.

This afternoon about 4·30 the French Minister—for the second time since he came—was received privately by the Sultan, and remained with him till about 10 o'clock, so, possibly some first effort has been made towards eliciting clearly fully what has to be conceded.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[15639] No. 169.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 73. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 6, 1912.*

ON my return to Tangier Mr. White showed me a memorandum which he had drawn up and communicated privately to Sir Eyre Crowe on the reply sent by the French Government to the memorandum submitted to them by His Majesty's Government with regard to the Tangier municipality.

I fully endorse all that Mr. White said, and I would suggest that the memorandum be made official.

As regards the first heading, I consider the French contention that it is for the protectorate to establish the constitution of the municipality by decree and to define the rights of foreigners quite inadmissible. In my opinion, the internationalisation of Tangier is on a parallel with the institution of the French protectorate and the Spanish zone, and must be provided for by a direct arrangement with the Sultan and all the treaty Powers. It is certainly in our interests that the other treaty Powers should have a voice in the matter, and that we should not have to deal exclusively with France and Spain.

Under heading No. 4 I do not consider that the objections of the French are well founded. Of the twelve elected members there will certainly be two of each one of the five principal nationalities, Moorish, French, Spanish, British, and German: each of these nationalities will thus with their nominated member have a total of three, while the Powers least interested will only have their one nominated member. The composition of the municipal council will thus be probably as follows:—

Three Moors, three French, three Spaniards, three British, three German, seven members nominated by the Powers less interested, viz., Italy, Austria, Russia, Holland, United States, Belgium, and Portugal, leaving only two more members to be accounted for.

It appears to me that in a council thus composed the interests of the principal Powers are amply safeguarded. We might however, if necessary, yield on this point, and agree to a purely elective council, but in this case I hold most strongly that the Moors should be treated like any other nationality and that their numbers should not exceed the maximum fixed, which would probably have to be four.

The French memorandum speaks of "election by notables"; but this appears to me a dangerous principle, and I should insist upon election under the same conditions and qualifications as in the case of all foreigners. In this connection I would mention that Ali Zaky Bey came to call upon me the day after my arrival, and talked a great deal about the future municipality. He warned me that the French were determined to do all in their power and make use of all the means at their disposal to increase their influence on the council. Above all things, he said, you must oppose the principle of nomination by the Makhzen of the Moorish members; members so nominated would be mere creatures of the French. "Election by notables" may sound better, but I fear that in practice it would prove to be much the same as nomination by the Makhzen. Ali Zaky also said that any such nomination would be very unpopular among the Moors themselves.

The French statement with regard to the proportion of Moors to the total population of Tangier are erroneous. According to the accepted French estimate the population of Tangier amounts to 45,000, of whom 25,000 are Moors, 10,000 Jews, and 10,000 foreigners. I enclose herewith a schedule which I have obtained from the administration of the "taxe urbaine." The last column shows the number of electors of each nationality there would be, supposing the franchise proposed by me and accepted by the French of 120 pesetas rent per month were accepted. The total number of electors amounts to 533, of which only 122 are Moors. Therefore neither in population nor in electors does the Moorish element amount to anything like three-quarters. It may be interesting to note that exclusive of Moors and native Jews, Great Britain furnishes the greatest number of electors of one nationality.

What, however, appears to me far more important than the question of the composition or mode of election of the municipal council is that of the controlling body. As Mr. White pointed out, the elements, for the present at all events, from which the Tangier municipal council will be drawn, are not such as would inspire

absolute confidence or could be left without a large measure of control; moreover, as a matter of fact, the control proposed by us is no greater than that exercised over the municipality of Alexandria. It is merely vested in other hands. I fully endorse Mr. White's view as to the desirability in any case of starting with a strong control, which can be relaxed later on if thought desirable.

With regard to the question of the financial resources of the municipality I am inclined to suspect for various reasons that the French hope to starve Tangier financially and force it to fall back upon Shereefian (*i.e.*, French) aid. We shall, I think, undoubtedly have to insist on some arrangement by which a considerable portion of the customs, even though collected by the "Contrôle de la Dette," would be handed over to the municipality. The total customs dues levied in 1911 at Tangier were as follows:—

	£
On imports—	64,117
10 per cent.	16,591
2 per cent.	40,427
On exports	

The other revenues available would be the yield from the "taxe urbaine," estimated at about 4,600*l.* a year, the profits from the grain market 1,600*l.*, the slaughter-house tax 1,050*l.*, mole and other dues 150*l.* The yield of the tertib cannot be estimated with any accuracy, but would certainly not be very large for the Tangier district.

The "Commission d'Hygiène" at present receives a sum of about 600*l.* in voluntary contributions for scavengering and lighting, but these of course will cease when the municipality is established. They also receive a large subsidy from the "Conseil sanitaire," which would also be discontinued.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—As a matter of fact the Moors who actually pay taxes according to the enclosed schedule amount to three-quarters of the tax-payers; this is partly due to the fact that the great bulk of the poorer classes of foreigners, especially Spaniards, live in patios where the proprietor pays the tax. The Moors live in their own houses and their rents are excessively low. They do not therefore, as stated above, by any means make up three-quarters either of the population or of the electors.

R. L.

Enclosure in No. 169.

Extract from the "Registre de la Taxe urbaine."

NOMBRE des Personnes de diverses nationalités à Tanger qui payent la Taxe sur des Loyers évalués à par mois.

Nationalités.	Au-dessous de 80 pesetas.	De 80 à 99 pesetas.	De 100 à 119 pesetas.	120 pesetas et au-dessus.
Marocains, protégés ou non	2,907	49	58	122
Israélites, sujets marocains, protégés ou non	261	17	23	127
Allemands	15	2	3	11
Américains	10	..	..	4
Anglais	68	4	3	79
Autrichiens	5	1	1	3
Belges	2	1	..	1
Espagnols	114	25	6	76
Français	109	11	7	77
Hollandais	6	1	3	4
Italiens	49	4	6	19
Portuguais	6	1	..	10
Russes	..	..	1	..
Personnes d'autre nationalité	..	..	..	..

[15642] No. 170.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 76.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 8, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I learn from Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox that the report that the Sultan intended to refuse to sign the French protectorate treaty had caused considerable excitement at Marrakesh. The Basha Dris Wold Mennou told Mr. Lennox that the southern tribes would stand by Mulai Hafid as long as he remained Sultan, but that if he abdicated they would only support a new Sultan who would declare against the protectorate, and that they would not accept Mulai Abdelaziz or any other Sultan except on these conditions.

The news of the assassination of Lieutenant Guillasse and rumours of a defeat of French troops which were current in the south tended to add to the general feeling of unrest among the tribes. I trust, however, that on learning that the French troops have not suffered any defeat, and that the Sultan has signed the treaty, the excitement may calm down and the tribes keep quiet.

I understand that preparations are being made by the French military authorities for the dispatch of an expedition to the southern provinces. It is to be hoped that it will be on a sufficiently large scale to overawe the tribes and promptly overcome any resistance, and also that it may be accompanied by Moorish troops and officials as representing the Sultan.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[15567] No. 171.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, April 14, 1912.*

I HAVE spoken to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your telegram No. 14 of 13th April.

His Excellency would be quite willing to accept a settlement on the lines proposed by you, and he is extremely grateful to you for making the suggestion.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[16986] No. 172.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 39.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 15, 1912.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's telegram No. 25 of the 14th instant, I have to inform your Excellency that the Spanish Ambassador called to-day to convey the thanks of his Government for the proposals recently made by His Majesty's Government for reconciling the views of the French and Spanish Governments respectively in regard to territorial compensations.

M. de Villa Urrutia then referred to the question of Tangier. Sir A. Nicolson said that the view of His Majesty's Government, now that the whole status of Morocco was about to be radically altered, was that Tangier should be internationalised, and they considered that, in the new conditions which would arise, internationalisation was the only solution to which His Majesty's Government could agree. M. de Villa Urrutia remarked that his Government were unwilling to sign any agreement to which they might come with France as to the French and Spanish spheres until the Tangier question had been definitely settled. Sir A. Nicolson gave it as his personal opinion that if the Spanish Government did reach an agreement with France, it would be wiser for them to close at once and not to await a settlement as to Tangier, adding that it seemed to him imprudent to leave the larger question open longer than was necessary.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15887] No. 173.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 56.)

Sir, *Madrid, April 11, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a translation of a memorandum embodying a new set of Spanish proposals which the Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to the French Ambassador yesterday. They constitute the Spanish reply to the French proposals explained in my despatch No. 52 of the 2nd instant. I received the memorandum in a private letter from Señor Garcia Prieto.

It will be seen that, in the southern Spanish zone, the coast from Ifni to Wady Dra is conceded. On the other hand, Ifni resumes, to the north and east, the dimensions assigned to it in the Secret Convention of October 1904. The effect of the proposal is to give the French zone access to the sea to the south instead of to the north of Ifni, as had been previously proposed.

As regards the southern frontier of her northern zone, Spain states that she is willing to accept a "rectification" on the principle of give and take. She proposes that the Uarga shall become the frontier to a point which is to be eventually determined by a mixed commission.

M. Geoffray promised to submit these new proposals to his Government, but he stated that they would certainly fail to satisfy M. Poincaré, who adhered to all the demands which he, M. Geoffray, had put in on the 30th ultimo—that is to say, to the demand for the whole coast down to Wady Dra, except a small "enclave" for Ifni, and to the demand for the entire basin of the Uarga. His Excellency thus withdrew his offer to suggest to M. Poincaré that the frontier in the Uarga district might be allowed to follow the ridge which is said to run along the northern bank of the river, instead of following the watershed between the Uarga and the Mediterranean. He said that his recent instructions precluded him from countenancing any Spanish proposal falling short of the surrender of the whole basin of the Uarga, from its source downwards to the point where it cuts the line of the 1904 boundary.

I gather from M. Geoffray that he is himself rather puzzled by the attitude of M. Poincaré in regard to these frontier questions. The instructions which he receives from Paris are alternately conciliatory and uncompromising, and his Excellency is left in doubt as to the ultimate intentions of his Government. Meanwhile, he can only present the French demands in all their crudity, and transmit to Paris those which he receives from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, without venturing himself to offer any further suggestions.

I did not myself attend yesterday's meeting, although invited to do so by Señor Garcia Prieto in the usual way. I explained to his Excellency verbally that I was in doubt whether my presence on these occasions had not become a little embarrassing to the French Ambassador. M. Geoffray had for some time not thought it necessary to invite me to meet him at the Spanish Foreign Office when he had had communications to make to Señor Garcia Prieto, nor had he communicated to me the text of the memoranda submitted by him. I had no complaint to make of this omission, for M. Geoffray had never failed to give me subsequently the fullest particulars of his interviews with the Foreign Minister, and I did not think that he had withdrawn in any degree the confidence which he had been pleased to place in me from the beginning of the negotiations. But I could not help feeling that for one reason or another he did not care for my continued participation in the actual conversations. At all events, he had not of late shown any desire to secure my presence at the meetings. Under these circumstances, I thought I had better keep away from them—at all events, for the present. Señor Garcia Prieto said he quite understood my position, but that he would nevertheless continue to invite me to the meetings, leaving it to me to attend or not, as I thought best.

I had a conversation with Señor Garcia Prieto this morning on the subject of his interview with M. Geoffray. I found him rather depressed by a telegram he had just received from the Spanish Ambassador in Paris. The latter had had the advantage, just before holding a conversation yesterday with M. Poincaré, of hearing from Señor Villaurrutia, who was passing through Paris on his way back from Madrid to London, what was the precise purport of the new Spanish proposals. Though not authorised to communicate them officially, Señor Perez Caballero had told M. Poincaré what they amounted to. M. Poincaré had displayed some impatience and great disappointment. He had evidently expected much more. In the southern zone Spain, he said, was only

offering one stretch of coast for another. She closed to the north of Ifni as much as she opened up to the south. On the other hand, in the northern zone she had reverted to the inacceptable idea of yielding nothing at one point without receiving compensation at another. The French Government did not admit any obligation to pay for a concession which they thought they had a right to ask for. Though M. Poincaré would not be able to answer the Spanish proposal officially until his return on Tuesday or Wednesday of next week from the south of France, he could tell the Ambassador at once that France still claimed the watershed between the Mediterranean and the Uarga as the frontier between the two zones. If Spain did not yield much further than she had yet been disposed to do, there would inevitably be a rupture. Señor Perez Caballero had then led the conversation on to the subject of Tangier. M. Poincaré said the question was such a difficult one and England was so determined to secure the absolute internationalisation of Tangier, that there seemed to be no prospect of a speedy settlement. This being so, M. Poincaré urged that Tangier should be treated as a separate question and that a convention should be signed between France and Spain on the other points now under discussion, leaving Tangier to form the subject of an ulterior convention. Señor Perez Caballero demurred to this, and asked why Tangier should not be treated as falling simply within the Spanish zone. This would render unnecessary the delimitation of the Tangier district, from which Spain naturally apprehended a further mutilation of her northern zone. It would also greatly simplify the whole question at issue between France and Spain, and enable a speedy settlement to be made. M. Poincaré said that England would never listen to any solution of the Tangier difficulty other than one based on the international idea. It was therefore useless to broach the question. The discussion must proceed on the assumption that an international system was to be elaborated, and this would necessarily take some time longer. Señor Perez Caballero concluded his telegram with the advice that, in view of the impatience which was being displayed in Paris at the failure to bring the negotiation to an end, the Spanish Government should spare no effort to arrive at an agreement with France before the meeting of the Chamber of Deputies some time in the month of May.

Señor Garcia Prieto assured me that he ardently desired a settlement, but to ask for the whole of the Uarga valley was really too much, unless indeed Tangier were left within the Spanish zone, in which case Spain might concede even the entire basin of the Uarga. He begged me to treat this admission as confidential. He added that Señor Villaurrutia was instructed to place before you the full views of the Spanish Government with regard to Tangier, and that he should anxiously await your reply.

Meanwhile, he said that he was looking forward to a very unpleasant week. He did not doubt that the French press would be again encouraged to empty the vials of its wrath on the heads of the Spanish Government. The Spanish press would of course retaliate, and when M. Poincaré returned to Paris he would find that the controversy had once more become acute. Señor Garcia Prieto would do all that he personally could to pour oil on the troubled waters.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 173.

Spanish Memorandum communicated to French Ambassador at Madrid.

(Translation.)

THE Spanish Government will defer to the wishes of the French Government and accept that:—

1. The line of demarcation in the south shall be the Wady Dra.

2. Seeing that the agreement of 1904 did not fix the boundary of Ifni except to the north and east, it is now fixed to the south as proposed by France—that is, the Wady Sidi Ouerzeg is taken as the frontier.

The line that shall join the source of this river with that of the Wady Tazeroualt shall be as direct as possible.

In the northern zone the line of the convention of 1904 shall be maintained, but Spain shall later take steps to rectify it in such a way that the left bank of the Uarga shall form part of the French zone as far as a point neither below the confluence

with the Wady Seraa nor above the longitude of the Djemaa es-xorfa Taffraout. This point, and the best means of uniting it with the line of the 1904 convention—that is, with the dividing line between the basins of the Uarga and the Kert and the basin of the Inauen—shall be fixed by a mixed Franco-Spanish commission, which shall further estimate the area of the part that passes from the Spanish to the French zone, and shall indicate the boundaries of a similar area which shall pass from the French to the Spanish zone, either on the Atlantic side (south of Laraiche) or between the Muluya and el-Mesun, or divided between the two districts.

The road from Fez to Alcazar through Wazzan, which serves as the base of the 1904 boundary, crosses the Lucus by the ford of the Sebab. Five kilometres below this ford the boundary between the zones leaves the river and follows a straight line to the Atlantic coast by the northern edge of the lagoon of Ez-zerga.

This is the exact interpretation of the convention, and so it has been held to be on repeated occasions by the embassy in Paris, the legation in Tangier, and the Ministry of State.

The boundary of parallel 35° does not agree with this interpretation.

[15851]

No. 174.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 16.)

(No. 170.)

Paris, April 14, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a *note verbale* which I have to-day addressed to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 156 of the 13th instant, relative to the Franco-Spanish negotiations in regard to Morocco.

M. Poincaré has not yet returned from the south of France, but is, I understand, expected to arrive here to-morrow morning.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
L. D. CARNEGIE.

Enclosure in No. 174.

Memorandum communicated to M. Poincaré by Sir F. Bertie.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador has the honour, under instructions from Sir Edward Grey, to acquaint the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government, in view of the gravity of the situation which may arise in Morocco should the present Franco-Spanish negotiations fail to reach a settlement, have instructed Sir Maurice de Bunsen earnestly to urge the Spanish Government to make a further attempt at conciliation.

In order to facilitate a settlement of the question, Sir Francis Bertie is directed to press upon the serious consideration of the Government of the republic the desirability of confining their demand to a district bounded by the River Warga to the north up to a point which a mixed commission will subsequently determine. Should this course commend itself to the French Government, Spain might be found willing in return to waive her demand in the eastern portion of the northern zone for an equivalent counter-concession, and to yield the whole of the southern zone, with the exception of Ifni, as far south as the Wady Dra, provided the Ifni enclave were of reasonable dimensions.

Sir Francis Bertie has the honour to express the earnest hope that the French Government will not in any case break off the negotiations; for, in such an event, the Spanish Government would either ask that the matter be referred to arbitration or, as soon as the French Government proceeded to the organisation of a protectorate, appeal to all the Powers signatory of the Algeciras Act. Should the Spanish Government take either of these steps much embarrassment would probably be caused.

Paris, April 14, 1912.

[16279] No. 175.

Tangier Municipality: Notes by His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tangier on the Memorandum communicated to M. Cambon on March 15, 1912.—(*Received April* 18.)

I.

IS it not rather for the Sultan and all the treaty Powers to come to an agreement on the subject? It seems dangerous to exclude Germany and the other Powers, as article 1 of the 1911 treaty scarcely covers the question of the internationalisation of Tangier, in which Germany must be interested. In possible future negotiations for modifications it might be useful to have the support of other Powers, who would all be interested in maintaining the truly international status of Tangier and fostering its prosperity, whereas it would be in the interests of both France and Spain to strangle the commerce of Tangier as much as possible.

II.

So long as the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan at Tangier is maintained, there is no reason why it should be more effective here than in the French or Spanish zones. I presume that there will be a Moorish official here representing the Sultan similar to the High Commissioner in the Spanish zone; but it appears to me essential that all real authority, except in certain specified matters, should be vested in the municipality, subject to the control of the representatives of the Sultan and of the treaty Powers.

III.

From language held to me by the Spanish Minister it would appear that Spain would not oppose a sufficiently wide *banlieue* being assigned to Tangier. A 15-kilom. (9½-miles) radius would be somewhat small. To embrace the district marked on the map shown to me by M. Villasinda (see my despatch No. 46 of the 7th instant) one would require an average radius of about 17 kilom. I presume, however, that there would be no difficulty over an increase of 2 kilom.

IV.

I see the point of the French objection to all the Powers being placed on an equality in regard to nominated members, and it is perhaps difficult to defend our proposal that Powers with few residents of their nation and small trade interests should be entitled to nominate members. Our object was to accentuate the international principle, and also to ensure a fair proportion of reliable men on the municipal commission. Experience with the "Commission d'Hygiène" shows that by no means the most desirable persons are elected, and that politics play the principal part in the elections. The French colony, from the legation downward, are very active in their efforts to secure the return of special candidates, even, I am told, going so far, as paying for poorer Frenchmen the small annual subscription which entitles them to vote. This, however, will not be possible under the present scheme if the 120 pesetas per month limit is maintained as the qualification. I should be sorry to see the system of nominated members put aside, but I can suggest no alternative to our proposal in this respect except to allow the diplomatic body as a whole to nominate six members, who must be of different nationalities. This would leave eighteen, or if four are to be Moors, fourteen to be elected by foreigners. In that case one would limit the number for each nationality to four, *including the nominated members*, i.e., if one of the six nominated members is a German, only three Germans could be elected, whereas if no German is nominated four could be elected.

If, however, it is decided to have no nominated members, and to give the Moors a special position, I should limit their number to one-sixth, *i.e.*, four, leaving twenty to be elected by the other electors—not more than four of one nationality. To give the Moors one-fourth of the seats (*i.e.*, six) would only leave eighteen for the rest, then the Moorish and French votes combined would be ten, which would probably secure them the presidency: thus with only two outside votes and the president's casting vote they would have a majority.

I do not consider the French arguments for placing Moors on a special footing to be at all sound. In the first place, I would ask what do they mean by "éléments

marocains"? Do they mean "Moors" or "Moorish subjects," including Jews? If the former, they certainly do not constitute anything like three-fourths of the population; indeed, the number of "Moors" who would be qualified as electors would be comparatively small, especially if officials are excluded, as in the case of foreigners. Then, what of the Jewish population who are Moorish subjects? Are they to vote for the foreign members? What, also, about Moors who are under foreign protection? It was partly these various difficulties that induced us to propose one body of electors without regard to religion or nationality. Algerians must not, of course, be considered as "Moors," but if one excludes them, there are very few Moors who can speak any language but Arabic, which would be a drawback at the deliberations of the municipality.

With regard to the control to be exercised by the representatives of the Sultan and of the Powers, we followed the regulations of the Alexandria municipality, substituting an international control for that of the Government of the country. It must be borne in mind that the Tangier municipality is not likely, for the present at any rate, to contain many men of the standing one would desire; it would therefore be dangerous to allow them large powers without control. It would, I think, be more prudent at first to retain a general power of control in the hands of the representatives, and experience will show whether it can be relaxed later on. It would be much more difficult to extend the control in the future, if found necessary, than to extend the powers of the municipality, if the control proved to be unnecessary.

VI.

One of the greatest difficulties to be contended with at Tangier in the future will be revenues. It is, I think, most important to secure for the municipality as large a share as possible of the various Makhzen revenues in this district pledged as security for the various loans. Possibly the arrangements to be come to by the Franco-Spanish Financial Commission now sitting at Madrid may, to some extent, be adapted to the situation at Tangier. If the land and revenues pledged to the bondholders are to be entirely withdrawn I cannot see how the necessary funds are to be obtained. The "tertib" in this district would not produce any very considerable sum. The yield of the tax on town buildings appears to be only about 4,603*l.* per year, whilst the other rates and taxes mentioned in the memorandum could only be expected to bring in a comparatively small sum. If heavy taxes are imposed here it will have the effect of driving people away, and will adversely affect the prosperity of the place, whilst with little security to offer it will be difficult to raise municipal loans except on onerous terms.

Tangier, March 31, 1912.

[16275] No. 176.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received April* 18.)

(No. 30.) *Tangier, April* 18, 1912.
(Telegraphic.)

RUMOURS reached Tangier yesterday by wireless telegraphy of a mutiny at Fez. French Legation have now received official answer from French Minister, who had not yet left the capital.

Portion of the Shereefian troops mutinied yesterday morning, their grievances being connected with certain new arrangements with regard to food and pay. They were joined by the lower elements of the population. Some 1,500 French troops were marched in, and a certain amount of fighting took place at the gates. Reinforcements are being sent from Mequinez. British consulate is safe, being in the quarter held by the French troops, presumably also Dr. Verdon's house, which is next door. House in which telegraphists lived was attacked and several killed. Sultan is safe, though isolated in palace.

French Legation lay special stress on the purely military and non-political nature of the mutiny, but on this point I am inclined to be sceptical, as all reports received lately point to increasingly bitter feeling against the French.

[16286] No. 177.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, April 18, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.
Following from His Majesty's consul at Fez :—

"This morning certain Moorish troops, angry, especially at a change in pay arrangements suddenly announced, by which they are to receive part in food instead of all cash, mutinied [?] north of Fez, killed several French instructors, came down the town, killed four telegraph employés in their residence, looted same, looted French hotel, and (by report) killed some French people there, looted French bank and tobaccco shops.

"French troops summoned from outside walls, and after some hours' fighting have occupied fort and consulate quarter, where most Europeans live; order seems now in course of restoration.

"No British subject injured so far as I know.

"Reliable details are not yet procurable, owing to suspension of traffic in the streets until calm is restored."

[16304] No. 178.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 18.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, April 18, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 31 of to-day.
Only three companies of French troops have entered Fez; remaining five still stationed outside walls owing to danger of attack by tribe. Greater part of Shereefian army appears to have remained loyal. Leading Moors here take gloomy view of the situation, and anticipate risings elsewhere. French Minister's latest telegram more optimistic.

[16481] No. 179.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 193.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April 18, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 156 of the 13th instant I have to inform you that the French Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson to-day that the French Cabinet had given the most careful and friendly consideration to the British proposal for an arrangement between France and Spain as to territorial compensations in Morocco. The French Government were, however, of opinion that it would not be possible for them to accept the compromise suggested by us, and that they must maintain their request for the cession of the whole of the valley of the Warga. His Excellency went on to say that recent events at Fez had confirmed their opinion that the position of France must not be weakened or endangered at important points, such as the Warga valley. They were, however, prepared to accord certain compensations to Spain in return for the valley of the Warga, by extending the Ifni enclave and by conceding to Spain the right to submit to the Sultan the name of the candidate she would propose for the post of the Moorish khalifa for the Spanish zone. M. Cambon added that M. Poincaré trusted that His Majesty's Government would employ their best offices in persuading Spain to accept an arrangement on the above lines.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Cambon that the matter would be carefully considered.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[16466] No. 180.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, April 19, 1912.

AU moment où il va assumer le contrôle des institutions marocaines, le Gouvernement de la république s'est préoccupé des responsabilités qui peuvent lui incomber de ce chef à l'égard des Puissances étrangères.

L'état général d'insécurité du Maroc, l'indépendance traditionnelle d'une grande partie du pays vis-à-vis du Makhzen, la désorganisation actuelle du pouvoir chérifien et l'insuffisance de ses moyens d'action, d'une part, l'activité des intéressés étrangers excitée par la perspective d'un développement économique dont on escompte les profits, d'autre part, risquent de provoquer des initiatives prématurées et dangereuses pour leurs auteurs.

La reconnaissance officielle du protectorat français, qui sera le point de départ d'une œuvre longue et difficile de réorganisation, ne peut être considérée comme une garantie suffisante pour toute entreprise dans l'intérieur du pays et comme un encouragement aux imprudences.

Le Gouvernement de la république déclinerait donc toute responsabilité quant à la sécurité tant des étrangers que de ses propres ressortissants qui voudraient s'aventurer dans les provinces marocaines où ne s'exerce pas l'action des autorités chérifiennes ou françaises. Assurément cette situation ne sera que provisoire et le Gouvernement français s'efforcera de l'améliorer dans le plus bref délai possible ; mais ceux qui n'en tiendraient pas compte agiraient à leurs risques et périls.

Avant que la sécurité de l'Algérie ne fût complète, des mesures avaient été édictées dans cette colonie déterminant les zones dans lesquelles les Européens pouvaient s'établir, celles qu'ils étaient admis à parcourir et celles qui leur étaient interdites ; l'état actuel du Maroc justifierait pleinement des distinctions de ce genre que le protectorat français aura la faculté d'établir.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 18 avril, 1912.

[16370] No. 181.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 33 ?.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Tangier, April 19, 1912.*

MACLEOD telegraphs all British subjects safe and well.

[16481] No. 182.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, April 19, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 25 of the 16th April.
Please consider the following communication confidential :—

It has been very confidentially intimated to me by the French Government that, although they are willing to extend the Ifni zone and to concede to Spain as a right that the name of the candidate proposed as Khalifa shall be submitted by the Spanish Government to Sultan, they cannot withdraw their request for the whole valley of the Warga.

Please inform me how, in your opinion, the Spanish Government would be likely to receive a proposal on the above lines from the French. I wish to know your views before making any reply to the French Government.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 169.)

[16634] No. 183.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

Sir, *Fez, April 6, 1912.*

ON the 29th instant the French Minister had an interview with the Sultan, lasting from about 4 P.M. till 10 P.M.

On the 30th the Minister was again at the Palace, where General Bailloud was entertained to a lunch previous to his departure for Tangier.

No news transpired during the 30th and 31st March and the 1st April, and apparently the Sultan was considering the proposals which the Minister had now put before him exhaustively.

On the 2nd instant, when visiting the French Minister, I took the chance to hope that his business was going on satisfactorily, and added that whenever he had any particulars which he might desire His Majesty's Government to know, or which might be of interest to us, I would be happy to be of service towards transmitting them. M. Regnault thanked me for this. His negotiations were progressing all right, the fact, indeed, being that the Sultan had agreed to the French Government's proposals, but this news was not being made known here for the present. I expressed hearty good wishes at this success, for though I had expected the Sultan to give way ultimately, I had not anticipated he would yield so soon. If not indiscreet, might I enquire what were the terms agreed upon? M. Regnault answered that the agreement was on the lines of the treaty of Bardo and of the Franco-German accord of November last, and added, obviously by way of avoiding details, that the British Government had been kept entirely *au courant* with the proposals which he had come to put before the Sultan. M. Regnault remarked also that there were a good many details still to arrange, and he expected to be here for three weeks more.

Later, on the 2nd instant, I had a brief talk with the Grand Vizier Mokri, who, in very dejected spirits, merely said that the Sultan had seen no way out of agreeing to the French proposals without amendment or addition, and had therefore on the 31st March assented to them, but all was being kept private for the present. (I could scarcely avoid reflecting—to myself—that it would have been more courteous of M. Regnault, both for general reasons, and remembering how loyally we English here have supported the French cause these eight years—often at much loss and inconvenience to ourselves—and the pains we had been at to do honour in every way to his present mission, had he informed me at the time of the conclusion of the treaty, instead of now, two days afterwards. However, I was careful to show nothing of such feelings.)

Though the viziers are aware of it, the news of the conclusion of the treaty is not generally known here yet.

Last evening I received the "Times" of the 28th March, and noticed therein Mr. Montagu's reply in the House of Commons to the effect that he was not aware of the terms of the treaty under negotiation between the French Government and the Sultan, which was obviously at variance with the French Minister's remark to me on the 2nd instant.

I therefore saw the Grand Vizier, Cid-el-Mokri, very early this morning, and, after stipulating for absolute secrecy on both parts, mentioned Mr. Montagu's statement, and asked for particulars of the treaty. I pointed out that presumably the treaty would require the Powers' assent to become operative, and as this might afford the Moors' last chance to obtain any modification of it, it would be well that we have it under examination as soon as possible, He answered that the actual text of the treaty was with the Sultan, but he would ask for it, I said, under the circumstances, I would prefer to leave the matter alone rather than ask the Sultan for it, for in all likelihood the Sultan would either refuse or would use the request for ends of his own. It would be sufficient if the particulars were afforded to me verbally. To this no objection was made, and my informant then went out of the room and came back with an Arabic memorandum of his own, which I took down in English to his dictation. He assured me that, while given in strict secrecy, I could rest assured the information was authentic and accurate, save that his memorandum, possibly, did not give the articles in their proper sequence.

I have to-day telegraphed these details to His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tangier for your speediest information.

The treaty consists of nine articles, as follows:—

1. The Sultan authorises the French Government to occupy militarily any part of Morocco, and to supervise the general administration, finance, army, and education.

2. The French Government will respect the Moslem religion and mosque property. The town of Tangier will remain apart, and be under a local council. The Sultan recognises the rights of Spain under the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish agreements of 1904.

3. The French Government will uphold the Sultan personally.

4. The French Government will carry out the treaty by means of (*i.e.*, the intermediary) the Sultan and Moorish authorities, the French authorities submitting proposals from time to time for His Majesty's assent.

5. A French resident, who will be in charge also of the foreign affairs of Morocco, will reside at the Moorish Court.

6. The French diplomatic and consular services abroad will protect Moorish subjects and Moorish interests abroad.

7. A budget will be prepared regularising revenue and expenditure.

8. The Sultan will not borrow money nor grant concessions without the assent of the French Government.

9. The treaty will be submitted to the French Government for ratification and to be passed into law by the French Legislature, and a copy thereof will be furnished to the Sultan.

When giving me those particulars, my informant remarked that the Makhzen's main objections to the treaty were:—

(*a.*) The absence of a term to the length of the French occupation;

(*b.*) The permission to place troops in any part of Morocco, except the Spanish zones and Tangier, without the Sultan's consent;

(*c.*) The absence of any security against the employment of Moorish troops outside Morocco (which, especially if service should become compulsory, might cause much hardship); and

(*d.*) The transference of foreign affairs, in appearance as well as reality, to France.

I made no comments on these subjects to my informant.

It is obvious that conclusive criticism of the French proposals is impracticable until the actual text is before one. Some general comments may, however, be made.

Article 1. Under the circumstances of Morocco, it might be difficult, without great loss and military inconvenience, for the French to give notice to and get the Sultan's assent to the occupation of each part of Morocco from time to time. The clause gives, however, no security against the incorporation of Moorish troops with those of France.

In this connection, it will be remembered that under the scheme already published, the Moorish army is incorporated with the French troops in Morocco, and the French troops' commander-in-chief is to be the Moorish Minister of War.

Article 2. It would seem a pity, for the country's sake, that mosque property has been put outside the scope of reform, for, here in the interior at any rate, it is a perfect reservoir of corruption.

Though Spanish rights under the agreements of 1904 have been recognised by Morocco, no recognition of British rights under the Anglo-French agreement of 1904, nor of such British rights as may flow from the Franco-German accord of 1911 has been included.

Article 3.—No provision has been made for the succession to the Sultanate. It will be remembered that there is no Moorish law of succession, the sovereignty going to whomsover is recognised by the inhabitants of the country. In the event of the present Sultan's demise and the French zones, the Spanish zones, and the town of Tangier each adhering to a different candidate, one wonders who would be the legal sovereign?

Included with the "upholding" of the Sultan are, doubtless, the allowances to be made to him, and though the actual signing of the treaty is not known here publicly yet, the Sultan's sudden change of attitude has been noted readily enough, and this is very generally ascribed to the largeness of the sum, part in ready money, part in Makhzen properties he is to be allowed to keep for himself, and part in annual allowances, which the French are supposed to have promised to secure him.

Article 4.—This article appears to include the principle of co-operation, and would seem to mean the continuance of the present form of administration, with Moors as the

ostensible occupants of the respective posts, to which advisers, presumably, will be attached, which would seem a wise arrangement. The clause about the Sultan's assent, if fairly carried out, would give opportunities for the Moorish officials to be heard in a consultative way or even rather more.

Article 5.—Comment on this has already been made herein.

Article 6.—A good half of the trade with this district is done through Moorish merchants established in Manchester. Some few of them are naturalised British subjects, but some are not. They are held in good repute in Manchester. Besides these, there are the Moors who repair to Gibraltar, and the colony of Moors in Egypt, most of whom trade with Great Britain as well as Morocco, and who have hitherto looked, on occasion, to us for assistance abroad, and all of whom it is hard to imagine going to the French consular authorities for protection in their affairs.

Articles 7, 8. *and* 9.—These, in their principles and object, seem to need no comment, save that as regards concessions and loans, these will presumably continue to be governed by the existing treaties and accords.

It is to be observed that there is no article providing for the submission of the treaty to the various Powers interested.

With regard to the remainder of the French Minister's negotiations, I fear, under the changed circumstances, it may be more and more difficult to procure information, but such as I may be able to get I shall of course report.

I have, &c.

J. M. MACLEOD.

[16548] No. 184.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 77.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 13, 1912.

WITH reference to Mr. White's despatch No. 68 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the contract for the first 100 metres of the jetty ("épi"), to be built at Casa Blanca to afford shelter for lighters at a cost of 300,000 fr., has been granted by a "marché de gré à gré" to the French firm of Jammy, who built the port of Oran. The original estimate had amounted to 400,000 fr., and it has been decided to employ the remaining 100,000 fr. in preparing blocks of masonry for the remainder of the work, in accordance with the original arrangement.

The remainder of the work will be put up to tender immediately. Two days ago, however, Mr. White had occasion to see Ali Zaky Bey, the president of the Commissions of Adjudication, who referred to the subject in the course of conversation. He said that he could not help thinking that some misunderstanding existed with regard to the adjudication to which the remainder of the work was to be submitted. M. Porché, he knew, held that it would be nothing more than a *concours* by which absolute freedom would be left to the commission, which in a technical matter would be guided by him, to select the tender which suited them best, irrespective of price, &c. Ali Zaky said that he could not believe that this was the intention of the diplomatic body, and asked Mr. White what his views were. Mr. White replied that His Majesty's Government certainly desired a real adjudication, though they were prepared to waive the printing of the full "cahier des charges" and thus shorten the delay. Ali Zaky said that in order to clear up the matter once for all, he proposed to write to the doyen of the diplomatic body on the subject. His letter will be circulated, and I propose to endorse the view expressed by Mr. White to Ali Zaky.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[16712] No. 185.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tangier, April* 20, 1912.

FOLLOWING telegram has been received from British consul at Fez, 19th April:—

"My telegrams of the 17th and 18th. Could not telegraph lengthily sooner. Wireless busy militarily. Bodies murdered 17th were paraded streets amid great

popular acclamation and often horribly mutilated. At New Fez 17th mutineers seized some 70,000 cartridges. Mob opened prisons, killed, looted many Jews. Yesterday New Fez, except Palace and certain precincts and thoroughfares, Old Fez, except consulates quarter, were possessed by armed bands mutineers. 18th: day passed securing consulates quarter, parties French troops releasing sundry hidden Europeans, recovering remains dead, such efforts being supported by firing from British consulate and neighbouring roofs and by shelling extra mural points. Night quieter. 19th: Mequinez reinforcements arrive, morning cleared quarters between upper and lower town, and groups of extra mural rebels east side by shelling. Town highly alarmed, fearing general bombardment. Afternoon clearing streets continued, native officers New Fez succeeded rally loyal remains some regiments and began imprisoning mutineers. Large number of Jews reported safe Palace and Dardaboobagh. Outlook to-night much improved. Balding Redman regiments loyal and saved several European officers. Received mails Tangier 12th, 13th, 14th. Sefrou troops loyally fighting Berbers. Country beyond Fez radius 17 miles still quiet. Postal services still suspended. All British subjects safe at consulate."

[16738] No. 186.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 21.)

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, April* 21, 1912.

ACTING on telegraphic instructions from the French Government, French Ambassador informed Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs last night in writing that French Government repeats its demand for the entire valley of the Warga, which recent events in Fez compel it to occupy. French Government offers in exchange to allow Spain to keep a strip of coast line 25 kilom. deep extending southwards from Ifni as far as Wady Nun, and also to concede Spanish demand that the khalifa for the Spanish zone shall be appointed from a list submitted by Spain to the Sultan.

I presume that Spain is in possession of that portion of her zone which lies to the south of Wady Dra.

French Ambassador showed me this morning draft of his letter making above communication. I remarked that its terms were rather those of an ultimatum than those of a mere proposal made in the course of a negotiation. He did not deny this, but supposed that French Government had found it necessary to bring discussion to an end. I also said that I was under the impression that question was still under discussion between the French Minister for Foreign Affairs and yourself.

Neither French Ambassador nor I have as yet any knowledge of the way in which Spanish Government are taking French demand. If Minister for Foreign Affairs should consult me before I receive your instructions, I propose to advise him to comply as regards Warga, and to tell French Government that Spanish Government will make this sacrifice in order to prove its friendship to France in a moment of difficulty. It will be open to Minister for Foreign Affairs to press for further French concessions, if necessary.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[16869] No. 187.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 79.)

Sir, *Tangier, April* 16, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 77 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the letters from Ali Zakki Bey, the president of the Comité spécial des Travaux publics, and from M. Porché, the State engineer, on the subject of the adjudication to which the remainder of the work for providing shelter to lighters at Casa Blanca is to be submitted.

You will observe that M. Porché has abandoned the idea, mentioned to Mr. White by Ali Zakki, that the adjudication should be nothing more than a *concours*, and that the committee would be free to adopt the tenders which suited them best.

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The circular was sent to me first, and I have written an annotation upon it to the effect that I agree to Ali Zakki's proposal, but that we must be careful that a long notice is given to the public of the third, and far the largest, portion of the work being put up to tender.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 187.

Ali Zakki Bey to Dean of the Diplomatic Body.

M. le Doyen, *Le* 13 *avril*, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance qu'à la suite de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser, le 7 de ce mois, au sujet des travaux projetés pour le port de Casablanca, la Commission générale des Adjudications s'est réunie, le 9 courant, à l'effet d'examiner le projet de marché de gré à gré présenté par M. Porché, ingénieur en chef du Service des Travaux publics.

Après explications techniques fournies par M. le Ingénieur en chef et examen du cahier des charges, la Commission générale a décidé la passation d'un marché de gré à gré avec M. Jammy d'Oran, pour la construction d'une centaine de mètres d'épi à Casablanca au prix de 3,000 fr. par mètre courant, exécuté par les fonds de moins 2 mètres 50 centim. avec plus-value de 70 fr. par décimètre de profondeur en plus.

Ces travaux, dont la valeur totale doit être de 400,000 fr. environ, doivent être terminés le 25 juillet, 1912, au plus tard. Une pénalité de 500 fr. par jour de retard a été insérée audit cahier des charges.

S'il restait un reliquat sur la somme de 400,000 fr., il serait employé à la fabrication de blocs pour la deuxième tranche, de manière à ce que l'entrepreneur suivant puisse les employer dès son arrivée à Casablanca, probablement dans le courant de juillet.

D'autre part, M. Porché m'avait, à la date du 10 avril, adressé au sujet de l'adjudication de la seconde tranche, la lettre dont ci-joint copie. Cette lettre motivait une réunion du Comité spécial, puisque l'intervention financière de la Caisse spéciale était en jeu.

Après avoir reçu les explications de M. Porché, le comité s'est rangé à sa manière de voir. Il a donc décidé, dans sa séance de ce jour, de prélever sur les fonds de la Caisse spéciale une somme de 750,000 fr., devant venir en addition au reliquat disponible des fonds provenant de l'indemnité de Chaouïa ; l'entreprise devant être adjugée montera alors à 1,800,000 fr. environ, ce qui permettra simultanément d'achever l'abri à barcasses et, pour protéger cet abri, prolonger la grande jetée d'un peu moins d'une centaine de mètres ; ces deux natures de travaux ne pouvaient d'ailleurs absolument pas être confiés à des entrepreneurs différents, car ils doivent utiliser le même matériel (notamment les deux titans) et le même chantier, d'ailleurs très étroit, constitué par le tronçon déjà construit de la grande jetée.

Cette somme de 750,000 fr. sera prélevée, comme le propose M. Porché, sur le crédit de 800,000 fr. inscrit au budget de la Caisse spéciale pour 1912 au titre de grands travaux de port, ainsi qu'il était prévu au programme dressé en 1909, et approuvé par le corps diplomatique.

Toutefois, comme le propose M. Porché, et pour tenir compte de ce que cette réserve devait s'appliquer, le cas échéant, à des travaux à exécuter au port de Tanger, le comité demande que la subvention consentie par lui soit, si possible, remboursée à la Caisse spéciale sur les ressources ultérieures du budget marocain, lequel aura, de toutes façons, à supporter la dépense beaucoup plus considérable de la continuation et l'achèvement du port de Casablanca.

Enfin, en ce qui concerne l'adjudication elle-même, elle sera passée dans les formes ordinaires par la Commission générale des Adjudications, qui se réunira lundi prochain, pour en fixer la date ; le délai de publication sera fixé à soixante jours, comme le prévoit le règlement en cas d'urgence ; un avis détaillé faisant connaître tous les renseignements utiles sera publié et adressé à chaque légation ; il sera notamment indiqué que les pièces complètes du projet pourront être consultées par les concurrents au Bureau de la Commission générale et à ceux des Travaux publics à Tanger et à Casablanca.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Président,
A. ZAKKI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 187.

M. Porché to the Dean of the Diplomatic Body.

M. le Président, *Le* 10 *avril*, 1912.

L'EXÉCUTION de la partie la plus importante des travaux de l'abri de Casablanca devant être réalisée par voie d'adjudication, il me paraît n'y avoir aucun inconvénient à ne plus doter ce travail exclusivement sur les fonds des Chaouïa.

D'ailleurs, le reliquat disponible de ces fonds ne permettrait pas d'achever entièrement l'abri, étant donné que les modes de tractation nouvellement envisagés conduiront à un excédent de dépenses certain.

D'autre part, il est extrêmement désirable que, parallèlement à l'exécution des travaux de l'abri, on prolonge d'une certaine longueur la grande jetée afin de couvrir cet abri, sinon suffisamment, au moins mieux qu'elle ne l'est avec le tronçon actuellement existant. Et ce tronçon lui-même nécessite l'exécution de travaux de défense si l'on veut éviter qu'il ne soit encore avarié l'hiver prochain.

Dans ces conditions j'ai l'honneur de soumettre au comité une proposition tendant à affecter au projet sus-visé la somme de 750,000 fr. sur celle de 800,000 fr. prévue au budget de la Caisse spéciale de 1912 pour les grands travaux du port ; cette somme viendrait en addition des fonds provenant de l'annuité des Chaouïa, et dont le reliquat disponible ne dépasse guère actuellement 1,000,000 de francs : ce serait donc une dépense totale de 1,800,000 fr.

Les travaux pourraient être menés ainsi jusqu'en juillet 1913, époque à laquelle, il faut l'espérer, à la suite d'une nouvelle adjudication et de l'attribution des crédits nécessaires, un nouvel entrepreneur les poursuivra.

L'attribution d'une somme de 750,000 fr. au seul port de Casablanca sur les fonds de la Caisse spéciale peut sembler un peu lourde, eu égard aux besoins des autres villes de la côte ; néanmoins, vous reconnaîtrez que la situation de ce port nécessite impérieusement un effort immédiat et sérieux.

Pour tenir compte de ces diverses considérations, je proposerais au comité d'admettre qu'en principe cette affectation de 750,000 fr. ne serait décidée qu'à titre d'avance sur le budget du Gouvernement marocain, et que, réserve faite de l'approbation de celui-ci, cette somme serait remboursée à la Caisse spéciale, dès que la situation financière le permettra. Tel est le sens des propositions que j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de soumettre au comité. Au cas où le Gouvernement marocain ne les approuverait pas de son côté, la somme de 750,000 fr. serait abandonnée par la Caisse spéciale ; mais on pourrait facilement parer à cet inconvénient en décidant que sur les revenus des années ultérieures de cette caisse, perçus à Casablanca, une certaine somme serait réservée pour les travaux à exécuter dans les autres ports y compris Tanger, de manière à rétablir l'équilibre dans la répartition.

Il semble donc bien que de toute façon aucun obstacle ne s'oppose à l'adoption de ma proposition, et à son adoption immédiate, puisque, ainsi que vous le savez, la mise en adjudication des travaux de la seconde tranche de l'abri ne doit subir aucun délai.

Veuillez, &c.

[17015] No. 188.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 36.) *Tangier, April* 22, 1912.
(Telegraphic.) R.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 20th April.

French Legation inform me that, according to present information, total killed at Fez are about 12 civilians, including 1 woman, about 15 French military instructors, and some 40 French Algerian soldiers killed and wounded in the fighting.

General Moinier reached Fez yesterday with reinforcements, which bring total number of French troops to about 5,000. He reports that order has been restored and that tribes are quiet.

Legation state that bread is being distributed among the Jews and tents provided. A subscription has been opened by the British Jews of Tangier and first instalment of 200*l.* has been sent.

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[16738] No. 189.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 26 and 27 of 20th and 21st April.

Before advising Spanish Government to cede whole of Warga we must know what view they take of last French demands. If they are prepared to yield, subject to reasonable compensation elsewhere, I think French Government might be asked to meet them.

We cannot agree to regard Tangier as being in the Spanish zone, as we regard its complete internationalisation as most important.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 174.)

[17298] No. 190.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, April 23, 1912.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has just read to me letter he intends sending this evening to French Ambassador. It is to the effect that Spanish Government take stand on the position created by your proposal made on the 14th April to them and presumably also to [?] French Government a day or two later. Spanish Government had at once accepted, and they still hoped French Government would do the same.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that this reply represents the unanimous decision of Council of Ministers as confirmed in subsequent conversation between himself, Prime Minister, and the King.

On economic as well as [?] military grounds, it was impossible for Spain to cede area equivalent to quarter of her entire zone. In support of this estimate he pointed to map of 1898 by Roquevaire, according to which watershed claimed by France would leave Spain with a mere strip of the Mediterranean coast from Alhucemas westward. Moreover, the region in question was entirely unknown, and if Spain agreed to cede whole valley no one could say what would be the extent of her sacrifice. His Excellency admitted confidentially that he has himself seen tracing by M. Massenet, of Franco-Spanish Mining Company in the Riff, showing the course of a projected railway from Alhucemas to Fez. France required the valley for the purposes of this railway, and generally to make it impossible for Spain to communicate freely between eastern and western portions of her zone.

His Excellency [?] spoke earnestly, as it seems unlikely that the French demand in its present form could be made acceptable to Spanish Government. Rather than concede it, they would let matters take their course and occupy Tetuan and Arzila.

It seems unfortunate that French Ambassador was not allowed to renew officially offer he made on his own responsibility on the 30th March (my despatch No. 52), to the effect that frontier might follow ridge running immediately to the north of Warga to a specified point. This would be a very different thing from demanding above-mentioned watershed. Possibly French Government might reconsider this point.

(Sent to Paris.)

[17305] No. 191.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 24.)

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, April 24, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 27 of 20th April.

Following is translation of text of the French demand concerning valley of Warga:—

"Events at Fez have only confirmed the French Government in the necessity of occupation in force of the neighbouring region. Occupation could not be effectively accomplished if region of the Warga were not held by our troops. French Government, therefore, after fresh and exhaustive examination of the question, persist in demanding that the whole valley be recognised as integral part of French zone."

(Sent to Paris.)

[17629] No. 192.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, April 26, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 36 of 22nd April.

French have disarmed natives at Fez and are masters of the situation there. Massacres have, however, had a bad effect on the country generally, and there are signs of unrest in the south as well as in the north. One hundred and seventy-five cavalry from Mahalla, near Alcazar, have deserted with arms, tents, and baggage, and the French instructors, being doubtful as to the loyalty of the remaining cavalry and 550 infantry, reported position as critical. Assistance has been sent them from a small French force at a post on Sebu, about 15 miles distant.

Spanish Minister tells me that his reports from Alcazar are unsatisfactory, tribes discussing a general rising against the French and possibly attack on Spanish also.

[17734] No. 193.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, April 26, 1912.*

RUMOUR reaches Spanish Government that tribes are meditating an attack on Wassan and Alcazar, and Spanish reinforcements are under orders to leave immediately for Alcazar and Laraiche.

Minister for Foreign Affairs fears that rupture of negotiations will now be very difficult to avoid, as French Prime Minister once more told Spanish Ambassador at Paris on 24th April that French Government could not be satisfied with anything less than entire basin of the Warga.

French Ambassador is to-day showing Minister for Foreign Affairs sketch map marking the frontier which France desires to obtain. The line is made to run from source of the Lucus to make allowance for the watershed, and Spain thus gains the little corner hitherto demanded by France. It is not likely that this slight concession will move Spanish Government from the position which they have taken up.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[18110] No. 194.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic) *Foreign Office, April 26, 1912.*

YOUR French colleague will have received a fresh proposal as to Warga Valley. You should examine it with him and let me know whether you consider it offers a basis for continuing discussions with Spanish Government.

[17712] No. 195.

Consul MacLeod to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 8.)
Fez, April 12, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that during the last few days orders have been issued for the Court to leave Fez about the 18th to 20th instant for Mequinez and Rabat by way of Beni Hassan, thus avoiding the more direct route through Zemmur, which is still somewhat disturbed.

The French Mission is to leave Fez a day or two before the Court for Rabat, but it is expected that the mission and the Court will reach Rabat together. There is much talk of the Sultan then embarking at Rabat to spend some weeks in Paris, after which he will return to Rabat, and then either go on to Marrakesh or return to Fez, or remain at Rabat, which would then be made the capital.

The French Minister has, however, stated to me that the Paris visit is not absolutely fixed yet.

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The movement to Rabat is much disliked in Court circles and by the public here generally. No need is seen for it, for obviously, nowadays, the Sultan can do nothing at Rabat which he cannot do here, and two suspicions are expressed—first, that the design is to keep the Sultan permanently at Rabat, where he can be at once more effectually secluded and more easily defended; and, second, to have the Sultan and the future capital at a greater distance from the Spanish zone than they would be at Fez. It will be remembered that one extremity of the Spanish zone—the mountain of Mulai Bushta—is within 25 miles of Fez, on the north-north-west side, and so there is a feeling in some French circles here that one result of making Fez the capital in future would be to help the development of the southern areas of the Spanish zone.

Put in other words, the fear in Court circles is that the permanent installation of the Sultan at Rabat would mean not a reform or strengthening of Moorish administration, but merely the substitution of a French in place of a Moorish administration—in effect, the annexation of this country to Algeria.

It is possible, of course, that the Rabat idea is being discussed merely to show the Spaniards what may happen if they do not concede to France some parts of the Spanish zone nearest to Fez.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[17659] No. 196.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 80.)

Sir,

Tangier, April 18, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, regarding the complaints made by Jewish and Moorish shopkeepers at Fez in regard to the proceedings of the French military authorities in their efforts to suppress the arms traffic.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 196.

Consul MacLeod to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 24.)

Sir,

Fez, April 9, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that considerable excitement has been caused amongst the Jews here, and a number of Moslems have the same grievance, in regard to proceedings of the French military authorities in their efforts to suppress contraband traffic in arms and ammunition.

The position, by general admission, is that quantities of arms and cartridges exist at Fez, many of them acquired through malversation by native functionaries and soldiers in past years, but mostly bought by private individuals for their own defence during the troubles of last year.

The French military officers tried recently to buy back all arms and ammunition in the Jewish quarter, but owing to the holders' fear of being accused of contraband traffic nothing resulted.

The French officers allege, however, that the Berber insurgents beyond Sefrou and other tribesmen still get supplies of cartridges from Fez, and lately the instructors have been offering rewards to their men for discovery of such traffickers.

The complaints now are that the soldiers have begun to turn this to account by extorting money from shopkeepers—into whose shops or houses they drop a few cartridges—under threat of accusing them of illicit traffic.

On the 7th instant, Mr. Jacob Assoulines, British postal sub-agent in the Mellah, and Mr. Judah M. Bensimhon gave me certain particulars of the case—that of a Sefrou Jew, called Vidal, who lives at Fez—which has caused the most excitement, and Mr. Bensimhon, as secretary of the Fez branch of the Anglo-Jewish Association, sought my intervention about it, the more particularly as it was alleged that the accused Jew had been flogged by some French instructor to compel him to admit that the accusation was true, and flogging of Jews—no matter for what offence—had been

formally abolished by decree of the Sultan Sidi Mohammed about fifty years ago, by the efforts of Sir Moses Montefiore. Moreover, in the course of the same affair, a Jew passer-by had been bayoneted in the arm by a soldier, and several other passers-by had been mauled then by the soldiers. Two of the assaulted persons were Spanish subjects—one, indeed, being the Spanish consul's cook, a Spaniard—and some Spanish and German protégés were also struck.

Meanwhile, the rabbis and other leading Jews were petitioning the French Minister and the Grand Vizier on the matter.

I replied that I could not but suppose the French Minister and the chief military authorities would do justice impartially in the affair, and therefore before taking any steps (the more so as I had no case of any British, American, or Portuguese protégé being affected) I must await the result of the representations made by the Jews themselves.

This would be best too in the Jews' own interests, as foreign intervention, unless unavoidable, would be apt to be resented by the French authorities,; but I hoped Mr. Bensimhon would not infer that I felt no interest in the matter. On the contrary, I hoped he would keep me informed of all that should happen. With all this he quite agreed, and to-day he has stated to me that the affair is now in course of investigation by the French military authorities, and the result will be learned this evening or to-morrow, and also that an effort was being made towards the buying of all arms and cartridges in the Mellah by the authorities, or the depositing of them with some Jew who would be responsible for their safe keeping.

I am hopeful, therefore, that the present affairs themselves will be concluded satisfactorily.

I would, however, submit to your Excellency's consideration the inadequacy as regards even most elementary justice of the present state of things, under which innocent accused persons have—unless by raising general uproar—practically no chance of defending themselves. The proceedings are positively farcical, the prisoners' accusers, judges, and jury being all the same persons, and besides, seldom qualified, either by knowledge of Arabic or experience in sifting evidence or the like, to act fairly. It may be asked also whether it is at all fair to take civilians (of a community, too, who are most peaceable, law-abiding people) before military officers at all, and to punish them as if they were soldiers, except that, unlike the latter, they are denied even the form of a court-martial.

It is true, unfortunately, that the Moorish civil authorities are corrupt, and apt to connive at such offences as smuggling, but it should not be difficult to devise some simple form of joint civil and military tribunal for such offences, competent to hear both parties fully before punishing prisoners accused of offences against the army, or even to create some military tribunal whereat the prisoner should have reasonable opportunities to defend himself.

I shall, of course, report in due course the results of the investigations into the present matter, particularly of the flogging case.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[17660] No. 197.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 81.)

Sir,

Tangier, April 18, 1912.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 45 of the 11th instant transmitting correspondence with Dr. Kerr respecting the position of Protestant missions in Morocco.

Reports have reached this legation that Protestant missions encounter considerable difficulties in Algeria and Tunis, and, should this be the case, it would perhaps be desirable to obtain some kind of assurance from the French Government on the subject when they request the adherence of His Majesty's Government to the Protectorate Convention.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

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[17661] No. 198.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 82. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 17, 1912.*

THE Spanish Minister told me the other day that he was very anxious to have a talk with me on Moorish matters in general, and I called on him this morning.

He asked me my opinion on the progress of the negotiations at Madrid, but I had to confess that I had little or no information with regard to them. He told me that matters having practically come to a deadlock you had intervened with a proposal for the demarcation of the zones both in the north and the south. His Government had accepted your proposal, and he hoped that the French Government would do the same; it was, he believed, being discussed by them at a Cabinet Council that morning. I asked M. de Villasinda what steps the Spanish Government would take in the event of an agreement being come to between the two Governments. He replied that a High Commissioner would be appointed to reside at Tetuan and administer the zone in concert with the Sultan's khalifa. This High Commissioner would be a civilian, and probably a Minister Plenipotentiary. M. de Villasinda told me that he believed that his Government intended him for the post, but added that he personally would very much prefer that they should select someone else. He had very strong views with regard to the line of policy which should be pursued, and above all things he deprecated any sort of military occupation of Tetuan. There were already sufficient military posts in the neighbourhood of the town for all the requirements of safety, &c., and a great deal of bitterness would be avoided if the soldiers could be kept out of the way. In this he would find himself diametrically opposed to the military party, whose one idea was to make a series of expeditions and regain for the Spanish troops the laurels lost in the American war, quite regardless of the difficulties and disasters such a policy entailed—the great loss of life, the expenditure out of all proportion with the results obtained, not to mention the danger of a revolution in Spain and the fall of the Monarchy.

I had, he said, no idea of the difficulty of his position during the last fourteen months, but it was against the military party in Spain, not against the Moors or even the French, that he had had his hardest battles. He was ready to fight to the last in support his views; but he was young, and his authority was not yet sufficient to crush the resistance of old generals. I said that I only hoped that he would be selected for the post, as I felt convinced that his view was the only right one in the interests of his country.

M. de Villasinda then referred to the question of internationalisation of Tangier, and said that he feared that France must always overshadow all the other Powers owing to the position which she already held, such as the control of the debt, the collection of the customs, &c. He also feared that the Germans would pour money into Tangier, and thus obtain a preponderance. I replied that so long as we could obtain real internationalisation I thought there was nothing to fear; once that was secured, it was a case of *chacun pour soi*. Each Power had the right of doing as much or as little as she chose; we could not claim any right to limit commercial or industrial enterprise. M. de Villasinda said that I could count upon his support in my efforts to secure real internationalisation; he was also in favour of the exercise by the diplomatic or consular body of a large measure of control over the municipal council. I said that I thought it desirable in framing our "projet" we should have it as supple and flexible as possible, as experience of the "règlements" drawn up under the Act of Algeciras had shown that, notwithstanding all the care that had been taken, cases were continually cropping up which had not been foreseen and for which no provision was made. He fully agreed in this, and said he had made the same recommendation to his Government. He told me that he had reason to believe that the Germans intended to maintain their legation at Tangier, although he could not understand (any more than I can) what the position of the Minister would be once the French protectorate was recognised. He anticipates great trouble for the French for many years to come, and told me that he had received information to the effect that a rival Sultan had already been proclaimed in the south (a son of Ma-el-Aineen), and that Si Madani Glawi had thrown in his lot with him. I must say that no such report has reached me, but Menebhi, whose principal agent has just returned from Marrakesh, tells me that the situation is most dangerous there, and that the smallest spark will be sufficient to set the whole country

in a blaze. The great chiefs are all quarrelling amongst themselves, the authority of the Sultan has ceased to exist, and the bitterness against the French is steadily increasing.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[17662] No. 199.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 83.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 20, 1912.*

THE news of the mutiny of a portion of the Shereefian army at Fez and of the rising of the lower classes of the population, which formed the subject of my last telegrams, has caused general consternation. As far as I can gather, the first report which reached Tangier was a message sent by the sole survivor of the wireless telegraphists at Fez; this was communicated to the French Legation, who at once telegraphed for confirmation and details to M. Regnault, who was still at Fez, having delayed his departure owing to bad weather. The message was communicated to Mr. Harris, with whom I happened to be dining, by an intimate friend of the principal operators at the wireless station here; whose information has always been most reliable. At first I refused to believe that a rising had taken place absolutely in Fez, in the presence of French troops, &c., and where the population can have no delusions as to the power of France, but whilst we were discussing the report a telephone message came from the French secretary, saying he would like to see me at once on an urgent matter. M. de Revel then repeated to me the report which had reached Mr. Harris half an hour before, and said he was beginning to be anxious, as no reply had yet arrived from M. Regnault, although six hours had elapsed since the dispatch of the telegram. He asked me whether I had heard anything from Mr. MacLeod. I told him that I had not, and I must say that we both arrived at the conclusion that the station must have been wrecked. It was then past eleven, and I thought it wiser to wait till the next morning before telegraphing to you. At half-past eight M. Revel came round and communicated to me various telegrams which he had received early that morning from M. Regnault, the substance of which I reported to you in my telegram No. 30 of the 18th instant. Half an hour later I received Mr. MacLeod's first telegram.

The mutiny and the revolt have now been thoroughly crushed at Fez, but I believe that we must be prepared for disorders throughout the country. I was convinced from the reports which I had received lately from Mr. MacLeod and Dr. Verdon that the feeling against the French was intensely bitter, and this view was borne out by what Menebhi told me. I understand too that the Shereef of Wazzan (the son of the Englishwoman) told a friend privately at the beginning of the week that he might expect to see a very serious outbreak within a few days. Mr. MacLeod's last telegram, in which he reports the parading of the mutilated corpses through the city amid the acclamations of the population, shows that the movement was far from being purely military, as the French try to make out, and throws a serious light on the situation. It is inexplicable to me that the French should not realise the necessity for going slowly and for avoiding innovations and reforms, which can only exasperate the natives. In this new regulation with regard to pay, which furnished the pretext for the mutiny, I am inclined to trace the hand of Commandant Maugin. If my surmise is correct, he bears a heavy weight of responsibility on his shoulders. By the military executions in February he kindled the flame of insurrection which led to the siege of Fez and all its consequences, and it is not unlikely that the present movement may assume considerable proportions and add greatly to the difficulties of France. Unfortunately, it is not only in military matters that the French are showing want of judgment. The projected move of the court to Rabat appears to me as unwise as it is unnecessary. Mr. MacLeod writes that up to the present he has not come across a single person who can give even a plausible ground for it. It is most unpopular with the court officials and can only lend colour to the view held by the natives that the Sultan has sold them to the French, and is now handing them over to the sole authority of their new masters. I imagine that, after what has occurred, the move will be abandoned, at all events for the present; and I think this just as well, as it was quite on the cards that the tribes would take the opportunity, perhaps the last, of attacking the Sultan on his journey.

F.O. 413/56
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

The Sultan's visit to Paris also appears to me a great mistake. It must add to the exasperation of the Moors by accentuating their humiliation, and I cannot see what useful purpose it can possibly serve beyond flattering the vanity of the French.

Reports were current in Tangier yesterday that El Mokri had been assassinated; they were untrue, but I fear that they may prove to have only been premature. He is generally looked upon as the traitor, and his life is no doubt seriously menaced.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[17816] No. 200.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, April 27, 1912.

FRENCH Ambassador has just read to me a long telegram which he sent last night to the French Government in order that they might be fully acquainted with his views before meeting of French Council of Ministers to-day. His Excellency lays stress on the danger of rupture with Spain in the present circumstances, and strongly urges a settlement on the basis of his own proposal as made to Spanish Government on 30th March, but which was disapproved at that time by the French Government (see my despatches Nos. 50 a d 56). He thinks Spanish Government might be induced to accept this proposal if His Majesty's Government gave it their support. It would leave upper valley of the Warga in the Spanish zone, and I agree it might be fairly recommended to the acceptance of the Spanish Government, details being left until mixed commission of delimitation. French Ambassador fears, however, that the French Government may yield to pressure of party desiring rupture.

(Sent to Paris.)

[17817] No. 201.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, April 28, 1912.

MY telegrams Nos. 31 and 32 of 27th April.

French Ambassador has received telegram from French Government showing that his earnest representations have produced some effect. French Government state, however, that, before putting forward as their own the proposal made by his Excellency on the 30th March, they prefer to await result of your instruction directing me examine last French proposal with the French Ambassador (see your telegram No. 25 of 26th April.)

As regards this I have nothing to add to my telegram No. 31. French Ambassador thinks that it is desirable that French Government should be made to understand clearly that in your opinion the last French proposal has not a chance of acceptance here; they will then no doubt ask for your support for alternative proposal, which appears to me to be a reasonable basis for discussion.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[17899] No. 202.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 61.)
Sir,

Madrid, April 26, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 27 and 28 of the 21st and 23rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the French Ambassador's letter requesting the cession of the entire valley of the Uarga, together with the reply thereto of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 202.

M. Geoffray to Señor Garcia Prieto.

Madrid, le 20 avril, 1912.

Mon cher Ministre,

JE reçois à l'instant, trop tard pour pouvoir aller vous porter cette communication moi-même, des instructions télégraphiques de mon Gouvernement relatives à la question de la délimitation des zones au Maroc. Les événements dont Fez vient d'être le théâtre n'ont pu que confirmer le Gouvernement de la république dans la nécessité d'occuper fortement la région avoisinante. Or, cette occupation ne saurait s'effectuer d'une façon efficace si la région de l'Ouarga n'était pas aux mains de nos troupes. Dans cet état de choses, M. Poincaré me charge de vous faire savoir que le Cabinet français, après un nouvel examen approfondi de la question, persiste à demander que la totalité de la vallée de l'Ouarga soit reconnue comme partie intégrante de la zone française. En ce qui touche la délimitation de la zone d'Ifni, tenant compte des désirs exprimés par le Cabinet de Madrid, le Gouvernement de la république propose de reconnaître comme faisant partie de la zone espagnole, une étendue de côtes d'environ 60 à 65 kilom. partant du sud d'Ifni et aboutissant à l'oued Noun, cette bande atteindrait en profondeur une ligne à déterminer sur le terrain, laquelle ligne ne s'éloignerait pas de plus de 25 kilom. du rivage. En outre, voulant donner une preuve de plus de son esprit de conciliation, mon Gouvernement se déclare disposé, au cas où ces propositions seraient accueillies par le Gouvernement Royal, à reconnaître à celui-ci le droit qu'il a réclamé avec insistance au cours des négociations, et qui consiste à proposer lui-même au Sultan la liste des candidats au poste de khalifa dans la zone espagnole. Je me plais à espérer que le Gouvernement Royal appréciera l'esprit amical qui a inspiré ces propositions.

Veuillez, &c.
GEOFFRAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 202.

Señor Garcia Prieto to M. Geoffray.

(Translation.)

Madrid, April 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador,

HAVING examined attentively and in the most friendly spirit the proposals contained in your letter of the 20th respecting our negotiation about Morocco, I have the honour to inform you that my Government, after their proposal of the 10th of this month by which they thought they had made a real sacrifice to facilitate a complete agreement between our countries, received the urgent advice of the British Government to make another effort toward conciliation by giving up our demand for compensation in the north equal to what was ceded to France on the left bank of the Uarga, and by giving up likewise our southern zone up to the Dra, excepting Ifni, with a reasonable district round it. This proposal, as you know, I accepted in the interests of a settlement. Failing it, the British Government thought the situation in Morocco might become extremely grave, and the Spanish Government adhere to the proposal in the hope that the Government of the republic will listen to the recommendation which, according to Sir M. de Bunsen, will be to the effect that your demand in the Uarga region be confined to the district bounded in the north by that river as far as a point to be determined hereafter by a mixed commission.

I have, &c.
M. GARCIA PRIETO.

[17943] No. 203.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 187.)
Sir,

Paris, April 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that it is announced this evening that the French Government have appointed General Lyautey as resident-general in Morocco, and M. Gaillard, French consul at Fez, as secretary-general.

It was considered probable that M. Regnault would be named resident-general, but the recent rising at Fez has apparently induced the Government to appoint a general to the post.

F.O. 371/1356
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

General Lyautey has made his reputation by his successful handling of matters on the Algerian-Moroccan frontier.

I enclose, extracted from the "Temps," an account of his career.*

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[18117] No. 204.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, April 29, 1912.

LES graves événements qui viennent de survenir au Maroc ont obligé le Gouvernement de la république à prendre des mesures immédiates afin d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre dans l'Empire chérifien, sans attendre la ratification du traité signé à Fez le 12 mars dernier, et sa notification ultérieure aux Puissances.

Le Général de Division Lyautey a été nommé Commissaire-Résident général de la République française au Maroc; à ce titre, il possédera les pouvoirs civils et militaires les plus étendus sous la souveraineté du Sultan; ses instructions lui recommandent de veiller à l'exacte observation des engagements pris par la France à l'égard des Puissances, tant en ce qui concerne le maintien de l'ordre qu'en ce qui concerne l'égalité économique dans l'Empire chérifien.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 29 avril, 1912.

[17976] No. 205.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 29.)

(No. 38.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, April 28, 1912.*

FRENCH chargé d'affaires has just read me the following telegram which he has received from his Government:—

"From this day all powers possessed by French Legation at Tangier are transferred to resident-general at Fez. An agency under orders of Ministry for Foreign Affairs is established at Tangier, and is placed provisionally in your charge. You should take such measures as you think proper to institute ('instituer') new régime."

French chargé d'affaires will call on doyen to-morrow morning and ask him to circulate note to this effect.

[17817] No. 206.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 185.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, April 29, 1912.*

SIR M DE BUNSEN'S telegram No. 33 of 28th April.

I entirely concur in second† paragraph, and your Excellency should so inform French Government, adding that His Majesty's Government would greatly regret a rupture of negotiations, but that they feel that Spain has reached the limit of concessions that can reasonably be demanded of her. His Majesty's Government are, however, prepared, in the interests of a settlement, to urge Spanish Government to accept proposal referred to in Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 32 of 27th April, details of which your Excellency has received in the print.

Your Excellency should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs to this effect, and express the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that French Government will agree, as this seems a fair compromise, and a rupture of negotiations would be most unfortunate.

(Repeated to Madrid, No. 27.)

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* Not printed.

† This word was wrongly cyphered "first."

[18322] No. 207.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, April 30, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 185 of yesterday states that you concur in first paragraph of Sir M. de Bunsen's telegram No. 33 of 28th April. I have, however, not yet received Foreign Office telegram No. 25 of 26th April to Madrid therein referred to. I presume that representations to French Government should be as follows:—

His Majesty's Government feel from the reports which they have received from their Ambassador at Madrid that Spain has reached limit of concession which she will make and which can reasonably be asked of her. They would deplore a rupture of negotiations, and, in interests of a settlement, which is so necessary, they are ready to urge Spanish Government to accept a line following a ridge of hills running just north of River Warga along that portion of it which approaches Fez (see Sir M. de Bunsen's despatch No. 52 of 2nd April, not No. 50, as stated in his telegram No. 32 of 22nd April).* France would therefore surrender her claim to the Upper Warga.

Please instruct me whether above is sufficiently definite. I cannot without further details make it more so.

[18322] No. 208.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 1, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 60 of 30th April.

Representations to French Government should state that His Majesty's Government are convinced, from reports from their Ambassador in Madrid, that last French proposal has not a chance of being accepted by Spain, and that they feel that Spanish Government have reached the limits of concessions that can be reasonably demanded from them. His Majesty's Government are, however, ready, in the vital interests of a settlement, to urge Spanish Government to accept a line following a ridge of hills running just north of the River Warga along that portion of it which approaches Fez, leaving the Upper Warga to Spain. His Majesty's Government earnestly hope, &c., as stated in last paragraph of my telegram No. 185 of 29th April.

[18642] No. 209.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 211.)
Foreign Office, May 1, 1912.

Sir,

M. CAMBON informed me to-day that the serious and sudden outbreak in Morocco had made it necessary to appoint a general, and to place in his hands the diplomatic as well as the military power. M. Cambon observed confidentially that it was owing to the fact that these two Powers had been placed in separate hands that there had been this trouble. His Government had therefore appointed one of their generals, but they had also appointed an agent in Tangier, with whom the Ministers might communicate.

I said that I understood the position of the Ministers to remain provisionally as it had been hitherto.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* This telegram also referred to Madrid despatch No. 56, which contains the same description of the line as despatch No. 52.

F.O. 413/56
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

[18501]

No. 210.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 62.)

Sir,

Madrid, April 29, 1912.

I HOPE that my recent telegrams have sufficiently explained the serious hitch which has occurred in the Franco-Spanish negotiation concerning Morocco. The point round which the dispute centres is the possession of the basin of the Warga. France claims, in short, that the frontier between the two zones, as drawn in the 1904 convention, should be shifted from the southern to the northern watershed of the Warga, that is, to the watershed between the Warga and the Mediterranean. The frontier now demanded by France is further defined in the enclosed short memorandum as communicated by M. Geoffray to Señor Garcia Prieto on the 26th instant. Starting from Jebel Beni Hassan, a mountain placed in Roquevaire's map of 1908 near the head waters of Wady Kert and some 40 kilom. south of Alhucemas, the suggested line follows westwards for 70 or 80 kilom. the mountain ridge ("ligne de faîte") to Jebel Tiziren. From this point, leaving the main ridge, which about here assumes a north-westerly direction, the line proceeds some 70 kilom. further on its westerly course to the source of Wady Lucus. The entire length of the proposed northern boundary of the basin of the Warga is thus about 150 kilom. from point to point. It leaves Spain for a considerable distance with a strip of Mediterranean coast not exceeding 30 kilom. in depth. The new frontier would lie about 50 kilom. to the north of the line traced on the map which accompanied the Franco-Spanish Treaty of 1904.

The unanimity of the Spanish Cabinet in rejecting this proposal is positively asserted this morning in an official communication to the press. From many conversations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I gather that they are moved in the main by the considerations that, by yielding to the French demand, they would sacrifice a large area believed to be in parts very fertile; that Spain would find her zone indented in such a way as to render precarious all communication between its eastern and western portions; that what France really desires is the construction of a railway from Alhucemas to Fez, which would follow the course of the Warga and come, therefore, under French control over its entire length, except some 30 kilom. at its northern end; that the power of Spain to deal effectively with the hostile tribes of the Riff would be seriously curtailed by excluding her from the line along which she might otherwise attack the enemy from the rear; and that, in short, her means of effectively administering and developing her zone would be materially impaired to an extent rendering it doubtful whether it would be worth her while to retain it.

Realising the hopelessness of moving the Spanish Government from this view of the case, the French Ambassador promised Señor Garcia Prieto on the 30th March, as already reported in my despatch No. 52 of the 2nd April, that he would recommend his Government to abandon its demand for the entire valley, and to accept a compromise to the effect that the frontier, instead of being pushed back northwards all the way to the Mediterranean watershed, should be made to follow the ridge of mountain lying immediately to the north of the River Warga. This, he thought, would be much the same thing, from a Spanish point of view, as if it followed the course of the river itself, as proposed by Spain. At the point where in Roquevaire's map the course of the Warga bends sharply away to the north, M. Geoffray was prepared to suggest that the frontier should cross the river and proceed in a north-easterly direction along a ridge which appears to lead straight thence to Jebel Beni Hassan. If this line were adopted, France might content herself with the reflection that she had obtained the valley of the Warga along that portion of its course which would seem to have a bearing on the question of the security of Fez. Spain, on the other hand, would retain the upper valley of the Warga, the possession of which, in her own hands, she esteemed essential to the adequate security of Alhucemas.

M. Geoffray informs me, in confidence, that this proposal was one which had been already submitted to M. Poincaré by M. Benoist and M. Rousselet. He did not tell me what position these gentlemen occupied at the Quai d'Orsay. They thought that the line which they suggested would sufficiently protect French interests. M. Regnault was of the same opinion. M. Geoffray therefore felt safe in offering to do his best to secure its adoption by the French Government. As reported in my despatch No. 56 of the 11th instant, his recommendation was not accepted at the time by M. Poincaré. His Excellency received instructions to renew the demand for the entire valley.

The divergence of view between the two Governments appearing to threaten an

open rupture of the negotiations, I ventured in my telegram No. 24, Confidential, of the 12th instant, to make a suggestion which, in my opinion, and I might say that of my French colleague, appeared to offer some prospect of being accepted by both sides. The Spanish Government had prejudiced their case by demanding compensations in the northern zone for any concession which they might make to France in the way of a rectification of the frontier. They had also made very insufficient offers as regards their southern zone. It appeared to me that a reasonable arrangement could be reached on the lines of Spain giving up her demand for compensation in the northern zone, and offering, in the southern zone, the coast down to Wady Dra, with the exception of an enclave round Ifni, which would remain Spanish. On the other hand, it seemed possible that France might content herself, on these terms, with the line of the Warga itself as a point to be subsequently determined by a mixed commission.

You had the goodness to instruct me accordingly by your telegram No. 14 of the 13th instant. I made the necessary communication to Señor Garcia Prieto, and was able to report in my telegram No. 25 of the 14th instant that his Excellency had unhesitatingly accepted your suggestion on behalf of the Spanish Government, in so far as Spain was concerned. But the French Government were still unwilling to relinquish their larger demand. Their reluctance was increased by the mutinous outbreak which occurred in Fez on the 17th instant. M. Geoffray was instructed to inform the Spanish Government that this event would render necessary the armed occupation of the country surrounding Fez—a step which could only be effectively taken if the entire valley of the Warga were held by French troops. Some compensation was offered to Spain in the south and also in respect of the manner of the appointment of the Sultan's khalifa for the Spanish northern zone. His Excellency made this communication in writing to Señor Garcia Prieto on the 26th instant. The Spanish reply, dated the 23rd, adhered closely to the British proposal. The Foreign Minister explained verbally, both to M. Geoffray and myself, that it implied unequivocally the rejection of the French demand for the entire valley of the Warga.

Unmoved by this refusal, the French Government directed M. Geoffray to endeavour to overcome the objections of the Spanish Government by submitting to them the above-mentioned memorandum of the 26th instant, accompanied by an explanatory sketch map. It amounted to a definition of the precise extent of the French claim and, though it made it clear that the important town of Chechaouen (French spelling) was to be retained by Spain, a point which had been left doubtful, Señor Garcia Prieto saw in it no material concession to the Spanish view. He told M. Geoffray off-hand that he must maintain the position taken up in his letter of the 23rd. He wrote to me to the same effect, adding that the line drawn on the French sketch map assumed quite a different aspect when transferred to a Spanish map, and that, moreover, the position of the source of the Lucus was admitted by competent persons to be one of the open questions of Moroccan geography. M. Geoffray at once informed the French Government, by telegraph, that he had been unsuccessful in his effort to bring Señor Garcia Prieto round to the French view of the question. This point had therefore been already made plain to M. Poincaré at the time when I had the honour to receive your telegram No. 25 of the 26th instant, directing me to examine the proposal with M. Geoffray, and to report upon it. Had I received it sooner, I could only have replied in the sense of the answer of the French Ambassador. Both to his Excellency and to myself it was obvious that the "fresh proposal" was, in reality, nothing more than a definition of the full extent of the previous French demand.

Determined to make a last effort to prevent a rupture, M. Geoffray has since strongly urged his Government to revert to the proposal which he himself put forward tentatively on the 30th March, and which is described in the French correspondence as the Rousselet proposal.

I venture to think that, as explained to me by M. Geoffray, it is one which the Spanish Government might fairly be invited to accept.

I have, &c.

MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 210.

Memorandum communicated to Señor Garcia Prieto by M. Geoffray.

D'APRÈS les derniers renseignements fournis au Gouvernement de la république sur l'aspect géographique et politique du bassin de l'Ouergha, la délimitation ci-après indiquée apparaît comme rationnelle :

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

A partir du Djebel Béni Hassan, la frontière suivrait la ligne de faîte jusqu'au Djebel Tiziren. De ce point, elle irait, le plus directement possible, rejoindre la source du Loukkos. Les tribus Rmara et Khmès seraient ainsi comprises en totalité dans la zone espagnole, tandis que les tribus Ktama, Béni Ahmed et Rzaoua se trouveraient tout entières dans la zone française.

Ambassade de la République française, Espagne,
le 26 avril, 1912.

[18549]

No. 211.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, May 2, 1912.

IL résulte d'une communication adressée par le chargé d'affaires d'Angleterre à Tanger à l'ingénieur en chef des Travaux publics du Maroc que le Gouvernement britannique entend réserver à la future municipalité internationale de Tanger la mise en adjudication des eaux, de l'éclairage électrique et des tramways dans cette ville.

D'autre part, il résulte d'une lettre communiquée à M. Porché par M. Norton, administrateur de la Société marocaine de Travaux publics, que le Gouvernement britannique ne s'oppose pas à ce que les travaux du port de Tanger et ceux du chemin de fer soient mis en adjudication par le Gouvernement marocain.

L'Ambassadeur de France serait reconnaissant au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères de lui faire connaître si telle est bien la manière de voir du Foreign Office en ce qui concerne ces deux questions.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 1er mai, 1912.

[18640]

No. 212.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 2, 1912*

MY telegram No. 38 of 28th April.

French chargé d'affaires informs me he has received instructions to continue to treat all matters with diplomatic body, sign circulars, &c., during period of transition. Consulates at Tetuan and El Arish are to be under Tangier.

[18643]

No. 213.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, May 2, 1192.*

ITALIAN chargé d'affaires this morning showed me, in strict confidence, telegram which he had received from Italian officer in charge of arsenal at Fez, stating that Sultan was abdicating in favour of eight-year-old son, who would be placed under tutelage of Grand Vizier. Source of information usually reliable.

I mentioned report to French chargé d'affaires without stating its origin. He has no confirmation. He told me Sultan had been wishing to abdicate for some time, but had been given clearly to understand he was only being allowed to retain vast possessions which he has amassed on the condition of his fulfilling his part of the contract, one most important item of which was that he should remain on the throne and help to institute new régime. If he failed to do this his property would be confiscated and he would very probably not be allowed to remain in Morocco.

[18316]

No. 214.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1912.*

FROM perusal of papers which will have reached you in the Morocco print sections, your Excellency will be aware of the general attitude of His Majesty's Government with regard to the internationalisation of Tangier. I now have to transmit to your Excellency further papers on the same subject which will, I think, render quite clear the standpoint of His Majesty's Government in this matter, particularly my notes to M. Cambon and to Señor de Villa Urrutia of the 2nd instant.*

You will see from the last paragraph of the above-mentioned note to the Spanish Ambassador and from the communications exchanged with M. Cambon, that it is proposed that further discussion of the question should take place at Madrid, and I should be glad therefore if you would take an early opportunity of explaining fully to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs the views of His Majesty's Government.

I may add that the textual differences in the memoranda communicated to the French and Spanish Ambassadors in regard to the French counter-scheme are due to the fact that the Spanish Government are presumably unaware of the confidential discussions respecting the question of Tangier which have taken place between the Cabinets of London and Paris.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[15639]

No. 215.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a memorandum setting forth the views of His Majesty's Government on the draft scheme for the internationalisation of Tangier which you were good enough to communicate to me on the 23rd March last.

I should be grateful if this paper could be laid before your Excellency's Government at an early date.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 215.

Memorandum commenting on the Draft Scheme for the Internationalisation of Tangier communicated by the French Ambassador on March 23, 1912.

(Communicated to French Ambassador, May 2, 1912.)

Article 1.—Method of setting up the Municipality.

HIS Majesty's Government regret they cannot share the view of the French Government that a Shereefian decree would be sufficient to establish an international municipality on a proper footing.

It is an essential feature of the scheme that the municipality should stand to the Sultan in the same relations as the French and Spanish protectorates, and just as the French protectorate will be legally built up on the basis of a treaty between the French Republic and the Sultan, and the Spanish protectorate no doubt on the similar basis of an Hispano-Moorish treaty, so the international status of the Tangier municipality must rest on a formal agreement between the several treaty Powers and the Sultan.

His Majesty's Government therefore feel bound to adhere to the view expressed in the memorandum communicated to M. Cambon on the 15th March, 1912, that, "in

* Nos. 215 and 218; and to Spanish Ambassador [17632] (not printed); to M. Cambon [17632] (not printed).

order that the municipality should have a good and secure title, it must be established in virtue of a convention between the Sultan of Morocco and the treaty Powers represented at Tangier. All the essentials of the scheme must be covered by the convention or by a Shereefian decree annexed thereto as an integral part of it."

The above considerations lend additional weight to the objection entertained by His Majesty's Government to restricting an international agreement on this subject to Great Britain, France, and Spain alone. It is difficult to see on what ground the other Powers signatories of the Algeciras Act could be excluded from being a party to an arrangement under which their several representatives at Tangier will eventually be called upon to exercise important functions, and it would not be surprising if one or other of them were to refuse their acceptance of a convention in the negotiation of which they were not allowed, even nominally, to have a voice. His Majesty's Government therefore consider that the other signatory Powers should be consulted before the conclusion of any arrangement, though they think that the draft of such an arrangement might be prepared by France, Spain, and Great Britain. They are unaware whether the French Government are relying on any assurances they may have received from the German Government binding the latter to acquiesce in whatever arrangements may be made by France, Great Britain, and Spain. Unless binding assurances to this effect have been given, such unquestioning acquiescence can hardly be expected as a matter of course. But, even if Germany were known to be ready to accept the arrangement proposed by the French Government, this seems no reason for excluding her or the other treaty Powers from the signature of such a convention with the Sultan as His Majesty's Government consider, for the reasons above explained, to be necessary. On the contrary, such a conciliatory attitude on the part of the German Government would materially facilitate the conclusion of the general convention which the situation demands.

Articles 2, 4, 8, *and* 9.

His Majesty's Government are generally in agreement with the Government of the republic.

Article 3.—*Composition of the Council.*

In a communication made semi-officially by the French Embassy on the 25th March last, the view is expressed that the original British proposal, while seeking to reconcile two principles—the equality of all the Powers and the relative importance of the different colonies and their interests—is in effect merely the application of the first principle and the negation of the second. His Majesty's Government recognise that there is some force in the contention that the composition of the municipal council which they proposed would not reflect with accuracy the proportional importance of the respective interests of the several Powers. But on the other hand, the French counter-proposal seems to lose sight of the necessity for securing the equality of the Powers in some measure: it amounts to the application of the second principle and the negation of the first. His Majesty's Government think that a modification of their original suggestion, on the following lines, would meet both points.

The council might consist, as to one half, of twelve nominated members, one for each nationality, including Moorish; the twelve remaining members should be freely elected, subject to the proviso that no nationality (including the Moorish) should be represented by more than four members in all, including the nominated member, if any. This, His Majesty's Government think, would give proper scope for the due proportional representation of the various nationalities.

One of the principal objects which His Majesty's Government have in view in proposing that half the members of the council should be nominated is to ensure the services of a fair proportion of reliable and experienced men on that body so far as such men may be available, and thus to secure for it as large a measure of stability and efficiency as the circumstances will permit, and they find it difficult to see how reliance can be placed on obtaining this very essential result otherwise than by some system of nomination. Nor can they share what appears to be the apprehension of the French Government that the twelve nominated members will naturally tend to form one group, and the twelve elected members another. On the contrary, they are convinced that both nominated and elected members will tend to act in national groups, and that, under the scheme now proposed, the Powers with the largest interests will be most effectively represented on the council, while at the same time every treaty Power will have at least that voice in the council's deliberations which it can justly claim when asked to consent to its institution.

As regards the Moorish members, His Majesty's Government see grave objection to the sugggestion of an election by Moorish notables. They feel strongly that the local native population should be allowed freely to elect the men who enjoy their confidence, and that with this view anything should be avoided which would tend to make the choice of the Moorish members subject to the direct or indirect influence of the Makhzen. Such influence would undoubtedly make itself felt with the notables, whose position necessarily brings them into more or less close touch with the Court at Fez. There are, moreover, important elements of the native population which would have no prospect of being in any way represented if the franchise were restricted to the notables. Apart from the Jewish community, which is estimated to number approximately 10,000 souls, it is understood that there are a considerable number of Algerian Mussulmans of good standing. It would not be equitable or politic to exclude either of these groups.

In these circumstances it appears both just and expedient that the franchise for the native element should be identical with that for the other nationalties.

Nor do His Majesty's Government see any valid reason for giving the Moors a preponderating position in the council. To do so would both violate the principle to complete internationalisation and weaken the council by giving an undue proportion of seats to the most backward and ignorant section of the community.

Articles 5, 10, *and* 11.—*Powers of the Municipality.*

The Government of the republic are apparently in substantial agreement with His Majesty's Government in considering that the Powers of the municipality should be as free and unfettered as is consistent with existing treaty rights. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government, this could best be secured by assigning to the municipality all powers of Government except in respect to matters specifically to be excluded. The French Government may see a difficulty in any decree constituting the municipality which would formally proclaim the transfer of the Sultan's sovereignty to that body. It should, however, be possible without unnecessarily wounding the susceptibilities of the Sultan, to find a suitable form of words which would express the idea that his authority, for the purposes of administration and legislation in the municipal area, is devolved upon the municipality in all matters except those especially reserved. The French Government will doubtless recognise the importance of laying down in most precise terms the powers of the municipality, as the only means of avoiding future disputes or attempts at outside interference.

Article 6.—*Committee of Control.*

The Tangier municipality is not likely, especially in the earlier stages, to contain—even with the retention of the principle of nomination in respect of half its members—as large a proportion of men of high capacity and large experience as would be desirable having regard to the important powers to be exercised by them. Until it has been possible to watch the proceedings of the council for a time, it would certainly involve much risk to allow it to wield such wide authority without control. His Majesty's Government adhere to their view that it would be more prudent at least at first to retain a *general* power of control in the hands of the representatives of the signatory Powers at Tangier, following in this respect the model of the Alexandria municipality, whose functions are subject to the supervision of the Egyptian Government. Experience will show, as regards Tangier whether, and to what degree, such control can be relaxed at a later date; the French Government will not fail to realise the difficulty of extending the control at some future time, should experience show this to be necessary.

Article 7.—*Revenue.*

His Majesty's Government fear that the revenues contemplated in the French memorandum of the 25th March last will not in themselves suffice for the needs of the municipality. So far as they are able to judge, the only revenues available would be the yield from the "taxe urbaine," estimated at about 4,600*l.* a-year, the profits from the grain market 1,600*l.*, the slaughter-house tax 1,050*l.*, mole and other dues 150*l.* The yield of the "tertib" would certainly be small for the Tangier district, while the voluntary contributions to the Commission d'Hygiène for scavengering and lighting would of course cease. Thus the yield of the local taxation reaches the entirely inadequate figure of approximately 7,500*l.*

His Majesty's Government would deprecate the imposition at Tangier of high

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direct taxation, which must necessarily affect the prosperity of the town, and they would point to the difficulty of raising loans on reasonable terms in the absence of any adequate security.

For these reasons His Majesty's Government think that the municipality should be allowed to have the revenue from the special customs surtax, not only for the construction of the port, but for public works in general. They consider, further, that it would be only just that some portion of the Tangier customs, though collected by the Contrôle de la Dette, should be allotted to the municipality, and that at least it should be agreed that, when the time comes, some fifteen years hence, for the existing loans to be converted, some arrangement should be made, if experience has shown that the available resources are insufficient, for freeing the Customs and Government monopolies from the present charges, with a view to some portion of these revenues being made directly available for Tangier.

From this point of view the wording of article 10 appears dangerously wide and indefinite; as it stands, it could only have the effect of unnecessarily curtailing the powers and hampering the administration of the municipality. His Majesty's Government adhere to the opinion that the municipality should have complete authority, except as regards certain exemptions, which should be specifically enumerated in precise terms, as was suggested in the memorandum communicated to M. Cambon on the 15th ultimo. His Majesty's Government would be quite ready to discuss the list of such exemptions in the friendliest spirit, but the principle should be laid down clearly in the proposed convention.

[18117]

No. 216.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government have taken note of the communication which you were good enough to make to me on the 29th ultimo, to the effect that General Lyautey has been appointed French Resident-General at Fez with full civil and military powers.

His Majesty's Government fully understand the reasons which have led the French Government to make this appointment in anticipation of the ratification of the Franco-Moorish convention and its formal acceptance by the treaty Powers.

On the other hand, the French Government will doubtless concur in the view of His Majesty's Government that, until such acceptance has been signified, the position of the foreign representatives at Tangier and the mode of their communications with the Shereefian Government must remain unaltered.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[16466]

No. 217.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to state that careful consideration has been given to the *note verbale* which your Excellency was good enough to communicate to this Office on the 18th ultimo relative to the existing state of insecurity in Morocco.

Your Excellency's note observed that, in view of this situation, the French Government must decline to accept responsibility for the safety of foreigners who enter districts in which the authority of the Sultan or of the French administration does not at present prevail, and added that this situation would only be provisional, and that the French Government would endeavour to improve it with the least possible delay.

In taking note of this communication, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government recognise that, in the present state of the country, Europeans entering certain districts must do so at their own risk, but they are not, as at present advised, prepared to agree to any part of Morocco, to which a clear treaty right of resort exists, being closed entirely to British subjects. In view of the last

paragraph of your Excellency's note, His Majesty's Government are anxious to make it clear that they could not give a formal or implied consent to any such infringement of the treaty rights of British subjects as would follow from the establishment in Morocco of the Algerian precedent referred to.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[15330]

No. 218.

Sir Edward Grey to Señor de Villa Urrutia.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1912.*

ON the 11th ultimo your Excellency was good enough to communicate to me the draft of the answer which the Spanish Government proposed to send to the French proposals for the internationalisation of Tangier, and to state that the Spanish Government did not desire to communicate this document to the French Government until they had learnt the opinion of His Majesty's Government in regard to it.

I now have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum showing the reasons for which His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to lend their support to the arguments which the Spanish Government propose to use in their reply to the French Government.

At the same time I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency a further memorandum showing the views of His Majesty's Government on the French draft scheme which was communicated to this Office on the 23rd March by the French Ambassador at this Court. His Majesty's Government trust that on many points this memorandum will be found by the Spanish Government to meet their objections to the draft scheme submitted by the French Government, and they hope that it may form the basis of a preliminary agreement between the three Powers. In making these counter-proposals His Majesty's Government are actuated by the desire to bring about the creation of a municipal system in which the accepted principle of the internationalisation of Tangier would be given full and impartial effect.

In accordance with the suggestion made by the French Government, and accepted, so I understand, by the Spanish Government, I am instructing His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid to communicate the view of His Majesty's Government to the Spanish Minister of State with a view to their being discussed with his Excellency and with the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 218.

Memorandum in reply to Spanish Proposals.

(Communicated to Spanish Ambassador May 2, 1912.)

Article 1.—*Method of Organisation.*

(*a.*) Article 9 of the Franco-Spanish Convention of the 3rd October, 1904, states that "the town of Tangier shall keep the special character which it derives from the presence of the diplomatic body and its municipal and sanitary institutions." His Majesty's Government have accepted this treaty, which was formally communicated to them at the time.

As regards the juridical situation of the town, the following are the views of His Majesty's Government:—

Pending a general judicial reorganisation, such as may have to be carried out *pari passu* with the changes contemplated for the rest of Morocco under the Franco-German Convention of the 4th November, 1911, the existing tribunals in the municipal territory should provisionally continue on their present basis. A special court will, however, have to be set up at once in order to hear cases brought against the municipality. Such court might consist of three consular judges and two assessors, to be appointed according to a list annually drawn up by the diplomatic body at Tangier

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in consultation with the Makhzen. Appeals would lie to the Federal Court at Lausanne.

In the case of actions brought by the municipality, the latter would have to take proceedings before whatever would be the competent court in each particular case.

(*b.*) His Majesty's Government have always considered that the primary object of the internationalisation of Tangier was that it should be held to be entirely outside the sphere or zone of any one particular nationality. There will thus be three administrations in Morocco: the Spanish zone, the French zone, and Tangier.

(*c.*) His Majesty's Government agree that the "powers" of the municipality referred to in the French text relate to local questions.

Article 2.—*Area.*

His Majesty's Government feel that full scope should be given to allow of the proper growth and development of Tangier, and they fear that the radius of 6 kilom. suggested in the Spanish memorandum would be inadequate for this purpose. In conversation with His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Tangier on the 5th March last the Spanish Minister observed that, in his opinion, the extent of territory to be assigned to Tangier should depend in great measure upon the degree of internationalisation.

His Majesty's Government would suggest that the exact boundary could best be settled by negotiation between the diplomatic representatives of the Powers at Tangier.

Articles 3 *and* 4.—*Composition of the Council.*

The views of His Majesty's Government on this point are given fully in the memorandum on the French proposals. It will be seen that His Majesty's Government are in favour of a franchise established on the basis of the "taxe urbaine," and that they propose that the Moorish members should be placed on the same footing as regards numbers as any other nationality.

Articles 5–9.

As already indicated under the head of article 1 (*b*), His Majesty's Government cannot admit that the town and district of Tangier should be held to lie in any particular zone or to be connected in any special way with the authorities or administration of any one particular nation. They regret, therefore, that they cannot accept the contention on which the Spanish objections to these articles are based.

Foreign Office, May 2, 1912.

Enclosure 2 in No. 218.

Memorandum commenting on the Draft Scheme for the Internationalisation of Tangier communicated by the French Ambassador on March 23, 1912.

(Communicated to Spanish Ambassador May 2, 1912.)

Article 1.—*Method of Setting up the Municipality.*

HIS Majesty's Government regret they cannot share the view of the French Government that a Shereefian decree would be sufficient to establish an international municipality on a proper footing.

It is an essential feature of the scheme that the municipality should stand to the Sultan in the same relations as the French and Spanish protectorates, and just as the French protectorate will be legally built up on the basis of a treaty between the French Republic and the Sultan, and the Spanish protectorate no doubt on the similar basis of an Hispano-Moorish treaty, so the international status of the Tangier municipality must rest on a formal agreement between the several treaty Powers and the Sultan.

His Majesty's Government, therefore, are of opinion that, in order that the municipality should have a good and secure title, it must be established in virtue of a convention between the Sultan of Morocco and the treaty Powers represented at

Tangier. All the essentials of the scheme must be covered by the convention or by a Shereefian decree annexed thereto as an integral part of it.

The above considerations lend additional weight to the objection entertained by His Majesty's Government to restricting an international agreement on this subject to Great Britain, France, and Spain alone. It is difficult to see on what ground the other Powers signatories of the Algeciras Act could be excluded from being a party to an arrangement under which their several representatives at Tangier will eventually be called upon to exercise important functions, and it would not be surprising if one or other of them were to refuse their acceptance of a convention in the negotiation of which they were not allowed, even nominally, to have a voice.

His Majesty's Government therefore consider that the other signatory Powers should be consulted before the conclusion of any arrangement, though they think that the draft of such an arrangement might be prepared by France, Spain, and Great Britain. They are unaware whether the French Government are relying on any assurances they may have received from the German Government binding the latter to acquiesce in whatever arrangements may be made by France, Great Britain, and Spain. Unless binding assurances to this effect have been given, such unquestioning acquiescence can hardly be expected as a matter of course. But even if Germany were known to be ready to accept the arrangement proposed by the French Government, this seems no reason for excluding her or the other treaty Powers from the signature of such a convention with the Sultan as His Majesty's Government consider, for the reasons above explained, to be necessary. On the contrary, such a conciliatory attitude on the part of the German Government would materially facilitate the conclusion of the general convention which the situation demands.

Articles 2, 4, 8, *and* 9.

His Majesty's Government are generally in agreement with the Government of the republic.

Article 3.—*Composition of the Council.*

His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot accept the principle of this article. It appears to them to lose sight of the necessity for securing the equality of all the Powers, while over-emphasising the relative importance of the different colonies and their interests. They trust that the divergent views of the two Governments on this question may be reconciled by a scheme on the following lines:—

The council might consist, as to one half, of twelve nominated members, one for each nationality, including Moorish. The twelve remaining members should be freely elected, subject to a proviso that no nationality (including the Moorish) should be represented by more than four members in all, including the nominated member, if any. This, His Majesty's Government think, would give proper scope for the due proportional representation of the various nationalities.

One of the principal objects which His Majesty's Government have in view in proposing that half the members of the council should be nominated is to ensure the services of a fair proportion of reliable and experienced men on that body so far as such men may be available, and thus to secure for it as large a measure of stability and efficiency as the circumstances will permit, and they find it difficult to see how reliance can be placed on obtaining this very essential result otherwise than by some system of nomination. Nor can they share what appears to be the apprehension of the French Government that the twelve nominated members will naturally tend to form one group, and the twelve elected members another. On the contrary, they are convinced that both nominated and elected members will tend to act in national groups, and that, under the scheme now proposed, the Powers with the largest interests will be most effectively represented on the council, while at the same time every treaty Power will have at least that voice in the council's deliberations which it can justly claim when asked to consent to its institution.

As regards the Moorish members, His Majesty's Government see grave objection to the suggestion of an election by Moorish notables. They feel strongly that the local native population should be allowed freely to elect the men who enjoy their confidence, and that with this view anything should be avoided which would tend to make the choice of the Moorish members subject to the direct or indirect influence of the Makhzen. Such influence would undoubtedly make itself felt with the notables,

whose position necessarily brings them into more or less close touch with the Court at Fez. There are, moreover, important elements of the native population which would have no prospect of being in any way represented if the franchise were restricted to the notables; apart from the Jewish community, which is estimated to number approximately 10,000 souls, it is understood that there are a considerable number of Algerian Mussulmans of good standing. It would not be equitable or politic to exclude either of these groups.

In these circumstances it appears both just and expedient that the franchise for the native element should be identical with that for the other nationalities.

Nor do His Majesty's Government see any valid reason for giving the Moors a preponderating position in the council. To do so would both violate the principle of complete internationalisation and weaken the council by giving an undue proportion of seats to the most backward and ignorant section of the community.

Articles 5, 10, *and* 11.—*Powers of the Municipality.*

His Majesty's Government agree with the Government of the republic in considering that the powers of the municipality should be as free and unfettered as is consistent with existing treaty rights. In their opinion this could best be secured by assigning to the municipality all powers of Government expect in respect to matters specifically to be excluded. The French Government may see a difficulty in any decree constituting the municipality which would formally proclaim the transfer of the Sultan's sovereignty to that body. It should, however, be possible, without unnecessarily wounding the susceptibilities of the Sultan, to find a suitable form of words which would express the idea that his authority, for the purposes of administration and legislation in the municipal area, is devolved upon the municipality in all matters except those especially reserved. The French Government will doubtless recognise the importance of laying down in most precise terms the powers of the municipality, as the only means of avoiding future disputes or attempts at outside interference.

Article 6.—*Committee of Control.*

The Tangier municipality is not likely, especially in the earlier stages, to contain—even with the retention of the principle of nomination in respect of half its members—as large a proportion of men of high capacity and large experience as would be desirable having regard to the important powers to be exercised by them. Until it has been possible to watch the proceedings of the council for a time it would certainly involve much risk to allow it to wield such wide authority without control. His Majesty's Government think that it would be more prudent—at least at first—to retain a *general* power of control in the hands of the representatives of the signatory Powers at Tangier, following in this respect the model of the Alexandria Municipality, whose functions are subject to the supervision of the Egyptian Government. Experience will show, as regards Tangier, whether, and to what degree, such control can be relaxed at a later date: the French Government will not fail to realise the difficulty of extending the control at some future time, should experience show this to be necessary.

Article 7.—*Revenue.*

So far as His Majesty's Government are able to judge, the only revenues available for the needs of the municipality would be the yield from the "taxe urbaine," estimated at about 4,600*l.* a-year; the profits from the grain market, 1,600*l.*; the slaughter-house tax, 1,050*l.*; mole and other dues, 150*l.* The yield of the "tertib" would certainly be small for the Tangier district, while the voluntary contributions to the Commission d'Hygiène for scavengering and lighting would of course cease. Thus the yield of the local taxation reaches the entirely inadequate figure of, approximately, 7,500*l.*

His Majesty's Government would deprecate the imposition at Tangier of high direct taxation, which must necessarily affect the prosperity of the town, and they would point to the difficulty of raising loans on reasonable terms in the absence of any adequate security.

For these reasons, His Majesty's Government think that the municipality should be allowed to have the revenue from the special customs surtax, not only for the construction of the port, but for public works in general. They consider further that it would be only just that some portion of the Tangier customs, though collected by the Contrôle de la Dette, should be allotted to the municipality, and that at least it should be agreed that, when the time comes, some fifteen years hence, for the existing loans

to be converted, some arrangement should be made, if experience has shown that the available resources are insufficient, for freeing the Customs and Government monopolies from the present charges with a view to some portion of these revenues being made directly available for Tangier.

From this point of view the wording of article 10 appears dangerously wide and indefinite; as it stands, it could only have the effect of unnecessarily curtailing the powers and hampering the administration of the municipality. His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the municipality should have complete authority, except as regards certain exemptions, which should be specifically enumerated in precise terms. His Majesty's Government would be quite ready to discuss the list of such exemptions in the friendliest spirit, but the principle should be laid down clearly in the proposed convention.

[18671]

No. 219.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 3.)

[By Post.]

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, May* 2, 1912.

MOROCCO.

Your telegrams Nos. 185 of 29th April and 198 of yesterday.

M. Poincaré will examine your proposed compromise for the Warga frontier with every desire to meet your wishes and to bring the negotiations with the Spanish Government to a speedy conclusion. He thinks that the Spanish Ambassador here is now more conciliatory than his Government, and would recommend the adoption of the compromise.

M. Poincaré, in order to prevent confusion in communications, will reply to His Majesty's Government before making any further communication to the Spanish Government through the French Ambassador.

[15369]

No. 220.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

(Confidential.)
Foreign Office, May 3, 1912.

Your Excellency,

IN my note of yesterday I transmitted to your Excellency a memorandum setting forth the views of His Majesty's Government on the draft scheme for the internationalisation of Tangier drawn up by the French Government.

I now have the honour to enclose a memorandum containing a statement of those views in the form in which they have been communicated to the Spanish Government, in reply to an enquiry received from them.* Your Excellency will observe that from this statement all reference to the previous exchange of views between the French and British Governments have been omitted, as any such reference would be likely to wound the susceptibilities of the Madrid Cabinet.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[18823]

No. 221.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 4.)

(No. 86.)
Tangier, April 27, 1912.

Sir,

M. PORCHÉ, the chief State engineer, came to see me the other day. He said he was particularly anxious to have some conversation with me, as he believed that there was a tendency among the foreign legations to believe that the Public Works Committee were making use of the plea of urgency to avoid adjudication and secure the various works for French companies. This was, he believed, especially the case in connection

* Enclosure 2 in No. 218.

with the various port works to be undertaken at Casa Blanca. He wished to assure me most solemnly that such an idea had never entered his head. He was, as he had told me on a previous occasion, a strong partisan of adjudication as the surest means of obtaining the best work at the lowest price: he had always been dead against favouring French firms, which, if they were unable to hold their own in an open competition, were evidently unworthy of interest. In the case of Casa Blanca the urgency was undoubted, and it had really been impossible to foresee what had occurred. A variety of causes had combined to bring about the present situation. A series of storms of unparalleled violence, an unusually heavy harvest and the new arrangement for the collection of the achour, which had resulted in the simultaneous arrival at Casa Blanca of enormous quantities of grain for export. (This question was dealt with in Mr. White's despatch No. 177 of the 24th June of last year.) It was absolutely necessary to take immediate measures to meet the situation, and it was on that account only that the plea of urgency had been put forward. The works were relatively but small ones, and I might rest assured that when the question of the great works to be undertaken in this country came on, there would be no attempt made to avoid there being put up to tender. I said that I was very glad to receive his assurances, and that I felt convinced that he was acting in perfect good faith. At the same time I could not but think that the manner in which one of the principal questions, that of the shelter for lighters at Casa Blanca, had been treated, was clumsy in the extreme. He could hardly be surprised if people or Governments, who were on the lookout to criticise, pounced upon the case to illustrate their theory that France was determined to defeat their various provisions by which equal commercial chances and advantages were to be granted to all nationalities in Morocco. A detailed scheme, I said, was submitted to the "Comité spécial des Adjudications" at the end of last year, and they were requested on the score of urgency to forego adjudication and hand over the work to a local firm (*i.e.*, French) by a *marché de gré à gré*. Various delegates, amongst others Mr. Rattigan, contested the urgency on the ground that, according to the opinion of M. Llorens, the second State engineer, no work could be begun until March, and there would be plenty of time for a *marché de gré à gré après concours*. No decision was taken, but it appeared likely that this view would prevail. The scheme was then suddenly withdrawn, and an entirely new and far larger one was substituted for it in accordance with the telegraphic instructions from M. Porché himself, who was then in Paris. Certain portions of the new scheme could no doubt be begun at once, and His Majesty's Government reluctantly agreed to waive the principal of adjudication for three operations which had been distinctly specified in writing by the French chargé d'affaires. When, however, the matter came up again for settlement, it was found that a quite different and far more important operation had been substituted for one of the three agreed to by His Majesty's Government. Such were the facts, and I did not see how he could deny that they might furnish grounds for suspicion for people in search of them. M. Porché agreed that the whole episode had been most unfortunate. He ascribed it in the first instance to the incompetence of M. Llorens, to a misunderstanding of technical wording on the part of M. de Billy, and generally to the fact that, owing to the jealousy of Spain, he had been prevented all these years from having "adjoints" who could be of any real assistance. He was obliged to see to everything himself, and he was overwhelmed with work. As it was, he was behindhand with schemes which he knew ought to have been proposed weeks before. To his shame he must tell me that he would be obliged to ask me to agree to further small works being submitted to a *marché de gré à gré*. They were quite unimportant in themselves, but they were absolutely essential if we did not wish to perpetuate a congestion which would cause enormous loss to all commerce at Casa Blanca, not only this year but also the next. I replied that this was exactly what I complained of. He placed us on the horns of a dilemma: either we must abandon the principle of adjudication, which formed the corner-stone of our commercial policy of Morocco, or else we must condemn British commerce, which was by far the largest at Casa Blanca, to ruinous loss. It was a system which in practice amounted almost to blackmail. M. Porché replied that he realised the justice of what I said, but assured me once more of his *bona fides* in the matter. Personally, he regretted bitterly that the Compagnie marocaine should secure the execution of any works. As I knew, he was on the very worst terms with them. He had condemned their work as worthless, he had rejected their plans, he had fought them through thick and thin. Fortunately, he said, they were a French company; he trembled to think what would have happened had they been German! In that case he would have had all Germany up in arms against him!

The new works to which M. Porché referred consist of the building of some stores on the terreplein, and also, I believe to the building of a wall, which should be done at

once in order that it may have time to harden before the winter. I told him that I hoped to be able to agree to his request, but that I should only do so on account of the important British interests involved. I should, I added, always continue to protest against the system by which adjudication was evaded.

I believe M. Porché to be honest in what he says, and I know that he is disliked by his colony, who consider that he does not favour them sufficiently: that does not, however, make the situation any the less unpleasant, and I am often perplexed how to act. I think on the whole, however, that in these small works the interests of British commerce must be taken to come first, and no great harm can be done by agreeing to *marchés de gré à gré* provided we place on record our determination in other cases to adhere to the principle of adjudication.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[18824]

No. 222.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May 4.*)

(No. 87.)

Tangier, April 27, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 47 of the 15th instant, transmitting copy of a letter from the secretary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society with regard to the statements made by Mr. Donald Mackenzie that British-protected subjects were engaged in slave dealing, and that two of the most prominent—Si Mehdi-el-Menebhi and the Shereef of Tamslocht—actually held slaves. As is almost invariably the case in all statements made by Mr. Mackenzie, one-half is absolutely untrue. When British protection was granted to Si Menebhi he at once freed all his slaves, and their manumission papers are deposited at this legation.

I cannot reply at once with regard to the Shereef of Tamslocht; his protection appears to have been granted him privately by Sir Ernest Satow. I imagine, however, that he too was made to conform to the rule by which no British-protected person can hold slaves. I am writing to the British vice-consul at Marrakesh on the subject, and will report to you again as soon as I have received his reply.

I would suggest that Mr. Mackenzie should be called upon to name the British subject to whom he refers as "financing a notorious slave dealer," and to state on what evidence he bases his accusation.

As you will recollect, the complaints which Mr. Mackenzie made last year to the Foreign Office on other matters connected with Morocco, and the articles which he published in the "Daily Chronicle" reflecting unfavourably on our consular officers and also upon Mr. Wellesley proved on examination to be a tissue of lies and misrepresentations, and it appears to me unfortunate that respectable societies such as the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society should continue to be misled by the statements of such a man. I have stated this opinion frankly to Mr. Gurney, the president of the Howard Association, who is now at Tangier.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[18825]

No. 223.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May 4.*)

(No. 88.)

Tangier, April 29, 1912.

Sir,

I HAD hoped to be able to forward to you by to-day's bag a detailed account from His Majesty's consul at Fez of the recent mutiny, which formed the subject of my telegrams Nos. 30, 31, and 32 of the 18th instant, Nos. 33 and 34 of the 19th instant, No. 35 of the 20th instant, and No. 36 of the 22nd instant, but so far I have only received a few private lines from him stating that he was overwhelmed with work in connection with the distribution of relief to the Jews, and had so far been able to write nothing. I have, however, received an interesting letter from Dr. Verdon, copy of which I have the honour to transmit herewith. It is evident from the various reports by eye-witnesses which have been published in the newspapers that the movement

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was very much more serious than at first believed to be, and that it was by no means purely military. Officials of all sorts are said to be implicated, and the name of the Sultan himself is freely mentioned as a party to the revolt. I should not be at all surprised if, as suggested in Dr. Verdon's letter, His Shereefian Majesty when alone with the mutineers made all sorts of promises and professions to them, partly no doubt to save his own life and partly out of hatred for the French. It is curious to note the two aspects of the Moorish nature; on the one side the ferocious cruelty of the Fez mob egged on and incited by the women, on the other side the courage and devotion shown by the better class Moors, who sheltered, succoured, and saved Europeans often at the risk of their own lives.

I understand that severe punishment is being meted out to the mutineers, and that executions in private are going on daily. The whole country between Fez and Alcazar, notably in the neighbourhood of Wazzan, is said to be in a state of effervescence; so far, however, the only actual case of repercussion is the incident at Arbouah, reported in my telegram No. 37 of the 26th instant, when 175 men deserted and went off with their arms, &c. Reports have been current in Tangier during the last few days that numbers varying from twelve to eighteen of the extra-urban police under French control have deserted, but it is difficult to arrive at the truth. My Spanish colleague maintains that he knows it for a fact; at the same time it is flatly denied by the French chargé d'affaires and by the officers of the police. Mr. Harris tells me that he has had enquiries made of the men themselves, and can find no confirmation of the report. On the other hand Menebhi believes it. The latter tells me that the reports from the south grow worse and worse, that the great kaïds are steadily increasing the number of their armed retainers, that they have patched up all old feuds among themselves, and that for the first time for 200 years they are united—presumably against the common enemy. The acting British vice-consul at Mogador informed me the other day that at the request of the French consul he had intimated to all British subjects that it was unsafe for them to go to the interior. The Spanish zone appears to be fairly quiet, although the Spaniards have landed fresh troops at Laraiche.

The appointment of General Lyautey as Resident-General and M. Gaillard as Secretary-General were announced in the "Havas" which reached Tangier on Saturday and published in yesterday's papers. They will, I anticipate, cause general satisfaction amongst the natives, both Moors and Jews, who have learnt to know and to appreciate the two men. The selections are no doubt both excellent. If the resident is to be a general, it would be impossible to find a better man than Lyautey. In addition to his military qualities and his known strength of character he possesses great experience and great tact, a genius in dealing with Moors, and a deep affection for the country and the people. The same may be said about M. Gaillard, and by his nomination as Secretary-General I trust that the difficulties which I have always anticipated that our consular officers would encounter, had they to deal with a military administration, may be removed. In this connection I would recall your attention to my despatch No. 23 of the 11th February last, in which I reported a conversation which I had had with M. Gaillard, who expounded to me at considerable length the views which he held with regard to the policy to be pursued in the future organisation of the protectorate. These views appeared to be most sensible, and I am glad to think that he will now be in a position in which he can give effect to them. It seems hard that M. Regnault should not be allowed to reap what would have appeared to be the natural reward of so many years of unceasing and admirable work, and that the first post of Resident-General in Morocco should be given to another. On can only hope that the blow may to some extent be softened by the thought that the recent mutiny and the necessity for strong military action throughout the country rendered the appointment of a military man almost inevitable.

I cannot help being somewhat surprised at the decision taken by the French Government, as reported by Sir F. Bertie in his telegram No. 58 of the 24th instant, not to send any reinforcements to Morocco. It appears to me quite on the cards that serious outbreaks may occur simultaneously in different parts of Morocco, in which case the French troops available would be quite inadequate to deal with the situation. The inability to repress such outbreaks at once would be taken as a sign of weakness and would undoubtedly lead to a rapid spread of the disorders.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 223.

Dr. Verdon to Sir R. Lister.

Fez, April 20, 1912.

Dear Sir Reginald,

AT midday on the 17th about 3,000 of the Makhzen troops revolted and killed all the French instructors they could lay hands on. The revolt was due to the new regulations, by which the soldiers were to have a half peseta a-day and their food instead of a quarter dollar a-day, also they were to carry their tents and equipment like French troops; the change in pay was, however, the vital point. The troops were already sore because during the recent fighting near Sifru they were made to bury their dead in their uniforms and boots, instead of in the orthodox fashion, after washing the bodies and wrapping them in linen. Perhaps, too, some hot-tempered Frenchmen used threats when the men refused to accept the reduced pay with rations. The troops went to the Sultan and, according to Cortes, the Spanish dentist, who was with the Sultan at the time, the soldiers all stood in the Mishouar with bayonets pointing towards the Sultan as if threatening him; there were French officers' caps on bayonets. The Sultan went out alone, and spoke to the soldiers, who shouted "God uphold Mulai Hafid and down with the French!" Cortes is sure the Sultan, to save himself, told the soldiers that he was with them. I was down the town lunching with Si Hamed Mokri when news came of the revolt. I came up the streets riding quietly on a mule, and met a few townsmen, armed with sticks, and a soldier, who told me two French officers were killed, and a man on a mule, who told me to go back, as the soldiers were killing the Christians. I got to my place all right, and by MacLeod's advice took my family to the consulate. There we spent an anxious hour while the mob were killing Arny, Laspada, Lory, and some employés of the wireless telegraphy in their houses some 400 yards from the consulate; it is strange they did not come on our way as the Bureau arabe is in Mikwar's house opposite our consulate. Now we are all right and the house full of Tirailleurs. It is impossible to write all that has happened in these four days, and I know MacLeod will send you a full account. About twenty French military and civilians have been killed. The mob got hold of the dentist, Cortes, and killed his servant and took his horse; but Cortes managed to pursuade them that he was one of them and all against the French, and came from Bab Bougeloud with the mob, shouting and yelling like the rest; he was in Moorish dress; near his house he slipped away and saved his head.

I think it is all right now; the soldiers are submitting and one rebel "tabor" is putting another rebel "tabor" in prison. Some of the killing was too awful, Lieutenant Marichal was hurled from a roof by Moorish women. Redman had a bad time, climbing walls and dropping big distances; but the people, chiefly women, treated him well and said he was English; the mob did not even loot his house, they were told he was English. No doubt the movement is anti-French, though such a mob would kill any Christian if they met him in the streets. De la Motte, the commandant of the Bureau arabe, did well in organising a force of hospital orderlies, officers, servants, and others, who formed a post at the end of our street and stopped all coming down our way. All the same for an hour we had no protection, and De la Motte's first remark to MacLeod was, "I heard you were all killed."

The French are to blame. One would have thought that last year's experience and the death of Guillasse would have made them realise that they should not go too fast. After last year's revolt they at once sent away all the old Kaïd Errahas; these were no doubt rascals and robbed right and left, but they were no worse than other Moorish officials, and the soldiers feared them and they held their men in hand in their way. In their place they put new kaïds, who had no influence, and the real commanders of the "tabors" were young French officers accustomed to Algerians and such troops, but who had no idea as to how to handle Moors; all went quietly until Mangin returned with new schemes and regulations. The soldiers have no respect for their Sultan, nor for their new Kaïd Errahas, nor for the French instructors. The proposed visit of the Sultan was a mistake, the people all declare that Hafid has sold his country to the French for money, and proposed to visit his masters at Paris. They say the Sultan will always be cursed by Mussulmans now and after his death.

The recent letter from the Sultan, read in the mosque by the basha, abusing and scolding the townspeople in most harsh terms, was another mistake. In fact the French seem to have gone out of their way to excite the people, and at such a time, when all the Moors are bitter against them, the French introduce a sweeping army reform, reducing the men's pay. Anyone who knows the Moors knows how he hates

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his "mona" being interfered with. Surely the French might have sounded the soldiers before attempting this reform. The soldiers enlisted on the terms of a quarter dollar a-day, and were never told that they would have it reduced to half peseta plus food; the new recruits have taken the most active part in the revolt. Mangin last year reduced the army by about a half and sent the rest away without money, taking the old uniforms from the men, so that we saw men going about in their shirts, and if we had not had the old Kaïd Errahas to keep the men in hand there would have been a revolt then.

I hear some of the French blame the Spanish for having tried to sow dissension among the soldiers in order to get recruits for their police at Melilla. I heard an officer and some French correspondents talking in this way this morning.

So far, I have done nothing but blame the French. I am full of admiration for the Tirailleurs, officers and men; the courage they have shown in going about the narrow streets, shot at from terraces and windows, is above praise. They have lost very heavily, a Lieutenant Algerian told me that of his company he was the only officer left; all the rest dead or wounded, and that in all his experience in Shouia and elsewhere he had never seen losses like the Tirailleurs sustained when entering the town by Bab Hadid and during the rescue work in the town. The French artillery are simply magnificent, they put shells about the place with marvellous precision. The way the French have got a hold on the town, kept off the tribesmen with their artillery is also very clever. This part of the work cost them practically no lives. A shell in a mosque and others in the right places has made the townspeople turn out of their houses many of the mutineers who were quartered in them.

We are all quite well, and none the worse for the exciting experience.

Yours, &c.

E. S. VERDON.

[19155] No. 224.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 192.)

Sir, *Paris, May 5, 1912.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 66 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the accompanying copy of a letter from M. Poincaré's "chef de cabinet" communicating to me the instructions which his Excellency has addressed to the French Ambassador in London, to propose to you a formula for the line of demarcation between the French and Spanish zones in the Uarga valley. M. Poincaré hopes that this compromise will meet with the approval of His Majesty's Government, and that the Spanish Government may be induced to accept it.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 224.

M. Daeschner to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 5 mai, 1912.*

AVANT de partir pour la Meuse, M. Poincaré m'a chargé de vous communiquer les instructions qu'il a adressées à M. Cambon à la suite de l'entretien que vous avez eu avec lui jeudi. Il pense que cette formule, qui dégage des traces hypothétiques sur des cartes insuffisantes, sera envisagée avec faveur par votre Gouvernement; il espère donc que, grâce à l'appui toujours si bienveillant que Sir Maurice de Bunsen voudra bien prêter encore une fois à M. Geoffray, le Gouvernement espagnol sera amené à accepter cette solution transactionnelle.

Veuillez, &c.

E. DAESCHNER.

Enclosure 2 in No. 224.

M. Poincaré to M. Cambon.

JE vous prie de vouloir bien communiquer au Gouvernement britannique la solution transactionnelle suivante que j'ai étudiée pour répondre à la démarche de Sir Francis Bertie, et qui me paraît conforme à la pensée de son Gouvernement:—

"A partir de Djebel Béni Hassen la frontière gagnerait l'Ouergha en amont du coude que cette rivière forme à la hauteur de la Djema Cheurfa Tafraout; elle en laisserait ainsi la haute vallée à l'Espagne. Passant au nord de la Djema Cheurfa Tafraout elle suivrait ensuite—et sans pouvoir franchir la crête des hauteurs qui dominent le bassin de l'oued Ouergha—la limite septentrionale des territoires habités par les tribus établies sur la rive droite de cette rivière. Elle nous laisserait ainsi les deux rives dans la zone de protection de Fez, sans couper les tribus. La frontière rejoindrait à l'ouest la ligne conventionnelle indiquée dans l'accord de 1904, article 2. La délimitation serait faite ultérieurement sur le terrain d'après les principes susindiqués."

R. POINCARÉ.

[19314] No. 225.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 90.)

Sir, *Tangier, April 30, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 88 of the 29th instant, I have the honour to report that I have now received a number of telegrams from His Majesty's consul at Fez which have been delayed in transmission, in some cases four or five days, and which amplify the details already received regarding the mutiny at Fez.

Mr. MacLeod, in examining the causes which contributed to the outbreak, mentions the following as of importance:—

The mystery which surrounded the negotiations in connection with the protectorate treaty; the half-hearted opposition of the French authorities to the nomination of the new governor of old Fez; and the lavish entertainments given by the Sultan and Moorish officials to the French Mission, which unnecessarily irritated the population and produced the impression of a triumph.

Among the military grievances, Mr. MacLeod draws attention to the "encadrement" of Moorish with French troops, and the impression that the Sultan would go to Paris and leave the French in entire control; the substitution of French for Arabic in the words of command; the changes in pay and substitution of compulsory rations in part payment; the heavy equipment to be carried, as in the French army; the burial of soldiers killed in action without being washed and swathed in accordance with Mahommedan rites; the laxity of certain French instructors and the severity of others, and the general introduction of sweeping military reforms at the same moment.

The situation at Fez appears to be improving daily. The city is now under martial law, and large numbers of mutineers have been arrested, in many cases with the assistance of the local tribes. A house-to-house search for arms is being instituted. Somewhat drastic measures in this connection were proposed by the French authorities, who issued a proclamation that artillery would be trained on the town during the period of disarmament, and that, if any resistance were offered, a bombardment would commence. No previous notice was given to the consular corps, and His Majesty's consul and his Spanish colleague protested to the French Minister against so summary a proceeding. M. Regnault assured them that no bombardment was contemplated, and that a circular to that effect would be sent to the consular officers. This assurance was communicated to all concerned, and produced an excellent impression, largely contributing to the facility with which the disarmament is taking place.

Mr. MacLeod reports that the Jewish quarter has suffered terribly. Numerous houses have been completely destroyed and their inmates compelled to seek shelter even in the cages of the Sultan's menagerie, where one child was badly mauled by a

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lion, whose presence had been overlooked. Fortunately, numerous contributions have been received here for their relief, some 1,350*l.* having been received from England for this purpose. Among the French officers who have been conspicuous in making arrangements for the assistance of the British community Mr. MacLeod mentions General Brulard, MM. Delamotte, Fellert, Henry, and, more especially, Philipot.

His Majesty's consul reported on the 28th instant that all British subjects in Fez were well.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[19457] No. 226.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, May 7, 1912.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Fez to-day :—

"(Personal and Secret.)

"My telegram of 4th May.

"All reports continue confirming Sultan's resolution of leaving Fez, and abdicating shortly and residing at Tangier. Successor who would be most popular both with people of towns, soldiers, and tribes would be Abdul Aziz, specially if French could be now persuaded to pursue firm progressive but cautious policy. Leading Moorish functionaries at Fez just now all friendly to Abdul Aziz. Lyautey and Abdul Aziz were, formerly at any rate, good friends.

"To-day solemn religious service held in honour of victims of insurrection. All Moorish functionaries except Sultan attended, as well as French and foreign civilians and military. All officials, including consuls, in uniform. Grand Vizier on behalf of Sultan read a speech denouncing tribe, promising support, restoration of order, and warmly sympathising with France and with families of victims. French Minister spoke in same sense. Recent events would not divert French Government from carrying out obligation as protecting Power. French Minister warmly commended humanity of action of many Moorish soldiers and Moorish civilians, and was warmly sympathetic with [group undecypherable].

"Moinier, turning his back to the Moors and addressing Europeans exclusively, made vindictive and threatening speech, alluding to soldiers' grievances as 'prétextes futiles,' and making no reference to friendship manifested by soldiers and Moorish civilians.

"No foreigner made speech, but I expressed to French Minister our fullest possible sympathy with French and with families of victims, and expressed to Generals Moinier and Brulard gratitude of British colony to them and French soldiers, whose courage and devotion contributed to our security.

"I learn that meeting of tribes east of Fez dispersed before arrival of column. Column remained in occupation of tribe Uladhadj."

Personally I very much doubt whether ex-Sultan could be induced to reascend throne.

Moinier's speech seems to me extremely injudicious.

[19583] No. 227.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 8, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 7th May.

French chargé d'affaires informs me that Sultan has been prevailed upon not to leave for Rabat. He will await resident-general at Fez. Latter arrives at Tangier 12th May, but will not land. He is expected at Fez 24th May, travelling viâ Rabat.

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[19758] No. 228*.

Memorandum communicated by the Marquis Imperiali.—(Received May 9.)

(Translation.)

ON the occasion of the recent wreck of the Greek steamer "Evanthia" near Ceuta, a dispute arose between the captain of the steamer and the passengers, not a few of whom were Italian citizens, respecting reciprocal rights and obligations under the charter-party, and in the absence of either Italian or Greek consular authorities who could exercise jurisdiction in the locality near which the wreck occurred, the dispute had to be carried, not without considerable inconvenience, before the judicial authorities in Gibraltar, to which place the captain of the steamer had gone.

This circumstance called attention to the advantage and expediency of including Ceuta and the other Spanish *presidios* on the Riff coast in the jurisdiction of the nearest consular offices. But efforts to carry this into effect would appear destined to meet with difficulty, in view of the continued reluctance hitherto shown by the Spanish Government to admit any foreign consular jurisdiction in their military *presidios*.

The Italian Government would in these circumstances be glad to exchange ideas on the subject with His Britannic Majesty's Government. They consider that there might be an opportunity of treating the question of consular protection in the Spanish possessions in Morocco with the Madrid Government, when the Franco-Spanish agreement respecting Morocco now under negotiation has been concluded, and when it is communicated to the Powers. It might then be convenient for the Italian and British Governments to present to the Madrid Government analogous demands in regard to the question of consular protection in the Spanish possessions in Morocco.

Italian Embassy, London, May 8, 1912.

[19726] No. 228.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 35 of 4th May: Boundary between French and Spanish zones in North Morocco.

French Government will not commit themselves to any definite line along the Warga because they maintain that it may divide tribes, which would make administration impossible. This is of course a real difficulty. The only solution I can suggest is that there should be a formula instead of a definite line. Would Spanish Government accept the following?—

(R.) "From Djema del Cheurfa Tafrout westward the boundary shall follow the northern limit of the territories occupied by the tribes established on the River Warga as far as the point of intersection between such line and the north and south line laid down in the Franco-Spanish convention of 1904 between Ben-Ahmet in the north and the Fichtala in the south."

(Repeated to Paris, No. 210.)

[19790] No. 229.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 91. Confidential.)
Tangier, May 6, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE received interesting letters from Dr. Verdon dated the 28th and 28th ultimo. He tells me that numbers of rebel soldiers, together with many civilians suspected of being implicated in the mutiny, are being arrested daily, and that up to the moment of writing some forty had been shot. The rebel tabors who submitted have been disarmed and are in the Kasbah Sherarga under a guard of tirailleurs. The two black regiments are the only ones who have been allowed to retain their arms. Dr. Verdon is convinced that every tabor in Fez was concerned in the revolt and pillage of the Mellah, and that even the black regiments had a hand in the pillage, as a quantity of loot was discovered in the house of their Kaïd-er-Reha.

The bitterness of feeling against the French is increasing and is largely shared by the better classes. They argue that the French took the troops out of the hands of the Makhzen, that they then introduced reforms which drove the soldiers to revolt, and then blamed the townspeople because the soldiers mutinied and killed French officers and civilians and were aided and abetted by the populace. He does not consider that there is any further fear of a revolt, but he expresses the opinion that Fez will be an unpleasant place for Europeans to reside in for some time to come. The attitude of the people, he says, is sullen, and Sergeant Balding says the same of the soldiers. The opinion appears to be held very generally that Ould Bo Mohammed Shergui, the Basha of new Fez, and the Basha of Sefroo, and other French notables incited the soldiers to mutiny and aided them by opening gates, &c. It is to be hoped that no evidence may be found against Shergui, who is a brother-in-law and intimate friend of Menebhi's, as the French authorities would undoubtedly assume that Menebhi himself was concerned. Sid Ali Zaky Bey, who was here the other day, said he would not be at all surprised if Sid Taib Mokri had also been mixed up in the conspiracy, and the enclosed letter which I have received from Mr. MacLeod seems to give colour to the view. I have instructed Mr. MacLeod to explain to Sid Taib that it is quite against our principles to grant political protection: moreover, in this case we have no reason even for wishing to do so, as we have never had any cause to be grateful to Sid Taib for services rendered—rather the reverse. I see, however, that M. Regnault in his report dismisses the idea that the Sultan or any of his viziers have been implicated, and declares that their attitude was above all suspicion. This would cover Sid Taib and, I hope, also Shergui. The ex-Sultan, Mulai Abdul Aziz, discussing the mutiny with Mr. White the other day, said that he had every reason to believe that the mutineers, when they were received by the Sultan, asked him whether it was a fact that it was by his orders that they had been placed

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under the absolute command of the French instructors, and whether he had approved the new regulations. The Sultan had replied in the affirmative and had said that he could not help himself, as he had no power to resist. The mutineers then replied, "But we have the power and will set you free." The Sultan then said, "If you have the power, do it." The soldiers then rushed back into the town and started on their career of massacre and pillage, shouting that they were acting by the wish of the Sultan. The ex-Sultan certainly is of opinion that the mutiny was not a spontaneous outbreak, although he does not believe that Mulai Hafid or the Grand Vizier had any previous knowledge of its being planned.

Dr. Verdon tells me that the Sultan still wishes to go to Rabat, and we hear from all sides that he is most anxious to abdicate and come to live at Tangier, where, in the name of the Grand Vizier, he has bought the property of Sir Robert Drummond-Hay on the mountain; he will thus become next-door neighbour of his brother, Mulai Abdul Aziz. It remains to be seen whether the French will consent either to his departure from Fez or to his abdication.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 229.

Consul MacLeod to Sir R. Lister.

(Confidential.)
Dear Sir Reginald, *Fez, April* 29, 1912.

THE evening before last I had a long interview with Taib Mokri. He naturally spoke very bitterly of the French and vehemently went on to say that he now wished to resign immediately and to get a foreign protection, if possible British protection, or, failing that, to leave the country. He was persuaded that some serious injury to him was contemplated, and he appealed almost in tears to me to get him protection. He went on, voluntarily, to say that there need be no difficulty, for he had a Shereefian letter, made during the uncertainties of the Mulai Zin affair, authorising any foreign Government who might desire to do so to give him protection, and he showed me this letter and entreated my advice.

I pointed out that at best, situated as he was, the grant of a protection was scarcely to be thought of, the more so as he had not cited any services rendered to us, but that I would mention to you what he had said, and I knew you would hold it absolutely confidential.

As regards advice, I warned him most earnestly against taking any step just now such as resigning, when he was not in that calmness of mind which such a decision required. Quite the contrary; he should not only stick tight to his post, but should resolutely swallow down all chagrin he might be feeling and spare no effort to be friendly in the quarter referred to, no matter how difficult that might be. That would be the truest service to himself and everybody in the long run. Then when things settled down he might calmly reconsider the matter. Meanwhile I would let you know of it all, and so he promised he would do his utmost to follow that course.

I reflected (to myself) that it was impossible to tell what turn these events at Fez might give to the Powers' policies in Morocco, especially ours, and so the prudent thing seemed to be to afford you an opportunity of acting in whichever way you might think would best serve our interests in future.

Believe me, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[19834] No. 230.

Memorandum communicated by M. Cambon, May 10, 1912.

AU cours des réunions qui ont été tenues à Madrid, au mois de mars dernier, par la Commission technique financière franco-espagnole, les délégués de l'Espagne ont suggéré l'idée d'établir au Maroc, entre les deux zones française et espagnole, une ligne intérieure de contrôle douanier. Le but de cette proposition était de fournir un moyen pratique d'assurer à chaque zone la part qui lui reviendrait sur le produit des droits

de douane perçus à l'importation ou à l'exportation et de sauvegarder aussi le régime économique de chacune des deux zones.

Cette question ayant ultérieurement fait l'objet de pourparlers entre le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la république et l'Ambassadeur d'Espagne à Paris, le délégué français à la commission a été invité à présenter le projet de rédaction suivant, qui précise la manière dont fonctionnerait le système de contrôle douanier:—

"Le Gouvernement français se réserve le droit d'établir à la limite terrestre de sa zone une ligne de contrôle, à laquelle sera reporté le paiement des droits sur les marchandises d'origine étrangère destinées à la zone française. Quant aux produits marocains originaires de la zone française qui, à leur passage à ligne de contrôle, se déclareraient pour l'exportation hors du Maroc, ils acquitteront au bureau de la ligne du contrôle les droits d'exportation et seront tenus pour libérés au lieu d'embarquement par la production des quittances. Les deux Gouvernements se mettront d'accord sur les règlements d'application du régime ci-dessus défini, qui est institué à titre provisoire et qui pourra être revisé après une expérience de deux ans."

Cette rédaction, qui exclut l'expression "ligne de douane," s'inspire des principes suivants:—

1. Chaque zone doit recueillir son produit douanier;
2. Le droit de douane ne doit pas être payé deux fois;
3. Les marchandises d'origine marocaine circuleront librement de zone à zone.

En prévision du cas où les séances de la commission devraient être prochainement reprises, le Gouvernement français serait heureux de connaître le sentiment du Gouvernement britannique sur ce projet d'établissement d'une ligne intérieure de contrôle douanier.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 9 *mai*, 1912.

[19920] No. 231.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, May* 10, 1912.

May 9.—I gave Minister for Foreign Affairs free translation of your telegram No. 39 of 8th May, in order that he might submit your question to Council of Ministers presided over by King of Spain this morning. After doing so Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote me a letter to following effect:—

1. Council of Ministers ask for assurance that, as regards region to east of Tafrout line, 1904 convention will hold good.

2. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that French geographers regard Warga as forming division between provinces of Djebala and Fez. He enumerates tribes established along right bank of Warga, and asserts that except a few fractions they lie entirely on right bank. Simplest solution is therefore to ignore small fractions which may be found on left bank, and to accept unmistakable frontier by river itself. Otherwise said fractions ought to be included in Spanish zone. What he considers as inadmissible is that every tribe having a village on left bank should be ascribed in its entirety to French zone.

Moreover, means of communicating between eastern and western portions of the Spanish zone will be sufficiently weakened by cession of left bank to France without Spain being called upon to submit to further [? disadvantage of] being deprived of power of using right bank for that purpose.

Council of Ministers ask, however, which are tribes which France [? says] would be divided by course of Warga, and how far does each of them extend northward.

(Sent to Paris.)

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[18549]

No. 232.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's *note verbale* of the 1st instant relative to the question of constructing waterworks, a port, and railways at Tangier, and, in reply, to inform your Excellency that, as stated therein, His Majesty's Government propose to reserve for the Tangier Municipality the call for tenders for the waterworks, electric lighting, and tramways.

With regard to the construction of a port at Tangier, I would remind your Excellency that, as pointed out by His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in December last, His Majesty's Government have always considered that this question is one of the matters which more particularly appertain to the municipality. This position has been recognised by M. Poincaré, who, on the 23rd February last, in discussing with Sir F. Bertie the situation as it would be affected by the completion of the French protectorate, observed that, as Tangier was to be internationalised, the French Government (acting, that is, for the Makhzen) would not be free to grant a concession for the construction of a port there. This is also the view of His Majesty's Government.

It may seem that this statement is at variance with the sense of the letter addressed by the British administrator of the Société marocaine de Travaux publics to M. Porché, to which your Excellency refers in the *note verbale* under reply. In order to avoid any misconception on this point, I should explain to your Excellency that the discussion with Mr. Norton, which resulted in his letter to M. Porché, was solely confined to establishing quite clearly the distinction drawn by His Majesty's Government between the working ("exploitation") of railways, harbours, &c., in Morocco, which might be entrusted to third parties by the Moorish Government, and the contracting for the construction of such public works, which must be submitted to adjudication. The discussion did not at all concern itself with the definition of what was meant by the "Moorish Government," nor did the necessity for any such definition arise. The term was used to express the sovereign authority in the three zones—French, Spanish, and international—as it is in future to be delegated to and exercised by the protectorate and municipal officials.

So far as the railway is concerned, His Majesty's Government recognise that only a comparatively small portion of the system will lie in the Tangier zone, and that the call for tenders for construction is a matter which, while necessarily of a certain importance to the municipality, does principally affect the interests of the French and Spanish protectorates.

But, in view of the fact that the starting point and one of the administrative centres of the line will be Tangier, His Majesty's Government think it would be only fair that the municipality should be in some way represented on the board of administration, and have a voice in the control of the terminus. The task of the municipality will already be sufficiently hampered by the independent administrations, such as the Customs, the Government monopolies, and the State Bank, which must exist within its borders, and every effort should, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be made, not only to avoid as far as possible the creation of further difficulties of this kind, but also to devise means to ensure the harmonious working of the various institutions.

I have, &c.

E. GREY.

[20086]

No. 233.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Madrid, May* 10, 1912.

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning. He spoke to me in the sense of his letter, the substance of which I sent you in my last telegram. He said that your suggestion, though not acceptable to Spain in its present form, seemed to show that France had adopted a more conciliatory attitude. To his mind the river was without doubt the most desirable boundary, but at the same time he personally would accept a settlement based on tribal frontiers, provided that any tribe which might be found to be divided by the river should be allotted entirely to that zone which contained the bulk of the tribe.

I am disposed to share the French Ambassador's opinion that it would be difficult to apply consistently to both zones the principle of demarcating a frontier in accordance with the tribal boundaries. Spain would certainly require consistency in the application of the method. If France persists in rejecting Uarga boundary, French Ambassador and I think that what is called the "Rousselet" proposal should be again brought forward, but M. Geoffray is anxious not to be quoted as being in favour of this view.

His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris informed.

[20486]

No. 234.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 69. Confidential.)

Sir, *Madrid, May* 11, 1912.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs handed to me to-day, at his weekly reception, the memorandum forwarded herewith in translation. It contains preliminary observations on the views of His Majesty's Government concerning the future status of Tangier, as recorded in the two memoranda, which accompanied your note of the 2nd May to the Spanish Ambassador in London.

His Excellency begged me to regard this communication as confidential. He did not consider it as forming part of the discussion which is to take place in Madrid with regard to the above subject between the representatives of the three Powers chiefly concerned. Until indeed the French Ambassador receives the instructions he is still awaiting, no discussion *à trois* can be usefully initiated. This being so, Señor Garcia Prieto was anxious to call your attention to two points arising out of the documents before him, which he thought it would be expedient to deal with independently of the prospective discussions. Both points relate, he considers, rather to the external relations of Tangier than to the question of the internal organisation of the city. He would wish them, therefore, to be settled immediately, and, if possible, to form the subject of an article to be inserted in the proposed Franco-Spanish convention.

The first point is that of the area to be assigned to the municipal district of Tangier. Señor Garcia Prieto is unwilling to expose the Spanish zone, in which Tangier will form an enclave, to the risk of being unduly encroached upon as the result of the deliberations of the foreign representatives at Tangier to whom it is proposed to refer the question of the extent of the municipal area. He would prefer that the question should be settled by negotiation between Spain, France, and England. He renews the Spanish suggestion that a radius of 6 kilom. from the present town limits would sufficiently provide for the needs of the new municipality.

Secondly, he presses for the assimilation of the régime of the Tangier custom-house to that of the custom-houses of Tetuan and Laraiche. He desires that, as is now being arranged with regard to those two places, the French Commission of Control should also cease to exercise its authority over the Tangier custom-house, and that the latter should be administered, in so far as it remains at all under Moorish administration, by the Sultan's khalifa for the Spanish zone. The service of the loans and war indemnity, secured on that custom-house, would be provided for by negotiation between France and Spain, as in the case of the Tetuan and Laraiche custom-houses. There would be no objection to the surplus being paid over to the Tangier municipality.

Señor Garcia Prieto spoke at length of the dangers which he apprehended would result from the retention of this important service in French hands. While recognising that the proposals set forth in your communication of the 2nd instant to the French Ambassador in London would tend to curtail very considerably the predominance of the French at Tangier, he argued that France would not be prevented by your scheme from securing at all times the adherence of an obedient group of nominated town councillors. As on certain of the international commissions, a group of powers habitually acted and voted with the French representative, so it would be found that a similar group of the satellites of France would be formed in the International Town Council. France would still contrive to have the principal voice in the municipality. If she was also to control not only the railway to Fez, but also the Tangier custom-house, the new city régime would be only nominally international. The same thing would happen as

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at Casa Blanca. At the latter port the French-controlled customs authorities had long ceased to keep up even an appearance of impartiality. The limited supply of lighters was always at the disposal of French merchants. It was useless for others to apply.

At his Excellency's request I promised to forward to you the enclosed memorandum. At the same time, I pointed out to him that the question of the Tangier custom-house had of course been already considered by you, and that it was evident that, in your view, the dangers apprehended by him were sufficiently met by the proposals you had put forward after a full review of the circumstances. It would not be easy for you now to adopt a different attitude with regard to them. On the other hand, it was not likely that France would accept the Spanish proposal. On the merits of the question, I said that it was impossible to foretell exactly how the twenty-four town councillors of Tangier would be likely to group themselves. It would be wiser, I thought, to assume that all would desire to co-operate towards evolving an efficient administration.

His Excellency had no belief that matters would turn out in this way. He is still convinced that France will dominate the new situation at Tangier unless more effective safeguards are adopted than any which have yet been proposed. He remarked that it was asking a good deal of Spain to expect her concurrence off-hand with a set of propositions as to which, though perhaps more interested than any other country, she had as yet not even been consulted. I replied that your recognition of the interest of Spain in the matter and your desire to take full account of her well-considered wishes were sufficiently well shown by your action in favouring the initiation of a full discussion of the whole subject at Madrid. His Excellency said that he was very grateful, and felt sure that you would see the importance of the questions he was raising.

As Señor Garcia Prieto begged me to consider his memorandum as being addressed, at the present stage, to His Majesty's Government alone, I have not mentioned the matter to the French Ambassador.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 234.

Memorandum communicated to Sir M. de Bunsen by Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, May 10, 1912.

(Translation.)

WHILE reserving their reply to the two memoranda handed to the Spanish Ambassador in London by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs respecting the future position of Tangier, the Spanish Government specially and immediately wish to call the attention of the British Government to the two points which concern even more than they do the internal existence of Tangier its external relations.

One of the points is the extent of territory which will be subjected to the special régime. The Spanish Government have proposed a radius of 6 kilom., reckoned from the present boundary of the zone of the second police tabor. The British Government fear that this will be insufficient, and suggest that the boundary should be fixed in Tangier itself by the representatives of the Powers. It is, however, clear that any increase of the Tangier municipal sphere involves a corresponding diminution of the surrounding Spanish sphere of influence, and the Spanish Government are thus unable to leave this point for subsequent negotiation, and still less to entrust it to the decision of the local diplomatic body, in which each Power has an equal vote, notwithstanding the difference of degree to which each country is interested. There seems no reason why the Spanish, French, and British Governments, having obtained technical reports from their legations at Tangier, should not immediately discuss the matter in Madrid. The Spanish Government maintain their proposal of 6 kilom., to serve as the basis of negotiations.

Secondly, there is the question of the customs, respecting which the Spanish Government would be glad to have certain explanations as regards the British point of view. In the present state of things in Morocco it is necessary to point out that, as regards the customs, there are two distinct elements: (*a*) a Moroccan administration service, constituted by the Umana and including employés who are to-day dependent on the Sultan; (*b*) a "contrôle," more or less rigorously exercised, in the name of the bondholders and for their benefit, and that of the French Government in its position as creditor of the Makhzen.

In constituting Tangier as an autonomous municipality for local affairs, the powers not conferred upon the municipality should not be retained by the Sultan, for the reason that His Majesty, being obliged to exercise these powers under the protectorate and through the intermediary of France, would be equivalent to recognising indirectly Tangier as included in the sphere of French influence, whereas geographical facts, as well as the spirit and letter of treaties, point to the contrary. Moreover, looking at the question from a special point of view, there seems to be every reason why the custom-house, wedged in between two others belonging to the Spanish zone, should not remain in the hands of the administration of the French zone.

The custom-house in question should therefore, in so far as it is a Moroccan administrative service, depend on the Khalifa of the adjoining zone and not on the Sultan. And naturally in this case, the questions concerned with the control exercised on behalf of the bondholders should form the subject of an arrangement between Spain and France in the same manner as in the case of Tetuan and Laraiche.

The foregoing is perfectly compatible with the natural and legitimate wish of the British Government that a portion of the proceeds of the customs should belong to the municipality. At the present moment, after the proportion due from Tangier for the service of loans has been paid, there remains a surplus which is applied also proportionately to the French war indemnity and, afterwards, to the general expenses of the Makhzen. There seems to be nothing to prevent this surplus from being, in such a manner as may be determined, handed over to the municipality for its expenses; but there is no reason why the balance should be remitted to the Sultan.

[20706] No. 235.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 14, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 39 of 12th May.

You should communicate to Minister for Foreign Affairs the following proposal for defining the French and Spanish zones in the Warga district:—

(R.) "Starting from Jebel Beni Hassan (from the Dakber-el-Kadi peak), the frontier will run towards the Warga, which it will join to the north of Tafrout above the bend formed by the river. Continuing from that point westwards, the frontier will follow the chain of heights overlooking the right bank of the Warga as far as the north and south line laid down in article 2 of the convention of 3rd October, 1904.

"Over this last section the frontier will follow as closely as possible the northern limits of the riparian tribes of the Warga, and the southern limits of the tribes which are not riparian." (End of R.)

You should explain to Minister for Foreign Affairs that I have done my best to reconcile views of both French and Spanish Governments, and I trust that he will accept the proposal, as otherwise I do not see what more I can do to bring the French and Spanish Governments together.

[19834] No. 236.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 60.) *Foreign Office, May 15, 1912.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a memorandum communicated to me by the French Ambassador,* enquiring as to the views of His Majesty's Government on certain French proposals respecting customs control between the French and Spanish zones in Morocco.

It may be that the system now proposed will be less cumbersome than a system of refunds, but it will almost certainly give rise to extensive smuggling. Moreover, as regards Tangier, goods landed there for Fez, for example, will have apparently to pass through three customs houses, as the Spaniards will no doubt apply, as against Tangier, the régime that will be put into force against themselves by the French.

* See No. 230.

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On the other hand, the question would arise whether there would be any advantage for the Tangier municipality in a system which, whilst imposing customs barriers on the land frontiers of its territory, would permit of ultimately freeing imports destined for that territory itself from French control once the lien upon the Tangier customs in favour of the bondholders of the Franco-Moorish loans shall have been removed.

I should be glad to receive your observations on the French proposals at your early convenience, and propose to await them before replying to M. Cambon.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[21122] No. 237.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 18.)

(No. 99.)

Sir, *Tangier, May* 11, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 44 of the 14th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the circulars with regard to the *marché de gré à gré* for the first portion of the works to be undertaken at Casa Blanca for the construction of the shelter for lighters. The annotations of the various representatives are appended and do not appear to call for further comment or explanation on my part.

Ali Zakki Bey was here yesterday on some other business, and I questioned him with regard to the double signature of the Compagnie marocaine and Schneider, of Creusot. I regret to say that he replied that, so far from both having signed, neither had. Their representatives had gone to Casa Blanca and were to report their signature at once by telegram or post. Nothing, however, has been received so far, although several days have elapsed and a steamer has come in, which left well after their arrival.

If they are now going to demand a modification of the conditions, as Jammy did, and further delay is to ensue, it would be impossible for the work to be sufficiently advanced before the advent of the bad season to be of any real use, and I should almost feel inclined to propose that the present *marché de gré à gré* (which, owing to the scandalous mismanagement, will no longer serve its purpose) should be dropped, and that a general and far larger scheme, comprising all the various works required at Casa Blanca for affording shelter to lighters, additional quay space, terreplein, stores, &c., should be carefully drawn up and offered to proper adjudication. We have been driven to accepting "urgency" for a number of schemes on account of our desire to serve the interests of British trade, but now that it is clear that these interests will only profit to a very small extent by the works proposed, owing to the delays which have occurred, there really seems no reason why we should continue to waive our rights to adjudication.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 237.

Circular Letter addressed to Representatives of the Powers in Morocco.

Messieurs et chers Collègues, *Tanger, le 29 avril*, 1912.

JE viens de recevoir dans la question des travaux de Casablanca, au sujet de laquelle j'ai déjà maintes fois eu l'occasion de vous entretenir, la lettre ci-jointe du président de la Commission générale des Adjudications et des Marchés.

J'avoue avoir été très étonné en lisant le contenu de cette communication.

M. Zakki, en effet, dans sa lettre du 13 courant, nous avait positivement déclaré que la Commission générale avait décidé la passation d'un marché de gré à gré pour le premier tronçon avec M. Jammy et nous devions, par conséquent, supposer que le contrat avec ce dernier avait été signé.

Afin de pouvoir vous éclairer autant que possible au sujet de cette affaire, qui intéresse au plus haut degré le commerce international de Casablanca et qui aura

peut-être à subir de nouveaux retards par le nouvel incident survenu, j'ai prié M. Zakki de venir me donner quelques explications, dont il résulte ce qu'il suit :—

Le Service technique des Travaux publics avait trois candidats pour le marché de gré à gré dont il s'agit : MM. Jammy, Galthier et la Compagnie marocaine. Le service avait choisi le premier, qui, par télégramme, avait accepté le marché, en ajoutant qu'il viendrait sans retard personnellement à Casablanca. En effet, quelques jours plus tard M. Jammy se rendit à Casablanca, examina le port et revint à Tanger, où il exigea du Service des Travaux publics différentes modifications au programme—exigence à laquelle le service ne croyait pas pouvoir donner suite. Pour l'exécution pure et simple du projet, M. Jammy désirait alors une augmentation de 15 pour cent sur le prix convenu. La Commission générale ne pouvant accéder à ce désir, le marché fut annulé.

M. Jammy s'étant retiré et M. Galthier, constructeur du port de Bône, s'étant récusé, il ne resta plus que la Compagnie marocaine que le Service des Travaux publics pouvait proposer à la Commission générale pour la passation du marché de gré à gré en question.

Après ces explications de M. Zakki, je me suis permis de lui soumettre mon opinion.

D'après moi, le marché de gré à gré avec la Compagnie marocaine devra non seulement contenir, comme celui avec M. Jammy, la date du 24 juillet pour la fin du tronçon de 100 mètres et la même clause pénale de 500 fr. pour chaque jour de retard, mais également deux autres clauses :—

1. *Un Cautionnement.*—Si on avait exigé à M. Jammy avant l'acceptation du marché par télégramme un cautionnement raisonnable, M. Jammy aurait probablement tenu ses engagements et un nouveau retard eût été évité.

2. *Des Entrepreneurs.*—MM. Jammy et Galthier étaient tous deux des entrepreneurs. La Compagnie marocaine ne l'est pas. Pour ces travaux-ci elle suivra, par conséquent, le mode de procéder suivi jadis par elle à Casablanca et Saffi et passera l'exécution du marché de gré à gré à un entrepreneur. J'estime que dans le marché de gré à gré avec la Compagnie marocaine il devra être stipulé que la Commission générale devra approuver le choix de l'entrepreneur que fera la Compagnie marocaine.

Dans le cas où mes honorables collègues partageraient ma manière de voir, j'estime que nous devrions donner des instructions dans ce sens à nos délégués dans la Commission générale pour les Adjudications et les Marchés.

Veuillez, &c.

W. DE RAPPARD.

La nouvelle que nous apporte la lettre d'Ali Zakki Bey me produit une impression des plus pénibles. Je partage absolument la manière de voir de notre honorable doyen. Il me paraît de la plus haute importance que nous sachions à qui la Compagnie marocaine compte passer l'exécution du marché de gré à gré que la commission désire lui confier et que nous puissions contrôler ce choix, vu la façon déplorable dont elle a exécuté ses contrats antérieurs pour les travaux de Casablanca et Saffi. La Compagnie marocaine est, à mon avis, responsable pour la situation néfaste que nous tâchons de combattre aujourd'hui, et il est de notre devoir de nous sauvegarder par tous les moyens à notre disposition contre une répétition de ces tristes expériences.

R. LISTER.

Je suis complètement d'accord avec la manière de voir de notre honorable doyen et de notre collègue d'Angleterre.

SECKENDORF.

Pleinement d'accord avec notre honorable doyen et mes collègues de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Allemagne. Je dois, en outre, ajouter que, d'après les renseignements que me fournit M. Aguirré, qui, en sa qualité de délégué du corps diplomatique à la Commission générale des Adjudications, se trouvait présent à la séance du 27 que mentionne Ali Zakki, il n'a pas eu la moindre connaissance de ce que cette commission ait traité et autorisé dûment à cette séance la passation du marché de gré à gré dont il s'agit avec la Compagnie marocaine.

VILLASINDA.

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Je suis pleinement d'accord avec M. le doyen du corps diplomatique et MM. les Ministres d'Angleterre, d'Allemagne et d'Espagne.

NEEF.

Idem.

CALLENBERG.

Idem.

CAEPENTER.

En raison des annotations précédentes, j'ai demandé à M. Porché des renseignements sur les conditions dans lesquelles la Compagnie marocaine a accepté ces travaux. Ces renseignements répondent, à mon avis, aux objections des représentants des Puissances qui ont jusqu'à présent annoté la circulaire.

Tout d'abord, la soumission est signée de la Compagnie marocaine et de Schneider & Cie., maison dont la compétence est indiscutable en matière de travaux. Le Service des Travaux publics, désirant avoir le maximum de garanties, a exigé cette double signature, la Compagnie marocaine et Schneider ne pouvant, du reste, sous-traiter sans l'autorisation de l'administration.

Ce qui s'est produit pour la soumission Jammy n'a rien d'anormal. M. Porché a fait connaitre à la Commission des Adjudications les propositions télégraphiques de M. Jammy afin de permettre à celui-ci de venir signer une soumission. Jusqu'au moment de cette signature—et ce point avait été spécifié par M. Porché à la commission —M. Jammy n'était pas adjudicataire définitif.

Le délai accordé à la Compagnie marocaine est le même que celui accordé à M. Jammy et se terminera, en conséquence, le 10 août.

La clause pénale est la même.

ROBERT DE BILLY.

Je suis pleinement d'accord avec la manière de voir de M. le chargé d'affaires de France.

S. DE LIKATSCHEF.

Enclosure 2 in No. 237.

Ali Zakki Bey to Doyen of the Diplomatic Body.

M. le Doyen, *Tanger, le 28 avril*, 1912.

ME référant à ma lettre en date du 13 avril courant et à la communication que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser le 25 de ce mois, toutes deux relatives aux travaux projetés pour le port de Casablanca, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que, par suite de certaines difficultés survenues au dernier moment, le marché relatif au premier tronçon n'a pu être passé avec M. Jammy.

Au cours de sa séance d'hier, la Commission générale des Adjudications a, sur la proposition du Service des Travaux publics, autorisé la passation du marché dont il s'agit avec la Compagnie marocaine.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Président,
ALI ZAKKI.

Deuxième Tournée.

Pour permettre à mes honorables collègues de prendre connaissance de l'annotation de M. le chargé d'affaires de France.

Il résulte de cette intéressante annotation de M. de Billy que la soumission dont il s'agit est non seulement signée par la Compagnie marocaine, mais également par la maison Schneider & Cie. S'il résulte de ce fait que ce sera cette dernière qui effectuera à Casablanca les travaux en question, il me paraît qu'il n'y a plus lieu pour nous de nous inquiéter concernant la façon dont lesdits travaux seront exécutés, d'autant plus que nous pouvons être sûrs que l'administration, après les expériences faites jadis avec la Compagnie marocaine, veillera doublement à cette exécution.

L'annotation de M. de Billy me donne lieu à deux petites observations :—

1. Quant à la question de la soumission Jammy, je trouve que M. le président de la Commission générale eût mieux fait d'attendre à nous annoncer la décision de la passation du marché de gré à gré avec M. Jammy jusqu'à ce que ce marché fût irrévocablement signé. En recevant la lettre du 13 avril de M. Zakki, nous étions en droit d'en déduire qu'effectivement M. Jammy était l'élu, et, par conséquent, notre étonnement, à mon avis naturel, en apprenant que "par suite de certaines difficultés survenues au dernier moment, le marché relatif au premier tronçon n'a pu être passé avec M. Jammy."

2. J'ai toujours cru que dans le marché de gré à gré avec M. Jammy il s'agissait du 24 juillet comme fin du délai pour la livraison des travaux. Il paraît maintenant que cette date est fixée au 10 août.

Enfin, je crois devoir attirer l'attention de mes honorables collègues sur la contradiction existant entre l'alinéa 2 de la lettre du président de la Commission générale du 28 avril dernier et l'annotation de notre honorable collègue d'Espagne.

W. DE RAPPARD.

Tanger, le 7 mai, 1912.

Je suis très content de lire l'annotation de M. de Billy. Il est évident que le nom de Schneider et du Creusot inspire la plus grande confiance, pourvu que cela soit eux qui exécutent les travaux. Je dois avouer que je ne savais pas qu'ils faisaient des travaux de ce genre ; il serait vraiment regrettable si le contrat en question devait passer entre les mains de trois maisons avant d'arriver à son vrai exécutant.

J'aimerais bien savoir pourquoi la date du 24 juillet a été reculée au 10 août. Le temps qui reste entre cette date-là et le 15 septembre, date à laquelle on nous dit qu'on ne peut plus travailler, est bien court.

Quant au dernier paragraphe de la note de notre honorable doyen, il devrait être facile de tirer l'affaire au clair quand nous aurons reçu le procès-verbal de la séance, qui, selon la décision du corps diplomatique, doit nous être communiqué.

REGINALD LISTER.

Vu :
SECKENDORF.
VILLASINDA.
NEEF.
DEPRETIS.
CALLENBERG.
ROBERT DE BILLY.
CARPENTER.
LIKATSCHEF.
FERRÃO.

Troisième Tournée.

A cause du grand nombre de "Vu," je me vois obligé de revenir une troisième fois sur l'affaire de Casablanca et de vous demander si vous êtes d'accord que j'écrive à M. le président de la Commission générale que nous autorisons la passation du marché avec la Compagnie marocaine à condition que ce soit la maison Schneider qui exécute les travaux. Ensuite, je demanderai dans cette lettre à M. Zakki pourquoi la date du 24 juillet a été changée en celle du 10 août, et le prierai de m'en envoyer le procès-verbal de la séance du 27 avril, qui, d'après le désir exprimé jadis par le corps diplomatique, nous doit, du reste, être présenté après chaque séance de la commission.

[21123]

No. 238.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 100.) *Tangier, May 12*, 1912.

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 92 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that the news which has reached me during the past week from Marrakesh is of a more or less disquieting nature, although Mr. Vice-Consul Lennox reports that

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the town itself is quiet and that the agitation is more directed against the Makhzen than the Europeans.

The situation at present appears to be that the basha, Woold Drees Mennou, the miserable creature of the Sultan, is powerless to maintain order, and that the consuls are consequently more or less obliged to turn to the Glawi brothers. The French vice-consul appears to desire to do so altogether, but Mr. Lennox has pointed out to him that the basha was the official, that the Glawi in supporting Kaïd Abdsalem in Rehamna were acting against the Government, and that he thought it was necessary to try first and effect a reconciliation between the two parties. This Mr. Lennox is doing his utmost to bring about. In my opinion the French are once more absolutely to blame for the situation. It would never have arisen had they shown a little firmness in the winter and insisted on the dismissal of Mennou, whose appointment was little short of a disgrace and should never have been allowed. Hadj Thami would have been reinstated as basha, and with his personal authority and the great power he and his family wield in the south the whole country could have been kept quiet. I have represented this over and over again to M. de Billy, and begged him to act before it was too late, as I have always anticipated that trouble must arise in the south. With his usual want of grasp of the situation, he has, however, always temporised, and things have been allowed to go on as they were, with the result that the whole country is now out of hand and that a disaster might occur at any moment.

The basha's khalifa has been massacred at Immin Izzat, about 15 miles from Marrakesh, after a violent and bloody affray in which some hundred men appear to have been killed, and the house and village looted and burnt.

In the Rehamna the anti-Makhzen force under Kaïd Abdsalem is increasing daily, and the whole district is in a state of wild agitation, and in Marrakesh itself unpleasant incidents have occurred in which Moors and soldiers have lost their lives.

Mr. Madden informs me that he had some conversation on the situation with the French captain of the "Bureau arabe," who told him confidentially that the French vice-consul at Marrakesh had asked that a light column might be held in readiness to go to Marrakesh if necessity arose. Mr. Lennox, however, has stated the opinion that, in the event of a French advance upon Marrakesh, it is essential that a sufficiently powerful force should be sent to overcome the opposition which they were sure to encounter, as any reverse or delay would make the position of Europeans most dangerous. Mr. Madden has especially drawn the attention of the "Bureau arabe" to this opinion.

Mr. Lennox tells me that Hadj Thami has sent him a message offering him guards, and saying that so long as he was alive there would be no danger to Europeans. I feel convinced that he will do all that he can, and that his protection will be extended to British subjects and protégés in particular.

I only hope that we may hear before long that the French have decided to act, and that he has been reinstated as basha.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[21275] No. 239.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 18.)

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, May* 18, 1912.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 16th May.

King of Spain told me to-day he still hoped agreement might be reached, but it was too much to ask Spain to give up her line of communication between eastern and western portions of her zone.

Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that this is principal point at issue. He says one of the riverain tribes is believed to extend 50 kilom. northwards from Warga. Besides cutting communications, line demanded by France would include all the fertile portions of the valley in the French zone. Spain would be left with a barren and impenetrable mountain region. His Excellency speaks bitterly of what he terms ungenerous behaviour of France, adding that even if convention be still attainable there is now little hope of friendly co-operation between the two countries in Morocco.

French Ambassador says that the Spanish refusal does not surprise him, as he has repeatedly assured French Government that the Rousellet Bey proposal, pure and simple, was most Spain could possibly be induced to accept. Even this proposal, he thinks, would [? now] have to be accompanied by liberty of transit for Spanish troops along Warga valley to make it acceptable. King of Spain and Minister for Foreign Affairs repeated to him what they said to me.

(Sent to Paris.)

[21421] No. 240.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 20.)

(No. 72.) *Madrid, May* 17, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 40 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith translation of the reply which I have received from the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs to your last proposal regarding the frontier between the French and Spanish zones in the region of the river Uarga.

You suggested a line following the chain of heights overlooking from Tafraut westwards the right bank of the Uarga, but including also within the French zone the riverain tribes of the right bank.

Spain will not consent to surrender the riverain tribes unless in any case the bulk of the tribe be established on the left bank and only a lesser portion on the right bank. She insists also on the frontier being so drawn as not to cut an essential line of military communication between the eastern and western portion of her zone. Delimitation under these conditions to be carried out by mixed commission.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 240.

Señor Garcia Prieto to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(Translation.) *Madrid, May* 16, 1912.

My Dear Ambassador,

IN view of the repeated refusal of France to accept the English formula, which for her part Spain accepted, without even discussing it, the very day (14th April) of its presentation, all that the Spanish Government can do to show consideration for the initiative taken by Sir Edward Grey, and to facilitate an arrangement, is to agree that, if the mixed commission contemplated in that formula should determine that to the west of Tafraut any tribe, whose bulk is established on the left bank of the Uarga, owns some villages or pieces of territory on the right bank, the said villages or pieces of territory should likewise pass to the French sphere of influence, on the distinct understanding that the commission would procure that, in consequence of this arrangement, Spain should not find herself deprived of convenient (expedita) military communication between the different regions of her zone.

As the French objection was that the line of the Uarga would cut certain tribes, it is clear that in this way her observation is taken into account even though it is not regarded as wellfounded. What would have no justification is that not only the tribes in that position, but all those on the right bank of the Uarga lying to the west of Tafraut and being riverain tribes should pass to the French zone.

Asking you to thank Sir Edward Grey again for the efforts he is making to bring the two interested countries together, efforts which it cannot be denied that Spain is responding to by amplifying to her disadvantage the same English formula which she had accepted.

I remain, &c.
M. GARCIA PRIETO.

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[21657] No. 241.

M. Cambon to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 19 mai, 1912.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception à votre Excellence de sa lettre en date du 2 de ce mois, relative à la sécurité des étrangers au Maroc.

En réponse à cette communication, je suis chargé de faire connaître à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de la république n'a jamais prétendu faire suspendre, même provisoirement, l'exercice des droits contractuels qui résultent, pour les sujets britanniques, des traités anglo-marocains. Il a seulement entendu mettre à couvert sa responsabilité et celle du Gouvernement du protectorat, en avertissant les Gouvernements intéressés du danger que présenterait, pour leurs ressortissants, un exercice inconsidéré de ces droits. Son intention s'est bornée à faire admettre par les Gouvernements étrangers le principe en vertu duquel ceux de leurs nationaux, qui s'aventureraient dans des régions où le protectorat ne serait pas en mesure d'assurer leur sécurité, le feraient à leurs risques et périls. Les distinctions que le Gouvernement marocain pourrait être amené à établir entre diverses zones, les passeports qu'il pourrait être conduit à délivrer n'auraient d'autre valeur que celle d'un avertissement, donné à ceux qui en enfreindraient les limites, et dégageraient ainsi temporairement sa responsabilité.

Veuillez, &c.
PAUL CAMBON.

[21738] No. 242.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 50.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 21, 1912.*

REPORTS from Fez state that practically all the tribes to the east of Fez are uniting, and threaten to attack the town. Fighting continues on the southern side. French troops number some 5,000, and are considered insufficient to deal with general tribal rising.

[22216] No. 243.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 253.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May, 21, 1912.*

M. CAMBON told me to-day of his conversation of yesterday with Sir Arthur Nicolson (see my despatch to Sir M. de Bunsen No. 50 of this day's date), and of the suggestion which the latter had made. He asked me what I thought of it.

I said that I thought it was most useful. As an objection to the proposed line, the French Government had raised the point of the impossibility of dividing the tribes. They had been met by the suggestion that the line should be modified in order to surmount this difficulty. The Spanish Government now pointed out that they must have a means of communication; and the suggestion might be modified to meet this. I did not think that all this would be of much practical importance afterwards; and therefore it was the more important now to find a formula which would enable the Spanish Government to put a good face upon the matter for their public opinion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22007] No. 244.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 50.) *Foreign Office, May 21, 1912.*

Sir,

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 20th instant, and in reply to his enquiry was informed by Sir A. Nicolson that His Majesty's Government did not propose to take any further action in regard to the question of the Warga valley.

Sir A. Nicolson observed that, so far as he could understand, the chief preoccupation of the Spanish Government was to be assured that the communication between the eastern and western portions of the Spanish zone in Morocco should not be interrupted. It was presumably a matter of indifference to the Spanish Government whether they had 5 or 10 kilom. more or less of territory in an unknown land probably sterile and inhospitable, certainly inhabited by wild and warlike tribes whom Moorish Sultans had not been able to subdue. In these circumstances, it seemed to Sir A Nicolson that it might be possible for the Spanish Government to accept the last British proposal as a basis of negotiation conditionally on a joint commission, appointed *ad hoc*, determining that the communications between the east and the west were freely secured to Spain, if the general frontier line indicated in the British proposal were adopted. As far as could be judged from imperfect maps the communications could be secured with the proposed line, but the commission would be able to verify that. Sir A. Nicolson made it clear to the Ambassador that this suggestion was entirely a personal one.

M. de Villa Urrutia said that he thought such a solution was possible, and that he would telegraph it to his Government at Madrid.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21122] No. 245.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 66.) *Foreign Office, May 23, 1912.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your despatch No. 99 of the 11th instant, and I entirely approve your annotations on the circulars relative to the contract for the first portion of the harbour works at Casa Blanca.

I have given careful consideration to your tentative suggestion that the present *marché de gré à gré* should be dropped and that a general scheme comprising all the various works required at Casa Blanca should be drawn up and submitted to proper adjudication. There is much to be said in favour of this suggestion, but the matter appears to me to depend on whether or not the first portion of the works can be finished before the winter. If it can, and if the contract with the penalty clause is duly signed by both the Compagnie marocaine and Messrs. Schneider, His Majesty's Government can hardly withdraw their consent, nor would it be in the interest of British shipping to do so. But, if the work cannot be finished before the winter, His Majesty's Government may be justified in withdrawing their consent, which was given solely on the ground of urgency and with great reluctance.

I should be glad if you would keep me informed of how the matter develops, and whether the contract has at last been signed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22215] No. 246.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, May 24, 1912.

L'AMBASSADE de France a proposé que la question du statut international de Tanger soit soumise à une commission officieuse constituée à Madrid, et composée d'un représentant de chacune des deux Ambassades de France et d'Angleterre et d'un

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délégué du Ministère espagnol d'État. Si le Gouvernement britannique accepte cette proposition, il serait utile de lui donner suite le plus tôt possible ; M. Geoffray est en mesure de faire procéder immédiatement à l'étude du statut de Tanger et la discussion pourrait commencer dès que Sir Maurice de Bunsen aurait reçu ses instructions.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 24 mai, 1912.

[22252] No. 247.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 106.)

Sir,

Tangier, May 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting information received from M. Gaillard as to the general lines on which the new régime is to be organised.

From what M. de Billy said to me, I gather that a definite decision on this subject will not be taken until after General Lyautey has arrived at Fez and had an opportunity of studying the question, though the general lines will probably be much as stated by M. Gaillard to Mr. MacLeod, except that, according to M. de Billy, it seems probable that the resident-general's head-quarters will be at Fez, whilst Count de Saint Aulaire will reside at Rabat and M. Gaillard would be attached to the Sultan and Makhzen.

I fully endorse the view expressed by Mr. MacLeod in the 7th paragraph of his despatch, and I cannot but regret that the sensible ideas which M. Gaillard developed to me, as reported in my despatch No. 23 of the 11th February last, should not have prevailed.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 247.

Consul MacLeod to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 31. Confidential.)

Sir,

Fez, May 9, 1912.

THE French consul, M. Gaillard, who has been appointed "head of the Secretariat," to-day gave me the following description of the new régime which it is proposed to establish :—

2. The native Ministry of Foreign Affairs will disappear and the army arrangements will be as described in Enclosure 3 in my despatch No. 9 of the 29th April to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

3. There will be a resident-general, by whose advice all the Government will be guided, and through whom the Sultan's powers will be exercised by means of two departments, which, for clearness, may be called the civil (or diplomatic) and the military. The former will take charge of the Sultan's foreign affairs, and will conduct the resident's correspondence with Paris. At its head will be Count Saint Aulaire, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. The other will be under a general officer (not yet selected, but who will not be General Moinier), who will administer the army and all military matters.

4. The Moorish Administration, in form, will remain (I infer) as at present, with the exceptions that the Moorish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will disappear and that a department called the Secretariat will be established. The duties of the Secretariat will be—

(1.) To conduct the intercourse between the resident and the Sultan.

(2.) To advise the Grand Vizier and exercise powers of inspection and control (*a*) on matters of general native policy, (*b*) on matters of finance, including the preparation of a budget, collection of taxes, the administration of justice and military affairs as far as regards the Sultan's connection with them.

The head of the Secretariat will have the assistance of expert French advisers on each of these subjects. M. Gaillard frankly admitted that, while he felt very flattered

at being selected to be head of this Secretariat, he was still very hazy as to how much (even approximately) was expected of him, and how all this was to be set about, and as to how it would work.

5. Doubtless by this whole scheme, or any scheme of any powerful foreign Government, there will eventually be created a much better administration than Morocco has ever had. Whether, however, this is at all the best plan is the point I would submit for consideration. As seen here, it appears to present the following disadvantages :—

(1.) It is not a development or a reform of the existing system, but rather the implanting of a new one, to the very appearance of which (especially in Morocco, where appearance is so vastly important), it will take much time or great force to accustom the Moorish population, to whom it will all present an enormous and disagreeable visible change.

(2.) It appears to leave to the Sultan himself no functions of any consequence.

(3.) It is of course a fact that there are not in Morocco any natives (as in Egypt, for instance), with the training or force of character necessary for directing departments of State on modern lines. It may be suggested for consideration, however, whether some plan, by which the appearance of things in native eyes was left as undisturbed, or changed as gradually as possible, would not have been more suited to the needs of the case. It will be observed that the proposed plan instantly sets up a completely new system into which all native institutions will have to be fitted or compressed.

6. So far as I can discern, a better plan would have been to leave the existing form of régime untouched ; to have simply, and as unobtrusively as possible, added a European adviser, with European assistants where necessary, to each department, and to have kept the Moorish army administration quite distinct from the French troops of occupation ; and the sentiment which makes Moors to look to the Sultan as their natural leader, both temporally and spiritually, should have been developed and turned to account.

7. The proposed scheme seems, by its ruthless elimination of so much that looks Moorish and its instantaneous establishment of strange institutions, to be likely to effect the reformers' aims with a maximum rather than a minimum of difficulty. In other words, to the existing difficulties (which are enormous enough) the proposed scheme seems to add many others of its own making.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[22253] No. 248.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 107.)

Sir,

Tangier, May 16, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Fez reporting the unsatisfactory state of health of the Sultan and His Majesty's desire to abdicate and reside at Tangier, where he has just purchased the country house and grounds of the late Sir John Drummond-Hay.

M. Regnault succeeded in persuading Mulai Hafid to await the arrival of General Lyautey before taking any decision, but His Majesty is in continual fear of assassination, and it is quite probable that the French will before long be obliged to allow him to abdicate. In that case Mulai Abdul Aziz would undoubtedly be the most suitable person to ascend the throne, but I much doubt whether His Majesty would accept the offer were it to be made to him.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received a private letter from Mr. MacLeod reporting a conversation with Sid Taib Mokri, who stated that the Sultan was still as determined as ever to go to Rabat and abdicate there, and that His Majesty's conversation and attitude were still indicative of his mind having become affected by recent events. Sid Taib appears to have enlarged on the folly of the course which the Sultan proposed to follow. If he must abdicate he should summon the Ulema and notables of

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Fez, make the abdication, and asked them to nominate, or at all events acknowledge, his successor. The acceptance by Fez of a new Sultan would facilitate his recognition throughout the country far more than if he were proclaimed at Rabat or any other Moorish town. Sid Taib was of opinion that Moulay Yusef was the only possible successor.

R. L.

Enclosure in No. 248.

Consul MacLeod to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 35. Confidential.)

Sir, *Fez, May* 11, 1912.

I AM sorry to report that the Sultan has for the last few days been in very unsatisfactory health.

From the descriptions I have had confidentially both from the French consul and from various Moors who have seen the Sultan frequently these days, His Majesty seems to be in a highly nervous and excited state, particularly since the 7th instant. He has been restrained with considerable difficulty first from leaving Fez, and next from going into sanctuary at Mulai Dris, and he still insists vehemently on going to Rabat and there abdicating, requesting the latter, in fulfilment of a secret but written promise he received from the French Minister, prior to signing the protectorate treaty, that France would allow him to resign whenever he pleased.

It has been pointed out to the Sultan that, the troops here as yet being all required for local purposes, there is not available a sufficient number to escort him securely to Rabat, besides which it would be imprudent for him to make any such move until both the city and the whole region are restored to normal quiet.

Yesterday the Sultan did not appear at Friday prayers, but during the rest of the day, and again to-day, he is reported to be calming down again.

All those who have seen him and told me of his condition are unanimous in not attributing his state to anything soever but his unstrung nerves after what he has come through. He appears to feel great terror of some revenge on him by soldiers, or tribesmen, or other malcontents.

One informant tells me the Sultan, through Sid Taib Mokri, has bought gardens at Tangier (Miss Drummond-Hay's and Sir Robert Drummond-Hay's) with the view of residing there before long.

As to a possible successor should he abdicate, the names mentioned here as yet are only the Sultan's son, Mulai Dris, a child of 8 years or so of age; the Sultan's brother, Mulai Youssef; and the ex-Sultan Mulai Abdelaziz. The last-named would be by far the best liked successor, hereabouts at any rate where he has regained much popularity of late years, and in view of the fact that all the present leading Moorish officials are former partisans of his.

If such a change were made by the Moors themselves, the effect might be better than if the successor was ostentatiously the nominee of any foreign Power, though, of course, in general opinion, what is most to be desired is that the Sultan should get better and make the best of the situation for the country and for himself under the new régime.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[22254] No. 249.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 108.)

Sir, *Tangier, May* 16, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Fez enclosing translation of a letter addressed to the Governor of Fez by the chief of the French Bureau des Renseignements, imposing, by order of General Moinier, a fine of about 33,335*l.* on the inhabitants of that town on account of the massacres, and also a translation of the reply of the Fez notables protesting in respectful language against the imposition of a fine, and disclaiming responsibility for the consequence of the mutiny of the soldiers.

In a later despatch, copy of which is also transmitted herewith, His Majesty's consul reports that the Sultan had expressed to General Moinier his indignation that such a letter should have been written in any name but His Majesty's, and that the general had replied that the letter had been issued without his authority. Mr. Macleod adds that M. Regnault has caused the Fez people to be informed that their reply is receiving consideration.

It is to be hoped that General Lyautey will show more tact than has recently been shown by General Moinier, and that he will be able to restrain his subordinate officers. It is the extraordinarily injudicious proceedings of the military authorities even more than the weakness shown by the civil authorities in the matter of abuses that has completely alienated what little sympathy was at one time felt for the French by the natives, who looked forward to a régime of order, justice, and prosperity after the troublesome times through which the country has been passing.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 249.

Consul MacLeod to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 32.)

Sir, *Fez, May* 9, 1912.

THIS morning the Governor of Fez summoned the principal citizens of Fez to hear a letter from General Moinier (not from the Sultan) demanding an indemnity of 200,000 dollars from Old Fez for its participation in the recent outbreak. The persons summoned included a number of British and other foreign protégés.

On being asked what they had to say a number of those present answered that, while they would have no objection to contribute freely even more than the sum demanded towards compensating innocent people who had been injured in person or property, they objected to being fined. What had happened was not the fault of any decent person in the city, but was attributable to the soldiers, the rabble, and the slackness of the authorities. The French authorities had militarily executed both the soldiers and town rioters, and, having done so, the fining of the respectable citizens was unjust.

The British Semsar, Sid Mohamed-ben-Emfeddal Bengeloun, spoke strongly in the above sense. On hearing of this, I sent word to him that, quite irrespective of the rights or wrongs of it, he had no right to offer criticisms to the authorities on such a matter. If anything unlawful were demanded of him he could complain to me, and I sent word both to the governor and to the French consulate of this reproof. I procured from two different sources a copy of the letter, of which, with a translation, I beg to enclose a copy herewith,* as also of the formal reply to it.* It will be seen that no exception of anybody is made. The whole of the citizens—non-protégés and protégés—those who befriended Europeans and those who massacred or pillaged them, are all lumped together.

Requests from our protégés for directions having been made to me, I answered that they should politely refer to me any person who should make any demand of them in this matter.

I thereafter spoke with M. Gaillard (French consul) about it. He replied that a mistake must have occurred. It had been arranged with General Moinier that the Sultan would issue an edict demanding an indemnity of 200,000 dollars from Old Fez, and the text of this was in preparation. There was no question of demanding anything from protégés or from persons who had befriended Europeans. Far the contrary, it was proposed honourably to reward such persons. It was not proposed to mention anybody as being exempt, but the protégés were, in practice, to be considered as friendlies to Europeans, and so nothing would be demanded from them.

M. Gaillard felt sure the letter must have been issued by mistake by some junior member of the Bureau des Renseignements without General Moinier's knowledge, and General Moinier's attention would be called to the matter. Meanwhile M. Gaillard would be really obliged if I could speak to the French Minister. This I did, and M. Regnault answered warmly in the same sense as M. Gaillard, adding that he could not suppose General Moinier could have issued the letter, as by its terms (*i.e.*, by its being addressed to the governor by him instead of by the Sultan) General Moinier placed himself at the head of the administration.

* Not printed.

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There the matter stands. It may possibly prove to have been a mistake, but I would point out that it is the second mistake of that kind which has occurred, because the letter, or proclamation, of the 23rd April, to which the Spanish consul and I took exception, was also addressed by General Moinier (and not by the Sultan) to the public.

It seems to me another instance of the unfortunate disaccord between the French military and civil elements, which has been increasing more and more of late with such disastrous results.

I am making enquiries as to whether the 200,000 dollars in question is a war indemnity payable to the French troops in compensation for the resistance they experienced (*i.e.*, whether it is like the indemnity exacted from Mequinez last year, as reported in a letter of Hadj Mohamed Mikwar dated the 10th June, 1911, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 46 of the 13th June, 1911), or is intended towards compensating the various victims of the insurrection not connected with the relieving forces. It will be seen from the text of the letter that the indemnity, when collected, is not to be paid over except upon General Moinier's order.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 249.

Consul MacLeod to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 33.)

Sir, *Fez, May* 11, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 32 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that an interview took place between the Sultan and General Moinier in regard to the latter's demand for an indemnity of 200,000 dollars from Old Fez. The Sultan was very indignant at the issue of such a letter except in His Majesty's name. The general's reply was (I infer) that it was issued by mistake without his authority.

Meanwhile, consequent upon the French Minister's intervention, the Fez people have been told that the matter is not being proceeded with for the present, and that their reply is receiving consideration.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

[22255] No. 250.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 25.)

(No. 109.)

Sir, *Tangier, May* 18, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez reporting language held by him to the French Minister regarding the proclamation by General Moinier of a state of siege at Fez.

It appears to me very doubtful whether the right claimed by the French military authorities to try foreign subjects and protégés by court-martial can be maintained, and I should be grateful if I could be furnished with instructions on this point in case a charge were brought against a person under British protection. A case has arisen in connection with a Moorish subject under the protection of the United States, full particulars of which are given in a despatch addressed to the American Minister by Mr. MacLeod, who has transmitted to me a copy, which I beg leave to enclose herewith.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have received a private letter from Mr. MacLeod enclosing copy of a further despatch which he has addressed to the American Minister, from which it appears that the officers of the "Bureau des Renseignements" have come to their senses, and there is every hope of the matter being satisfactorily terminated.

R. L.

Enclosure in No. 250.

Memorandum by Consul MacLeod.

(Confidential.)

YESTERDAY I chanced to be visiting the French Minister on another matter when some conversation ensued about the recent "state of siege" proclamation at Fez.

2. I observed that it had been stated in the "Dépêche marocaine" that the British consul had been very friendly in that matter and had made no remark, whereas the other consuls had replied making reservations as to their rights of jurisdiction. Might I, to prevent any misapprehension, state the position as I saw it, and still see it?

3. The proclamation was by no means left unstudied by me. It would be easy to criticise it generally, *e.g.*, the proclaiming at all of a "state of siege" four days after the fighting had ceased and three days after all the city gates had been opened and commerce resumed! M. Regnault laughed with such evident enjoyment at this sally that I felt sure he must have urged some similar objection on General Moinier. The term "state of siege" appeared to me, under the circumstances, simply a term of French military law by which the general bade us all take notice that he was at war. What concerned us were his specific requirements. The time and circumstances then were inopportune for discussions of theories on such matters.

4. My object had been, even before the proclamation was made, so to act as to ensure, on the one hand, that no hindrance by any of our people to the French forces in the doing of their duties occur, and, on the other, that no infringement—in practice—of our rights should happen; in other words, so to act that when this troublous time was past there would be no differences to settle between us about it either here, or in Tangier, or at home. I had reasoned the matter thus:—

Requirements 2, 3, and 4 were really of a police nature to which, at the request of their consul and on cause shown, British subjects were bound to submit, especially in view of the atrocious nature of the crime which had been committed. The consuls, by treaty, could call upon the Moorish authorities to assist them in their duties. Supposing, for instance, I had had to search several British protégés' houses very promptly, I should have needed to ask for the Makhzen's help. The French forces were acting for the Makhzen, and were thus to all intents and purposes Makhzen forces for the time being.

5. The orders I issued to British subjects (some are of Moorish lineage) and protégés were essentially fulfilments of treaty obligations, but which the pressure of circumstances did not permit of being asked for and issued with the usual formalities beforehand, and care was taken to arrange with the military authorities that any of the powers they required would be exercised by competent officers of commissioned rank.

6. My anticipation was that the careful direction beforehand of our people would best ensure the non-arising of any dispute, and very particularly would prevent any possibility of resort by the French authorities to the powers they claimed (limitation No. 1) of trying anybody* by their courts-martial for offences against public order. To this claim I could, in principle, not agree. The French military authorities, however, gave me to understand beforehand that, whenever the circumstances at all permitted of it, no recourse would be had as regards British subjects or protégés to any jurisdiction but the consul's.

7. For the rest, under all the circumstances, I thought we could safely rely upon the good sense and moderation of the French Minister, and the generals and officers in command of the latter's forces, the more so that our protégés hereabouts are all of the respectable commercial class, not in the least likely to take part in public disturbances.

8. In practice this anticipation has been entirely fulfilled, for, so far, only one case —that of a protégé's stepson, a lad of 16 or so, arrested under accusation of buying some looted tobacco—has occurred. On my calling the military authorities' attention to it they promptly handed the lad over to me, and explained (1) that the arrest had been made ignorantly by native soldiers of the Basha, and (2) that they had no case against the lad, for it had appeared he was arrested in mistake for some non-protégé of the same name.

* I mean any foreigner or protégé.

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9. I did not, of course, go into all these details with the French Minister. He remarked that the military authorities' right to try foreigners or foreign protégés was "discutable." That right had been exercised without objection at Casa Blanca (? or Shawia), and so perhaps I might get instructions about it. But as regards the line followed under the circumstances, and its fairness and friendliness, he expressed hearty satisfaction.

J. M. MACLEOD.

Fez, May 13, 1912.

[22257] No. 251.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 25.)

(No. 111.)

Sir,

Tangier, May 19, 1912.

HIS Majesty's consul at Fez reports that things continued quiet in the town as also to the north and west.

In the Seefroo district and to the east and south-east the tribes continue to hold meetings to discuss the advisability of attacking the French troops at Fez. Their attitude has been stiffened by the reports of the doings of the French at Fez, and particularly by the demand made by the French military authorities for the Sheraga tribe to surrender their arms, which demand the Sheraga have refused to accede to. They urge with a great deal of reason that they cannot give up their arms so long as the French have made no provision for protecting them against their neighbours, especially the tribes to the north and east who have never submitted to the rule of the Makhzen.

Dr. Verdon writes: "The tribes to the east are much excited at the shooting of Mussulmans by the French and the disarming of the townspeople at Fez. Emissaries are going about to the different tribes calling upon the people to fight the French, and telling them that it is preferable to die fighting than to be shot like dogs by the French."

Altogether the situation is far from pleasant, and the French force at Fez is far too small for the moment to admit of any offensive operations on a large scale being undertaken: their time will be taken up repelling attacks, against which all sorts of precautions are being taken.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

[22378] No. 252.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 25.)

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Madrid, May 25, 1912.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs showed me to-day a telegram he had sent to Spanish Ambassador at London directing him to submit to you further proposal to the effect that mixed court of commission should fix frontier in Warga district, line being drawn along heights overlooking right bank in such a way as to safeguard necessary [? line of] Spanish military communications. French Ambassador agrees with me in thinking that this proposal would be acceptable if it were not accompanied by conditions which French Government would certainly reject.

I again reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs that you regarded your last proposal as final, but, as French Ambassador approves this new version in principle, it is possible that French Government might be willing to consider it.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[22620] No. 253.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 117.)

Tangier, May 21, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 60 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, as pointed out by Mr. White in his despatch No. 67 of the 28th March, the acceptance of the principle that the customs dues should accrue to the zone from which articles of export originally came or to which those of import are destined would very injuriously affect the position of Tangier from the financial point of view, and I venture to submit that it is undesirable that this principle should be applied. It appears to me that it might be opposed on the grounds that (1) it would be subversive of the theory that Morocco is to remain one State under the sovereignty of the Sultan, and that it is merely in its administration that His Majesty is to be assisted by France, Spain, and the Tangier municipality; (2) that it would be difficult to put it into practice in a satisfactory manner.

Amongst some of the disadvantages under the second head I would mention the following:—

It would often be impossible, in the case of imports, for customs officials at the ports to know whether goods landed are for consumption in the zone in which that port is situated or to be forwarded to a different zone, the declaration of the consignee being the only guide. In order to provide against fraud it would be necessary either to establish a system of refunds or else one of sealing the packages. In the latter case there must be contrôle officers at the zone frontiers to verify the passage of the goods with seals intact. This would necessitate the employment of a large number of customs officials on the inland frontier as well as at the ports, and would entail considerable additional expense. In the case of exports, the question would arise as to which zone should receive the duty on goods which have remained some time at the port before shipment. As an example, I may cite the case of cattle brought to Tangier from the south. They come from the French zone, pass through the Spanish zone, and then frequently remain a certain time in the Tangier zone to recover from the journey and to be fattened up before shipment: which zone is to benefit from the duty paid thereon? Similarly, confusion would arise in the case of goods purchased little by little from different quarters and subsequently shipped.

Merchants would incur additional expense and inconvenience as well as loss of time. Goods for Fez, for instance, would have to pass the custom-house at the port as at present, and would subsequently have to pass those at the frontiers of the French and Spanish zones, at each of which there will be some formalities to fulfil, probably on both sides of each frontier, to verify exit from one zone as well as entry into the other. The merchant would have to be represented by an agent at any rate at the frontier of the zone for which the goods are destined, to be present at the examination of the goods, the assessment of duty, and their repacking. Possibly, to avoid the great inconvenience and loss of time that would be involved by the unpacking of the goods whilst *en route*, arrangements may be made for the goods being dutied at destination, but even in that case the passage of the goods would have to be verified at each frontier.

It must be borne in mind that no railways at present exist in this country and all goods are sent up country by pack animals. Unless, therefore, customs guards travel with each consignment it would be difficult to prevent contraband except by a system of deposits at each zonal frontier and refund on proof of exit.

On the other hand, I cannot see that any advantage whatever would be derived by Tangier from the acceptance of this principle. Once the lien upon the customs of the bondholders of the Franco-Moorish loans has been removed, the French right of control would *ipso facto* lapse and the municipality would be entitled itself to assume the complete and unfettered control of the customs.

In previous despatches I have drawn your very serious attention to the fact that, in my opinion, one of the greatest difficulties which we shall have to contend against in an internationalised Tangier, will be that of lack of funds; if now by far the larger part of the yield of the customs at Tangier is to be taken away, the situation will become by so much the more serious. It must be remembered that although 95 per cent. of the customs revenues are pledged to the service of the loans, the whole of that amount is not required and the surplus falls to the Moorish Government. This surplus is of course steadily increasing as the trade of the country grows.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

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[22799]

No. 254.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 28.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tangier, May 28, 1912.

MY despatch No. 99 of 11th May: Lighter shelter at Casa Blanca.

At a meeting of Public Works Committee held on 21st May it was unanimously decided, on the recommendation of the State engineer, to offer following three works to *marché de gré à gré*:—

1. Construction of connecting viaduct.
2. Removal of rocks which at present prevent access to existing quay.
3. Construction of small jetty at Sidi Biliout.

Estimated total cost, 2,314*l*.

They are doubtless urgently required, all the more so as State engineer declared definitely that new lighter shelter could not now possibly be ready before next summer.

Contract for first section of jetty was signed by agents of Creuzot and Compagnie Marocaine with representative of Public Works Department on 6th May, and the 100 days which we are now told are to be allowed for completion of work run from then, taking us on to 15th August.

According to State engineer work will become impossible after 15th September, consequently practically no work can be done this year on the second section.

As at present arranged, adjudication of second section was to take place on 20th June, His Majesty's Government having very reluctantly agreed to this shortened term of notice, which unfavourably affects British enterprise, in view of urgency and in belief that work could be begun at once. As this is now no longer the case, I would suggest that we demand that the present adjudication should be withdrawn, and that new adjudication be held fulfilling the requirements of articles 3 and 4 of regulations. "Cahier des charges" would be printed and distributed and ample time allowed for study and preparation of tenders. Work could not now begin before [group undecypherable: ? next year], so there would be plenty of time.

This adjudication might comprise, in addition to complete lighter shelter, quays, and terreplein, as large a portion of main mole as funds will permit of.

President of Public Works Committee tells me that German delegate made a suggestion in this sense to him privately, so we should probably have their support, and also that of Dutch and other representatives.

(Very Confidential.)

"Times" correspondent informs me that in a conversation which he had with managing director of Compagnie Marocaine, the latter told him that his company was by no means anxious to undertake the work, considering plans bad and the price too low, but had been obliged to do so by the French Government, who threatened otherwise to withdraw their official support. He added that same thing had occurred at the time of original contract. He fully admitted that their work on that occasion had been bad, and did not see how it could be anything else this time. I have no means of controlling these statements.

[22415]

No. 255.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 28, 1912.

WARGA boundary.

Spanish Ambassador communicated on 24th May a proposed formula to meet suggestion made by me. The French Ambassador has also communicated a formula on the same question. In order to endeavour to reconcile the two views, please ask Minister for Foreign Affairs if he would be disposed to accept the following:—

"A Franco-Spanish technical commission, while taking as a general basis a line running from Tafrout to its intersection with the line from north to south of the 1904

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[22800] No. 255*.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, May 28, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 28th May: Casa Blanca harbour works.

Doyen has not as yet been officially informed of signature of contract, although it took place three weeks ago, and I have only ascertained it privately and with considerable difficulty. Adjudications committee, with whom final signature rests, have not yet received document. I am assured, however, by president of public works committee, that there is no doubt as to the date of 6th May.

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convention, and the principle that the tribes, riverain and non-riverain, of the Warga should not be intersected, will proceed to settle on the spot a frontier which will ensure direct military communication between the different regions of the Spanish zone in those parts."

The above has been communicated to French Embassy here.
(Repeated to Paris, No. 231.)

[22944] No. 256.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Tangier, May 29, 1912.*

YOUR despatch No. 64, only received yesterday afternoon.

Spanish proposal with regard to extent of municipal district of Tangier absolutely inadmissible. I consider we should maintain limits laid down in Mr. White's despatch No. 46 of 6th March, which evidently was the Spanish idea.

I see no objection to general line being decided upon at Madrid; line between head waters of two rivers could be settled here.

As regards second point, customs, I would repeat opinion that Tangier must be absolutely independent of Spanish influence as of French. In French zone Umama are named by Sultan, that is by the French; in the Spanish zone by khalifa selected by Spaniards, that is by the latter. I would propose that at Tangier customs officials be international. This would meet Spanish objection, as they would be able to resist undue influence of French Commission of Control, and could even exercise supervision over latter's action. By such an arrangement, moreover, it might be even possible to induce French to withdraw control from Tangier.

[22954] No. 257.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 29, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 51 of 26th May.

Resident-General reports that attack on Fez was resumed yesterday morning and lasted all day. He says that he can hold town and line of communications, but no more. He takes gloomy view.

French agent hopes that he may exaggerate on the side of pessimism; he is faced by situation for which he is in no way responsible, and in interests of his military reputation he is not likely to minimise its gravity.

[23061] No. 258.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, May 30, 1912.*

CASA BLANCA port works.

Kennard, who now represents American delegate on Public Works Committee, has received notice from State engineer proposing construction by *marché de gré à gré* of a further small terreplein in connection with three works enumerated in my telegram No. 53 of 28th May. Estimated cost, 1,600*l.*

Works to be completed in two months. He has reserved his opinion.

Work is undoubtedly urgently necessary owing to congestion of goods.

I await instructions.

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[22799] No. 259.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May* 30, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 53 of 28th May: Harbour works at Casa Blanca.

Please see my despatch No. 66 of 23rd May.

I entirely agree with your views. His Majesty's Government will consent to a *marché de gré à gré* for the three works specified in first paragraph of your telegram, and to construction of first section of jetty by Creuzot and Compagnie Marocaine provided contract is in order and contains penalty clause. But now that there is no chance of completing any further works this year they must insist on adjudication of second and third sections being withdrawn and a proper scheme being drawn up for all the works and submitted to adjudication in accordance with requirements of regulations. I authorise you to take steps to the above effect.

I am explaining matters to French Ambassador here.

[23101] No. 260.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 31.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, May* 30, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 43 of 28th May: Warga boundary.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs new proposals this morning. He was not very favourably impressed. I pointed out that proposal conceded main point demanded by Spain, namely, direct line of military communication, and I urged acceptance. His Excellency promised early reply. He also asked if I had anything further to say about Tangier, adding that Spanish Government would not sign any convention without knowing how far city area would extend. I fear that on this point it will be difficult to persuade Spanish Government to accept western portion of boundary defined in article 1 of new French draft convention respecting Tangier. French Ambassador has shown me this document, of which copy is no doubt in your possession. His Excellency is not yet instructed to join me in discussing question of Tangier with Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[23269] No. 261.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 1.)

(No. 118.)
Sir, *Tangier, May* 23, 1912.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 58 of the 14th instant in which you ask me for observations on a proposal of the Italian Ambassador that, after the Franco-Spanish Agreement respecting Morocco has been concluded, joint representations should be made to the Spanish Government with a view to the inclusion of the Spanish military *presidios* in Morocco within consular jurisdiction.

I observe that in the note of the Italian Embassy the terms "consular jurisdiction" and "consular protection" are used indiscriminately, and there appears to me a certain amount of vagueness as to the exact meaning which they wish to convey. If "consular jurisdiction," as understood in Morocco, is intended, I think we may safely assume that the Italian proposal would be met by a point blank refusal. Not only are the presidios Spanish territory in the fullest acceptance of the term, but they are also fortresses, and I cannot believe that the Spanish Government would ever agree to foreign Powers exercising consular jurisdiction within them any more than we should admit of such a thing at Gibraltar.

I cannot help thinking, however, that consular representation is what was intended by the Italian Government, in which case I consider that the proposal is an excellent one, and that we should support it as regards Melilla at all events. At the same time,

it must be borne in mind that when the question was raised at the end of last year His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid recommended that it would be wiser not to move in the matter, as the Spanish Government had only recently refused to entertain a similar request made by the French Government.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[23270] No. 262.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 1.)

(No. 119.)
Sir, *Tangier, May* 23, 1912.

I HAVE seen in the print the *note verbale* which was communicated to the Foreign Office on the 18th ultimo by the French Ambassador relative to the existing state of insecurity in Morocco, and also the reply which you addressed to M. Cambon on the 2nd instant. In this connection I was interested at some information which the German Minister gave me a few hours after I had read these papers to the effect that he had received instructions from M. de Kiderlen-Waechter to call upon the French agent and inform him that, now that the French Government had sent a resident-general to Morocco and were organising their protectorate, the German Government must hold them responsible for the protection of German subjects in Morocco. He was especially to call M. de Billy's attention to the fact that two of the Mannesmann brothers accompanied by several other Germans were at Tarudant, and impress upon him the necessity that no sort of harm should befall them. M. de Billy seems to have exclaimed, "But we can do nothing there to protect them"; to which Baron Seckendorff replied, "Yes, my dear friend, I know that, but I can hardly believe that you wish me to communicate that as your reply to my Government." I gather that some vague assurance has now been given that the French would do all in their power to ensure their security. Baron Seckendorff told me very confidentially that he believed that M. de Kiderlen-Waechter (whom he personally dislikes) intended to make himself as disagreeable as possible to the French in this and similar ways, and I imagine that it is the fear of this that prompted the French Government to make the *démarche* of the 18th April.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[23271] No. 263.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 1.)

(No. 121.)
Sir, *Tangier, May* 26, 1912.

THE news from the south still continues to be disquieting. The German Minister told me that he had had a long visit yesterday from Sid Guebbas, who was evidently in a state of considerable anxiety. There was, he had said, every reason to believe that the new Pretender, "Hiba," was marching upon Marrakesh at the head of a strong Mehallah, and that the ranks of his followers were being daily swelled. Baron Seckendorff told me that he had received a further telegram from his Government, instructing him to repeat the warning already made by him to the French agent, that the German Government would hold the French authorities responsible for the lives and security of German subjects in Morocco.

If the Pretender is really marching northwards, the Mannesmann brothers and the Germans with them are no doubt in a very precarious position at Tarudant. If any harm were to befall them, a very disagreeable situation would be created for the French Government, who must begin to regret the insensate haste with which they have imposed the protectorate with all its attendant obligations.

Baron Seckendorff told me that it was perfectly true that Hiba had German protection, but added that it had now been withdrawn, and that an assurance to that effect had been given to M. Poincaré by the German Ambassador in Paris.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[23272] No. 264.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 122.)

Sir, *Tangier, May 26, 1912.*

THE attack by French troops on the farm belonging to M. Renchausen near Laraiche, to which reference was made in Sir E. Goschen's despatch No. 228 of the 11th instant, still continues to form the subject of negotiation between the German Legation and the French agency here. The German Minister tells me that the whole thing is the result of jealousy and spite on the part of a French semsar, El Bo, who possesses great influence with the French military authorities in the neighbourhood, against the German semsar in charge of the farm in question. In order to wreak his personal vengeance, El Bo produced a number of trumped up charges against him, and finally succeeded in inducing Captain Vary to attack the farm and seize the native employés. The French version is perfectly different, and Baron Seckendorff has now proposed to his Government and M. de Billy that a joint commission, consisting of the French and German consular officers at Laraiche, should be appointed to enquire into the matter. M. de Billy, however, has raised objections to the German vice-consul, on the ground that he is at the same time Renchausen's agent. Baron Seckendorff has referred this objection to his Government, and has proposed to send in his place a member of the dragomanate of Tangier to Laraiche.

M. de Billy tells me that he considers that the question of the other German semsar who was arrested, and has subsequently been released by the orders of General Lyautey, is far more serious. He tells me that, from the reports which he has received, there is no doubt that this man and his employer, Zimmermann by name, intervened to prevent the arrest of two deserters by the French military authorities. The sheikh of the village had been quite prepared to give them up, but the German semsar had intervened forcibly, and the deserters were enabled to effect their escape. M. de Billy tells me that he has reported the whole matter very fully to his Government, and has suggested that the Makhzen should lodge a formal complaint against the German and his semsar at the German Legation. I have asked Mr. Forde for full reports on these two matters, as the versions given by the French and German Legations are so conflicting that it is impossible to arrive at the truth.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

P.S.—I have subsequently heard that the French military authorities have arrested eight Spanish semsars, and that the Spanish Minister has protested very strongly.

R. L.

[23230] No. 265.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, May 31, 1912.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 30th May.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is instructing Spanish Ambassador in London to submit to you a text which combines your last two proposals and which the Spanish Government would be prepared to accept on the understanding that France will concede a reasonable radius to Ifni, besides giving a favourable reception to certain financial proposals concerning Spanish zone which Spanish Ambassador will be instructed to make to French Prime Minister.

French Ambassador is fairly well satisfied with this answer, and hopes that his Government will favourably consider conditions attached to it.

The financial proposals in question are to the effect that proposed line of custom-houses between the two zones should be abandoned, each zone benefiting by receipts of its own custom-houses, and also that Spain be relieved of all liability in respect of certain annual payments due to Makhzen.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[23913] No. 266.

Note communicated by Señor de Villa Urrutia, June 3, 1912.

(Translation.)

TAKING as general basis a line which, starting from the Jebel Beni Hassan (peak of Akberelkadi) continues towards the Warga, meets it north of Tapaut above the curve formed by the river, and proceeds from that point westwards along the chain of heights overlooking the right bank of the Warga till it intersects the line from north to south defined in the second article of the convention of 1904; and the principle that in this part of its course the frontier shall follow as closely as possible the northern boundary of the riverain tribes of the Warga and the southern boundary of the non-riverain tribes, a Franco-Spanish technical commission shall fix in that territory a frontier which assures direct military communication between the different regions of the Spanish zone in that district.

Spanish Embassy, London,
June 3, 1912.

[23691] No. 267.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, June 2, 1912.*

CASA BLANCA lighter shelter.

I have addressed note to doyen in accordance with instructions in your telegram No. 21 of 30th May. Netherlands Minister, in circulating it, expressed concurrence in view; also German and Spanish representatives, to whom it went first.

It then went to French agent, who called to see me yesterday in a state of considerable excitement. He takes line that adjudication, having been agreed to by representatives and published in due form, cannot now be withdrawn. I replied that on former occasion term of adjudication had been altered after publication without any difficulty being raised. He said that he must refer question to his Government. He added that technical objections would be very great, and asked me to see State engineer. This having been done, latter maintains that situation is practically unaltered, as [? contractor] for second lot would take six weeks to purchase plant and collect material, consequently he could not in any case commence work till 15th August. It is, in his opinion, most important for protection of jetty in construction that mole should be prolonged as far as possible, and that heavy blocks provided for in second lot should be placed at end of jetty where it is most vulnerable. Contrary to what he stated in his note to Mr. White when pleading urgency (see Mr. White's despatch No. 61 of 23rd March), he now declares that work could be pushed on during spells of calm weather in winter. He urges that abandonment would almost certainly entail destruction of first lot. (End of R.)

These arguments would be cogent if sufficient time is [group omitted]—ed for any considerable prolongation of mole, but this I doubt, notwithstanding statements of State engineer, whose opinions tend to change according to object he has in view. I hear privately that Morocco Company will certainly not have finished by 15th August. Confusion arising from simultaneous existence of two workshops on mole will cause further delay. Titans cannot work in two places at once, and I believe little extra protection can be provided before storms. I cannot control State engineer's technical arguments, but some point to fact that he has not been quite truthful, and this renders me sceptical. On the other hand, I understand general impression prevails that in any case jetty will be carried away, and if we have caused interruption of work, of the danger of which he has warned us, we may be sure he and the French will take care all the odium falls upon us. In any case should His Majesty's Government in view of above allow adjudication I consider very good effect will have been produced, as French here are thoroughly frightened, and we may hope for fairer treatment in future. I believe we have the large majority of foreign representatives with us.

French agent's annotation is to the effect that he is referring home question power of withdrawal of adjudication, and that he thinks State engineer's opinion should be asked on variety of technical points.

[22215] No. 268.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, June 3, 1912.*

FRENCH Government propose that Tangier municipality scheme should be discussed at Madrid between representatives of the British and French Embassies and Spanish Foreign Office. I am informing French Government that I agree, and that instructions will shortly be sent to you.

Until receipt of such instructions you should abstain from any discussion, though you will be aware of our views as expressed in the memorandum communicated to M. Cambon on 2nd May.

[23771] No. 269.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 78.)
Sir, *Madrid, June 1, 1912.*

I HAD the honour to report in my telegram No. 44 of yesterday that the Spanish Government had drawn up, for submission to you by the Spanish Ambassador in London, a text for the delimitation of the Ouergha region, which is founded upon your last two proposals as embodied in your telegrams No. 40 of the 14th ultimo and No. 43 of the 28th ultimo. The boundary is to be traced on the spot by a technical Franco-Spanish Commission on the basis of a line drawn from Jebel Beni Hassan to cut the Ouergha at a point lying to the north of Tafraut and above the curve formed by the river, and following thence along the chain of heights overlooking the right bank of the river till it reaches the north and south line of the 1904 Convention. The commission will also be guided by the principle that the frontier shall follow as closely as possible the northern limit of the territory occupied by the riverain tribes, and the southern limit of that which is occupied by the non-riverain tribes. Moreover, the commission shall draw the line in such a way as to secure to Spain direct military communication between the different regions of her zone in those parts.

How far it may be possible for the mixed commission to harmonise eventually these various requirements, it would be rash at present to forecast. It will be sufficient for the moment if a formula like the above can secure acceptance in order that the negotiation, which has so long been in abeyance in consequence of the French demand for the Ouergha valley, may at length be proceeded with, and brought, it may be hoped, to a speedy conclusion.

For their part, the Spanish Government will accept the formula on the understanding that France will endeavour to meet their wishes on two points.

The first relates to the delimitation of Ifni, which will remain as a Spanish enclave in the Atlantic coast line of the French protectorate. In the month of December last the French Ambassador proposed that Ifni should embrace a strip of coast of some 50 kilom. in length, extending from Wady Bu Sedra in the north to Wady Arksis in the south. When the French demand for the entire valley of the Ouergha was first put forward, M. Geoffray was authorised to offer in exchange an extension of the southern boundary of Ifni some 20 kilom. further, namely, as far as Wady Noun (not to be confounded with Cape Noun, lying some distance further south). In view, however, of the reluctance of Spain to concede the above demand, his Excellency informed the Spanish Government that Ifni would be regarded by France as extending merely from Wady Sedra in the north to Wady Ouerzeg in the south, a coast line of some 40 kilom.

The interior boundary has been variously defined by the French Ambassador as extending (December 1911) to the upper course of the rivers Moul-el-Achar and Asif-n-baga or Ifni; (March 1911) to the watershed between the latter river and other rivers situated further inland; and (April 1912) to a distance of 20 kilom. from the coast. Ifni, in short, has expanded and shrunk according to the more or less favourable nature of the Spanish offers from time to time. Señor Garcia Prieto had the goodness to give me yesterday a copy of a memorandum sent by him a few days ago to M. Geoffray, defining as follows the fair limits of Ifni, as now conceived by the Spanish Government: Northern boundary, Wady Mireleft (or Igueder); eastern boundary, the meridian of the source of the Mireleft (or Igueder); southern boundary,

Wady Saiad (identical, apparently, with Wady Noun). The coast line would be about 90 kilom. in length, and the depth of the hinterland from 40 to 70 kilom. from the coast inwards. The memorandum contends that the various French definitions of the area of Ifni leave too little space for the development of a piece of territory cut off from all communication by land with the Spanish southern zone, which is to commence at Wady Dra.

M. Geoffray seems to think that the precise extent of Ifni is a matter of very little consequence to France, and that a compromise should easily be found between her previous demands and those now advanced by Spain.

The second point on which Spain hopes to receive satisfaction, in return for her acceptance of the formula now proposed in respect of the Ouergha, relates to certain financial matters, which, I understand, have already formed the subject of discussion between the French Prime Minister and the Spanish Ambassador in Paris. The most important of these is the question of the customs receipts at Tetuan and Laraiche. The French members of the Mixed Financial Commission which dealt with this question pressed for the acceptance of the principle that each zone should profit by the import duty paid on goods destined for consumption within its respective limits. To apply this principle, it appeared to them necessary to establish a line of control between the two zones. Goods imported, for instance, at Laraiche and consigned onwards by overland route to Fez, would pay nothing till they reached the frontier line of control, where the duty would be levied by the French officers of customs. This arrangement would be only very reluctantly accepted by Spain. It is thought here that it would give rise to endless confusion and misunderstandings. There would be great difficulty in convoying the goods overland, and it would be found they would often be disposed of before they ever reached the frontier. A paradise, in short, would be created for the smuggler. The Spanish Government hope to be able to induce M. Poincaré to give directions to the French commissioners which will enable them to accept the more simple method of each maritime custom-house levying duties on all goods which pass through it, the said duties accruing to the benefit of the zone in which the custom-house is placed. M. Geoffray is himself in favour of this plan being adopted. Meanwhile, the French commissioners have not yet returned to Madrid from their Easter holidays.

A further financial advantage which the Spanish Government hope to secure is exemption from liability in respect of certain annual payments due to the Makhzen. The particulars have not been explained to me.

Assuming an understanding on these points, there still remain several questions requiring settlement before the desired convention could be signed. There is no agreement as yet as to the frontier between the French and Spanish zones in the region of the Lucus. According to the 1904 Convention, it was to run as directly as possible to the sea from a point on the river lying 5 kilom. below the point at which the river is crossed by the road from Fez to Alcazar, viâ Wazan. Confusion arises from the alleged fact that there are two roads which would answer this description, and that they cross the Lucas at points some kilometres apart. The precise boundary depends, therefore, on which passage of the river is the one contemplated by the convention. France claims the lower and Spain the upper passage. Between the French and Spanish conventional lines from the river to the sea lies a tract of country which is now occupied by two French military outposts. Moreover, France has lately suggested that the 35th parallel of north latitude should be regarded as the frontier. There are thus three separate frontier lines under discussion.

Several articles of the draft convention still present points in dispute between the two parties. I may mention the question of the manner in which the selection and nomination of the Khalifa for the Spanish zone is to be made. There is also the question of the privileges of the Franciscan order of monks, and that of the Spanish religious protectorate in Morocco. Moreover, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has repeatedly assured me that it will be impossible for him to sign the convention unless it contains an article giving satisfaction to Spain on the question of the area of the proposed international municipality of Tangier.

With a reasonable amount of good will on both sides, it should not be difficult to arrive at a fair solution of all these questions without much further loss of time.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[24302] No. 270.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Tangier, June 7, 1912.*

SULTAN left Fez for Rabat yesterday with strong escort under General Gouraud. He was accompanied by Regnault, who is coming to Tangier.

[23691] No. 271.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 60 of 2nd June: Casa Blanca port works.

The constantly shifting views and proceedings of the French authorities place us in an impossible position. I am not prepared to modify the instructions contained in my telegram No. 21 of 30th May if nothing more substantial and more satisfactory is urged against them than the statements of M. Porche's and of French chargé d'affaires, who have been shown in the past to be quite unreliable in regard to this question. I shall await the result of the reference which has been made to Paris before considering the matter further.

It would seem clearly desirable that some authoritative and unbiassed technical opinion be furnished by someone other than State engineer, to whose opinion it seems difficult to attach any weight.

[23061] No. 272.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 7, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 57 of 30th May: Casa Blanca port works.

As we have agreed to the other three works, we must agree to this also in view of your opinion that it is urgently necessary. But before doing so please make certain that there will be no further proposals of this kind.

[24355] No. 273.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 128.)
Sir, *Tangier, June 1, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Mr. Harris, a member of the English group in the Société marocaine des Travaux publics, informed me that M. de Caqueray, one of the directors of that company, had told him that he and his colleagues on the board fully realised that, unless arrangements were made for a larger British participation in the society, they would meet with continued opposition from His Majesty's Government and would be unable to effect anything. Mr. Harris handed to me a memorandum on the subject, copy of which I beg to transmit herewith.

I told Mr. Harris that he could let M. de Caqueray know that his society could expect no support from this legation unless the British participation were very largely increased, or unless some arrangement were come to formally binding the society to purchase in the United Kingdom a definitely fixed proportion of material required for public works in this country. I explained at the same time to Mr. Harris that in any case the support of His Majesty's Government would only be given so far as it could be done whilst fully maintaining the principle of economic and commercial equality of all.

Mr. Harris said he had already impressed that upon M. de Caqueray, and told him that he himself, though a shareholder in the society, would, as correspondent of the "Times," oppose the society if an attempt were made to favour it to the exclusion of British enterprise. M. de Caqueray had replied, however, that the Sultan was free to grant concessions for the working of railways, ports, &c., as His Majesty thought fit, and that if the Société marocaine des Travaux publics, in which, after all, British

[24301] No. 272*.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 7, 1912.*

FRENCH Ambassador informs me that French Minister for Foreign Affairs will accept last Spanish formula about Warga boundary with no other modification except substitution of "non-interrompue" for "directe" communication. It is thought that "directe" might be held to imply an absolutely straight line. I think this should be satisfactory on this point, and you may say so when necessary.

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capital was represented, were prevented from acquiring such concessions through the opposition of His Majesty's Government, the only result would be that those concessions would be granted to purely French companies.

I suggested to Mr. Harris that he might draw M. de Caqueray's attention to articles 106 and 107 of the Algeciras Act, wherein it is provided that such concessions shall be "subject to the principles of public awards on tenders without respect of nationalities," as it could hardly be argued that "the rules observed under the laws of foreign countries" did not admit of the application of that principle in such cases.

It appears to me that the most important point to secure is that British enterprise should get its fair share of the work of construction, and that a fair proportion of the material required should be purchased in England. This could perhaps be better secured by a formal engagement to that effect being entered into by the Société marocaine des Travaux publics than by a mere increase of the capital of the society. So far as I can understand, the society does not propose to construct public works, but to sublet its contracts to other companies, and in that case it would be able to select English companies for the work.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 273.

Memorandum by Mr. Harris respecting the Société marocaine des Travaux publics.

IN the course of a conversation with M. de Caqueray, a director of the Société marocaine de Travaux publics, the question of the insufficiency of the British participation in that concern was discussed.

M. de Caqueray stated that when the société was founded by the Crédit foncier d'Algérie et de Tunisie, these gentlemen considered that England, having obtained privileges in Egypt, should be satisfied with a small participation, and this policy unfortunately took effect before a larger spirit could be introduced into the affairs of the société.

The opposition, or rather the refusal of the British Government to grant its official support, made the officials of the société realise their mistake, which, presumably, has never been rectified, in spite of proposals and promises from Paris.

M. de Caqueray, together with, he believes, a majority of the directors, are in favour of granting every possible satisfaction to England in this matter, but it is very doubtful if any redistribution of the original shares could be arranged. M. de Caqueray is prepared to lay another scheme before his co-directors, should such be acceptable to the British Government, namely, that the existing participations should remain for the original shares in the société, but that for each separate undertaking sub-companies should be formed in which the various participations could be arranged by negotiation. For instance, should the eventual "exploitation" of the Tangier port be granted to the société, after a course of adjudication had been resorted to for its construction, the British participation should be materially increased in this Tangier "filiale," and the same for the railway. Whether the British Government is willing to consider this proposition or not, it would appear necessary to resort to it in the case of works undertaken in the Spanish zone, where no doubt the Spanish participation would have to be materially increased. I judge from M. de Caqueray—and I did nothing to dispel this impression—that the directors of the société are anxious as to the intentions of the British Government in the future, and that some sort of compromise would be willingly accepted by them. Whether a compromise in the form proposed by M. de Caqueray, taken in conjunction with the previous proposal of the société—to purchase more material in England—is possible, I am not in a position to judge. In any case, great care would have to be taken in drawing up a new agreement to guarantee that in no case should the British participation in any of the sub-companies fall below a certain minimum, this minimum to be agreed upon by the British Government.

W. B. HARRIS.

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[24356] No. 274.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 8.)

(No. 129. Confidential.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 2, 1912.

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 60 of to-day's date, the State engineer came to see me yesterday in order to explain to me what he considered the technical objections to the proposal of His Majesty's Government that the adjudication for the second lot of the works at Casablance to be held on the 25th instant be withdrawn, and that a larger scheme, which would comprise all the works necessary for providing a real shelter for lighters, should be at once drawn up and submitted to adjudication in conformity with the regulations and with full limit of time. I stated briefly in my above-mentioned telegram M. Porché's principal arguments, but I now transmit copy of a note on the subject which he addressed to me at my request. M. Porché spoke with considerable bitterness, and signs of this are to be seen in the note in question.

His remark with regard to His Majesty's Government's action being taken on account of a delay of fifteen days is, I think, almost impertinent, considering that they signified their acceptance of the "marché de gré à gré" on the 23rd March. Moreover, he knows perfectly well that the delay has been going on owing to the muddles (to call them by the kindest name) in his department ever since the middle of December, when a scheme which he has since characterised as preposterous was submitted to the approval of the Committee of Public Works, with the request that, in view of its urgency, permission might be given for its execution by a "marché de gré à gré." I taxed him with this, and asked him how it ever came about that a scheme which he practically disowned only a fortnight later was ever submitted. It was then that he told me a deliberate falsehood, viz., that he had never seen the scheme at all, and that the whole thing had been drawn up and put forward by the Spanish second State engineer, M. Llorens, with the assistance of a Public Works engineer at Casablanca, Philippeau by name. I know for a fact that the scheme which was certainly drawn up by M. Philippeau was forwarded to Paris for M. Porché's approval; that he never really liked it, but that he reluctantly adopted it, and gave instructions for its being put forward at Tangier. It is this falsehood and the way in which his opinions change, according to the object which he has in view, which make me so sceptical now as regards all his statements.

I do not myself believe that sufficient work can be done on the second lot, above all, on the mole, to afford protection to the new jetty which is being built by the Compagnie marocaine before the commencement of the stormy season. I also hear that the latter speak openly of not finishing their section until the middle of September, and the Dutch Minister tells me that they have allowed for thirty days' penalties at 500 fr. (20*l.*) a-day, viz., 15,000 fr. (600*l.*), in the price of their contract. They therefore are in no hurry. M. Porché had to admit that he could not be certain of the work being finished by the end of the 100 days; also that the existence of two workshops would create confusion, and that the cranes could not work upon the jetty and the mole at the same time. He got very much irritated when I held him to the date of the 15th September; that date, he said, was only approximate, and very possibly a great deal of work could be done later. I replied that it was he who had selected the date, having stated in a note to Mr. White, when pleading urgency, that "one could not expect to work in the sea at Casablanca after the 15th September." I pointed out to him that the only work which could provide shelter to the jetty, &c., which was the essential object, was work in the sea.

In the course of our conversation, M. Porché said that what was specially important was to add a few of the very large blocks of masonry provided for in the second lot to the first section of the jetty, which was being built of smaller ones, and thus enable its end, which was its most vulnerable point, to resist the attacks of the sea. Mr. White, who was present at our interview, suggested that the Public Works Department themselves might make the few blocks which were required for this purpose, or, at all events, come to an arrangement by which they might be provided. M Porché seemed rather staggered at this, and tried to dismiss the idea as unpracticable, though he could not produce any forcible argument against it.

What, no doubt, adds to the difficulty of the present situation is, that I have found out in the last few days that the general impression at Casablanca and here

(M. Luret told Mr. White so very confidentially) is that the works will, in any case, all be carried away this winter; if this does take place, and if, as stated in my above-mentioned telegram, we are the cause of the interruption of the work, of the danger of which M. Porché has now warned us, he and the French will undoubtedly take care that all the odium falls upon us. Our position then would be a very unpleasant one, as we should have to meet the outcry of our merchants and shipowners, although I am convinced that in the long run a very much more satisfactory job could be made if the temporary tinkering could be stopped and the whole work undertaken and executed next year by one first-class firm.

There is no doubt that the general impression amongst the foreign representatives here is that the whole thing has been scandalously mismanaged, and there is a considerable feeling against the French. The Dutch Minister, in his covering letter to circulate my note, expressed his concurrence with the view of His Majesty's Government, and proposed to write to the president of the Adjudications Committee in that sense. The German and Spanish Ministers, to whom the circular went first, both agreed. The circular then reached the French agency, and M. de Billy has written the following annotation:—

"Je ne crois pas que le règlement sur les adjudications ait prévu une procédure pour l'annulation d'une décision régulièrement prise, et je ne puis que solliciter les instructions de mon Gouvernement à ce sujet. D'autre part, je suis d'avis qu'au point de vue téchnique il convient de demander à M. Porché: (1) Si les travaux ne peuvent commencer avant le 15 août; (2) S'ils doivent forcément être interrompus le 15 septembre; (3) Si les travaux nouveaux n'ont pas été prévus comme consolidation des anciens et si l'interruption des travaux pendant l'hiver n'aurait pas pour conséquent la ruine de ce qui a déjà été fait."

I imagine now that a meeting will be called at which M. Porché will be heard. It will, of course, be difficult for me to meet technical arguments which may influence my colleagues to maintain the present arrangement.

I cannot help feeling sorry for M. Porché. I believe that he is at heart an honest man, but has been obliged to resort to all sorts of questionable manœuvres to secure the work for a French firm, in order to carry out the instructions of his Government. Moreover, he has been the victim of circumstances. He was, in the beginning, very much understaffed; his second, the Spaniard, Llorens, was appointed for political reasons and does not enjoy his confidence in technical matters, and he has been detained months in Paris for the convenience of the French Government at times when his presence was urgently needed at Tangier.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 274.

M. Porché to Sir R. Lister.

M. le Ministre, *Tanger, le* 1er *juin*, 1912.

CONFORMÉMENT à votre demande, j'ai l'honneur de résumer et préciser ci-après les renseignements que je vous ai donnés ce matin, concernant le second lot de travaux, à exécuter au port de Casablanca, et dont l'adjudication est prévue pour le 25 juin, 1912.

Ce second lot comprend:

1. L'achèvement de l'abri à barcasses dont, d'accord avec le corps diplomatique, un premier lot a fait l'objet d'un marché de gré à gré;
2. La défense et le prolongement sur une certaine longueur de la grande jetée.

Vous avez bien voulu m'indiquer que, en présence du retard (d'une quinzaine de jours environ) qui résultera, pour l'achèvement des travaux du premier lot, de la substitution de la Compagnie marocaine et de MM. Schneider et Cie. à M. l'Entrepreneur Jammy, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique faisait observer qu'il resterait à l'entreprise du second lot avant l'hiver, un délai trop court pour faire œuvre utile; qu'en conséquence il semblait y avoir lieu de revenir sur la décision du corps diplomatique concernant l'adjudication du second lot au 25 juin et de préparer une nouvelle adjudication, avec délai de publicité de 100 jours.

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Contrairement à ce qui apparait au premier abord, le retard survenu dans les travaux du premier lot n'est pas de nature à influer, pratiquement, sur la marche des travaux du second lot.

En effet, l'achèvement des travaux du premier lot est, suivant les conditions de la soumission, prévu maintenant pour le 15 août, 1912.

Le résultat définitif de l'adjudication du second lot ne sera probablement acquis avant le 1er juillet, 1912.

Les six semaines qui s'écouleront entre ces deux dates devront être employées par l'adjudicataire du second lot :

A passer ses commandes de chaux et ciment (vous n'ignorez pas que l'arrivée de ces commandes demande plusieurs semaines) ;

A constituer son matériel et le transporter à Casablanca ;

A commencer à l'extrémité de la grande jetée, c'est-à-dire à une distance d'une centaine de mètres du chantier du premier lot, la construction des gros blocs en béton qui devront être placés comme défense de cette jetée au début de l'hiver.

Or, le délai de six semaines est à peine suffisant pour les commandes et travaux préparatoires, en sorte que, même si l'entreprise du premier lot avait pu être terminée avant le 15 août (et rien n'indique qu'elle ne sera pas terminée avant cette date, en raison des primes accordées en cas d'avance) l'entreprise du second lot n'aurait pu activer davantage ses travaux ; la marche du second lot est commandée la date de son adjudication (qui n'a pu être fixée qu'au 25 juin en application des règlements), et non pour l'achèvement du premier lot.

Le retard signalé ne semble donc pas constituer un fait nouveau, de nature à faire revenir le corps diplomatique sur les dispositions qu'il a approuvées et qui comportaient déjà, *ipso facto*, les conséquences que je viens de signaler.

Lorsque la première entreprise sera achevée, la seconde sera seulement en mesure de prendre la suite en marche normale.

D'autre part, il y a le plus grand intérêt à ce que les travaux du second lot succèdent sans interruption à ceux du premier.

D'abord, pour ne pas laisser l'épi de l'abri en construction à la merci des tempêtes d'hiver ; cet épi sera, en effet, constitué, sur les 100 premiers mètres (premier lot) par des blocs de 22 tonnes seulement, sa continuation (second lot) est prévu en caissons en béton armé pesant plusieurs centaines de tonnes, et il est nécessaire qu'avant les tempêtes d'hiver, c'est-à-dire aussitôt après l'achèvement du premier lot, on puisse placer plusieurs de ces caissons au bout de l'épi en construction, de manière à offrir à l'extrémité, toujours plus exposé que le corps de l'ouvrage, une résistance que ne présenteraient pas les blocs de 22 tonnes.

Ensuite, les travaux de protection de la grande jetée font partie du second lot, et il est indispénsable, pour éviter la ruine de l'ouvrage, d'exécuter des travaux avant les tempêtes d'hiver.

Si on annulait les dispositions prises pour l'adjudication du second lot, celle-ci ne pourrait avoir lieu avant fin septembre au plus tôt, les chantiers ne seraient organisés que vers le milieu de novembre. Par conséquent, pendant trois mois au moins (15 août—15 novembre) à l'approche et au cours de la mauvaise saison, les travaux en cours seraient abandonnés ; cet abandon serait très dangereux pour leur conservation.

Enfin, contrairement à ce qu'on semble supposer, l'entreprise du second lot ne sera pas arrêtée complètement à partir du 15 septembre ; les tempêtes ne sévissent pas toujours à partir de cette date, et en tous cas elles ne sont pas continues : le cahier des charges prévoit que l'entrepreneur devra pousser les travaux tous les jours où l'état de la mer le permettra ; sans doute avancera-t-il moins vite en hiver qu'en été, mais il avancera, cependant, et ainsi il pourra terminer au cours de l'été 1913, c'est-à-dire pour la campagne des céréales—ce qui serait impossible si l'adjudication était reculée.

Telles sont les considérations pratiques pouvant entrer en ligne de compte pour la décision à prendre.

Veuillez, &c.
PORCHÉ.

[24359]

No. 275.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 8.*)

(No. 132.)
Tangier, June 3, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of despatches I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez, reporting an interview which he has had with General Lyautey. It is a relief to hear that the official in charge of French policy in this country has formed so wise an estimate of the situation, and it is to be hoped that he is not too late to repair the serious errors which have been committed.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 275

Consul MacLeod to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 45.)
Fez, May 27, 1912.

Sir,

THE French losses in the fighting of yesterday were some 40 killed and upwards of 80 wounded. The enemy's losses are not known for certain, but they are perhaps 200 to 300 of killed and wounded.

The rebels who entered the city proceeded to the tomb of Mulai Dris and took away the sacred banner of that Saint. The general impression is that this will be regarded as a great feat of arms and will incite all the tribes to immediate and stronger efforts against the French, which for the number of French troops yet here may be most difficult to deal with.

In the meantime, all native news from the country is to the effect that further attacks on the place are imminent, and that there might possibly be one to-night.

I have had to-day a discussion of the situation with the Spanish consul, and (as I now happen to be the " doyen " of the consuls here) he agreed with me in thinking it would be useful to have a meeting of the consuls to discuss the situation as regards our respective colonies and interests. To discuss this, however, it seems essential to know what steps the French propose to take, or can take, and so I am, beforehand, going to see General Lyautey on this subject.

My despatch of yesterday needs correction in some minor details, but I cannot make these before to-day's post leaves, except to mention that the troops who cleared away the insurgents were not reinforcements from Mequinez, but were those brought by General Lyautey when he came.

So far as I have yet heard, the total troops available here number about 6,000.

In the meantime the townspeople, disarmed as they are, remain in the greatest state of fear, on the one side of the entry of the insurgents and on the other of the bombarding of the town should insurgents (as happened yesterday) effect an entry, which is natural enough, as, in the shelling yesterday, many inoffensive persons' houses were struck and their occupants killed or injured.

I have, &c.
J. M. MACLEOD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 275.

Consul MacLeod to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 46. Confidential.)
Fez, May 27, 1912.

Sir,

REFERRING to my despatch No. 45 of to-day, I have the honour to report that I visited General Lyautey this morning.

2. I explained that by M. Gaillard's having been called to other duties I was the senior consul here, and I was assembling the consuls to discuss the situation as regards the safety of our respective compatriots, and for such a discussion it would be of essential value to me to have his views and—without in any way meaning to ask for military information of a nature undesirable to communicate—to learn what steps were in contemplation.

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3. General Lyautey said that he was most glad I had come to see him. He was desirous to get all information from everyone here—foreign and native as well as French—and would take it as a kindness if I would always let them know either what I heard or what I thought of events here. There had been, and for many months, most serious errors made, and, if not too late, he was come to repair them as thoroughly as he could.

4. Amongst the errors a huge one was the isolation of the native authorities of all ranks from the people and the attempted substitution of direct French authority. The native functionaries had been left nothing to do and made ridiculous, and the methods and ideas of the French officials were incomprehensible to the people. All this was not "protectorate" policy at all. I would understand him at once when he added that his ideas of a protectorate were the English ones which he had studied minutely in many parts of the world, and which worked so well.

5. The situation here was so very bad there was no time to lose, and so he had that day told the "Bureau des Renseignements" that they must limit themselves instantly to their proper functions of collecting information, and to see to it that Moorish officials did their proper duties by themselves, and, since time pressed, he had told them that each Moorish official here must be at his duties as formerly within 24 hours, the court functionaries for instance assembling daily and doing their work by themselves. Not only this, but the greatest possible publicity must instantly be given to his wishes, and in that connection he would be much obliged if I would at once tell all Europeans and Moors known to me of it, which, of course, I said I would do with great pleasure.

6. Proceeding, General Lyautey said another large mistake had been these courts-martial and executions. Frankly, had he been here when the Fez outburst occurred, he would have shot right away all the known guilty parties he could catch, have kept friends with the loyal elements, soldiers as well as civilians, put criminals discovered later into gaol, and swept the whole business out of the public mind as fast as possible. In short, the affair would have looked like a fight—and a fight which was over and done with—and this the native mind would have understood and not been incensed by, whereas these prolonged trials and executions were utterly incomprehensible to them, and only maddened the native public by keeping the affair alive.

7. Another mistake was the disarming of the 1,500 soldiers who had remained loyal, and many of whom had indeed rendered valuable services. It would have a bad appearance now to rearm them all at once, but he had already begun to give them back their arms by degrees.

8. As regards the arms of protected persons, General Lyautey said he had no objection but quite the contrary to their being armed, and anyone guaranteed by his consul would have his arms back on application.

9. With respect to the safety of Europeans, General Lyautey thought it was always well to have as few as possible, so the consuls might arrange with M. Gaillard for any Europeans who desired to leave to go with the ladies and certain members of the French mission who were leaving in three or four days under a strong escort for Tangier.

10. General Lyautey observed that he had just expounded all this, as regards his policy, fully to the Sultan. The latter (naturally) had feared it had come too late; nevertheless it had, General Lyautey hoped, begun to restore some equanimity to the Sultan.

11. I thanked General Lyautey very heartily for his information, and added that it was a great relief to hear that such a policy was now being adopted, and I was hopeful that the good effect of it would be speedily felt, at any rate in the town, and I added that I would not fail to report fully the views he had expressed.

Fez, noon, May 28, 1912.

12. The meeting of the consuls took place this forenoon, but only the Spanish consul, the acting German consul, and I were present. Unanimous satisfaction was expressed upon the policy General Lyautey had announced, and note was taken of the escort offered for Europeans who might desire to leave. Naturally every consul, however, was unwilling to go further than that unless his own Government directed him to the contrary.

13. I am informing British subjects of the foregoing, but I imagine that, except Dr. Verdon and his family (who were leaving in any case), none will desire to depart.

14. The meeting of our protégés took place this forenoon, and I explained General Lyautey's policy fully. They were all delighted and relieved to hear it, and said they

would instantly tell all acquaintances of it. As regards their arms they expressed many thanks for General Lyautey's offer, but unanimously decided—of their own motion—that it was preferable for them to trust to the Moorish and French authorities exclusively to protect them. Such arms, if an emergency arose, would be carried not by themselves, but by natives in their employment, and so might be misused or at any rate risk the raising of disputes.

15. The expected attack last night did not come off, but there has been some desultory cannonading of outside rebels this forenoon.

I have, &c.
J. M. MacLEOD.

P.S. *May* 28, 1912, 6·30 P.M.—In afternoon very large numbers of enemy continued to come down Zalagh and along valley of Wad-el-Malakh. Towards sunset all troops retired into town. On south-eastern side large numbers of enemy, mostly mounted, moved towards south bastion. The whole was apparently taking up positions for a night attack on a large scale.

9·15 P.M.—Hadj Mohammed-ben-el-Hsin Filali and nine men of the Kasbah Filala having been willing to assist to guard consulate, they were disposed thus :—

For consulate : Hadj Mohammed-el-Hsin. Extra : Mukuddum-al-Aissowi (ex-kaïd mia and machine-gun man who formerly served with Sergeant Balding in Ben Saïd's regiment) and four other men.

All to be under Sergeant Balding and Mr. Redman, and to do exactly as bid by them. Sergeant Balding and Mr. Redman will be in charge alternately. A rifle and ten rounds were issued to each of the above five. They were strictly ordered in no emergency to fire on anybody unless a proved enemy, but to consider themselves as of use mainly to speak with any possible invaders of this quarter.

To Dr. Verdon's house were allotted : The shereef. Extra : four men.

The five to act under Dr. Verdon's man Rhali as mukuddum. The same course as above indicated for consulate men is to be followed by them. Four rifles and eighty rounds were issued to these four men for Dr. Verdon's house.

Mr. Selous, one carbine ; Mr. Kennedy, 1 carbine.

Sergeant Balding and Mr. Redman have their own arms and ammunition.

Firing went on around Bab-al-Gisa from 7 till 9.

May 29.—To general surprise the night passed quietly, save for a certain amount of sniping by French sentries. In morning it appeared that rebels had gone away, and a column was sent out to follow them up.

The last mail received from Tangier is that of the 23rd May.

Yesterday a rumour reached us that a British and a German courier trying to enter Fez at night had been shot dead accidentally by French Senegalese sentries. On enquiries it appeared that only one courier had been shot, and he was a private one from Ulad Aissa to the French Consulate. Nevertheless, I judged it best to telegraph asking that couriers be warned to take great care in approaching the French lines at night.

To-day all the city gates remain closed except Bab Mhroko and Bab Segma.

The town is quiet and trade in foodstuffs is going on. The post is open, but it is not possible to dispatch couriers regularly.

On the 26th part of Beni Mtir, part of Beni Mguild, and part of Zayan attacked Kasbah-al-Hajeb, Beni Mtir, and there was heavy firing from early morning till about 4·30 in the afternoon.

J. M. M.

[24520] No. 276.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 8.)

(No. 64.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Tangier, June* 8, 1912.

MY telegram No. 62 of 7th June: Casa Blanca lighter shelter.

At to-day's meeting M. Porché used same arguments [?] to me, and I had little difficulty in convincing my colleagues of their futility in view of change in situation

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created by delay. Finally, following resolution was passed, with full assent of French chargé d'affaires :—

"Diplomatic body considers that adjudication of 25th June (*sic.*), amounting to 1,800,000 fr., should be transformed into larger adjudication of from 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 fr., which would comprise all the works contemplated by Public Works Department to complete first phase of Casa Blanca port works. Construction of warehouses is included in this price, but may form object of special adjudication. Delay of 120 days will be granted in the case of both adjudications. Funds will be provided by Caisse spéciale. Diplomatic body expresses hope that Public Works Department will take the necessary steps to ensure adjudication being made with the least possible delay.

"In order to protect works which already exist, or are in course of construction, department is authorised to take measures of precaution which it deems absolutely necessary, expenditure not to exceed 150,000 fr."

I hope that you will approve this solution, which is practically what we asked for. Precautionary measures are the result of proposal of mine based on suggestion of Mr. White to State engineer (see my despatch No. 129 of 1st June), to which French chargé d'affaires told me before meeting that he was prepared to agree. They are, I think, valuable, as they will obviate possibility of recriminations on the part of merchants and ship-owners.

In the course of the meeting Netherlands chargé d'affaires [? Minister] [doyen] spoke with considerable violence of the incidents of the last six months, which he said without the intervention of His Majesty's Government might have created a situation which amounted to trampling under foot the Algeciras Act and the disregard of the whole principle of commercial equality in Morocco.

If you approve doyen will write in the sense of resolution to the president of the Adjudications Committee. French chargé d'affaires and State engineer were evidently much relieved at this conclusion of matter.

[24519] No. 277.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, June 8, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 46 of 7th June.

French Ambassador saw Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning and gathered that Spanish Government have no objection to accepting French modification of their last formula. Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out, however, that such acceptance would be conditional on an extension of Ifni zone and on French concessions with regard to Spanish financial proposals. Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs demanded extension of Ifni to south as far as Wady Noun, stated that he had promised Canary Islands' deputies to obtain this concession, and would rather resign than break his word. French Ambassador replied that he had no power to grant such an extension, but would refer matter to Paris. Minister for Foreign Affairs was apparently in a state of great nervous excitement during interview, and at one moment talked of breaking off negotiations

With regard to Tangier municipality scheme, French Ambassador gathered that Spanish Government leaned towards accepting British proposals on condition that circumference of Tangier zone did not exceed 6 to 8 kilom.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[24519] No. 278.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 10, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 45 of 8th June: Warga boundary.

Spanish Ambassador tells me, with the greatest disappointment, that the French have reverted to M. Caillaux's unfavourable proposal about Ifni, and have even gone back on what was understood to be arranged about appointment of khalifa in Spanish zone. I said that I understood that Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had asked

for an extension of Ifni to Wady Noun, that French Ambassador had replied that he had no power to grant such an extension, but would refer the matter to Paris. There was nothing alarming in this.

As to khalifa, I had understood it was settled long ago that Spain was to choose the khalifa for the Spanish zone. I could not believe this question was really to be reopened; if it were, it would be the most disappointing thing I had heard for some months, which was saying a good deal, and I must wait for further information. French Ambassador will no doubt keep you informed.

[25107] No. 279.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, June 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 47 of 10th June.

French Ambassador points out that statement of Spanish Ambassador regarding appointment of khalifa is incorrect in that no definite arrangement of this point was ever arrived at.

French Ambassador saw Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, and gave him to understand that he would meet Spanish wishes both in regard to khalifa and to extension of Ifni south to Wady Noun on condition of settlement of other outstanding questions. (End of R.)

(Confidential.)

In making above offer regarding Ifni, French Ambassador is, I believe, going something beyond his instructions from Paris.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[25289] No. 280.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, June 11, 1912.*

NEGOTIATIONS are to be opened forthwith at Madrid between representatives of the Spanish Government and of the French and British Embassies for a preliminary agreement respecting the proposed municipality of Tangier. It is essential that British representative should be conversant with local conditions of Tangier, and I have accordingly selected Mr. White for this duty. Please request him to proceed to Madrid at his earliest convenience and place himself at the disposal of the Ambassador, who will receive full instructions for the purpose of the negotiation.

[24520] No. 281.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June 11, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 64 of 8th June: Casa Blanca works.

I approve resolution, and congratulate you on the way in which you have handled this troublesome business.

[20486] No. 282.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 57.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 12, 1912.

I HAVE given careful consideration to your Excellency's despatch No. 69 of the 11th ultimo, enclosing a memorandum from the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, relative to the proposed internationalisation of Tangier.

Señor Garcia Prieto raises three points :—

1. Area of the municipal district ;
2. French predominance in the municipal council ;
3. Customs arrangements at Tangier ;

and I will deal with these points in that order.

1. *Area of the Municipal District.*

I should have preferred to leave this question for decision by the diplomatic body at Tangier, since it seems to me to depend essentially on local considerations, the chief of which are :—

(*a.*) Control of the water supply.
(*b.*) A sufficient area for market produce for the town's consumption.
(*c.*) Control by the municipal police of the local tribes.

Both His Majesty's Minister and His Majesty's consul at Tangier have very strongly expressed the view that a considerably larger radius is necessary to achieve these results, a view which I entirely share, and I trust that the Spanish Government will recognise the inherent reasonableness of this suggestion. I am however prepared, out of deference to the wishes of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to agree to the question being settled in principle at Madrid, but His Majesty's Government hold very strongly to the above opinion, by which the British delegates should be guided in the discussions.

2. *French Predominance in the Municipal Council.*

I confess that I cannot share the fears of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs. According to the scheme put forward by His Majesty's Government, there are to be twelve elected members, and as Sir R. Lister observes in his despatch No. 73 of the 6th April last, the result will probably be the election of three Moors, three Frenchmen, three Spaniards, three Germans, and three Englishmen. If the Moorish members are freely elected they are hardly likely to be French in sympathy, and the French elected members will thus be in a minority. As regards the twelve nominated members, there seems no reason to anticipate that they will form a French group, or that France will be able to dominate the council through them.

3. *Customs Arrangements at Tangier.*

The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs wishes that the Tangier customs-house should be assimilated to those of Tetuan and Laraiche, thus eliminating the officials of the French "Contrôle de la Dette" ; and that the customs should be administered, in so far as they remain at all under Moorish administration, by the Moorish khalifa of the Spanish zone.

The Franco-Spanish Technical Commission now sitting at Madrid have not yet, so far as I am aware, arrived at an agreement. Their task is to reconcile the claim of Spain to eliminate the control of French officials at the ports in the Spanish zone, and the claim of France to continue such control in the interests of the French bondholders.

It is, however, a question for consideration whether the system that may be expected to be set up eventually will lend itself for adaptation to Tangier, depending as it will have to do on a guarantee by the Spanish Government to the bondholders.

His Majesty's Government are as anxious as the Spanish Government to see the eventual disappearance of the French control over the Tangier customs, but they are unable, as at present advised, to suggest any precise arrangement for giving effect to such a policy. It would probably be impracticable to substitute for the guarantee on

which the existing French loans are at present secured, so far as Tangier is concerned, the collective guarantee of all the treaty Powers which, even if it could be successfully negotiated, would necessitate the setting up of some sort of international "Caisse de la Dette." Your Excellency will see from my despatch No. 58 of to-day the line which I should be prepared to follow in the matter.

I share the views of the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the necessity of separating the Tangier municipality and its powers from the French protectorate, but for that very reason I am unable to accept his Excellency's suggestion that the customs should be placed under the Moorish khalifa in the Spanish zone. The object of His Majesty's Government is to secure for Tangier the revenues and powers which rightly belong to its special position, and it would be illogical to attempt to do this merely by transferring those rights, which are at present exercised in virtue of treaties by French control and which, as the debts are paid off, will, it is hoped, be eliminated, to the khalifa in the Spanish zone, thus merely substituting the control of Spain for that of France. As has already been pointed out to the Spanish Government, His Majesty's Government consider that the French zone, the Spanish zone, and Tangier should form three constituent parts of the Moorish Empire, interdependent certainly, but each in its own sphere representing the sovereign authority of Morocco.

In view of the early meeting at Madrid of British, French, and Spanish representatives to discuss the broad principles on which the municipality is to be based, I should be glad if your Excellency would lose no time in informing Señor Garcia Prieto confidentially of my views as set forth in this despatch.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22215] No. 283.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 58.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 12, 1912.

HIS Majesty's Government having agreed with the French and Spanish Governments that representatives of the three countries should meet at Madrid and discuss the broad principles on which the internationalisation of Tangier is to be effected, I have appointed Mr. H. E. White, C.M.G., His Majesty's consul-general at Tangier, to represent His Majesty's Government at the meetings in question under your Excellency's directions. I have instructed him to proceed to Madrid with as little delay as possible, and to place himself at your Excellency's disposal.

Mr White should study carefully the correspondence on the subject which has passed between His Majesty's Government and the French and Spanish Governments since December last, a file of which is enclosed herewith for convenience of reference.* From this correspondence, especially the memoranda communicated to the French and Spanish Ambassadors on the 2nd May, he will learn the views of His Majesty's Government respecting the constitution of the Tangier municipality. These views should form the basis of his action and language at the meetings of the commission.

The three points on which the greatest divergence may be expected to manifest itself in the discussions between the lines of policy respectively favoured by the three Governments are :—

1. The powers and composition of the municipality.
2. The area of the municipal district.
3. The manner of dealing with the Tangier Customs.

I will briefly touch upon each of these questions in the above order.

1. His Majesty's Government adhere to their proposal that the municipal council should consist of twelve nominated and twelve elected members, subject to the proviso that no nationality, including the Moorish, should be represented by more than four members in all ; and that a general power of control should be in the hands of the foreign representatives at Tangier. His Majesty's Government would, however, in the last resort, agree to all twenty-four members being elected, subject to the same proviso as regards the maximum number of councillors of any one nationality, but no indication that they are prepared to make this concession should be given without my express authority.

* File of correspondence.

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2. For reasons which have been explained in my despatch No. 57 of to-day to your Excellency, His Majesty's Government hold strongly that a radius of 15 kilom. from the present town limits is the indispensable minimum to allow of the development of the town, and the British delegates should resist any attempt to reduce the municipal district to a smaller area.

3. The question of the Tangier Customs is likely to prove a very difficult subject. After careful consideration, I am of opinion that the efforts of the British delegates should be directed to securing ultimately the direct dependence of the Customs administration on the municipality, and its complete independence from either French or Spanish control. As your Excellency is aware, a Franco-Spanish technical commission is now elaborating a scheme by which the Customs at the ports in the Spanish zone are to be freed from French control, while, at the same time, the interests of the French bondholders are adequately safeguarded. It may be that the system eventually adopted for the Spanish ports could be applied to Tangier, in which case there would be three practically independent Customs administrations in Morocco, corresponding with the three zones.

I understand that the Moorish Customs receipts are in excess of the sums required to meet the service of the loans, and the balance is handed over to the Makhzen, and as it is most important that the municipality should from the outset be provided with an adequate revenue, I consider that some reasonable proportion of the Tangier Customs receipts should be made available for municipal purposes. Failing the possibility of making a satisfactory agreement of this nature now, it would be desirable to stipulate that the earliest possible opportunity should be taken for converting the existing loans, and for then making suitable arrangements of this nature. His Majesty's Government do not suggest that when that time comes the whole of the customs receipts at Tangier should be retained by the municipality, but I would propose that a provision should be inserted in the instrument constituting the municipality to the effect that when the present lien on the Moorish revenues disappears, the municipality and the French and Spanish administrations will come to an understanding as to the proportion of customs revenue to accrue to Tangier.

The above view extends to a certain degree my remarks on this point in the memoranda of the 2nd May last, as further consideration has strengthened my conviction of the inadequacy of the revenues assigned to the municipality under the French scheme, and the real necessity for securing for it an adequate financial provision.

I do not think there are any points which require further elucidation at the present stage of the negotiations, but I would observe in conclusion that the object of the Madrid discussions is to draw up the main lines only, as set out under nine heads in my memorandum of the 14th March last, and details of the scheme should be left for settlement by the foreign representatives at Tangier. It must, too, be borne in mind that the other Powers signatory to the Algeciras Act will have eventually to be consulted and their adherence obtained before the municipality can be definitely constituted.

Your Excellency will, of course, keep both the Foreign Office and His Majesty's Legation at Tangier fully informed by telegraph of the progress of the negotiations.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22620] No. 284.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, June* 12, 1912.

HIS Majesty's Government have given their careful consideration to the memorandum which your Excellency was good enough to communicate on the 10th ultimo respecting the proposed internal line of customs control in Morocco.

His Majesty's Government, while not unwilling to concede the principle that customs duties should accrue to the administration of the zone in which the goods are actually consumed, have grave doubts as to whether the arrangement proposed would carry out this object in a manner satisfactory to the mercantile community in Morocco. The difficulties of devising a satisfactory system appear to them to be insuperable. In many cases, for instance, it will be impossible for the customs officials to know whether imported goods are intended for consumption in the zone in which they are landed or are destined for a different zone. In the case of exports, such as cattle brought from the south to Tangier, and kept there for some time to be fattened, the question will

arise as to which zone should receive the export duty. A large number of customs officials will be necessary on the inland lines, and merchants, who will have to be represented by agents at each of the customs examinations, will incur great additional expense and inconvenience, as well as loss of time. Goods landed at Tangier for Fez will have to pass through no less than three custom-houses. An extensive contraband trade will inevitably spring up, and there will be constant trouble and complaints.

His Majesty's Government therefore earnestly hope that the present proposals may be reconsidered.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[25320] No. 285.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 136.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 9, 1912.

I HAD the honour to receive your telegram No. 22 in the evening of the 7th instant. The Dutch Minister, doyen of the corps diplomatique, had asked me to let him know your decision, which must very considerably influence his attitude at the meeting to be held the following day. He was dining with me, and I told him that you saw no reason to modify your view unless arguments were brought forward more substantial than those hitherto adduced by the State engineer and the French chargé d'affaires.

On the following morning M. de Billy came round to see me very early. He said that he could not admit the right of the corps diplomatique to annul an adjudication which had been announced in accordance with the regulations. I replied that it appeared to me that such a right certainly existed; after all, if a private person wishing to build a house asked for estimates from various firms, he was perfectly at liberty, until something had been actually signed, to change his mind and modify his plans. M. de Billy said he thought the principle involved was a most dangerous one, and that we should be opening the door to all sorts of abuses and dangers; at the same time, he was most anxious to arrive at a solution, and he said he could agree to an enlarged adjudication, with a delay of 100 days, provided the Public Works Department were authorised during the winter to take all the measures and precautions necessary to protect the existing works from the sea, and to repair at once any damage done. I replied that his proposal sounded very much like a suggestion which Mr. White and I had made to M. Porché, and I thought that my Government would have no objection. M. de Billy then asked me whether I would make the double proposal at the meeting. I replied that I certainly could not, as the proposal of my Government had already been laid before our colleagues; I imagined, however, that M. Porché, in the exposé he had asked to make of the situation, was sure to refer to the importance which he attached to the immediate reparation of any damage done by the sea to the existing works during the winter, and to their strengthening by fresh blocks of masonry when necessary, and I could make a suggestion that the Public Works Department should be authorised to make some sort of arrangement by which this might be done. M. de Billy could then take up my suggestion and make his proposal. He agreed to do this, and we went to the meeting. The proceedings were opened by M. de Rappard, and an argument at once ensued as to the right of the corps diplomatique to annul an adjudication which had been announced. M. de Billy stuck to his view. I finally said that it appeared to me that the corps diplomatique absolutely maintained their right up to the last moment to approach the Commission générale des Adjudications and demand a modification of an adjudication, setting forth their reasons for doing so; if necessary, they would bring pressure to bear to obtain satisfaction. M. de Billy, who had already shown signs of weakening, said that so long as it was the Makhzen who gave the order, he considered that the principle to which he adhered was sufficiently maintained. Nobody, of course, had ever imagined that the order would be issued by anyone else than the Commission générale des Adjudications, representing the Makhzen, and the matter dropped. M. Porché was then called in, and made a long statement, embodying more or less what he had said and written to me.

I then addressed my colleagues. I said that after what we had heard from M. Porché I felt sure that we must all realise that even he could hold out little hope of any adequate protection being furnished during the winter by the works to be

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executed under the adjudication of the 25th June. I referred briefly to the various delays, changes, and confusions which had occurred since the 14th December, the date at which the first scheme, which was a fortnight later withdrawn as preposterous, was submitted to the Committee of Public Works. I further did my best to prove that M. Porché's arguments, the force of which had been so far recognised by my Government that they had in March agreed to the *marché de gré à gré* and to the truncated adjudication, had now broken down owing to the amount of time which had been lost. The works could not now possibly give the result for which they were mainly intended, and on account of which they had been agreed to. The conditions were absolutely changed, and it was for this reason that my Government were of opinion that the adjudication of the 25th June should be withdrawn, and that a larger and more serious one should be substituted for it, which should satisfy all the requirements of the regulation; at the same time, I realised the force of M. Porché's remarks as to the necessity of a constant watch being kept during the winter upon the encroachments of the sea, in order that any damage done to the existing works might at once be repaired, and I suggested that it might be possible to authorise the Public Works Department to make arrangements for the establishing of such a watch. As had been arranged, M. de Billy developed this suggestion, and proposed that a larger adjudication should be made embracing all the works connected with the lighter shelter, and that the Public Works Department should be authorised to protect the existing works and those in course of construction. The doyen observed that this, of course, meant that the adjudication of the 25th June should be annulled, whereupon, to my great surprise, M. de Billy said: "Oh, no! we would merely add forty days to the time and make a fresh adjudication for the rest." The idea was so perfectly preposterous (to my belief, a mere try-on) that I at once protested. I might, however, have spared myself the pains, as the doyen, who has felt very strongly about the whole matter, launched out on a most violent attack upon the whole conduct of the negotiations by the State engineer and the French Legation. He pointed out how the Powers had been blackmailed into agreeing to an adjudication, which, by the shortness of the time allowed, practically excluded all firms from competing who were not already established in Morocco. M. Porché, he said, had already told him that he considered it most important that the firm which secured the second lot should also be entrusted with the third and far more extensive portion; this, therefore, meant that all foreign enterprise was to be excluded by French action from any possible participation in the first public work of any importance which had been undertaken in Morocco. He was glad of the opportunity of expressing his views in the matter; and he had no hesitation in stating the opinion that, had it not been for the intervention of His Majesty's Government, a situation would have been created amounting to the trampling under foot of the Act of Algeciras and the total disregard of the principle of commercial equality which the French Government has so solemnly guaranteed.

M. de Rappard's onslaught, coming on the top of my arguments, produced the most excellent effect. The French element collapsed completely. M. Porché, in trembling tones, admitted that he entertained the view that had been ascribed to him; it was for that reason that he was now so anxious that the whole of the first phase of port works to be executed at Casa Blanca should be comprised in one adjudication; he hoped, however, that arrangements might be made for the protection of the existing works. Not a word more was heard from M. de Billy of the maintenance of the adjudication of the 25th June, and the proceedings went on swimmingly. It was at once agreed that an enlarged adjudication, with a delay of 120 days, should be arranged for with the least possible delay, and the following resolution was drawn up:—

"Le corps diplomatique est d'avis de transformer l'adjudication du 25 juin, s'élevant à 1,800,000 fr. en une adjudication plus ample de 3,000,000 à 4,000,000 de francs, qui engloberait tous les ouvrages prévus par le Service des Travaux publics pour compléter la première phase des travaux du port de Casa Blanca. La construction des magasins est comprise dans ce prix, mais pourra faire l'objet d'une adjudication spéciale. Les délais de ces deux adjudications seront de 120 jours. Les fonds seront fournis par la Caisse spéciale. Le corps diplomatique émet le vœu que le Comité des Travaux publics prenne les mesures nécessaires pour que l'adjudication puisse être passée le plus tôt possible.

"Afin de protéger les travaux existants et en cours le Service des Travaux publics est autorisé à prendre les mesures de précaution qu'il jugerait strictement nécessaires et engager les dépenses correspondantes jusqu'à concurrence de 150,000 fr.

This latter figure appeared to me unnecessarily high, but it was agreed to by my colleagues, and as we had attained our main object I withdrew my objection. The principle of adjudication has now been vindicated, absolute equality has been restored, and it is once more possible that the work may be entrusted to a first-class firm. Moreover, as a matter of fact, I think that we ought to be glad that the arrangement for precautionary measures has been made, as there is just a chance that it may save the existing works from destruction, and it will, at all events, remove the possibility of recriminations from our merchants and ship-owners.

I impressed very strongly upon M. Porché and my colleagues the necessity for proceeding at once with the drawing up and printing of the cahier des charges. M. Porché said that he had all the separate plans for the various works ready, and they only required to be pieced together. I said that I thought that the adjudication ought to be held on the 1st January, to give time for the adjudicatee to collect his material, &c., before commencing work. This would mean that the cahier des charges must be ready by the 1st September. M. Porché promised to do his best to meet our wishes in this respect.

I was very much struck by the relief evidenced by M. de Billy and M. Porché at the conclusion of the matter. They looked like men to whom a heavy sentence had just been remitted, and we all parted the best of friends and in the highest spirits!

M. de Rappard, who had no doubt thoroughly lost his temper, asked me after the meeting whether I thought he had spoken too strongly. I said "No," adding that I thought it a very good thing that the persons responsible had been made to hear a few home truths! In any case, the effect of his remarks had been excellent.

As you will observe, the funds for the work are to be supplied by the Caisse spéciale, and I asked Mr Porché to come and see me this morning, in order to ascertain what its financial position was. He tells me that at the end of the year there will remain a balance of 3,000,000 fr., owing to the fact that various sums "engaged" will not be required this year. Moreover, the receipts for the year, which were estimated at 1,600,000 fr., have amounted to over 2,000,000 fr., leaving another 500,000 fr. available. This makes 3,500,000 fr. The Caisse spéciale is furthermore authorised by the Act of Algeciras to borrow from the State Bank a sum equal to one year's revenue, which would, if necessary, give another 2,000,000 fr. M. Porché said that he fully realised the necessity of getting the works finished at Casa Blanca, but, at the same time, he did not quite like emptying the Caisse spéciale for Casa Blanca at the expense of all the other ports, and expressed the hope that an arrangement might be made by which either the 2,000,000 fr. might be taken over by the protectorate budget whenever that was drawn up, or else the Casa Blanca receipts (500,000 fr.) might for four years be devoted to works in other ports. I said that I fully shared his view, and that I felt it above all urgently necessary that something should be done for Saffi. After Casa Blanca it was the port which had by far the largest export trade. Since the creation of the Caisse spéciale nothing whatever had been done for it, although it had already paid in something like 1,000,000 pesetas. It was one of the victims of the Compagnie marocaine, and the ruins of the port works so scandalously executed by them, in complete disregard of the conditions of their contract, now only constituted an extra danger to shipping.

M. Porché said that all I said was perfectly true. He was not, however, so afraid for Saffi, as he knew, for a fact, that a large loan was to be issued very shortly for port works on the coast, and he had little doubt of being able to obtain three or four millions for Saffi. It was rather of Tangier that he was thinking, whose situation would be a special one, and whose resources, at all events at the beginning, must be very small. In any case, he begged me not to raise the question of Saffi for the moment, for the following reason: As I knew, a nautical mission of experts had been named, and were starting to visit all the ports on the 18th June. The mission consisted of some of the greatest authorities on port works, as, for instance, M. Guérard, Inspecteur général des Ponts et Chaussées, who had built the ports of Monte Video, and, for a number of years, been chief port engineer at Marseilles; M. Constol, for twenty years chief port engineer at Algiers, and now inspector of hydraulic works at the Ministry of Marine; M. Renaud, head of the Hydrographic Department of the Ministry of Marine, &c. At his request, moreover, one of the most experienced captains of the Paquet Line of steamers had been also appointed on the mission, as he considered that the opinion of a practical man who knew the ports and the requirements of shipping was most valuable. He (M. Porché) would accompany them on their visit, and at each port he would submit to them the plan of the works he proposed to carry out, which they would examine, and which would be modified in accordance with their suggestions. In this way, he hoped

that we might be certain of securing the best and most suitable works. He had a certain amount of knowledge and experience himself, but he by no means pretended to be infallible, and he was very glad of this opportunity of submitting his proposals to such a distinguished body of experts. I said I was very glad to hear what he told me, which no doubt offered an extra guarantee for the future. I did not add that in your opinion it was clearly desirable that some such control of experts should be exercised, but the fact that you held this view naturaly only increased my satisfaction at what he had told me.

I also took the opportunity of M. Porché's visit to impress upon him most strongly the necessity of avoiding in the future this horrible system of *marchés de gré à gré*, which appeared to have become a habit with him. I wished him to realise that the patience of His Majesty's Government in the matter had been well nigh exhausted, that it was with the greatest reluctance that they had agreed to the last, and only on condition that no further proposals of the sort were made to them.

M. Porché said that he regretted most sincerely that he had been obliged to have recourse to these *marchés de gré à gré*; that really he was the victim of circumstances; that the Contrôl de la Dette kept running to him at every moment, insisting upon the immediate execution of such-and-such a work, and threatening the ruin of commerce if it were not at once carried out. I said that I fully realised his difficulties, but that I considered that quite enough had been done for the present with the four works to which His Majesty's Government had agreed in the last few weeks; I could only advise him as a friend to resist any further demands for *marchés de gré à gré*, as the harm they would do, in exasperating His Majesty's Government and British opinion, would far outweigh the small advantages which they might confer upon trade.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[25322] No. 286.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 138.)

Sir, *Tangier, June* 10, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 132 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez reporting a further conversation he has had with the resident-general,* who appeared inclined to postpone giving full effect to the line of policy he proposed to adopt for fear that an immediate reversal of action taken by General Moinier might be interpreted by the natives as a sign of weakness.

In a later despatch, however, under date of the 1st instant, Mr. Consul MacLeod reports that a public letter from General Lyautey had been read the previous evening to the effect that the French Government, in reply to the answer made by the people of Fez on the subject, had withdrawn the demand made upon that city by General Moinier for a fine of 200,000 dollars. This announcement had caused great satisfaction to all classes at Fez, who doubtless saw in it a proof of the resident-general's good disposition towards them.

Mr. MacLeod further reported that General Lyautey was having letters sent to the tribes by a Kitany Shereef, exhorting them to maintain order and assuring them of the friendly nature of the resident-general's policy.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[26255] No. 287.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 60.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 17, 1912.

THE Spanish Ambassador said to-day that he feared, as an outcome of a conversation last Friday, the 14th instant, between the French Ambassador in Madrid and the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the negotiations might break down. He was quite tired of new difficulties continually being raised by the French; and he

* Not printed.

[23269] No. 287*.

Sir Edward Grey to the Marquis Imperiali.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, June* 20, 1912.

WITH reference to my note of the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to state that I have given careful consideration to the proposal of the Italian Government that joint representations should be made to the Spanish Government with a view to the inclusion of the Spanish military *presidios* in Morocco within foreign consular jurisdiction.

I observe that in the memorandum which your Excellency was good enough to communicate to me on the 8th ultimo the terms "consular protection" ("protezione") and "consular jurisdiction" ("giurisdizione") are both used. I presume, however, that by these terms the Italian Government do not intend extra-territorial jurisdiction or the right of protection as at present exercised by foreign Powers in Morocco. If this view is correct, and the Italian Government contemplate consular representation in the ordinary sense, His Majesty's Government would be ready to examine the question when an opportune moment arrived.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

gave me, not as an official document, but as a summary of his conversation, the following paper :—

With regard to the first point, he explained that the French, when proposing to retain Mount Gani, had originally promised not to fortify it, but had now made it known that even this promise must be withdrawn. With regard to the second point, the property of the Spanish religious orders could not be transferred to the Spanish Government, and if the orders could not exist in the French zone their property would lapse to France. France ought to treat this matter with the Pope in Rome, but wished Spain to arrange it for her, which was not reasonable. With regard to the appointment of the Khalifa, which I had described as being a difficulty which I thought was dead, and which was now coming back as a ghost—a *revenant*,—the Ambassador enlarged on the impossibility of giving France, through the Sultan, the right to settle the appointment.

I said that the first two points were certainly not *revenants* as far as I was concerned, for I was now making their acquaintance for the first time. With regard to the Khalifa, I said that I saw no reason why Spain should not submit two names, of which the Sultan would choose one. This would preserve the appearance of appointment by the Sultan, and would be a point of form, not of substance. If, however, the Sultan was to be free to refuse to consider both the names, and then the next two names, and in fact all the names proposed by Spain indefinitely, the point would of course become one of substance as well as of form.

The Ambassador did not seem to think that it would be impossible to propose two names, if it was understood that the Sultan would choose one of them. He said that he must leave these matters in my hands.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 287.

Note communicated by Señor de Villa Urrutia.

FRANCE pretends to fix the 35° parallel as the limit south of Laraiche, which is not only less convenient than the one fixed by the convention of 1904, but even leaves out of our zone Mount Gani, which dominates Alcazar, and the inclusion of which within the Spanish zone His Majesty's Government considers essential.

2. The pretension of France is that the French establishments actually within the Spanish zone be respected, and that in exchange our compatriots in the French zone be superseded by Frenchmen. In this case whilst schools of the Israelite Alliance would continue within our zone to extend their influence, it is denied to the Spanish religious orders the right to exercise their mission amongst our compatriots, and it is expected that their property, which belongs to the pious official foundation called "Obra Pia," will be transferred to France.

3. France insists that the Khalifa be nominated out of a list of at least two candidates and that the Sultan have the right to refuse them, whilst we pretend that the nominee be the person we propose. It is evident that every right assists us on the matter, for the Sultan is not going to exercise this or any other right by himself, and we cannot admit that France intervene in the nomination of the authority who has to rule our zone.

Spanish Embassy, London.

[26491] No. 288.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 84.) *Madrid, June* 18, 1912.

Sir,

I HAD the honour to receive on the 15th instant your despatch No. 58 of the 12th, on the subject of the proposed conferences at Madrid, concerning the establishment of an international municipality at Tangier. Mr. H. E. White, His Majesty's consul at Tangier, arrived in Madrid on Sunday morning, the 16th instant. I communicated to him at once the contents of your above-mentioned despatch, which he will regard as his instructions. After conferring with M. Geoffray, French Ambassador, I wrote to

Señor Garcia Prieto, Minister for Foreign Affairs, requesting him to receive M. Geoffray and myself on the morning of the 17th instant, "so that we may arrange for the conferences which are to be held between representatives of the Ministry of State and British and French embassies respectively, in order to settle the general principles which will regulate the international system of Tangier, the final arrangement of the details being left for ulterior discussion between the representatives of the Powers at Tangier. It is understood (I added) that the result will have to be submitted afterwards to the acceptance of the Powers."

We met as arranged, and on the production of my letter, M. Geoffray, who said that he had received no definite instructions, accepted its terms as a fair definition of the object in view, adding that M. Guiot, who was present at Madrid in connection with the Franco-Spanish financial commission, would likewise represent his Excellency in the conferences relating to Tangier. Señor Garcia Prieto announced that his representative would be Señor Padilla, recently First Secretary to the Spanish Legation in Tangier, and now serving in the Ministry of State. I said that Mr. White would be the British representative.

I may here mention that in the view of the Spanish Foreign Minister and of M. Geoffray, M. Padilla and M. Guiot will not be the representatives of the Spanish and French Governments which will continue to be represented for the purposes of the Tangier negotiation, as well as for those of the general Franco-Spanish negotiation by Señor Garcia Prieto and by M. Geoffray themselves. Señor Padilla will represent, at the Tangier conferences, the Spanish Foreign Minister, and M. Guiot the French Ambassador. Similarly, Mr. White will be here regarded as representing His Majesty's Embassy, and not as directly representing His Majesty's Government. It is understood that their conclusions will all be adopted *ad referendum*.

Señor Garcia Prieto having remarked on the importance for Spain that the question of the extent of the area of Tangier should be discussed by the three representatives at Madrid, I said that I was authorised by you to consent to this course being taken, although His Majesty's Government adhered to their view that it would be more natural to leave this question to be settled on the spot.

The three representatives held their first meeting at the Ministry of State this morning. I enclose a memorandum by Mr. White on the discussion which took place. It will be seen that Señor Padilla's language on the question of the customs was held by Mr. White and M. Guiot to be inconsistent with the accepted principle of the mutual independence of the three administrations into which Morocco is to be divided. Señor Padilla promised to consult his Government, and the next meeting will be held to-morrow.

I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosure to Sir Reginald Lister.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 288.

Memorandum by Mr. White.

Meeting of June 18, 1912.

M. Padilla representing the Spanish Secretary of State.
M. Guiot representing the French Ambassador.
Mr. White representing the British Ambassador.

M. PADILLA opened the proceedings by stating that his Government thought it would be most convenient to come to an agreement in the first place (1) as to the extent of the territory to be assigned to Tangier, and (2) in regard to the question of the custom-house.

M. Guiot observed that he was prepared to discuss at once the first of these points, if it was so desired, though he himself would have thought it more convenient to take it later; as to the second point, however, he must at once make "toute réserve sur la question générale des douanes au point de vue de l'administration et du produit," but he was willing to discuss the question as to what share of the custom receipts would be made over to the Tangier municipality. He could not admit that the question of

customs administration was open to discussion, and he had no instructions to admit of his discussing it.

Mr. White stated that he also was prepared to discuss the question of the area of the municipal district, if the Spanish Government desired that point to be settled at once, though from some points of view it would be better to discuss the question of the composition of the municipal council first. In view of M. Guiot's declarations it would be better to postpone the discussion of the customs question until M. Guiot was authorised.

M. Padilla said that in the opinion of his Government the Sultan's khalifa in the Spanish zone should be empowered to collect the customs dues, and subsequently, after payment of the amount due for the service of the debt, distribute the balance between the administrations of the Spanish and French zones and the Tangier municipality in the proportions that may be agreed upon. Tangier being within the Spanish zone, this would be the natural procedure.

Mr. White observed that M. Padilla's proposition raised a question of principle, which must be disposed of before any other points could be usefully discussed. In the view of His Majesty's Government the whole of Morocco remains a single State divided for administrative purposes into three zones—a French zone, a Spanish zone, and an international zone—the administration of each zone being entirely independent of those of the others. The international zone could not be considered to be in any way within the Spanish zone, or connected with the administration thereof any more than with that of the French zone.

M. Guiot entirely concurred in this view. His Government at first held that Tangier, forming, as it will continue to form, an integral part of Morocco, the Sultan should retain "une tutelle" over it, they had, however, consented to withdraw this claim on behalf of the Sultan, with a view to establishing a truly international status for Tangier. They would therefore never admit that this "tutelle" should be transferred to Spain through the Sultan's khalifa in the Spanish zone.

M. Padilla replied that his instructions were to insist upon the proposition he had put forward, which he considered would not constitute any "tutelle" over the municipality, and would not in any way infringe the independence of the international municipality. He held strongly that the customs dues should be collected and distributed by the khalifa of the Spanish zone.

M. Guiot declared that his Government would never accept the principle involved in this proposition, and even should they do so, he, as the representative of the bondholders, who possessed acquired rights in regard to the customs control, would be obliged to oppose the proposition.

M. Guiot and Mr. White holding that their instructions as regards this question of principle were precise, M. Padilla was requested to refer the point to his Government.

Madrid, June 18, 1912.

[26693] No. 289.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June* 24.)

(No. 142.)
Sir,
Tangier, June 15, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul at Fez respecting the steps which the resident-general is taking to meet the existing situation at Fez.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure in No. 289.

Consul MacLeod to Sir R. Lister.

(No. 60. Confidential.)
Sir,
Fez, June 6, 1912.

I HAD occasion to see General Lyautey this afternoon, and he took the opportunity to make certain observations about the situation and the steps he was taking, which I beg to communicate for your Excellency's information.

First about the Sultan. Well, he was gone! Perhaps it was just as well! He

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not only did no work whatever, but of late had been a most embarrassing—indeed. dangerous—element, for, in his excited moods, he was capable any minute of doing some rash, violent act which would have still further complicated affairs. The Sultan had now given an engagement not to abdicate, nor (I inferred) worry the French on that matter for three months. This period would be used to get him into a calmer mind, and to restore to him the desire to remain Sultan. For these ends, General Lyautey had sent with him two of his staff who spoke Arabic well, with directions to keep His Majesty amused; then strict orders had been given all along the road and at Rabat that he was to be treated with the utmost dignity and respect, and careful arrangements had been made that all appointments, decrees, &c., were to be submitted for his signature and consent.

Then about the revolted tribes hereabouts. The absence of those troops escorting the Sultan precluded anything serious being done for a few days, but thereafter it would be possible to send a column, perhaps 4,000 strong, into the insurgents' own lands to the eastward, which would deal with them in such wise as to prevent any repetition of their recent doings. In regard to certain other tribes—for instance, those between Fez and Sefrou—they had showed no hostility, and were really endangered by the acts and pressure of the tribes beyond them. They had arms but no cartridges, and therefore General Lyautey was giving them supplies of ammunition wherewith to defend themselves, and this he trusted would deepen their confidence in the French. (I should explain, perhaps, that such "friendly" tribes, being close to Fez, are open to instant punishment from Fez, still severer than anything their neighbours can threaten them with, so they have every interest, especially just now with their harvests to gather and thresh, in keeping the peace.) The lands of those "friendly" tribes were meanwhile—in the areas closest to Fez—being patrolled by cavalry, so as to clear out any groups of agitators or marauders, and make the roads safe.

Then as regards the interruption of courier services. General Lyautey was very sensible of the great importance, for the sake of commerce, and for the calming of the public mind, both here and in every place in correspondence with Fez, of an end being put at once to stoppages of couriers. For this purpose he had authorised the Bureau des Renseignements to recruit and pay a body of about 100 mounted "Emhaznia" to act as patrols, escorts, &c., on the roads by which couriers came to Fez. (I would remark, in passing, that this seems a most excellent arrangement. Such "Emhaznia" are drawn from the tribes through which the couriers pass, and can therefore do much more for couriers than could foreign soldiers, and the plan, besides, presents far fewer risks of altercations in any connection than would the employment of foreign soldiers or of "Moorish Army" soldiers.)

As regards the south. General Lyautey said his news was very good as far as concerned the Marrakesh area. Then about the Sûs. The French consul at Mogador had succeeded in getting anfloos and other big kaïds to oppose Mulai Hiba so strongly that there was little fear of that movement spreading. Meantime, General Lyautey had sent such very full accounts to Mogador and everywhere of General Gonraud's victory near here on the 1st June as would, he hoped, still further impress the southern regions. (I had the impression, however, that General Lyautey was not so confident as regards the south as about the measures taken in regard to the situation hereabouts.)

On the whole, however, the impression I got was that General Lyautey thoroughly understood the Fez situation, and his attitude and measures seemed admirably adapted to attain the restoration of order hereabouts, especially when taken in conjunction with the confidence he continues to inspire in all classes of the townspeople, and the military measures in progress east of Taza, of which news appeared in the press of the 24th–26th May. These latter cannot but have a considerable effect in preventing the gathering against Fez of unmanageably large bodies of eastern tribesmen, and, besides, should be of further value when offensive operations are renewed from Fez against those tribes.

Reviewing the whole position, it would be idle to ignore the difficulty which the Sultan's departure has superadded to General Lyautey's task. His wish is to have everything done, as much as possible, directly by the Moorish authorities, and to the consistent doing of this, the Sultan's departure obviously presents a considerable obstruction. For instance, the future settlements with the tribes just now in revolt are now almost bound to be made direct by the French authorities, thus aggravating the very evil which General Lyautey deplores of direct government by French officials.

I have, &c.

J. MACLEOD.

[26696]

No. 290.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received June 24.*)

(No. 145.)

Sir, *Tangier, June 16, 1912.*

AS I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 63 of the 7th instant, the Sultan and Court left Fez on the morning of the 6th June, together with M. Regnault. The column which escorted the party as far as Sidi Kassem, in Sherarda, was under the command of General Gouraud, and was about 1,500 strong. I transmit an extract from a despatch of Mr. MacLeod, giving a description of His Shereefian Majesty's departure from Fez, and also copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Casa Blanca, reporting upon his arrival at Rabat on the 13th instant.

I have, &c.

REGINALD LISTER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 290.

Consul MacLeod to Sir R. Lister.

(Extract.) *June 24, 1912.*

P.S.—For some days before his departure the Sultan had been living in the Bou Jelûd Gardens. Yesterday morning he gave farewell audiences to the Ulema and notables. At Bou Jelûd he was joined very early this morning by General Lyautey and General Moinier. The streets leading from the Palace were lined by Tirailleurs and by Spahi Cavalry, and outside Bab Segma were drawn up the Sultan's negro cavalry regiment of guards and the negro infantry guards, in all, perhaps, 500 to 600.

A little further out the Governor of Fez and other Moorish local authorities, with their suites and some mounted tribesmen, and perhaps 300 or 400 citizens of the upper classes, well dressed and well mounted, were in waiting. Here also were the French mission, General Gouraud, and the rear guard (principally Senegalese) of the escort column. It was from this point that I saw them all depart.

Strange sounds came from inside Bab Segma, and presently the Sultan's band, huddled together and on horseback and muleback, came out. They were followed by the negro cavalry in line, and behind them, except for his personal attendants on foot, the Sultan rode alone. He seemed considerably agitated, and stared straight ahead all the time instead of looking about as usual to see who was there.

In his rear came some Spahis and then General Lyautey and other French military officers, with their escorts, and the various Moorish functionaries of the Court.

The French mission followed, and, the rear guard of the column then moving off, the departure was complete. Except for the ridiculous appearance of the band at its head, the procession was quite dignified.

Rabat and Laraiche are to be reached in five to six days, the daily journies being of 18 to 23 miles, that is to say, about 10 miles a-day further than the Sultan usually travels.

It will be remembered that the Sultan Mulai Hafid entered Fez in the summer of 1908 surrounded by contingents of the wildest tribes of Central Morocco, and posing as the true prince of believers in contradistinction to Mulai Abdelaziz, protégé of the French. A more dramatic contrast to all this than Mulai Hafid's exit to-day presented it would be hard indeed to imagine.

J. M. M.

Enclosure 2 in No. 290.

Consul Madden to Sir R. Lister

(No. 103.)

Sir, *Casa Blanca, June 14, 1912.*

MR. VICE-CONSUL CROSS reports the arrival of the Sultan Mulai Hafid at Rabat yesterday. He made no stop, and proceeded at once to his residence. Mr. Cross informs me that the Sultan's arrival was not an imposing affair, and he had a small escort of French troops in attendance. On the road from Fez the French escort from Fez went as far as Baht, where another escort from Rabat took charge, the former one returning to Fez.

M. Leriche notified the consuls at Rabat that the Sultan would receive them at the custom-house, but this was afterwards cancelled, and no reception took place.

I learn confidentially from the French that some 500 of the disbanded Shereefian troops from Fez have been conducted under escort to the river, and there liberated to go to their homes. Only a few were of Showia origin, and of these about fifteen were found to be in possession of articles apparently derived from the pillage of Fez. These men were imprisoned.

I also learn privately from the same source that, with reference to the recent attack on French officers in Dukalla (which I reported to your Excellency in my despatches Nos. 93 and 94), the rebel Ben Shoofa had paid with his life an attempt to escape, and that the responsibility for the affair of Kaïd Treeai and the Basha of Mazagan seemed clear, and that it would be advisable to arrest these personages when a suitable opportunity arises.

The local press states that the resident-general at Fez is sending a mission to the great kaïds of the south to explain to them the sense of, and to announce to them the organisation of, the French protectorate.

I have, &c.
A. M. MADDEN.

[26697] No. 291.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 146.)

Sir,

Tangier, June 16, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 87 of the 27th April last, I have now received a reply from the British vice-consul at Marrakesh to the enquiry which I addressed to him with regard to the allegation made by Mr. Donald Mackenzie that the Shereefs of Tamslocht held slaves. Mr. Lennox writes:—

"So far as I can ascertain, this charge is false. They have declared to me that they have only seven ex-slaves between the three brothers, and I hold copies of their emancipation documents.

The shereefs explain that they can obtain abundant female labour for their households from widows and other women who desire a home and sanctuary in their houses in return for their food and clothing.

"My wife has been in their harems, and says she believes their declaration. Her visits to the harems were made prior to the receipt of your Excellency's despatch."

Once more, then, Mr. Donald Mackenzie's accusations have been proved to be absolutely false.

I should be very grateful if this information, as well as that with regard to Menebhi, against whom Mr. Mackenzie brought a similar charge, could be brought to the knowledge of Mr. Gurney.

I have, &c.
REGINALD LISTER.

[26769] No. 292.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 87.)

Sir,

Madrid, June 19, 1912.

YOUR various proposals having suggested to the Spanish Government a formula, now happily accepted by France, by which the protracted wrangle over the valley of the Warga has been brought for the present to a conclusion, the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs has been engaged during the last few days in discussing with the French Ambassador some of the points still at issue between the two Governments.

One of these may be regarded as settled. I am informed by both parties that it is now agreed between them that the Ifni enclave shall extend from Wady Sedra, in the north, to Wady Noun, in the south, with a depth of 25 kilom. from the coast. The following two territorial questions remain to be adjusted:—

1. The frontier line between the two zones from the Muluya to Mount Beni Hassan. According to the 1904 convention the line was to follow, from the heights

lying on the left bank of the Wady Defla at its confluence with the Muluya, the watershed between the Muluya and Wady Inauen on the one hand and Wady Kert on the other. In the map attached to the convention the line so drawn extends to Mount Beni Hassan, and proceeds thence westwards along the watershed between the Warga on the one hand and the Wadies Inauen and Sebu on the other. Señor Garcia Prieto informs me that, instead of the above treaty line between the Muluya and Mount Beni Hassan, France now demands that the frontier shall be formed by a straight line from Mechra S. Hammou-el-Arausi (a point some distance to the north of the confluence between the Defla and the Muluya) to Mount Beni Hassan. A considerable piece of partly level and possibly fertile territory would thus be withdrawn from the Spanish zone, the latter being left with the barren mountainous region lying to the north of the proposed new line. The Foreign Minister resents this new demand, which he regards as unjustified by any strategic necessity, and as showing on the part of France the same ungenerous spirit as has characterised, in his view, her attitude throughout the negotiation

M. Geoffray, on the other hand, considers that the line demanded by France is a fair interpretation, in the light of more recent geographical knowledge, of the conventional line of 1904.

2. The frontier in the region of the Lucus. The line claimed by Spain, and marked on the map attached to the convention of 1904, runs from a point on the River Lucus, near the place called Sebbab, directly to the sea along the same parallel of latitude. North of this line the French have occupied since last summer, in face of Spanish protests, two military posts. They argue that it is impossible to abandon those posts, and that Spain must accept a frontier line passing to the north of them. The 35th parallel of north latitude is therefore demanded by France as the frontier between the two zones. The Spanish military authorities have pointed out that by accepting this line Spain would surrender to the French zone an important hill overlooking Alcazar. It would be in the power of France at any moment to mount guns there, and thus render untenable the Spanish position at Alcazar. Spain sees no reason why she should shift the conventional line to bestow this military advantage on France. As regards the two French military posts, she would consent to deflect the conventional line so as to leave them in the French zone, but she does not consider that there is any obligation for her to shift the whole line northwards to the 35th parallel.

Apart from these territorial questions, two points have become the subject of a somewhat acrid discussion between M. Geoffray and Señor Garcia Prieto. The first of these arises out of the religious protectorate claimed by Spain over the whole of Morocco, in virtue of ancient agreements with the Holy See and the Makhzen. I understand that the validity of this claim in the past is not disputed. In point of fact, the offices of the Roman Catholic Church have long been administered in Morocco exclusively by Spanish Franciscan monks. France is content apparently to leave matters as they stand in this respect in the Spanish zone. In the French zone, on the other hand, she desires to replace the existing establishments of Spanish Franciscans by French Franciscans. She seeks to obtain from the Spanish Government an undertaking that if the general of the Franciscans residing in Rome should see his way to appointing French Franciscans to exercise religious functions in the French zone no opposition will be raised by Spain.

Señor Garcia Prieto has explained to me that this is an exceedingly delicate question for Spain, and one that, if not handled with the greatest care, is calculated to raise a storm in Carlist and other powerful religious organisations in this country. The Spanish Franciscan establishments at Rabat, Casa Blanca, &c., were founded by contributions emanating from different quarters. The Vatican, the Obra Pia (a fund affected to religious purposes), the Spanish State, and individual munificence may all claim to have had a share in setting them on foot. The property of these establishments therefore is not vested in any particular State or society. If the French should seek to buy them out, it would be difficult to determine to whom the purchase-money should go.

In these circumstances the Spanish Government are very anxious to leave their religious establishment in Morocco as it stands. While ready to agree to the French proposal that no opposition should be offered in Spain to the nomination of French Franciscans in the French zone, they intend to obtain if they can from the General of the Franciscans an engagement that, whatever he may do to meet French wishes in that respect, he will not allow the numbers of the Spanish monks now living in the French zone to be reduced. The religious necessities of the Spanish populations of the coast

towns in the French zone could not, in the opinion of the Spanish Government, be ministered to by a smaller establishment of Spanish monks than the present one. Side by side with the Spanish monks there will be no objection to French monks being appointed to the extent that the General of the Order may think expedient.

M. Geoffray, on the other hand, is anxious, if I rightly understand him, to secure for his Government the right to supplant gradually the Spanish monks as they die off by French monks, so that in the end the French zone would contain no Franciscan monks of any other nationality than the French.

The second non-territorial point alluded to above is the question of the manner in which the khalifa for the Spanish zone is to be appointed. In view of the absolute subservience of the Sultan to the French Government, Spain is now unwilling to accept the arrangement proposed by France that the Sultan should select the khalifa from a list of three persons submitted by the Spanish Government. Señor Garcia Prieto considers that this course would result in a khalifa being named who would have previously promised obedience to the wishes of France in exchange for the favour of French support in obtaining the appointment. On the other hand, if Spain submits, as she now desires to do, not a list but a single candidate, there can be no question of his owing his nomination to French support. The Sultan would be compelled to accept the Spanish candidate unless he could offer some valid reason for not doing so.

M. Geoffray declares that France will only accept an arrangement based on nomination by the Sultan from a list of several candidates.

I need only allude at present to the financial questions still under discussion by the Mixed Financial Commission. Of these I understand that several are settled, while no agreement has yet been reached with regard to the most difficult of all, namely, that of the Customs arrangements.

The French Ambassador appeared to me to-day, when he was kind enough to call on me, to be in an excited and nervous frame of mind, not calculated to facilitate a friendly and business-like discussion of the questions at issue. He had expected that the settlement of the Warga question would lead to a rapid agreement on all the other points. This proves to be by no means the case. The Spanish view of the questions enumerated above differs in some points widely from that of the French Government. Some irritation exists on both sides, and I notice that the French press is again reverting to very bitter comments on the "uncompromising" attitude of Spain. I told M. Geoffray this morning that, as regards some at least of the points at issue, I regarded the accusation as not entirely well founded, and I expressed the hope that his Excellency would endeavour to come to an agreement on the various open questions seriatim, and that he would not lose patience if Señor Garcia Prieto did not see his way to accepting offhand the entire list of French demands. The settlement of the Ifni question was of good augury for the future, and I said that I thought the remaining points of dispute were not at all of a kind excluding an eventual settlement by means of a little give and take on both sides.

A further meeting is to be held between his Excellency and Señor Garcia Prieto this afternoon. As usual, I have received an invitation from the Spanish Government to be present. I asked M. Geoffray if he thought that I could be of any use to him by attending the meeting. He begged me to do exactly as I chose. In these circumstances I thought that it would be wiser to keep away. As I have mentioned in a previous despatch, M. Geoffray, while continuing to keep me informed almost daily of what he is doing, has ceased for some time to give me notice of his intended interviews with Señor Garcia Prieto or to send me copies of his communications to the Foreign Minister. I am left under the impression that he does not now care for my active participation in the discussion. Our relations continue most intimate and friendly.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[26770] No. 293.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 88.)
Sir,

Madrid, June 20, 1912.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 87 of yesterday, I have the honour to report that I had a conversation this morning with M. Geoffray, the French Ambassador, on

the subject of the present state of his negotiation with the Spanish Government. His Excellency had seen Señor Garcia Prieto yesterday, and had begged the latter to put in writing the demands of Spain on the various points still unsettled. M. Geoffray's account of these questions agrees generally with the outline given in my above-mentioned despatch. As regards the outstanding differences relating to the frontier between the two zones at their eastern and western extremities, the French Ambassador does not deny that the Spanish Government have a fair case to put forward and that it is unreasonable to describe their demands, as is so often done in the French press, as uncompromising. At the Muluya end of the frontier line he thinks that the French tracing of the line ought in the end to prevail. But, as the tracing is made on the latest sketch map supplied by the French military authorities, whereas the Spanish Government have only the incomplete maps hitherto available, it is natural that the Spanish and French lines should not exactly coincide. For some reason the French map has not been shown to Señor Garcia Prieto. It seems to establish, if accurate, the fact that Wady Defla is a watercourse which cannot be identified, and that, in order to carry out the intentions of the 1904 convention, it would be necessary to follow a ridge of mountains lying farther to the north than those marked on the Spanish map. I remarked to M. Geoffray that if the French Government were really desirous of applying the 1904 line, it would be easy to obtain the concurrence of Spain with a proposal to leave the actual tracing of the line to a frontier commission. His Excellency concurred, but said that it was difficult for him to suggest further concessions to be made by France, as he is already credited by his Government with having shown in these negotiations an excess of impartiality.

Similarly M. Geoffray thinks that there is a good deal to be said for the Spanish objection to the cession of a height commanding the town of Al Kasar.

On the other hand, he is opposed to any further French concession regarding the manner of the appointment of the Khalifa for the Spanish zone, which should be made by the Sultan from a list presented by Spain, and not by the mere acceptance of a single Spanish nominee.

On the question of the Franciscan establishments he anticipates that Spain will come to an agreement.

Taking these outstanding questions as a whole, it does not appear to me that the divergence of view is on any point of a nature to preclude further discussion. The French Ambassador agrees, but fears that his Government is in no mood for a continuance of the negotiations, except on the terms of immediate compliance by Spain with the principal French demands. M. Geoffray informs me that M. Guiot is entirely opposed to rupture on the ground of the existing differences. M. Geoffray fears that there will be a rupture, and he showed me a telegram which he sent yesterday evening to M. Poincaré begging that, in the event of the Spanish demands, which are to be put in writing, being rejected, the French Government would not proclaim a formal break with Spain, but would merely announce that the negotiation will be suspended for a time.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

[26927] No. 294.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 63.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1912.

THE Spanish Ambassador called at the Foreign Office on the 20th instant and said that he hoped the negotiations with France respecting Morocco were nearing a conclusion. The Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs had told the French Ambassador in Madrid that he was anxious to conclude them without further delay, and he had proposed:—

1. To concede to France the limits she desired near Laraiche on condition that France would agree to the inclusion in the Spanish zone of the mountain dominating Alcazar.
2. To meet the French wishes in respect to the religious orders in the French zone.
3. To maintain the Spanish view that Spain should submit only one name to the Sultan for the post of khalifa in the Spanish zone.

Señor de Villa Urrutia added that he trusted these proposals would meet with acceptance from the French Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[27114] No. 295.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 91.)

Sir, *Madrid, June 23, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 84 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a memorandum by Mr. H. E. White, giving an account of what has happened at the daily meetings held since the 18th instant between himself and the French and Spanish representatives on the mixed commission which is discussing the question of the internationalisation of Tangier.

I am sending a copy to Sir Reginald Lister.

I have, &c.
MAURICE DE BUNSEN.

Enclosure in No. 295.

Memorandum by Mr. White.

THE second meeting of the commission was held on the 19th instant. Señor Padilla stated that he had consulted his Government in regard to the question raised at the meeting held on the previous day, namely that of the independence of the international zone in regard to the Sultan's khalifa in the Spanish zone. The Spanish Government, however, maintained their position for the following reasons :—

1. The independence of the international zone as regards the Spanish zone would give rise to serious difficulties of an economic nature.
2. The Tangier zone is an enclave in the Spanish zone.
3. Tangier is situated on the coast opposite Spain, with which country it is in constant commercial communication.

A prolonged discussion ensued which, however, led to no result and Señor Padilla was requested to refer the point again to his Government.

On opening the meeting on the following day, Señor Padilla made the following declaration :—

" Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté n'a jamais mis en question la question de l'indépendance de Tanger, aussi bien vis-à-vis de la zone espagnole que de la zone française. Les observations du Gouvernement Royal en ce qui concerne la douane se basaient sur la thèse en vertu de laquelle on pourrait très bien concilier cette indépendance avec le fonctionnement d'un service douanier dans lequel l'administration du khalifa aurait, pour les raisons exposées hier par Señor Padilla, un rôle à remplir. En présence, toutefois, de l'avis contraire exprimé par ses collègues, Señor Padilla est prêt à admettre que le principe de l'indépendance de la municipalité, aussi bien vis-à-vis du Sultan que du khalifa, soit étendu au fonctionnement de la douane de Tanger comme à toutes autres matières."

M. Guiot objected to any reference being made to the customs question and, as Señor Padilla insisted in his declaration, standing on the *procès-verbal* as he had read it, he made " toutes réserves en ce qui concerne la mise en cause de la douane de Tanger . . . . il retient purement et simplement de la déclaration de Señor Padilla la reconnaissance du principe général de l'indépendance absolue de la municipalité."

M. Guiot has, at all the meetings, shown himself very sensitive to any reference to customs administration. At a previous meeting, on a reference being made to the

matter, he interposed that he could not accept that the question of the administration or control of the customs should be discussed. I then expressed the hope that the question of an understanding between the municipality and the Customs Administration would not be considered as excluded and that M. Guiot would be ready to hear any propositions that might be put forward and take them into consideration. He would not thereby in any way compromise the acquired rights of the Contrôle de la Dette.

I have had several private conversations with M. Guiot on this subject, and on that of the proposed internal lines of customs control referred to in Sir E. Grey's letter to M. Cambon of the 12th instant, and I regret to say that I have found him very firm on both these points. He is strongly opposed to any transference of the adminstration or control of the custom-house—at all events for the present—arguing that the public could but lose thereby, as the present administration is in proper working order and is able to satisfactorily discharge its duty, whereas to charge the new municipality with a duty of this nature would be to invite disaster. There is some force in this argument, and it would probably be more advantageous to introduce the change later and gradually.

With regard to the question of internal lines of customs control, I have found M. Guiot equally firm. The principle that customs duties should accrue to the administration of the zone in which the goods are actually consumed is admitted in the above-mentioned letter of Sir E. Grey and has also been accepted by the Spanish Government, and M. Guiot is not at all disposed to waive it. He tells me that the Contrôle de la Dette would in any case establish these lines of control, with a view to checking contraband in arms and ammunition, and he has no confidence in the Spanish authorities in such matters, and is confident that a large contraband trade will be carried on in the Spanish zone. The Spanish Government, after having practically accepted the proposal, have now drawn back, in the hope that we shall oppose the application of the system to the Tangier zone; this further strengthens M. Guiot's determination to insist on the point. I propose to further discuss the matter with him in a private manner, but I have little hope of success.

The question of the extent of the area to be assigned to the Tangier zone was discussed at the meetings held yesterday and to-day, and I have also very fully discussed it privately with Señor Padilla and Señor Hontoria, the Under-Secretary of State. At the public meetings Señor Padilla has maintained that a district with an average radius of 6 kilom. would be sufficient for the needs of the town. I proposed the district described in my despatch No. 46 of the 6th March last. M. Guiot expressed general approval of this proposal, but is, as he tells me privately, referring the matter to his Government for instructions. From my conversation with Señor Hontoria and with Señor Padilla I gather that the Spanish Government are prepared to accept my proposal if: (1) the eastern boundary were made to start at Punta Allares, on the straits, and thence run southwards to join the Anjera boundary north of Yebel Beni Meyimel; (2) Azib Uad-Rasi were assigned to the Spanish zone by adopting as the boundary the dotted line shown on the Spanish Staff map as starting from Yebel Zinatz, encircling Azib Uad-Rasi, and then following Uad-el-Taifin; (3) more of the Atlantic coast were assigned to Spain by starting the western boundary north of the name " Areara " on the map, and making it circle the southern shore of Marxa Xeriuar and join the Mharhar higher up its course.

I informed Señor Padilla that, with a view to meeting the wishes of the Spanish Government, I was prepared to recommend the acceptance of an eastern boundary leaving as much as possible of the Anjera to Spain. I considered it, however, essential for the security of the Tangier district that the international police should be able to follow up to their villages cattle robbers, who largely came from the frontier Anjera districts. I much preferred, for every reason, the natural bonndary formed by the Uad Lian, but the limits might perhaps be withdrawn to a line from Ras Kankux to Uad-el-Garifa, which would have to be laid down by a commission on the spot. With regard to the enclave up to Azib Uad-Rasi, I could not recommend its acceptance. As to the strip of coast, it appeared to be infinitely preferable to adhere to the natural frontier formed by a large river; the Tangier water supply is to come from Xeriuar, and it would be better not to bring the frontier so close to it. The reasons at first assigned for Spain's great desire for this modification was that the railway was to pass at that point, and Spain was desirous of having as many kilometres of the railway line in her zone as possible, as the proportion of Spanish participation would be increased thereby. I asked to see the map showing the proposed line, and also the terms of the arrangement with France regarding the railway, and said that if the point were really

important for Spain I would be prepared to meet their wishes as far as possible. These documents have not, however, been produced, and the ground has been shifted, Señor Padilla informing me this afternoon that it is fear of public opinion that makes Señor Garcia Prieto anxious to obtain as much coast-line as possible for Spain.

The whole question of the area remains open for the present and is under consideration by the Spanish Government, who, I trust, will eventually accept the limits which I have suggested with the above-mentioned modification as regards the Anjera.

In the meantime we have commenced the discussion of the question of the composition of the municipality, the electorate, &c., meetings being held every day.

HERBERT WHITE.

Madrid, June 22, 1912.

[27240] No. 296.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.)

Madrid, June 26, 1912.

MY telegram No. 51 of 23rd June: Tangier negotiations.

Agreement has been arrived at on the lines of Sir E. Crowe's memorandum of 14th March as regards headings 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, except that (1) Spanish Government desire that limit of municipal councillors of one nationality be raised to five; and (2) rent qualification for franchise be very low. On the first point we cannot give way. If no agreement can be arrived at on second point it should be left to the representatives at Tangier.

Mr. White has reserved question of limitation of powers of the municipality in regard to land regulations. In the Franco-Spanish agreement there is no provision for limiting the powers of Spain in this respect in the Spanish zone. There will therefore probably be no uniformity in the French and Spanish zones. Each would want to apply their regulations to Tangier, and agreement might be difficult. It would therefore be better that the municipality should have the same liberty in this respect in the international zone as Spain has in her zone. Do you agree?

(Repeated to Tangier.)

[27641] No. 297.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, June 27, 1912.

DANS son économie essentielle, le projet se borne à l'établissement d'une simple ligne de contrôle à laquelle serait reportée la perception des droits d'importation sur les marchandises d'origine étrangère débarquées dans une zone et destinées à l'autre zone. Ces marchandises seraient expédiées en transit sur la zone de destination, soit dès leur débarquement, soit après séjour en entrepôt.

Les envois qui auraient acquitté les droits au port de débarquement seraient affranchis de toute nouvelle perception, à leur arrivée dans la zone de destination, sous la condition qu'ils soient accompagnés de la quittance régulière des droits, authentifiée par l'autorité consulaire du pays duquel ressortit la zone de destination. Cette dernière obligation ne serait d'ailleurs imposée dans la pratique que pour les opérations ayant un caractère commercial; les petites quantities, expédiées à titre d'échantillon ou de provision, passeraient librement sans autre formalité qu'un examen sommaire.

Quant aux produits d'origine marocaine, ils continueraient à circuler en franchise entre les deux zones, sous cette seule réserve que ceux de ces produits qui seraient déclarés, à la sortie de la zone d'origine, comme destinés à l'exportation par les ports de l'autre zone acquitteraient le droit d'exportation à la ligne de contrôle. Dans ces cas, ils n'auraient pas, bien entendu, à acquitter de nouveau la taxe au port d'embarquement dès lors qu'ils seraient accompagnés de la quittance des droits primitivement payés.

Par ce rapide exposé il est facile de se rendre compte de la différence capitale qui existe entre le système proposé et la ligne douanière proprement dite.

La ligne de douane diviserait le Maroc en deux territoires étrangers l'un à l'autre et dont toutes les opérations, d'une zone à l'autre, seraient réputées constituer, en principe, des importations ou des exportations passibles de droits. Le projet auquel

s'est arrêtée la délégation française maintient, au contraire, l'unité économique du pays, puisqu'il est basé sur le principe général de la franchise réciproque des échanges entre zones, et qu'il ne prévoit l'acquittement des droits que dans deux cas déterminés, au gré des intéressés, soit pour les marchandises d'importation lorsque ceux-ci useront de la faculté de transit, soit pour les marchandises marocaines lorsqu'ils les déclareront en vue de l'exportation dès leur passage à la frontière.

Ce contrôle, ou la surveillance qu'il établit à la frontière des deux zones, est, dans ces conditions, une opération non susceptible d'entraver les transactions commerciales, tandis que les vérifications et investigations qui seraient la conséquence de la ligne douanière porteraient sur toutes les entrées et sorties dans chaque zone et rendraient très difficiles, sinon impossibles, les relations d'une zone à l'autre.

Il ne semble donc pas que le commerce puisse formuler des griefs fondés à l'encontre du nouveau projet; grâce à la faculté de transit, qui maintiendra dans l'espèce la liaison entre les deux zones, il ne sera pas exposé à payer deux fois les droits d'importation. Dans le cas où il aurait acquitté ces droits au port de débarquement, il lui suffirait de justifier de cet acquittement par la production d'une quittance régulière. C'est là une formalité peu gênante et d'application usuelle dans tous les pays pour la circulation des marchandises dans le rayon de surveillance établi le long de la frontière.

Aucune difficulté n'est à prévoir pour les marchandises marocaines allant d'une zone à l'autre. Dans la pratique elles ne seront pas déclarées comme destinées à l'exportation lors de leur passage à la ligne de contrôle, et ne seront par suite l'objet que d'une simple identification qui, actuellement et étant donnés leurs caractères d'origine bien marqués, ne peut donner lieu à contestation.

Le projet porte que des règlements particuliers, qui ne peuvent d'ailleurs être élaborés qu'après étude sur place, détermineront les détails d'application du nouveau système, qui ne serait prévu, tout d'abord, que pour une période limitée—deux ou trois ans, par exemple—afin que les modifications suggérées par l'expérience puissent y être appliquées.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 *juin*, 1912.

[27545] No. 298.

Sir R. Lister to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 66).
(Telegraphic.)

Tangier, June 28, 1912.

MY telegram No. 65 of 17th June.

British vice-consul in Morocco city reports that, owing to presence of M'toogi's son with large armed force, proclamation of appointment of the Glawi brothers to governorships of city and district would give rise to serious disturbance. He and his German and Austrian colleagues are in favour of postponement, and have written in that sense to French consul. Latter advocates going through with appointments. At the same time French chargé d'affaires tells me that French consul at Mogador considers it most important that nothing should be done to drive M'toogi into the arms of pretender.

I have instructed His Majesty's consul at Fez to talk matter over with resident-general, and to say that of course he must have far fuller information than I, and must be better able to judge best course to pursue. I have also told him to make it quite clear that Mr. Lennox was not in any way opposing appointments of the Glawi brothers. His attitude was merely prompted by local conditions of the moment.

Mr. Lennox is no doubt very unwell, and I think that it would be far better for Mr. Broome to replace him as soon as possible, all the more so as if, as I hope, resident-general sticks to appointment of Hadj Thami. His position with the latter at present would be rather difficult.

I hope that Treasury may be prevailed upon to agree (see consul-general's telegram of 19th June).

Please telegraph.

[27543] No. 299.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, June 28, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 53 of 26th June : Tangier.

At yesterday's meeting French delegate withdrew his acceptance of formula defining the powers of the municipality, and awaits further instructions. Spanish and French delegates also considered that question of composition of municipality should be left open for the present.

Divergence of views existing as to the mode of setting up municipality (point 1 of Sir E. Crowe's memorandum of 14th March), and matter being more political than technical, delegates decided to leave that point to their Governments to discuss unless instructed to the contrary.

French delegate strongly supports view of French Ambassador that arrangements regarding Tangier do not require subsequently to be made the subject of a treaty between the Sultan on the one hand and the several treaty Powers on the other hand.

On this point Spanish Government are also in disagreement with views expressed in paragraph 2, article 1, of memorandum communicated to French Ambassador on 2nd May. They think that no treaty with the Sultan is necessary, but would probably be glad to accept our view.

Spanish Government desire to reserve power of control to the foreign representa tives exclusive of Sultan's representative, on the ground that French representative represents the Sultan, and that France would thus have two votes and possibly a casting vote also. French delegate protests strongly against exclusion of representative of the country in which Tangier is situated, and to which most of the inhabitants belong. Mr. White requests instructions on this point.

(Repeated to Tangier.)

[27544] No. 300.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Madrid, June 28, 1912.*

FRANCO-SPANISH negotiation.

Discussion on points mentioned in my despatch No. 90 is proceeding more smoothly. Minister for Foreign Affairs hopes soon to be in a position to sign convention, provided an agreement can previously be reached regarding area and customs régime at Tangier. Spain will not accept for her zone a customs régime less favourable than that of Tangier. Chief outstanding difficulty in negotiation with France is with regard to inclusion of Mount Gani, near Alcazar, in Spanish zone. King of Spain makes a special point of this. French Ambassador is anxious to yield on the point, but it seems that French military authorities refuse their consent. Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed hope to me this morning that you might possibly put in a word to assist Spain in securing this concession.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[27962] No. 301.

Memorandum communicated by M. Cambon, June 28, 1912.

D'APRÈS les déclarations faites à M. Geoffray par Mr. White, le Gouvernement britannique désirerait faire adopter la procédure suivante pour l'établissement du statut de Tanger :—

(1.) La Commission franco-anglo-espagnole de Madrid poserait les principes généraux du statut.

(2.) Sur la base de ces principes, le corps diplomatique et le représentant du Sultan à Tanger élaboreraient la charte municipale de Tanger.

(3.) En conformité de cette charte, la municipalité de Tanger établirait son règlement intérieur, qui serait revisable.

2. De prime abord, il est évident que cette procédure exigerait un temps très long et pourrait soulever des difficultés peut-être insurmontables. Les échanges de vues préliminaires entre les Cabinets de Paris, de Londres et de Madrid avant la réunion de la Commission mixte de Madrid ont exigé six mois ; et telle petite Puissance, représentée diplomatiquement au Maroc, mais ne possédant à Tanger ni ressortissants ni intérêts, pourrait retarder à son gré la solution d'une question aussi importante que le statut de cette ville. Que, si cette Puissance voulait motiver son obstruction, les motifs ne lui manqueraient pas : " Pourquoi ne l'aurait-on pas consultée pour déterminer les principes généraux dont on l'invite à s'inspirer pour rédiger la charte municipale de Tanger ? Quelle distinction établit-on entre la charte municipale de Tanger et le règlement intérieur revisable ? " Il serait facile d'épiloguer pendant bien des années sur de pareilles questions.

3. Ces objections sont sérieuses et l'Ambassadeur de France les signale à l'attention du Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères. Mais c'est une raison plus grave—la situation acquise au Maroc par la France en vertu de la Convention franco-allemande du 4 novembre, 1911—qui empêche formellement le Gouvernement de la république de se rallier à la procédure proposée par Mr. White.

4. L'article 1er de la convention du 4 novembre, 1911, stipule que " le Gouvernement Impérial allemand déclare . . . . qu'il n'entravera pas l'action de la France en vue de prêter son assistance au Gouvernement marocain pour l'introduction de toutes les réformes administratives, judiciaires, économiques, financières et militaires dont il a besoin pour le bon gouvernement de l'Empire. . . . En conséquence, il [le Gouvernement allemand] donne son adhésion aux mesures de réorganisation, de contrôle et de garantie financière que, après accord avec le Gouvernement marocain, le Gouvernement français croira devoir prendre à cet effet. . . ."

5. Le statut de Tanger est, au regard de l'Allemagne et de toutes les Puissances qui ont adhéré à la convention du 4 novembre, 1911, sans les réserves formulées par la Grande-Bretagne ou les droits dérivant de traités antérieurs comme pour l'Espagne, une des réformes, une des mesures de réorganisation visées par l'article 1er précité. Il n'y a donc pas lieu pour la France de soumettre le statut de Tanger, dans quelque mesure que ce soit, à une nouvelle discussion des Puissances adhérentes à l'accord de 1911.

6. L'Ambassadeur de France attire l'attention du Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires Étrangères sur l'importance de ce point de vue ; le Gouvernement de la république ne saurait, peu de mois après la conclusion de la Convention franco-allemande, laisser mettre en doute le sens de son principal article.

7. Le Gouvernement de la république a pris, en ce qui concerne le statut de Tanger, des engagements envers le Gouvernement britannique et le Gouvernement espagnol ; il exécute fidèlement ses engagements. Mais il n'a pris aucun engagement au même sujet envers les autres Puissances, qui ne peuvent en somme prétendre à un régime de faveur qu'à cause de ce fait pratique qu'on ne peut en limiter le bénéfice aux seuls intérêts anglais et espagnols.

8. Dès lors, lorsque l'accord se sera fait entre les Cabinets de Paris, de Londres et de Madrid, il appartiendra au Gouvernement marocain d'instituer le statut de Tanger et au Gouvernement de la république d'être l'intermédiaire du Sultan pour le notifier aux Puissances.

9. L'intervention du corps diplomatique de Tanger n'apporterait à la Grande-Bretagne aucune garantie nouvelle, tandis que cette intervention serait pour la France un précédent des plus graves.

10. Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement de la république se plaît à espérer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi n'insistera pas pour maintenir une procédure inutile à assurer la durée et le bon fonctionnement du régime de Tanger et contre laquelle la France élève d'aussi fortes objections.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 28 juin, 1912.

[27961] No. 302.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, June 28, 1912.

EN discutant avec M. P. Cambon l'établissement d'une ligne de contrôle douanier entre les zones françaises et espagnoles au Maroc, Sir Arthur Nicolson n'avait indiqué qu'une seule objection : il craignait que l'admission en transit des marchandises

débarquées à Tanger, par exemple, et destinées à la zone française, ne favorisât la contrebande; et il manifestait le désir que les droits de douane fussent toujours payés au port de débarquement.

Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, prévenu de cette objection, fait observer que le transit doit fonctionner de la manière suivante:—

Lorsqu'une marchandise est déclarée en transit au port de débarquement, les droits qu'elle doit acquitter sont cautionnés auprès de la douane locale par l'expéditeur et par une caution agréée par la douane.

Si, dans le délai fixé par l'acquit de transit, la marchandise n'est pas transportée à la destination déclarée, la douane du port de débarquement poursuit le recouvrement des droits et applique l'amende fixée, le montant de ces droits et de l'amende ayant été en même temps garanti par la caution.

Il n'y a donc aucune crainte à concevoir au sujet des fraudes résultant du transit.

Il convient, d'ailleurs, de remarquer que le commerce britannique est parfaitement familiarisé avec la pratique du transit et qu'il n'admettrait pas plus que les commerces des autres pays qu'on le privât des facilités inhérentes à ce régime.

M. Paul Cambon espère que ces explications satisferont pleinement Sir Arthur Nicolson et que le Gouvernement britannique donnera son assentiment à l'établissement de la ligne de contrôle entre les zones françaises et espagnoles du Maroc.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 29 [?] *juin*, 1912.

[27240] No. 303.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, June* 28, 1912.

YOUR telegram No. 63 of 26th June: Tangier municipality.

I agree generally.

We cannot give way as regards number of councillors of same nationality, nor, I think, agree to a low franchise, but a further effort should be made to reach agreement respecting rent qualification. As regards land regulations I agree that municipality should have same liberty as Spain.

(Repeated to Tangier, No. 27.)

[27657] No. 304.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) *Madrid, June* 30, 1912.

FRANCO-SPANISH financial commission has now reported unanimously in favour of establishment of so-called line of customs control along frontier dividing French and Spanish zones. Object is to secure eventual recovery by each zone of the [group omitted: ? duties on] foreign merchandise which it imports, as well as on its exports, irrespective of zone to which port of import or export belongs. This system is no doubt open to objections pointed out in Sir R. Lister's despatch No. 117 of 21st March and in your note to the French Ambassador of 12th June. Have you any instructions to send me on this point? French Government will no doubt support conclusions of mixed commission. These will also be supported, although unwillingly, by the Spanish Government, but only on the understanding that Tangier does not obtain better terms as regards customs. It is most regrettable that Tangier should have to repay to the French and Spanish zones any meagre customs receipts which may remain after satisfying the service of loans. As, however, we have accepted principle involved (see your above-mentioned note to French Ambassador), it will be very difficult to secure any other arrangement for Tangier.

As regards line of customs control, M. Guiot states that these will be established in any case to [?] guard against smuggling, so that this inconvenience seems inevitable.

Mr. White therefore proposes, unless otherwise instructed, to proceed on the principle that Tangier must adopt system laid down by mixed commission. Otherwise Spain will claim any advantages secured to Tangier, and the work of mixed commission will have to be done all over again.

Mr. White will of course also demand concession secured by Spain for her zone that the Tangier municipality shall be at liberty when it sees fit to dispense with French control of customs on payment of loan annuities under the same conditions as arranged for Spanish zone. In other words, French control will be in abeyance so long as Tangier punctually pays the annuities. It might not suit Tangier to do so at first, in which case the French control would be provisionally maintained. Report of the mixed commission will follow by post.

(Repeated to Tangier.)

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